Skip to main content

Full text of "The sea and Japan's strategic interests, 1975-1985."

See other formats


VOX  LIBRARY 
^GRADUATE  SCHOOL' 
CALIFORNIA  03940 


•*!I°D  'uoi)|3o)9    ^^Z 

daaNia  asv~ 


THE 

JOHNS  HOPKINS 

UNIVERSITY 


THE  SEA  AND  JAPAN'S  STRATEGIC 
INTERESTS,   1975-1985 

by 
Linton  Wells  II 


Baltimore,  Maryland  21218 


,  93*44 


THE  SEA  AND  JAPAN'S  STRATEGIC 
INTERESTS,   1975-1985 


by 
Linton  Wells  II 


A  dissertation  submitted  to  The  Johns  Hopkins 
University  in  conformity  with  the  requirements 
for  the  degree  of  Doctor  of  Philosophy 

Baltimore,  Maryland 
1975 


7Z. 


'^-^ 


Copyright  1975 
Linton  Wells  II 


11 


ABSTRACT 

Recent  changes  in  military  technology,  commercial  ocean 
uses  and  the  law  of  the  sea  are  examined  in  relation  to  their 
impact  on  seapower  over  the  next  decade.   It  is  concluded  that 
technical  developments  will  significantly  narrow  the  alternatives 
available  to  political  decision  makers  during  this  period.  In 
addition,  the  foundations  of  the  freedom  of  the  seas  are  rapidly 
being  eroded,  there  are  signs  of  increasing  disorder  at  sea,  and 
the  utility  of  great  power  naval  vessels  as  instruments  of 
diplomacy  may  decline. 

Elements  of  Japan's  strategic  interests  and  the  status  of 
the  Maritime  Self-Defense  Force  (MSDF)  as  of  late  1974  are 
reviewed.  Some  potential  changes  in  these  interests  and  in 
the  constraints  on  the  armed  services  are  outlined.   Particular 
attention  is  given  to  pressures  for  and  against  a  wider  security 
role  in  the  Western  Pacific.  Existing  evidence  suggests  more 
continuity  than  change  in  Japanese  foreign  policy  over  the  next 
several  years. 

The  elements  of  seapower  outlined  in  Part  One  then  are 
applied  to  the  strategic  interests  which  were  noted  in  Part  Two. 
Japan's  need  for  a  balance  of  power  at  the  global,  regional  and 
local  levels  is  discussed,  along  with  the  role  of  naval  forces 


Ill 


in  securing  such  conditions.  Some  suggestions  axe  made  for 
future  MSDF  force  structures.  The  concepts  of  protective, 
acquisitive  and  suasive  commercial  seapower  are  introduced,  and 
Japan's  potential  is  examined  in  each  role.  Though  chances  for 
suasion  will  he  limited,  maritime  activities  can  offer  some 
increase  in  Japan's  resilience  to  foreign  pressures.  Her 
marine-related  expertise  and  capital  stocks  also  will  he  well- 
suited  to  acquire  a  wide  variety  of  goods  and  services  and  to 
take  advantage  of  new  ocean  development  opportunities. 


To  my  Parents 
who  have  given  me  every  opportunity 
and 
The  United  States  Navy 
which  has  given  me   this  one. 


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

This  paper  was  begun  during  a  month's  visit  to  Japan 
in  January  1973  a^  continued  in  Baltimore  and  Tokyo  during  1973 
and  1974*  A  trip  to  nine  countries  in  Southeast  Asia  and  Oceania 
from  May  to  July  1974  offered  many  additional  insights  into 
Japan's  image  abroad  and  into  coastal  state  perceptions  of  sea- 
power. 

A  letter  of  introduction  from  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations, 
Admiral  Elmo  R.  Zumwalt,  Jr.,  DSN,  to  the  Chief  of  the  Maritime 
Staff,  Admiral  Samejima  Hiroichi,  JMSDF,  established  many  of  the 
contacts  which  made  the  project  possible,   i  am  deeply  grateful 
to  both  leaders  for  their  interest  and  support. 

It  is  impossible  to  personally  acknowledge  each  of  those 
who  gave  their  time  and  assistance  for  this  study.  However, 
particular  thanks  must  go  to  five  individuals  without  whose  help 
much  less  could  have  been  accomplished.  Miss  Hakai  Yoko  of  the 
United  States  Information  Service,  Tokyo,  provided  introductions, 
translations,  source  materials  and  encouragement.  Her  friendship 
and  enthusiasm  were  among  the  highlights  of  this  research. 

Mr.  Taoka  Shunji,  defense  correspondent  for  Asahi  Shimbun, 
has  been  an  invaluable  source  of  information  on  a  remarkable 
range  of  subjects  extending  far  beyond  Japanese  strategic  studies. 


VI 


The  hospitality  which  he  and  his  wife  Noriko  have  shown  me  both 
in  Japan  and  the  United  States  is  unforgettable. 

Dr.  Tsunoda  Jun  of  the  National  Diet  Library  began  my 
education  in  Japanese  security  problems  during  my  first  research 
visit.  His  perception  and  experience  have  been  invaluable. 

Vice  Admiral  Kitamura  Kenichi,  JMSDF  (Ret.),  offered  basic 
insights  and  corrected  misconceptions  from  the  beginning  of  the 
project.  He  also  took  time  from  an  extremely  busy  schedule  to 
review  parts  of  the  manuscript. 

Captain  Yamazumi  Akira,  JT.ISDF,  Head  of  the  Foreign  Liaison 
section  of  the  Maritime  Staff  Office,  was  instrumental  in 
arranging  many  interviews  and  made  available  a  variety  of  useful 
services.  His  cheerfulness  and  attention  to  detail  overcame 
several  periods  of  discouragement. 

Dr.  Robert  W.  Tucker  of  the  Johns  Hopkins  University  guided 
the  overall  study,  as  well  as  most  of  my  post-graduate  education. 
His  criticisms  have  been  useful  both  in  style  and  substance.  Dr. 
George  Liska  posed  many  of  the  questions  from  which  the  seapower 
section  was  developed  and  was  second  reader  for  the  thesis.  Dr. 
Ann  L.  Hollick  of  the  Johns  Hopkins  School  of  Advanced  Inter- 
national Studies  initiated  my  interest  in  ocean  policy  and  law  of 
the  sea  issues. 

While  in  Tokyo,  I  was  attached  to  the  Defense  Attache  Office 
in  the  American  Embassy.  Captain  Wilton  L.  Atkinson,  USN,  and  his 
successor  as  Naval  Attache,  Captain  Marvin  L.  Duke,  USN,  offered 


VI 1 


the  support  and  assistance  of  their  staffs.  I  am  particularly 
grateful  to  Commander  John  S.  Viccelio,  USN,  for  his  comments 
and  advice. 

Dr.  Abraham  M.  Halpern  of  George  Washington  University's 
Sino-Soviet  Institute,  Commander  Michael  MccGwire,  RN  (Ret.), 
Mr.  Odani  Kosuke  of  the  Japan  Marine  Science  and  Technology 
Center,  Commander  Seno  Sadao,  JMSDF,  Dr.  Kenneth  R.  Stunkel  of 
Monmouth  College,  Admiral  Uchida  Kazutomi,  JMSDF  (Ret.),  Captain 
Don  Walsh,  USN,   and  Mr.  Gerard  P.  Yoest  of  the  American 
Institute  of  Merchant  Shipping  were  kind  enough  to  read  various 
drafts  of  the  paper  and  offered  important  criticisms. 

Particular  appreciation  also  is  due  to  Lieutenant  Commander 
James  E.  Auer,  USN;  Lieutenant  Commander  Pukui  Shizuo,  IJN;  Mr. 
Roy  A.  Mlynarchik,  Head  of  the  Press  Translation  Branch  of  the 
American  Embassy,  Tokyo;  Dr.  Okuhara  Toshio  of  Kokusikan  Univer- 
sity; Commander  Sekino  Hideo,  I  JIT;  Captain  Yamaguchi  Kaiji, 
JMSDF,  of  the  Maritime  Staff  College;  and  Mr.  Yamato  Kuril tami  of 
the  Maritime  Administration,  American  Embassy,  Tokyo. 

The  Southeast  Asia  trip  would  not  have  been  possible  with- 
out the  active  support  of  the  Defense  and  Naval  Attaches  at  the 
American  Embassies  in  Taipei,  Manila,  Bangkok,  Kuala  Lumpur, 
Singapore,  Jakarta,  Canberra  and  Wellington.   In  addition  to 
giving  their  own  assessments,  they  arranged  contacts,  transpor- 
tation and  other  valuable  assistance. 

Words  are  insufficient  to  express  my  gratitude  to  Mr. 


Vlll 


Takahashi  Tsutomu  and  his  wife  Takako.  During  each  of  my  visits 
to  Japan  they  have  opened  their  house  to  me  and  have  given  me 
a  greater  appreciation  of  their  country  than  they  can  ever  know. 

My  parents,  as  usual,  were  my  most  thorough  and  construc- 
tive critics.  Any  stylistic  continuity  in  the  paper  is  mainly 
due  to  their  efforts.  Mr.  David  Wilson's  help  with  the  bibli- 
ography also  was  greatly  appreciated. 

Finally,  thanks  are  due  to  Mrs.  Catherine  Grover.  Despite 
last-minute  revisions  and  indecipherable  handwriting,  she 
finished  typing  the  smooth  draft  with  time  to  spare. 


IX 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

Eaga 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS v 

LIST  OF  TABLES    xiii 

LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS xv 

LIST  OF  ABBREVIATIONS xvi 

INTRODUCTION   1 

Part  I:  The  Changing  Nature  of  Seapower 
Chapter 

INTRODUCTION  TO  PART  ONE 5 

One:     TECHNOLOGY  AND  CONTEMPORARY  NAVAL  OPERATIONS  ...  10 

The  Nature  of  Military  Innovations 10 

Tactical  Developments  15 

Anti-Ship  Missiles  16 

Aircraft  vs  Surface  Ships   27 

Other  Tactical  Innovations  31 

Strategic  Developments   35 

Submarine  vs  Anti-Submarine   35 

Sealift  and  Airlift 40 

Other  Strategic  Innovations   45 

Environment-Level  Developments   46 

Real-Time  Ocean  Surveillance  Systems  ....  46 

Command  Control  Communications  58 

Two:     THE  CHANGING  USES  OF  THE  OCEAN 60 

Merchant  Shipping  61 

The  GroY,rth  of  Tankers  and  Bulk  Carriers   .  .  64 

Containerization  67 

Barges,  Barge  Carriers  and  RO/ROs   69 

LNG  Carriers  and  OBOs 71 

Fisheries 71 

Non-Living  Marine  Resources 74 

Alluvial  and  Continental  Shelf  Minerals   .  .  74 

Offshore  Hydrocarbons 75 

Deep  Seabed  Mining 81 

The  Extraction  of  Materials  from  Seawater  ...  86 

Ocean  Engineering  Structures 89 

Conclusion 93 


Three:        THE  UNSETTLED  MARINE  POLITICAL  CLIMATE 95 

The  Foundations  of  Freedom  of  the  Seas      ....  95 

The  Barbary  Corsairs  (1500-1830)    97 

The  Chinese  Pirates     M 832-1 869}    ......  99 

The  Slave  Traders         (1807-1890)    ......  102 

Summary 104 

The  Current  Status  of  Maritime  Politics   ....  107 

The  Limitations  on  Global  Naval  Force      ...  107 

Extended  Coastal  State  Claims      110 

The  Regime   of  the  Deep  Seabed 123 

Shipping 124 

Conclusion 132 

Four:          THE  OCEAN  SETTING  1975-85 134 

Signs  of  Disorder 135 

The  Changing  Character  of  the  Oceans    ....  135 

Asymmetrical  Acceptabilities  of  Force      ...  137 

Current  Weapons  Technology  139 

Diminished  Freedom  of  the  Seas 140 

The  Use  of  Force  at  Sea 140 


Part  II:      The  Setting  of  Japan's  Seapovrer: 
Purposes,  Problems  and  Prospects 


Five:  JAPANESE   INTERESTS  AND  STRATEGIC  THINKING   1974    -    •  151 

The  Physical  Security  of  the  Japanese  People      .  154 

The  Setting 154 

Diplomatic  Security      159 

Military  Security 173 

The  Maintenance  of  Economic  Well-Being      ....  177 

International  Measures 177 

Domestic  Measures 187 

Preservation  of  Political  Autonomy/ 

Independence    1 91 

Contributions  to   the  Development  of  the 

International  System    192 

Six:  THE  CURRENT  STATUS   OF  THE  MARITIME  SELF- 

DEFENSE  FORCE  AND  THE  CONSTRAINTS  ON  ITS 

DEVELOPMENT  AND  EMPLOYMENT 194 

The  Current  Status  of  the  MSDF 194 

Domestic  Constraints      205 

Constitutional-Political 205 

Bureaucratic   210 


XI 


Economic  and  Industrial  211 

Manpower 217 

Logistical 218 

International  Constraints  219 

Great  Power  Reactions 219 

Developing  Country  Reactions  220 

Summary 221 

Seven:        THE  EVOLUTION  OF  THE  CONSTRAINTS 222 

Domestic  Issues   222 

An  Uncertain  Future      222 

Japanese  Militarism      2J1 

The  Quest  for  a  Satisfying  World  Role      .    .    .  236 

External  Changes 238 

The  People's  Republic  of  China   238 

The  Soviet  Union 241 

The  United  States      .....  242 

Other  States 244 

Changes  and  Continuities  in  Maritime  Affairs      .  245 

A  Twelve-Mile  Territorial  Sea     246 

200-Mile  Economic  Zone 248 

Oceanic  States  and  the   "World  Lake"      ....  253 

Summary 255 


Part  III:      The  Sea  and  Japan's  Strategic   Interests 

INTRODUCTION  TO  PART  THREE 258 

Eight:        THE  MILITARY  DIMENSION—FART   I:      GLOEAL 

AND  REGIONAL  INTERESTS    259 

The  Global  Balance 259 

Regional  Balances        264 

Options  Involving  the  United  States      ....  265 
Options   Involving  Countries  Other   than 

the  U.S.,    or  Multi-Lateral  Ties 272 

Other  Regional   Considerations      280 

Nine:  THE  MILITARY  DIMENSION—PART   II:     THE 

LOCAL  BALANCE  AND  OTHER   CONSIDERATIONS    284 

Patterns  of  Threats 284 

Direct  Threats  to   the  National  Territory   .    .  286 
Direct  Threats   to   the  Sea  Lines  of 

Communications 300 

Mine  Warfare 313 


Xll 


Divisive/intimidating  Actions  315 

Threats  which  Promote  Revolution 

or  Social  Unrest 318 

Defense  of  the  Economic  Zone 319 

Naval  Power  as  a  Bargaining  Chip 321 

Summary 322 

Ten:  THE  NON-MILITARY  DIMENSIONS  OF  JAPANESE 

SEAPOWER 324 

The  Scope  of  Japan's  Commercial  Ocean 

Interests 325 

Shipping       325 

Shipbuilding 330 

Fisheries 332 

Whaling 338 

Ocean  Development 340 

Japan's  Organization  for  Maritime  Development    .  346 

Non-Military  Seapower  and  Japan's   Interests    .    .  355 

Protective  Maritime  Ventures 355 

Acquisitive  Maritime  Ventures      358 

Suasive  Measures 36O 


CONCLUSION 363 

APPENDIX  OIK:      UNITS  CONVERSION  TABLE 368 

SELECTED  BIBLIOGRAPHY  370 


Xlll 


LIST  OF  TABLES 

Table  Page 

1-1  Anti-Ship  Missiles,   Surface  and  Subsurface 

Launched  (SSM)    17 

1-2     Diffusion  of  Missile  Launchers  (Estimated)   ....  19 

1-3     Air-to-Surface  Missiles  and  Homing  Ordnance  ....  29 

2-1     Composition  of  the  World  Merchant  Fleet  61 

2-2     Comparison  of  the  Carrying  Capacity  of  the 
World  Merchant  Fleet  by  Basic  Ship 

Types  1967-1972 63 

2-3     Leading  Offshore  Petroleum  and  Natural 

Gas  Producers 78 

2-4     Nodule  Metal  Production 84 

2-5     Potential  Uses  of  Multi-Purpose  Offshore 

Islands  and  Platforms   90 

2-6     Ocean-Atmosphere  Energy  Systems  92 

3-1     Hank  Order  of  Seabed  Areal  Allocations   118 

3-2     Ocean  Resource  Potentials 119 

3-3     Composition  of  World  Trade  1960-1970 128 

5-1     Japanese  Strategic  Regions — 1972 

Resources  Supply  1 67 

5-2     Japanese  Strategic  Regions — Trade  168 

5-3     Japanese  Strategic  Regions — Investments  169 

5-4     Livestock  Slaughtered  178 

6-1     The  Composition  of  the  Maritime  Self- 

Defense  Force 194 


XIV 


Table  Page 

6-2     Summary  of  the  First  to  Fourth  Defense 

Power  Consolidation  Programs ,  198 

6-3     Some  Comparisons  of  Blue-7/ater  Naval  Strengths  .  .  204 

6-4     Company  Reasons  for  Accepting  Unprofitable 

Defense  Contracts  214 

8-1     Foreign  Naval  Construction  by  Japanese 

Shipyards 278 

9-1     Soviet  Pacific  Amphibious  Assets  293 

9-2     A  Comparison  of  Swedish,  German  and 

Japanese  Defense  Forces   .  298 

9~3     A  Comparison  of  Submarine  and  ASW  Assets 

in  the  North  Atlantic  and  North  Pacific 

in  1974  and  1980 305 

9-4     Japanese  Domestic  Transportation  Shares  ......   314 

10-1    Possible  Nodule  Metals  Production  as  a 

Percent  of  1972  Japanese  Demand   357 


XV 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS 

Figure  Page 

2-1            Seabed  Mining  Activities 76 

2-2  Coastal  Regions  with  Inadequate  Fresh 

Water  Supplies 88 

5-1            Japan  in  Asia 156 

5-2            Japan's  Exploration  Effort  (Petroleum)      185 

6-1  Organization  of  the  Liar i time  Self- 

Defense  Force 196 

6-2           MSDF  Bases  and  Installations 197 

6-3           The  Southeast  and  Southwest  Route  Zones   202 

7-1  A  200-Mile  Japanese  Claim  Showing 

Disputed  Areas    249 

7-2  Disputed  Seabed  Areas  on  the  East  China 

Coast  and  Yellow  Sea  Continental  Shelf 251 

7-5            Japan's  Share  of  a  Partitioned  Ocean 254 

8-1            Northwest  Pacific   Cloud  Cover   270 

9-1            Japanese  Air  Defense  Radar  Coverage    289 

10-1  Organizational  Relationships   in  Sumitomo 

Lianganese  Nodule  Mining 349 


XVI 


LIST  OF  ABBREVIATIONS 


ADAV/S 

ADIZ 

AEW 

AF 

ARM 

ASDF 

ASM 

ASW 

AWACS 


Action  Data  Automation  Weapons  System  (U.K.) 

Air  Defense  Identification  Zone 

Airborne  Early  Warning  (Aircraft) 

Air  Force 

Anti-Radiation  Missile 

Air  Self-Defense  Force    (Japan) 

Air-to-Surface  Missile 

Ant i -Submarine  Warfare 

Airborne  Warning  and  Control  System 


BCAS 

BMEWS 


Bulletin  of  Concerned  Asian  Scholars 
Ballistic  Missile  Early  Warning  System 


C 

CIC 
CLB 
CNSP 
CSE 

CTS 

CVAN 


Command  Control  Communications 

Combat  Information  Center 

Continuous  Line  Bucket  System 

Council  on  National  Security  Problems  (japan) 

Central  Studies  Establishment  (Australia) 

Central  Terminal  Storage  (for  Petroleum) 

Attack  Aircraft  Carrier,  Nuclear  powered 


DDG 

DDH 

DOLIA 

DPRK 

DPRV 

dwt 


Guided  Missile  Destroyer 

Helicopter  Destroyer 

Deep  Ocean  Minerals  Association 

Democratic  People's  Republic  of  Korea  (North  Korea) 

Democratic  People's  .Republic  of  Vietnam  (North  Vietnam) 

Deadweight  Tons 


ECCM 

ECM 

ECOR 

EEC 

ELINT 

EUSC 

EW 


Electronic  Counter-Countermeasures 
Electronic  Countermeasures 
Engineering  Committee  on  Ocean  Resources 
European  Economic  Community 
Electronic  Intelligence 
Effective  U.S.  Control  Fleet 
Electronic  Warfare 


F4 

F4EJ 

F5 

F104 

FAO 
FB 


U.S.  Phantom  II  Fighter-Bomber 

Japanese  Variant  of  U.S.   F4 

U.S.   Fighter  Aircraft  primarily  built  for  export 

U.S.    "Starfighter"  Aircraft 

United  Nations,   Food  and  Agriculture  Organization 

Fighter-Bomber 


XV11 


FBM 

FEER 

FY 

GNP 

GRT 
GSDF 


Fleet  Ballistic  Missile 
Fax  Eastern  Economic  Review 
Fiscal  Year 

Gross  National  Product 
Gross  Registered  Tons 
Ground  Self -Defense  Force 


ICBM  Intercontinental  Ballistic  Missile 

IDR  International  Defense  Review 

IISS  International  Institute  for  Strategic  Studies  (London) 

IJN  Imperial  Japanese  Navy 

ITI  International  Trade  and  Industry  (see  MITl) 

IWC  International  Whaling  Commission 

JAMS TEC  Japan  Marine  Science  and  Technology  Center 

JDA  Japan  Defense  Agency 

JMSDF  Japanese  Maritime  Self-Defense  Force 

JOIA  Japan  Ocean  Industries  Association 

JSP  Japan  Socialist  Party 

LASH  Lighter  Aboard  Ship 

LCT  Landing  Craft,  Tank 

LCU  Landing  Craft,  Utility 

LDP  Liberal  Democratic  Party  (japan) 

LNG  Liquified  Natural  Gas 

LPG  Liquified  Petroleum  Gas 

LRI.EP  Long-Range  Marine  Patrol  Aircraft 

LSM  Landing  Ship,  Medium 

LST  Landing  Ship,  Tank 

LSV  Landing  Ship,  Vehicle 

MDIJ  Marine  Development  in  Japan  1972 

MDN  Mainichi  Daily  News 

MDP  Marine  Development  Program  of  Japan,  Fiscal  Year  1974 

MIG  Common  designation  for  aircraft  designed  by  Mikoyan 

of  the  USSR 

MITI  Ministry  of  International  Trade  and  Industry  (japan) 

MOBS  Mobile  Ocean  Basing  System  (U.S.  Navy) 

MSA  Maritime  Safety  Agency  (Japan) 

MSDF  Maritime  Self-Defense  Force  (Japan) ;  also  JMSDF 

MTS  Marine  Technology  Society  (U.S.A.) 

NADGE  NATO  Air  Defense  Ground  Environment 

NKIW  Nihon  Keizai  Shimbun  International  Weekly 

NPT  Non-Proliferation  Treaty 

NTDS  Naval  Tactical  Data  System 

0B0  Oil/Bulk/Ore  Carrier 

OECD  Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development 


XVI 11 


OPEC       Organization  of  Petroleum  Exporting  Countries 

OTH        Over-the-Horizon  (Radars) 

OTH-B      Over-the-Horizon  Backseat ter  radars 


PFLP 

PIRAZ 

PRC 

PT 

PXL 

RAN 
ROC 
ROK 
RO/RO 

RPV 


Popular  Front  for  the  Liberation  of  Palestine 

Positive  Identification  Radar  Advisory  Zone 

People's  Republic  of  China 

Patrol  Torpedo  Boat 

New  Anti-Submarine  Patrol  Aircraft  (japan) 

Royal  Australian  Navy 
Republic  of  China  ( Taiwan) 
Republic  of  Korea  (s .  Korea) 
Roll-On/Roll-Off  Ships 
Remotely  Piloted  Vehicles 


SALT  Strategic  Arms  Limitation  Talks 

SAM  Surface- to- Air  Missile 

SAR  Search  and  Rescue 

SDF  Self-Defense  Force  (japan) 

SENIT  Syste'me  d'Exploitation  Navale  des  Informations 

Tactiques 

SIPRI  Stockholm  International  Peace  Research  Institute 

SLAR  Side-Looking  Airborne  Radar 

SLBM  Submarine-Launched  Ballistic  Missile 

SODECO  Sumitomo  Ocean  Development  and  Engineering  Company 


SSM 
SSN 
SSPP 


Surface- to-Surf ace  Missile 
Nuclear  Powered  Submarine 
Solar  Sea  Power  Plant 


ULCC  Ultra-Large   Crude  Carrier 

USA  United  States  Army 

USN  United  States  Navy 

USNI  United  States  Naval  Institute   (Annapolis) 

USNIP  United  States  Naval   Institute  Proceedings 

USSBS  United  States  Strategic  Bombing  Survey 

VLCC  Very  Large  Crude  Carrier 

V/STOL  Vertical/Short  Take-off  and  Landing  (Aircraft) 

VTOL  Vertical  Take-off  and  Landing  (Aircraft) 


INTRODUCTION 

This  paper  will  examine  Japan1 s  ability  to  influence  other 
states,  and  to  protect  herself  from  their  influence,  through  the 
use  of  the  seas.  The  scope  of  these  uses,  which  together  com- 
prise a  nation's  seapower,  is  broader  than  usually  realized. 

The  last  few  years  have  seen  changes  in  naval  technology 
and  marine  industries  which  will  have  a  world-wide  impact.  In 
some  fields,  operational  capabilities  have  exceeded  the  ability 
of  governments  to  regulate  them.   In  others,  expansions  of 
jurisdiction  have  outpaced  the  capacity  for  both  exploitation 
and  enforcement.  For  a  few  activities  entirely  new  transnational 
institutions  have  been  proposed. 

In  any  case,  politics  and  technology  are  inextricably 
entwined  in  ocean  affairs.  The  reader  therefore  is  asked  to  be 
patient  with  what  may  seem  excessive  technical  detail.  An  effort 

has  been  made  to  include  only  that  which  is  needed  to  understand 
the  nature  of  current  seapower  and  the  physical  constraints 
which  have  been  imposed  on  the  political  process. 

The  time  frame  of  the  study  will  be  roughly  ten  years. 
With  a  few  exceptions,  specific  numerical  forecasts  have  been 
avoided.  In  Japan1 s  case,  events  since  October  1973  have  com- 
pletely upset  earlier  projections  of  continued  exponential 


growth,  while  the  studies  that  have  been  done  to  replace  them 
predict  everything  from  economic  contraction  to  a  return  to  pre- 
energy  crisis  expansion  rates.  Even  for  such  a  specific  item  as 
the  demand  for  U.S.  natural  gas  tankers,  1985  estimates  vary 
between  29  and  84  (and  between  29  and  180  for  1990)!   Accordingly, 
the  analysis  has  centered  on  possible  reactions  to  alternative 
situations  and  on  policies  which  offer  the  most  flexibility  under 
a  variety  of  assumptions. 

Part  One  will  review  some  recent  developments  in  military 
and  commercial  technology.  Issues  under  negotiation  at  the  Law 
of  the  Sea  Conference  also  will  be  summarized  to  illustrate  the 
depth  and  intensity  of  marine  political  problems.  Attempts  will 
be  made  to  identify  elements  of  continuity  as  well  as  change. 

The  second  part  will  consider  Japan's  strategic  interests 
and  the  current  status  of  the  Maritime  Self -Defense  Force  as 
points  of  reference  for  later  chapters.  The  latter' s  employment  and 
development  is  restricted  by  several  domestic  and  international 
conditions,  which  will  be  explored.   Some  possible  evolutions  of 
Japan's  definition  of  her  national  interests  and  the  limits  on 
the  Self-Defense  Forces  also  will  be  included.  Particular 
attention  will  be  paid  to  pressures  for  and  against  an  expanded 
naval  role  in  the  Western  Pacific. 

Finally,  Part  Three  will  look  at  the  relationship  between 
seapower  and  the  interests  outlined  earlier.  Two  chapters  will 
concentrate  on  military  problems  and  potential.  A  third  will  be 


devoted  to  commercial  ocean  affairs. 

In  general,  metric  units  will  be  used  herein.  Many  ocean 

* 

issues,  however,  axe  defined  in  terms  of  nautical  miles. 

Mention  of  a  370.4  kilometer  economic  zone  or  a  22.2  kilometer 
territorial  sea,  for  instance,  would  be  strange  even  to  the  most 
metricized  delegate  at  the  law  of  the  sea  negotiations.  In  the 
interests  of  clarity,  therefore,  the  terms  most  commonly  used  in 
discussions  of  a  particular  point  have  been  retained.  A  con- 
version table  will  be  found  in  Appendix  One. 


A  nautical  mile  (6080.2  feet)  is  equal  to  one  60th  of  a 
degree  of  longitude  at  the  equator,  or  very  nearly  one  minute  of 
latitude  anywhere.  Thus  it  is  a  convenient  unit  of  measure  on  a 
chart.  The  international  nautical  mile  is  defined  as  1,852  meters 
(exactly),  or  6076.1  feet. 


PART   I 


THE  CHANGING  NATURE  OF  SEAPOWER 


Chapter  One    .  . 

Chapter  Two   .  . 

Chapter  Three  . 
Chapter  Four 


Introduction 
.    .  Technology  and  Contemporary  Naval  Operations 
.    .   The  Changing  Uses  of  the  Seas 
.    .   The  Unsettled  Marine  Political  Climate 
.    .   The  Ocean  Setting  1975-1985 


THE  CHANGING  NATURE  OF  SEAPOWER 


Introduction 


Two  key  ideas  have  been  central  to  classical  writings  on 

1 

seapower  (though  they  often  have  been  left  unstated).   The 

first  is  that  the  sea  is  a  neutral  medium.   In  Mahan' s  words: 

In  itself,  the  sea  is  a  barren  tenure;  only  as 
the  great  common,  the  highway  of  commerce,  the  seat 
of  communication,  does  it  possess  unique  character 
and  value. 2 

This  principle  has  been  crucial  to  the  concept  of  freedom  of  the 

seas,  and  with  it  the  free  mobility  of  naval  vessels. 

The  second,  related,  point  has  been  that  there  is  a  clear 

distinction  between  the  sea  and  the  land:   "Man  marks  the  earth 

with  ruin — his  control  stops  with  the  shore"   (or  at  least  at 


1 

Some  of  the  major  works  after  Mahan  are:   Julian  S. 

Corbett,  Some  Principles  of  Mari time  Strategy  (Annapolis:   U.S. 
Naval  Institute,  1 971 ),  reprint  of  1 91 1  edition:   Herbert  Rich- 
mond, Statesmen  and  Seapower  (Oxford:   Clarendon  Press,  1946); 
Bernard  Brodie,  A  Guide  to  Naval  Strategy,  4th  ed.  (Princeton: 
Princeton  University  Press,  1958);  A.  E.  Sokol,  Seapower  in  the 
Nuclear  Age  (Washington:   Public  Affairs  Press,  1961);  S.  W. 
Hoskill,  The  Strategy  of  Seapower  (London:   Collins,  1962);  and 
Peter  Gretton,  Maritime  Strategy  (New  York:   Praeger,  1965) • 

2 

Alfred  T.  Mahan,  The  Problem  of  Asia  (London:  Kennikat 

Press,  1970),  p.  52. 

George  Gordon  Byron,  Lord  Byron,  Childe  Harold  (London: 
J.  M.  Dent,  1898),  Ch.  IV,  clxxix,  p.  184. 


the  three  mile  limit) .  The  populations  which  have  been  important 
to  governments  have  lived,  and  largely  worked,  ashore.  With  the 
exception  of  fish,  resources  and  food  also  have  come  almost 
exclusively  from  the  land.  It  follows  that  many  of  the  great 
power  rivalries  of  history  (including  the  present  one)  have  been 
cast  as  dichotomies  between  those  which  have  influenced  these 
populations  and  resources  directly  on  land,  and  those  which  have 
used  the  more  subtle  tools  of  navies  and  maritime  commerce. 

These  principles,  together  with  the  concept  that  superior 
force  is  the  final  arbiter  of  disputes,  have  underlain  most 
strategies  for  maritime  warfare.  The  subordination  of  military 
means  to  political  ends  usually  has  been  acknowledged,  but  such 
interactions  have  been  seen  mostly  in  the  choice  of  the  objective. 
Since  World  War  II  attention  has  shifted  to  more  restricted 
arenas — non-nuclear  warfare  at  sea,  limited  wars,  counter- 
insurgency  operations,  etc.   However,  once  the  scope  of  the 
military  activity  was  defined,  it  was  expected  that  it  would  be 
possible  to  bring  forces  to  bear  which  were  commensurate  with 
the  potential  threat. 

By  the  late  1960s,  however,  it  was  recognized  that  major 
naval  powers,  at  least  those  of  the  West,  were  operating  under 
unfavorable  asymmetries  in  the  acceptability  of  force — 


See  B.  H.  Liddell  Hart's  criticism  of  past  military 
practices  in  this  regard  in  "The  Objective  in  War,"  a  lecture 
delivered  at  the  U.S.  Naval  War  College  on  September  24,  1952. 
Also,  Bernard  Brodie,  War  and  Politics  (New  York:   The  MacMillan 
Company,  1973) »  passim. 


particularly  in  the  Third  World.  This  spurred  a  number  of 

studies  of  the  uses  of  naval  power  in  non-combat  situations  and 

5 
under  severe  political  constraints.   Even  more  recently, 

welcome  attention  has  begun  to  be  paid  to  the  diplomatic 

potential  of  non-military  maritime  instruments.   The  next  four 

chapters  will  concentrate  on  three  factors  which  may  undermine 

7 

the  utility  of  great  power  naval  forces  as  a  political  tool. 


5 
Two  pioneering  works  were:  L.  W.  Martin,  The  Sea  in 

Modern  Strategy  (New  York:   Praeger,  1967)  and  James  Cable, 

Gunboat  Diplomacy  (London:   IISS,  1971)*  See  also,  John  T.  Howe, 

Multicrises  (Cambridge:  MIT  Press,  1 971 ) ;   and  Edward  Luttwak, 

The  Political  Uses  of  Sea  Power  (Baltimore:   Johns  Hopkins  Press, 

1974);  other  references  are  listed  in  the  biography. 

c 

See  Joseph  Kasputys,  "The  Evolving  Role  of  the  Merchant 
Marine  as  a  Determinant  of  Seapower,"  Third  International  Sea- 
power  Symposium,  U.S.  Naval  War  College,  Newport,  H.I.,  1 973> 
pp.  134-170,  and  U.S.  Naval  Institute  (USNl),  To  Use  The  Sea 
(Annapolis:  USNI,  1 974) »  Sections  I  and  II. 

7 
Definitions 

(1)  Great  Power  navies.  These  will  be  considered  to  be 
those  fleets  which  can  conduct  operations  on  a  world-wide  scale, 
and  which  can  single-handedly  affect  the  global  balance  of  power. 
At  present,  only  the  U.S.  andtheSoviet  navies  qualify  for  this 
status.   In  the  past,  of  course,  Britain,  France,  Holland,  Spain, 
Portugal,  Japan  and  Germany  also  have  had  such  fleets. 

(2)  Middle  Power  navies.  Despite  the  difficulties 
attendant  to  definitions  of  middle  powers,  it  is  somewhat  easier 
to  speak  of  middle  power  navies.  They  will  be  defined  herein  as 
those  which  seek  to  exercise  command  of  the  seas,  for  whatever 
purpose,  beyond  their  own  coastal  waters,  but  not  on  a  global 
scale.   One  such  group  of  fleets  would  be  those  which  operate 
within  a  well-defined  geographic  region,  such  as  the  Italians  in 
the  Mediterranean  or  the  Iranians  in  the  Persian  Gulf.  But 
other  middle  power  navies,  such  as  Australia  and  Canada,  have  no 
such  finite  boundaries,  while  the  Indian  Ocean,  though  it  pro- 
vides natural  limits  for  the  attention  of  New  Delhi's  forces,  is 
too  large  to  be  the  sole  province  of  the  present  Indian  fleet. 
(The  mere  possession  of  nuclear  weapons,  and  even  submarine- 
launched  ballistic  missiles  (SLBM)  is  not  considered  sufficient 


The  factors  are:  (1)  The  current  state  of  naval  technology, 
(2)  the  growing  economic  importance  of  the  oceans,  and  (3)  the 
changing  marine  political  climate.  The  first  and  third  have 
augmented  the  usable  power  available  to  small  and  middle  powers 
at  sea.  All  three,  it  will  be  argued,  have  undercut  the 
impartiality  of  the  seas  as  medium  of  trade  and  communication, 
and  have  begun  to  blur  the  distinction  between  the  sea  and  land 
itself. 

The  basic  rationale  for  navies,  indeed  for  all  armed 
forces,  still  lies  in  answer  to  the  question:   "What  options  do 

Q 

you  have  if  diplomacy  fails?"   The  factors  to  be  discussed  do 
not  diminish  the  need  for  naval  forces  themselves,  but  they  may 
alter  the  conditions  which  govern  their  use.  It  must  be  remem- 
bered, however,  that  naval  force  is  only  one  component  of  sea- 
power.  Merchant  fleets,  geography,  population,  national  produc- 
tivity, etc.  all  have  been  a  part  of  the  equation  in  one  writing 


to  raise  a  navy  to  great  power  status.) 

(3)  The  editor  of  Jane '  s  Fighting  Ships  has  identified  two 
other  types  of  forces:   (a)  the  status-symbol  navy — he  uses 
Ghana  for  an  example,  and  (b)  the  coast  defense  fleet.  (See  the 
forward  to  Jane's,  1 973—74  edition,  pp.  73-78.)  An  interesting 
statement  concerning  the  latter  unit  was  provided  by  Rear 
Admiral  Walujo  Sugito,  Indonesian  Navy,  when  he  stated  that  his 
navy  would  develop:   "...  the  capability  in  wartime  to  keep 
the  border  seas  in  dispute.  [This  ability],  without  fining 
command  at  sea,  could  impede  the  advance  movement  of  the  enemy. 
If  the  enemy  is  superior,  ...  we  at  least  would  have  given  the 
land  forces  enough  time  to  make  the  necessary  preparations  •  .  .' 
Address  presented  to  the  Third  International  Seapower  Symposium, 
U.S.  Naval  War  College,  October  17,  1973.   (Emphasis  supplied.) 

I  am  indebted  to  Admiral  Arleigh  Burke  for  this  point. 


9 

or  another.   The  seapower  that  will  be  examined  herein,  however, 

is  broader  still.  The  ultimate  aim  will  be  to  understand  what 
leverage  Japan  or  any  other  maritime  nation  can  exert,  and  how 
it  can  insulate  itself  from  the  pressures  of  others,  through  the 
uses  of  the  oceans — be  they  economic,  military,  scientific  or 
recreational. 


9 

William  Reitzer,  in  "Mahan  on  the  Use  of  the  Sea,"  Naval 

War  College  Review,  XXV  (May-June,  1973),  PP»  73-82,  makes  the 
useful  distinction  between  seapower  (commercial  movement)  and 
sea  force  (navy)  as  subsystems  of  a  nation's  total  maritime 
power. 


Chapter  One 
TECHNOLOGY  AND  CONTEMPORARY  NAVAL  OPERATIONS 

The  Nature  of  Military  Innovations 

Changes  in  technology  can  affect  military  operations  on 

1 

three  levels — tactical,  strategic  and  environmental.   A  given 

development  may  lead  from  one  level  to  another  in  any  sequence. 
The  advent  of  steam,  for  instance,  first  transformed  naval  tac- 
tics by  reducing  some  of  the  elements  of  chance  inherent  in  wind 
and  weather.   In  time,  the  need  for  coaling  and  maintenance  led 
to  a  greater  reliance  on  bases  than  had  been  the  case  in  the 
days  of  sail,  thus  altering  the  strategic  picture.  Most  impor- 
tant, however,  was  the  fact  that  steam  eventually  helped  destroy 
the  indivisibility  of  the  seas,  which  had  been  the  key  to 
British  power  in  the  1?th,  18th  and  early  19th  centuries. 


1 
Tactics  refers  to  the  conduct  of  operations  for  immediate 

and  specific  objectives,  usually  when  opposing  forces  are  in 

contact.   Strategy  encompasses  a  broader  scale  of  both  position 

and  objectives  and  generally  applies  to  measures  taken  prior  to 

the  joining  of  forces.  Environmental  changes  are  those  which 

alter  the  setting  in  which  warfare  as  a  whole  is  conducted. 

Bernard  Brodie,  in  Seapower  in  the  Machine  Age  (Princeton: 

Princeton  University  Press,  1 941 ) ,  pp.  90-91  and  Chapter  XXI, 

makes  the  distinction  between  tactical  and  strategic  impacts  of 

steam  and  ordnance  developments. 


10 


11 


So  long  as  Britain  controlled  the  waters  from  the  North 
Sea  to  the  Straits  of  Gibraltar  during  the  age  of  sail,  she  con- 
trolled the  oceans  of  the  world,  at  least  insofar  as  other  Euro- 
pean Powers  were  concerned.  From  the  Armada  (1588),  through  the 
Dutch  Wars,  to  La  Hogue  (1692)  and  eventually  Trafalgar  (1805), 
the  truly  decisive  naval  battles  were  fought  in  European  waters. 
There  were  important  peripheral  campaigns,  to  be  sure — Suffren 
in  the  Indian  Ocean,  De  Grasse  in  the  We stern  Atlantic — but 
these  were  not  crucial  to  England's  overall  supremacy. 

Steam,  however,  enabled  forces  to  be  concentrated  rapidly. 
Moreover,  it  (along  with  the  development  of  the  torpedo  and  the 

submarine),  virtually  destroyed  the  feasibility  of  the  close 

2 

blockade,  which  the  Royal  Navy  had  used  for  so  long  to  keep  the 

fleets  of  her  enemies  separated.  It  also  made  the  effectiveness 
of  a  force  roughly  proportional  to  its  proximity  to  a  base, 
whereas  sailing  ships  had  been  much  more  independent.   The 


2 

A  "close"  blockade  implies  a  cordon  of  ships  around  an 

enemy's  harbor  to  detect  his  movements  immediately,  and  bring 
him  to  action  should  he  try  to  escape.  See  Arthur  J.  Marder, 
The  Anatomy  of  British  Seapower  (New  York:   A.  A.  Knopf,  1940), 
for  a  description  of  the  fiasco  attendant  to  an  attempted 
blockade  during  the  Royal  Navy's  1897  fleet  problem.   Legal 
problems  associated  with  blockades  by  mines,  submarines  and  more 
distant  warships  arose  during  both  World  Wars,  without  definitive 
resolutions.  See  C.  John  Colombos,  The  International  Law  of  the 
Sea,  5th  ed.  (New  York:   David  Mckay  Company,  1962),  Chapter  XIX. 
The  1972  mining  of  Haiphong,  supported  by  Seventh  Fleet  units  in 
the  Gulf  of  Tonkin,  was  similar  to  a  close  blockade,  but  only 
was  possible  since  the  U.S.  had  control  of  the  air  over  the  area. 

By  1904>  the  situation  was  exemplified  by  Jackie  Fisher's 
famous  comment  that:   "Five  keys  lock  up  the  World!  Singapore, 


12 


result  was  a  beginning  of  a  partitioning  of  the  seas,  an 
environmental  change  which  has  continued  to  this  day. 

Telecommunication  developments  affected  naval  operations 
in  a  reverse  order.  The  first  impact  was  environmental,  in  that 
the  transoceanic  cable  (1858)  destroyed  the  sailor's  monopoly  of 
intercontinental  communications.  Thereafter,  it  was  put  to 
strategic  use,  ordering  Dewey  to  Manila  Bay  (1898).  Finally, 
tactical  wireless  equipment  was  installed  in  most  of  the  major 
navies  during  the  early  years  of  this  century.  Its  first  combat 
use  came  in  the  Russo-Japanese  War  and  was  instrumental  in  the 
defeat  of  Admiral  Rozhdestvensky  at  Tsushima  (1905)* 


The  Cape,  Alexandria,  Gibraltar  and  Dover."   (Quoted  in  Marder, 
op.  cit.,  p.  473) - 

The  powers- that-be  were  not  unaware  of  the  implications 
of  this  technology.  In  1828,  the  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty 
wrote: 

Their  Lordships  feel  it  their  bounden  duty  to 
discourage  to  the  utmost  of  their  ability  the 
employment  of  steam  vessels,  as  they  consider  that 
the  introduction  of  steam  is  calculated  to  strike  a 
fatal  blow  at  the  naval  supremacy  of  the  Empire. 

(Quoted  in  Donald  Maclntyre  and  Basil  W.  Bathe,  Man-Of-War, 
[.New  York:  McGraw-Hill,  1969],  pp.  75"76.)  Note  that  the 
partitioning  also  coincided  with  the  rise  of  non-European  sea- 
powers.  These,  in  turn,  were  aided  by  the  rapid  development  of 
new  equipment,  which  effectively  forced  the  major  navies  to 
rebuild  their  fleets  every  few  years. 

5 
Linwood  S.  Howeth,  History  of  Communications — Electronics 

in  the  United  States  Navy  (Washington:   U.S.  Government  Printing 

Office,  1963).  Japanese  data  from  Fukui  Shizuo,  interview  July 

22,  1 974*  Although  the  advent  of  telecommunications  ended  the 

seaman's  role  in  international  communications,  it  actually 

heightened  the  importance  of  seapower  by  resolving  many  of  the 

command  and  control  problems  which  had  plagued  admirals  for 


13 


Aircraft  have  passed  from  tactical  to  strategic  roles.  In 
the  sense  that  airpower  has  reduced  the  constraints  of  geography, 
it  has  had  an  impact  on  the  physical  environment  as  well.  How- 
ever, as  will  be  discussed  below  (p.  40  ) ,  it  is  likely  to  be 
many  years,  if  ever,  before  the  skies  will  even  begin  to  compare 
with  the  seas  as  a  conduit  of  international  commerce. 

One  of  the  most  dramatic  shifts  which  has  affected  the 
nature  of  seapower  in  this  century  has  been  the  ability  to  pro- 
ject power  directly  from  one's  own  heartland  into  an  enemy's. 
Foreshadowed  by  World  War  II 's  strategic  bombing,  the  process 
reached  its  culmination  in  the  late  1950s  with  the  development 
of  the  ICBM.  No  longer  was  seapower,  through  blockade  or 
amphibious  operations,  the  only  link  for  the  infliction  of 
damage  between  an  island  state  and  a  continental  one.  Naval 
power  projection  kept  pace  with  advances  ashore — first  by 
increasing  the  range  of  naval  gunnery,  and  then  through  airpower, 

from  British  seaplane  raids  on  the  North  Sea  zeppelin  bases  in 

7 
1914>  to  carrier-based  nuclear  weapons  in  1949  and  on  to  the 


centuries.  Moreover,  there  are  few,  if  any,  recorded  instances 
where  control  of  the  seas  led  to  the  capture  of  important  dis- 
patches, so  the  loss  of  the  communications  monopoly  does  not 
appear  especially  significant. 

c 

The  fact  that  these  constraints  still  operate,  however, 
was  made  clear  by  the  need  for  enroute  airfields  during  the  Yom 
Kippur  War  airlift.  These  will  partly  be  eliminated  by  the 
development  of  a  mid-air  refueling  capability  for  transport  air- 
craft, but  only  a  few  of  the  largest  planes  will  be  so  equipped. 

n 

See  Norman  Polmar,  Aircraft  Carriers  (New  York:  Doubleday, 


14 


Submarine-Launched  Ballistic  Missiles  (SLBMs)  of  the  1960s. 
These  multiple  systems  added  flexibility  and  survivability  to 
strategic  forces,  but  the  advent  of  intercontinental  weaponry 
itself  eliminated  much  of  the  historic  value  of  the  sea  as  a 
"buffer"  between  great  powers.  With  it  went  the  ancient  justi- 
fication of  so  many  arms  races,  namely  the  direct  threat  posed 
to  Britain,  and  later  the  United  States,  by  a  strong  navy  in  the 
hands  of  a  state  with  a  large  standing  army. 

Recent  developments  in  military  technology  also  may  be 
categorized  according  to  their  potential  impact.  Among  those  of 
current  concern  to  naval  planners  are: 

(1)  The  production  of  sophisticated  ship-launched  weapons 
systems  such  as  surface- skimming  missiles  and  their  ready 
availability  to  coastal  state  navies  worldwide.  These 
weapons  tend  to  favor  the  defender  of  inshore  areas  or 
restricted  bodies  of  water. 

(2)  The  increased  effectiveness  of  aircraft  against  surface 
ships,  particularly  when  equipped  with  electro-optically 
guided,  laser-designated  or  other  homing  ordnance. 

(3)  The  disparity  between  submarine  and  anti-submarine 
capabilities. 

(4)  Recent  advances  in  strategic  airlift. 

(5)  The  possible  deployment  of  real-time  ocean  surveillance 
systems. 

(6)  Developments  in  Command  Control  Communications  (C  ) • 


1969)  for  a  history  of  the  development  of  naval  sea-based 
aviation  and  the  post-World  War  II  in- fighting  to  keep  the 
carriers  in  strategic  warfare.  Also  Desmond  P.  Wilson,  Jr., 
"Evolution  of  the  Attack  Aircraft  Carrier:  A  Case  Study  in 
Technology  and  Strategy,"  in  U.S.,  Congress,  Senate  and  House 
Armed  Services  Committees,  CYAN- 70  Aircraft  Carrier  (hereafter 
CVAN-70  Hearings),  91st  Cong.,  2ndSess.,  1970,  pp.  398-608. 


15 


The  first  two  are  tactical  innovations.  The  third  has 
both  tactical  and  strategic  implications.  The  fourth  is 
strategic.  Both  the  fifth  and  sixth  are  potentially  environ- 
mental. One  eventually  may  strip  warship  movements  of  the  cloak 
of  uncertainty  which  has  been  such  an  important  part  of  past 
naval  operations.  The  other  may  make  decisive  victories  possible 
while  the  majority  of  an  enemy's  forces  are  still  intact. 

The  size  and  scope  of  the  world's  research  and  development 
budgets  point  to  many  other  significant  changes  in  the  next  few 
years.  Some  of  them  also  will  be  noted  below.  The  factors  to 
be  examined  in  detail,  however,  are  especially  important  in  the 
context  of  the  changing  law  of  the  sea  and  Japan's  particular 
situation. 


Tactical  Developments 


Any  innovation  which  confines  its  effects  to  the  realm  of 

o 

tactics  is  destined  to  be  quickly  superseded.   This  is  true 

even  though  such  devices  often  seem  to  be  the  most  "revolutionary" 

9 
of  inventions.   Nevertheless,  improvements  in  a  particular  type 

of  weapon  and  the  counter-measures  thereto  may  shift  the  advantage 


Nowhere  is  this  better  illustrated  than  in  the  electronic 
warfare  (Bff)  field,  with  its  array  of  seekers,  counter-measures 
(ECM),  and  counter-countermeasures  (ECCM).   See  any  recent 
edition  of  Jane ' s  Weapon  Systems  (London:   Sampson  Low,  annual). 

Q 
Brodie,  op_.  cit. ,  p.  <)] ,   makes  this  point  with  regard  to 

the  ironclad. 


16 


back  and  forth  between  attacker  and  defender  through  several 
cycles  over  many  years.  This  seems  to  be  the  present  case  with 
homing  ordnance,  both  surface  and  air-launched. 


Anti-Ship  Missiles 

In  late  1974>  there  were  over  twenty  types  of  surface  or 
submarine -launched  anti-ship  missiles  (SSM)   which  had  been 
acquired  or  ordered  by  over  forty  navies.  These  are  outlined 

in  Table  1-1.  Although  these  weapons  were  introduced  in  the 

11 

late  1950s  with  the  Soviet  Scrubber,    they  did  not  get  wide- 
spread attention  until  they  were  used  to  sink  the  Israeli 

12 

destroyer  Eilat  off  Alexandria  in  1967.   '      Styx  missiles  were 

distributed  throughout  the  Warsaw  Pact  and  to  selected  Third 
Y/orld  countries  during  the  1960s,  but  Western  systems  have  pro- 
liferated more  rapidly  in  recent  years.  Table  1-2  illustrates 
their  distribution. 


1 0 

Some  sources  use  the  abbreviation  ASM  (Anti-Ship  Missile) 

for  these  weapons.   Herein  the  letters  SSM  ( Surface- to-Surf ace 
Missile)  will  refer  to  weapons  launched  from  surface  ships  or 
submarines.  ASM  (Air- to-Surf ace  Missile)  will  be  used  for  those 
carried  by  aircraft.  Note  that  some  equipment,  like  the  U.S. 
Navy's  Harpoon,  is  capable  of  airborne,  surface  or  subsurface 
launchings. 

1 1 

Scrubber,  Styx,  etc.  are  NATO  code  names  for  Soviet  SSMs. 

12 

The  missiles  in  Soviet  hands  always  caused  concern  among 

Western  analysts,  but  the  response  was  mostly  to  develop  counter- 
measures  rather  than  systems  of  our  own.  The  Eilat  sinking 
certainly  was  the  impetus  behind  the  U.S.  Harpoon  SSM  develop- 
ment, but  the  starting  dates  for  some  foreign  programs  (Sea 
Killer  -  1963>  Penguin  -  1962)  indicate  that  the  danger  (or  the 
potential)  was  seen  abroad  somewhat  earlier. 


17 


8*3 

«H  -H   -3 

O    03    U 

pj     0 

•— % 

U         tJ 

no 

CO    CO    fn 

N_^ 

,0(1)0 

£3    "H  ■*— -" 

CO  ^r-  CM 

3  > 

525  cd  fn 

a  o 

CNJ 


CNJ 


CNJ 


K> 


■>  §o 


p=i 


mvo  t^o  f^to  ^-o       o       co       oo 

NN  KN        CNI\CO  "*■         CNJ  t-  CM 

CNJ 
CNJ 


diAOOOO 
•  itncnj  u-N  r—  t— 
ti  no 


t3 

• 

cd 

-p 

0) 

5 

CO 

x: 

^ 

W 

3 

ltn 


oor—  ^inooo 

o 

o 

IAOO 

0(A          *         O  CO  o 

ITN 

f- 

KN  CNI    LTN 

T-                             C                T-     T-    CNI 

t— 

v-   CNJ 

p- 

o  o  o 

3    LTNC— 

525    t- 


cd   cd   cd 
•     •     • 

rt  a  « 


cd 
E-t 


O 

CD   -H 
P    -P 

03    cd 


Pi 


u 

CO 

91 

o 


+» 

<>.                  CD   O 
rACO  [ —  N"NCNJ    ftr-rov 

r— no  vo  c —  p—  o  t —  r— 

ON  ON  ON  ON  ON  rH   ON  ON 

LTN 
C~- 
ON 

o 

r— 

ON 

o\  o  c— 

no  r~— no 

ON  ON  ON 

CO 

r—  LP*  CNI    LTN  CD   CO 

r—  r—  r—  c-~-no  vo 

On  On  ON  On  On  ON 

Deve 

T— 

T- 

r—    t—    r— 

T—     T-     T—     T-     V-     T- 

• 
-P 

CO 
CO 

•^•rOifo^cNj  rovu-N'^-^ 

<^ 

«* 

"^-  KN  t- 

'^  LTN  CNI   VO    *4-  -^- 

a> 


•H  CD 

03  E 

CO  CO 

■H  js. 


pq 


-P   CNJ 

CD  t-  r- 
O     I       | 

OSS 
x  en  cn 
w  cn  cn 


p  cd 

H  ft 

cd  -h 

n  g. 

cd  o 

d)  rH 

cn  m 


fH 
CU 


u 

CD 


u 
co 


-P  -H  -H 

cd    ^  KN  ^    CNJ 

E  ^4         £i 

O    cd  E    o5    E 

-P    CD  CD 

o  cn  cn 


a> 


*S  g,00 


I 

2?    S 
I       I 

5  +*  cn  cn  cn 
W  cn  cn  cn  cn 


i 
i 


ei 

■H 

5*0 

CO 

n 

-P 

$ti 

•H 
fH 

a  -p 

PQ 

to  o 

0) 

o 

-p 
cd 

•H   O 

CO 

CD 

M 

fH 

U 

o 

P>H 

O 

a) 
-p 


C?    0 

te  Ti     • 

« 

U   cd  cn 

cn 

o  ^    • 
a  cn  £> 

£ 

18 


.    A  Q 

«h  -H  -H 
O   co   U 

CD     CO     H 
rQ     Q)     O 


VO 


LPlVO 

o 

CVJ 

o 

C—  iTN 

itn 

"=3- 

^3- 

CM 

L/N 

CM 

• 

Cd 

-p 

CD 

trf 

CO 

Si 

M 

W 

[3 

cd    cd 

•  • 

a  ti 


o~ 

C" 

e- 

o 

o 

o 

3 

o 

o 

» 

LTN 

in 

T* 

rH 

CD 

cd 

CM 

o 

ON 

a 

Pi 

MD 

VO 

LT\ 

ti 

o 

1 

1 

I 

■H 

CD  -H 

ON  CO 

T— 

ON 

00 

-P 

-P   -P 

MD  VO 

MD 

lTN 

lTN 

c 

cd   cd 

ON  ON 

ON 

ON 

ON 

o 

p»  h 

T—     T— 

*— 

^- 

T— 

o 

CD 

p. 
o 

CD 
P 

EH 


•H  (1) 
CO  S 
CO     CO 


lf\  LT\ 

T- 

T"~                T— 

•t          •". 

c-  «=j- 

«** 

"2" 

Ti 

o 

CD 

o 

£> 

Tt 

^          ,0 

-a 

>»<-  s 

ON  t —  ro> 

CO   CM 

1      1 

i 

rCi         | 

-P      I      O 

S5  S 

S 

CO    £3 

co  a  CO 

1      1 

i 

^_ •        \ 

-— -^      1    >>_> 

co  co 

CO 

CO 

CO 

CO  CO 

CO 

CO 

CO 

to 


U 


o 

•H   O 
O 


1 

•H 
-P 

Pi 

O 

«   o 
co^ 


CO 

CD 

-P 

CO 

>> 

CO 

+> 

CD 

£ 

o 

CO 

H 

o 

«H 

s 

iH 

a) 

•H 

o 

CD 

r— s  P< 

CO     CO 

CD     CD 

P* 

co     •> 

CO    Ti 

M     CD 

-P 

(0     CO 

p1  a 

O   -H 

•H    +> 

U     CO 

CO     CD 

> 

-s  CO 

•H 

Pi 

bi 

Pi 

o 

•H 

o 

o 

■P  ^-^s 

r-i 

iH 

•H 

co  a 

o 

ITN  ITN  Sf    O 

-P 

?i   **« 

^ 

r-  c^r—  pj 
I     i     i    £ 

cd 

3  CO 

Pi 

^t   "vl-  N"\     O 

^-j 

•H 

o 

c —  c^ —  r —  cd 

o 

'a^ 

o 

ON  ON  ON  Eh 

<H 

t —    <r—    r — 

O   -H 

rH 

CD 

•H 

O     CO 

cd 

O 

CO 

o          >» 

CO 

CO 

cd 

CD 

-P    -H 

•H           +> 

p 

CD 

S 

P 

-d 

«H    g 

-P          -H 

•H 

o 

C) 

CO 

+> 

^ 

fr          r-i 

M 

a 

-p 

O           -H 

CO 

CO 

tH|«h 

O   -H 

,o 

I-) 

>: 

a° 

H    <^ 

U         cd 

bn 

cd 

co 

■H     1 

o  m  ft 

C 

pq 

CO     O 

<H   cd 

■H 

ti 

M 

o 

-p 

"d  -H   o 

-P 

h 

o 

CD 

p" 

-  1 

<D    CO 

,-C 

H 

p. 

CD 

s 

CO 

ti     CD 

Xi    CO   & 

u 

d 

CO 

t^ 

CD 

O     O 

•H  -H     O 

•H 

-p 

CD 

"      -P 

Pi 

•H     CO 

^S§ 

P-h 

■H 

& 

ti 

o3 

£ 

-P  cm 

rH 

o 

Xi 

E? 

cd    !h 

bp  cd 

<D      Pi    r-H" 

CO 

■H 

CO 

■H 

-P 

H      0 

— 

^ 

— 

■P 

CD 

CD   CO 

fH    -H 

CD 

CO 

CD 

r-H 

PI 

•H     a    T3     O 

9 

CD 

■H 

4^> 

•H 

CD    Ti 

*5     &$ 

A 

> 

O 

CO 

O     CD 

►-3 

EH 

'-D 

<4 

^5 

CO 

•H 

~X     U     CO 

•H 

-P    CH 

rH  CO    CD  -H 

r* 

CO    -H 

rH              3    rH 

M 

fH    X) 

cd   cd  rO  H 

CD 

O 

•H     O 

g   cd   ^   cd 

O 

o 

"^ 

Pn  S 

co  co  co  PQ 

S| 

•    •    •    • 

CO 

W 

^CNJ 

NNt^-  UfNVO 

19 


VO 

O     1 

O    t 

VO     1 

C— 

CO 

K\ 

t— 

o> 

"<3- 

LPl 

*- 

T— 

St 

CVJ       | 

O     1 

VO     1 

r- 

k"\ 

N^ 

r*- 

O 

>^- 

LT\ 

T~ 

T~ 

CM 

"*    1 

VO     | 

VO     1 

f- 

vo 

VO 

f— 

cr> 

n-\ 

si- 

T— 

o 

^  l 

CM     I 

CM     I 

c— 

T~ 

o 

r— 

o> 

N"N 

sf 

t- 

T— 

CO 

VO     | 

CO     1 

O    1 

VQ 

VO 

K> 

VO 

cr> 

CM 

ro» 

T— 

T— 

VO 

CM      | 

«*  1 

VO     | 

VO 

•* 

C— 

tov 

o> 

CM 

CM 

r— 

T~ 

*tf 

VO     | 

O    1 

VO      1 

VO 

VO 

T— 

ro» 

o> 

T— 

CM 

T_ 

CM 

O     1 

VO     1 

1      1 

VO 

00 

CM 

0> 

T- 

T— 

CO 
CD 
rH 
•H 

CO 

05 
QJ 

rH 

•H 

CO 
CO 

D 

CO 

•H 

CM      1 

CM     | 

1      1 

vD 

•H 

S 

r— 

r<-s 

C7> 

^v- 

T— 

-P 
Q) 

•H 
> 
O 

CO 

o 

■P 

CO 
QJ 

M 

o 


u 


•H 
O 

O 
I 


o 
O 

« 

CO 
CO 


t-  CM 


co 
-p 

CO 

co 
o 
o 

CO 


•H 

CO 
rH 
00 

o 

tuD-P 

?    2 

>M     CO 

TO     CO 

rH     CO 

•H     CO 

• 


to 


I    O 


I     *1 

CM 


I   VO 


I      I 


I      I 


I      I 


I      I 


I      1 


ro 


CM 


I       I 


I      I 


I       I 


I       I 


I       I 


I       I 


t     "* 


I    CM 


I    VO 


I    CM 


I     CM 


I       I 


I       I 


I       I 


I       I 


0)  CO 

s — .. 

o     • 

o 

a 

CO   t3 
0) 

•rH 

-P 

'CO 

f-i     CO 

9 

ft 

o  w 

CO 

o 

r— i 

o 

•  r3 

+» 

•* 

HH 

CD  -«_• 

< 

£ 

P^ 

o 

d) 

M 

cB  E-i 

m 

-tf 

O 

CO 

0) 

«>J 

u  «< 

• 

•£ 

Ph 

f±,  & 

t=> 

CO 

O     I 

LPV 


VO 
CM 


VO     I 
CM 


VO     I 
CM 


CM 
CM 


CM      | 
CM 


VO     I 
VO 


O     I 


I      I 


O    I 


o 

*3- 


O     I 

*3- 


CM     I 


O     | 

co 


CD     I 


VO     I 


I     I 


I     I 


9 


O 
vo 
CM 


O     I 

VO 


3"  I 

ON 


CD     I 
CD 


£' 


I      I 


I      I 


o 
1 

rH 
CO 

-P 
CO 

•k 

CD 

CO 

M 

O 

O 

pr* 

o 

O 

&! 

>«_• 

Q 

« 

Ph 

* 

CO 

CO 

O 

B 

B 

Ph 
P* 

CM 


tO 


t-  CM 


N"N 


20 


-a 

CD 

§ 

•H 
•P 

O 

o 


CM 
I 


cd 

EH 


vo 

o 

to 

1   o 

CM 

*~ 

r- 
o> 

'8 

1       1 

*~ 

eg 

1    o 
CM 

1       1 

^— 

O 

1    1 

1       1 

1— 

CD 
0> 

1    1 

1       1 

r— 

vo 

vo 

1    1 

1       1 

1 — 

VO 
0> 

1    1 

1       t 

T— 

cm 

VO 

0> 

1     I 

1       1 

o 

vo 

o> 

1     1 

1       1 

T— 

o 

•H 
<H 
■H 
O 

a 


CO 


n  3 


"^•CM 

1       1 

"^-CO 

O    1 

^•o 

*3-  ro 

CO  o> 

•«3- 

CM  0> 

^O 

1       1 

■^1-CM 

O    I 

"*■  CO 

•^-CM 

co  lo 

^1- 

CM  VO 

3:  i 

1       1 

O  CO 

CM     1 

"d-  O 

<3- 

C—  CM 

^ — 

N-\ 

CM   LO 

VO     1 

1       1 

CM  O 

CM     1 

^    1 

N^ 

VO  O 

rov 

CM 

VO     1 

1       1 

*3-  sh 

1      1 

*3"    1 

rr\ 

VO  CM 

CM 

VD     I 

1       1 

O     1 

1      1 

"fr     1 

N"N 

vo 

CM 

O     1 

1       1 

VO      I 

1      1 

O      | 

ro, 

T~ 

CM 

"*    1 

1       t 

•"*        1 

1      1 

CO     1 

CM 
1       1 

1       1 

t            1 

1      1 

1    1 

t— 
I 

r— 

ON 


CD 


LfN      • 

l    r— 
■sh   i 

c-—  kn 
on  r— 

v-    ON 

CO 
PJ  CD 

•H 

CO 

W|  cd 

•H 

•P 


pq 
id  cd 


•    Ph 

ct) 

•< 

CO 

3    b3 

o 

c3    CO 

a 

— 

*-i 

•H 

CD 

9s          9s 

f-l 

f-l     CD 

CD 

S 

<ti^ 

CD 

H  +> 

O 

cd 

•H      • 

4 

cd 

a 

O 

■H 

►"3 

i-H     O 

o 

►  -p 

CO 

CT3     Gj 

•H 

r-l    CO 

•H 

^t 

f-i  cn 

-p  — ' 

•H 

f-l 

cd  & 

p 

•  • 

to    G 
d    cd 

P 

U    cd 

t3 

CO 

O 

03 
O 

cd 

• 

CO     f-l 

H 

cd 

u 

• 

a 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

O 

CM 

t— 

CM 

NN. 

"**- 

ir\ 

CO 

-P    «M 

co   o 


CO 


.5 


P=4    O 


^!    <D 


xi   f-i 
3£ 


Ph   CD 

a  ,d 


& 


bb  o 

CD    CO 


t3  .H 


CD 
CO     ft 


CO  t3 


hb  co 


u 


21 


The  implications  of  this  diffusion  are  important.  In  fact, 
given  any  sort  of  restraint  by  the  maritime  states,  the  missiles 
have  the  potential  to  redress  the  naval  balance  of  power  in 
inshore  areas  and  restricted  bodies  of  water.  This  alteration 
will  be  in  favor  of  the  coastal  states  at  the  expense  of  the 
major  naval  powers.  This  requires  some  explanation. 

The  modern  surface  warship  is  a  highly  sophisticated  piece 
of  machinery.  Radars,  communications  antennas  and  electronic 
countermeasures  domes  are  easily  visible  on  most  ships  of 
frigate  size  or  larger.   If  missiles  are  added,  the  complexity 
increases  sharply.  In  order  to  save  topside  weight,  many 
Western  navies  have  adopted  aluminum  superstructures,  thus 
effectively  removing  any  protection  for  the  transmitters,  wave- 
guides, computers  and  other  devices  which  often  are  located 
above  the  main  deck.  Although  the  ships  are  structurally  sound, 
and  their  hulls  capable  of  absorbing  considerable  damage,  the 
vital  electronics  suit  is  quite  vulnerable,  even  to  schrapnel 
from  a  near  miss. 

This  was  dramatically  illustrated  in  April  1972,  when 
U.S.S.  7/orden  was  accidently  damaged  by  an  American  air-launched 
missile  which  homed  in  on  its  radars  in  the  Gulf  of  Tonkin.  The 
offending  weapon  was  a  Shrike,  whose  warhead  is  considerably 
smaller  than  those  of  most  of  the  SSMs  novj  in  service.  Never- 
the  less,  Worden,  an  $80  million  guided  missile  frigate,  was 
virtually  incapacitated,  lost  one  man  killed  and  nine  injured, 


22 


and  had  to  be  towed  to  the  Philippines  for  repair. 

Published  data  on  the  Soviet  Styx,  one  of  the  oldest  SSMs, 
indicate  that  shipboard  warning  time,  once  the  missile  is 
launched,  is  at  most  two  minutes.    Moreover,  many  of  the  later 
designs  fly  at  heights  of  two  or  three  meters  above  the  water 
(thus  earning  the  name  "sea-skimmer").    This  profile  compli- 
cates the  problems  of  detection  and  fire  control  radar  solutions 
while  more  sophisticated  homing  devices  also  make  electronic 
jamming  or  deception  more  difficult.  The  ideal  answer  would  be 
to  destroy  the  launch-platform  prior  to  firing.  This  is  possible 
in  the  open  sea,  where  the  more  sophisticated  weapons  and  sensors 
of  the  larger  ship  might  be  decisive.  In  confined  waters,  how- 
ever, such  as  straits,  bays  or  gulfs,  the  advantage  of  surprise 
lies  with  the  patrol  boat,  unless  its  opponent  is  maintaining 
airborne  surveillance.  It  is  perhaps  worth  noting  that  43  of 
the  116  straits  to  be  closed  by  a  12-mile  territorial  sea 


1  ^ 

^New  York  Times,  April  19,  1972,  p.  1. 

The  Styx's  speed  is  rated  at  Mach  1  =  332  meters/second 
(643  knots)  at  sea  level.  Maximum  listed  range  is  42  km,  giving 
about  2  minutes  and  5  seconds  of  flight  time.  So  far,  most  com- 
bat launches  reportedly  have  been  at  less  than  20  kilometers. 
This  decrease  in  range  does  not  necessarily  mean  less  warning, 
however,  since  the  launching  can  be  anticipated  by  ECM  tech- 
niques. 

15 

Presumably  this  imposes  some  limitations  in  rough 

weather,  but  the  extent  is  not  clear  from  published  materials. 


23 


AC 

border  developing  countries.    Twenty-seven  of  these  are 

17 

bordered  by  states  in  possession  of  SSMs.    This  will  be 

discussed  in  more  detail  later. 

Today,  the  most  powerful  surface  warships  of  any  navy  are 
vulnerable  to  small  craft  in  the  narrow  seas.  This  is  not  a  new 
condition.  Such  ships  always  have  entered  restricted  waters  at 
their  peril.  Not  only  do  they  sacrifice  the  advantage  of  their 
long-range  weaponry,  but  they  also  subject  themselves  to  mines, 
torpedoes,  small  submarines,  shore  batteries,  and  a  host  of 
other  devices  which  have  long  been  used  skillfully  by  coastal 
states. 

There  is  an  interesting  parallel  between  the  current  SSM 

threat  and  that  which  was  seen  in  the  surface -launched  torpedo 

1  ft 
around  the  turn  of  the  century.  '   The  latter  eventually  was  met 

by  improvements  in  gunnery  ranges  which  made  it  possible  to 

19 

destroy  attackers  at  a  distance.    In  time,  an  analogous 


1  f\ 

U.S.,  Department  of  State,  Office  of  Geographer,  Chart 

entitled  "World  Straits  Affected  by  a  Twelve  Mile  Territorial 

Sea." 

17 

These  include  the  important  straits  of  Gibraltar,  Hormuz, 

Bab-el-Mandeb,  Malacca,  Lombok,  Sunda,  and  Ombai-Wetar.  Were 
the  Philippines,  Bahamas  and  South  Korea  to  get  SSMs,  the  figure 
would  rise  to  37  out  of  43  • 

1  ft 

The  years  between  the  perfection  of  the  Whitehead 

torpedo  (1867)  and  World  War  I  often  heard  predictions  of  the 

early  demise  of  the  battleship  at  the  hands  of  the  torpedo  boat 

and  later  the  destroyer.  See  Harder,  op_.  cit. ,  p.  1 23 - 

19 

So  far  as  is  known,    only  the  Japanese  61  cm  oxygen 

torpedo  of  World  War  II  could  outrange  a  battleship's  guns. 

Even  so,   most  of  its  successes  came  at  relatively  close  quarters 

in  night  actions. 


24 


solution  may  be  found  for  the  SSM,  as  helicopters,  VTOL  (Vertical 
Take-Off  and  Landing)  aircraft,  or  RPVs  (Remotely  Piloted 

Vehicles — radio-controlled  drones)  are  fitted  in  more  and  more 

20 

ships.  In  the  near  term,  however,  ECM  and  point  defense  systems 

will  be  the  only  available  protection. 

One  effect  of  the  SSM  has  been  to  expand  the  breadth  of 
the  coastal  danger  zone.  Moreover,  this  has  more-or-less  coin- 
cided with  the  world-wide  extension  of  the  territorial  sea  and 
the  heightened  awareness  of  ocean  affairs.   (See  Chapter  Three.) 
In  turn,  these  have  increased  the  interest  of  coastal  states  in 
defensive  systems.  Thus  it  is  significant  that  the  later  SSMs — 
such  as  Exocet  (France),  Gabriel  (Israel),  and  Harpoon  (U.S.), 
are  basically  pre-packaged  rounds.  Unlike  the  widely- distributed 
Styx,  the  more  modern  weapons  require  almost  no  maintenance. 
Thus  they  can  be  effective  in  the  hands  of  relatively  unsophisti- 
cated navies.  Moreover,  although  the  West  has  developed  elec- 

21 

tronic  countermeasures  for  some  of  the  older  Soviet  missiles, 

it  is  not  clear  that  much  attention  has  been  given  to  defense 
against  the  Western  missiles  held  by  coastal  states. 

Much  of  the  above  discussion  has  dealt  with  conventionally- 


20 

A  point  defense  system  is  a  missile  or  gun  installation 

with  a  high  kill  probability  at  short  ranges.   It  is  designed  to 

protect  only  the  ship  on  which  it  is  mounted.  The  opposite 

approach  is  a  long  range,  area  defense  weapon. 

21 

Note  the  Israeli  success  in  decoying  Egyptian  and  Syrian 

Styxs  during  the  Yom  Kippur  War. 


25 


armed  SSMs  against  destroyer-sized  targets.  There  are  other 
applications  of  these  weapons.  One  option  would  be  nuclear  war- 
heads. Such  devices,  which  may  already  be  operational  in  some 

22 

navies,   pose  a  potentially  lethal  threat  to  any  floating 

target.  They  may  well  find  employment  in  a  general  war,  or  a 

nuclear  war  at  sea,  but  such  scenarios  are  outside  the  scope  of 
this  paper. 

Another  problem  is  the  vulnerability  of  aircraft  carriers 
to  SSM  attack,  particularly  those  launched  by  submarines.  Much 

has  been  written  about  the  survivability  of  these  expensive 

23 

ships,   and  I  shall  not  enter  into  that  debate.   I  feel,  how- 
ever, that  they  are  not  in  very  much  danger  outside  of  a  U.S.- 

24 

Soviet  encounter.    To  attack  an  aircraft  carrier  is  almost 

certainly  to  go  beyond  the  threshhold  of  retaliation  for  a 
coastal  state.  Even  during  the  Vietnam  War,  Hanoi  made  no 
serious  effort  against  Yankee  Station.  Fast  patrol  boats  are 
not  likely  to  get  close  enough  to  a  carrier  to  do  much  damage, 


22 

As  noted  in  Table   1-1,    the  Soviet  SS-N-3   is  believed  to 

have   a  nuclear  warhead.      In  any  case,    the  nuclear-capable   ship- 
board SAMs   (such  as  Talos)   could  be  used  in  an  air- burst  mode. 
The  ballistic  SSNX-13  also  may  be  nuclear. 

23 

See,  for  instance,  the  CVAN-70  Hearings,  op.  cit.  (note 

1-7),  and  Paul  Schratz,  "The  Nuclear  Carrier  and  Modern  War," 
U.S.  Naval  Institute  Proceedings  (hereafter  USNIP),  XCVIII 
(August  1972),  pp.  18-25,  with  comments  in  the  issues  of  Decem- 
ber 1972,  p.  88,  and  April  1973,  p.  86.  Other  criticisms  of  the 
carrier  have  been  contained  in  a  number  of  articles  by  A.  Kusmak 
of  the  Brookings  Institution. 

TEhe  present  rate  of  arms  transfers  to  the  Persian  Gulf 
and  Eastern  Mediterranean  could  make  these  very  dangerous  areas 
for  the  carriers  before  too  long,  however. 


26 


and  few  coastal  states  will  have  a  submerged  launch  capability. 
The  actions  between  missile-armed  patrol  boats  themselves 
have  been  especially  interesting.  Although  India  employed  the 

Styx  with  considerable  success  during  the  1970  war  with  Pakis- 

25 
tan,   the  first  test  involving  SSMs  on  both  sides  seem  to  have 

come  in  the  night  actions  between  Egyptian,  Syrian  and  Israeli 

boats  during  the  Yom  Kippur  War.  The  Gabriel  missile  performed 

well.     The  Israelis  also  apparently  confused  the  Styx 

guidance  systems  with  relatively  compact  ECM  equipment,  thus 

26 

raising  hopes  for  future  encounters  with  such  threats.    It 

should  be  noted,  however,  that  the  ships  were  at  general 
quarters  prior  to  the  engagement,  thus  minimizing  the  chances 
of  surprise.  Moreover,  the  maneuverability  of  the  small  patrol 
boats  facilitated  last-minute  evasions  while  the  presence  of 
multiple  targets  may  have  misled  the  Arab  missiles.  In  short, 
it  is  not  clear  how  applicable  these  lessons  are  to  larger  war- 
ships. Certainly  they  were  of  little  help  to  the  South 
Vietnamese  frigate  sunk  by  Chinese  SSMs  off  the  Paracels  in  1974* 


25 

Ravi  Kaul,  "The  Indo-Pakistani  War  and  the  Changing 

Balance  of  Power  in  the  Indian  Ocean,"  USNIP,  XCVII  (May  1971), 

pp.  172-195,  presents  the  Indian  view.  A  Pakistani  outlook  is 

given  by  M.  I.  Butt  in  the  "Comment  and  Discussion"  section  of 

USNIP,  XCIX  (November  1973),  p.  88.  D.  P.  O'Connell  notes  the 

damage  to  neutral  merchantmen  caused  by  errant  missiles  in  "Can 

The  Navy  Plan  For  Peace?"  New  Scientist  (U.K.),  October  25, 

1973,  P.  257. 

26 

Aviation  Week  and  Space  Technology  (hereafter  Aviation 

Week),  December  10,  1973,  P«  20.  An  Israeli  account  is  given  by 
Shlomo  Ere 11,  "Israeli  Saar  FPBs  Pass  Combat  Test  in  Yom  Kippur 
War,"  USNIP,  C    (September  1974),  pp.  115-118. 


27 


Aircraft  vs  Surface  Ships 

Across  the  Song  Ma  river  in  North  Vietnam  is  the  Thanh  Hoa 
bridge.  Between  1965  an<^  1967>  American  pilots  flew  nearly  700 

sorties,  dropped  1250  tons  of  ordnance,  and  lost  8  aircraft  trying 

27 

to  destroy  it.    Such  are  the  stories  on  which  sailors  build 

their  hopes.  If  a  fixed  target  withstood  that  much  punishment 
(although  bridges  admittedly  are  difficult  to  destroy  because  of 
the  amount  of  open  space  and  inherent  structural  strength), 
surely  a  maneuvering  ship  would  have  even  a  better  chance. 

On  March  12,  1972,  the  Thanh  Hoa  bridge  was  attacked  by  a 

single  flight  of  aircraft  using  newly  perfected  laser-designated 

28 

ordnance  and  destroyed  with  a  direct  hit. 

The  threat  posed  by  terminally  guided  air-launched  weapons 
to  ships  at  sea  is  considerable.  In  the  few  times  that  a  match 


27 
'Malcolm  W.  Cagle,  "Task  Force  77  in  Action  Off  Vietnam," 

USNIP,  XCVIII  (May  1972),  p.  104.  So  indestructable  was  the 
bridge  that  new  theories  were  developed  to  explain  its 
resilience.  One  of  these  was:   "...  that  the  earth  was  com- 
posed of  two  giant  elliptical  hemispheres,  spring  hinged  some- 
where beneath  the  South  Atlantic  Ocean  and  clamped  firmly  shut 
on  the  other  side  by  the  Thanh  Hoa  bridge.  This  theory  had  it 
that  if  the  Thanh  Hoa  bridge  were  ever  destroyed,  the  world 
would  snap  open,  flipping  man  and  beast  thither  and  yon,  and  up- 
setting the  gravitational  balance  of  the  universe."   Ibid. , 
p.  105. 

^ew  York  Times,  May  24,  1972.  Laser-designated  means 
that  the  target  is  illuminated  by  a  laser  beam  either  from  an 
aircraft  or  from  the  ground.  The  attacking  aircraft  releases 
its  weapons  in  the  general  vicinity  of  the  target,  and  a  seeker 
attached  to  the  bomb  aims  it  at  the  point  "designated"  by  the 
laser.  The  Thanh  Hoa  destruction  is  even  more  impressive  since 
the  bridge  had  been  hit  by  the  television-guided  Walleye  bomb  as 
early  as  1967*  Despite  the  accuracy,  however,  the  Walleye 
damage  was  minor.  ( Cagle,  p.  97  )• 


28 


has  been  made,  the  results  have  been  impressively  in  favor  of 
the  aircraft.  In  1943  the  Germans  introduced  a  primitive  radio- 
controlled  glide  bomb  in  the  Mediterranean.  In  its  first  test 
it  sank  the  new  Italian  battleship  Roma  on  its  way  to  surrender. 
The  weapon  seriously  damaged  a  number  of  vessels  off  Salerno, 
and  later  was  to  plague  the  Allies  off  Anzio.  For  some  reason, 
it  was  not  used  again  in  the  war,  but  the  potential  was  clear. 
Excluding  the  Kamikaze,  which,  after  all,  had  a  special  form  of 
terminal  guidance,  warships  did  not  face  such  weapons  again 

until  the  late  1960s,  when  H.M.A.S.  Hobart,  and  later  U.S.S. 

29 
Worden  were  accidently  hit  by  U.S.  missiles.    Although  neither 

ship  was  in  any  danger  of  sinking,  they  were  rendered  hors  de 
c ombat  by  relatively  small  warheads  not  designed  for  the  anti- 
shipping  role.  Under  such  conditions,  the  damage  that  might 
result  from  a  250  or  500  kg  built- for- the-purpose  ASM  hit  is 
sobering  to  imagine. 

Table  1-3  represents  an  inventory  of  the  homing  or  laser- 
designated  weapons  now  in  production  or  under  development  which 
have  anti-ship  missions  at  least  as  part  of  their  tasks.  While 
these  are  not  yet  so  widely  distributed  as  the  SSMs,  their 
proliferation  probably  will  not  be  long  delayed,  especially  in 
light  of  the  sophisticated  arms  now  flowing  to  the  Middle  East. 


29 

H.M.A.S.  Hobart,  an  Australian  guided  missile  destroyer, 

was  hit  by  two  Sidewinder  air-to-air  missiles  in  June  1 9^8,   when 

a  U.S.   pilot  mistook  her  for  a  North  Vietnamese  helicopter.     The 

1972  Worden  incident  was  noted  above   (p.  21  ) . 


Table  1-3 
AIR-TO-SURFACE  MISSILES  AND  HOMING  ORDNANCE 


29 


Est. 

Est. 

Country 

Name 

Guidance 

Warhead 

Ran^e 

(kg) 

(km) 

France 

AS. 11 

1 

15 

3 

AS. 12 

1 

28 

6 

AS.  20 

1 

50 

7 

AS.  50 

1 

250 

12 

Germany 

Kormoran 

4 

250 

57 

Jumbo 

2 

nuc/conv 

n.a. 

Great  Britain 

Hellcat 

1 

10? 

3.5 

Skua 

3 

20 

19? 

Internat 

ional 

Martel  AJ.168 

2 

n.a. 

28-55 

Martel  AS. 57 

6 

n.a. 

28-55 

Otomat 

4 

n.a. 

64-570 

Japan 

ASM-1 

? 

140 

46 

Sweden 

RB  04  E 

4 

,6 

500 

28-59 

RB  05  A 

1 

150 

n.a. 

U.S. 

Bulldog 

5 

n.a. 

n.a. 

Bullpup 

1 

1 1 5-nuc . 

16 

Condor 

2 

227 

65-85 

Walleye  I 

2 

585 

bomb 

Walleye  II 

2 

907 

bomb 

Shrike 

6 

50 

15-17 

Maverick 

2 

59 

n.a. 

Hobo 

2 

907/1560 

bomb 

Pave  way 

5 

225/540/ 
407/1 560 

bomb 
bomb 

Harpoon 

4 

540 

55 

Standard  ARM 

6 

n.a. 

25 

USSR 

AS-1    "Kennel" 

4 

1000? 

90 

AS-2  "Kipper" 

4 

nuc. 

215 

AS- 5  "Kangaroc 

>" 

4 

nuc. 

650 

AS-4  "Kitchen' 

i 

4 

nuc. 

740 

AS-5  "Kelt" 

4 

n.a. 

220 

AS- 6       - 

4 

n.a. 

550? 

Source: 

Jane '  s 

Fighting  Ships 

1974 

-75 

Jane' s 

Weapon  Systems 

1973 

-74 

The  Mi! 

Litary  Balance 

1974-75 

Guidance  Codes: 


1 .  Wire  Guided/Radio  Command 

2.  Electro-Optical 

5.  Semi-Active  Homing 

4«  Active  riadar  Homing/infrared 

5.  Laser  designated 

6.  Anti-Radiation  Missile   (ARM) 


50 


The  introduction  of  such  weapons  does  not  alter  the  long- 
standing principle  that  ships  should  not  venture  into  the  range 

30 

of  land-based  aircraft  without  air  cover  of  their  own.    How- 
ever, it  does  downgrade  the  size  and  proficiency  level  of  the 
air  fleet  which  is  to  be  considered  a  strong  threat.  As  with 
the  SSMs,  pre-packaged  ASM  rounds  can  be  nearly  as  dangerous  in 
unskilled  hands  as  skilled  ones.  In  those  states  with  already 
proficient  ground  attack  or  marine  patrol  squadrons,  they  lend 

credence  to  the  arguments  that  the  air  force  should  be  assigned 

31 

a  larger  role  in  coastal  defense. 

In  one  sense,  however,  the  advent  of  both  ASMs  and  SSMs 
has  simplified  the  problem  for  the  defender  in  that  a  point- 
defense  system  designed  for  one  may  be  able  to  deal  with  the 
other.  There  are  several  such  possibilities,  ranging  from 

short-range  missiles  to  aircraft  20mm  cannon  with  firing  rates 

32 

on  the  order  of  6000  rounds  per  minute.    In  a  longer  time 

frame  the  use  of  laser-designated  projectiles  fired  from  guns 


See  Vice  Admiral  Sir  Arthur  Hezlet,  Aircraft  and  Sea 
Power  (New  York:  Stein  and  Day,  1970),  passim. 

31 

The  U.S.  Air  Force   has  shown  an  increased  interest  in 

such  a  mission  since  at   least  the  early   1970s.      Conclusions  sup- 
porting greater  Air  Force  participation  in  maritime  operations 
also  were   reached  by   the  Australian  Maritime  Airpower  Study 
Group.      Captain  J.   A.   0'Farrell,   R.A.N. ,    to  author,    June   19,    1974« 

32 

Some  of  the  best  writing  on  this  subject  is  contained  in 

the  brilliant  articles  by  Desmond  Scrivener,  "Weapons  for  the 
General  Purpose  Escort,"  International  Defense  Review  (hereafter 
IDR).  #3/1973,  pp.  331-336  and  "Escort  Ships— An  Alternative 
Solution?"  IDR,  #4/1 973 ,  pp.  46O-463. 


31 


33 

may  shift  the  balance  back  in  favor  of  the  defense. 

In  short,  the  ASM  and  SSM  represent  a  phase  of  the  offense- 
defense  cycle  which  definitely  favors  the  attacker.  But,  as  one 

respondent  put  it,  the  surface  ship  is  too  valuable  a  tool  to 

34 
•'roll  over  and  die."    In  time,  technology  will  find  a  counter 

to  today's  threats,  even  though  new  ones  will  arise  in  their 

place.  Nevertheless,  for  most  of  the  period  covered  by  this 

study,  all  but  the  most  sophisticated  ships  will  be  vulnerable 

to  the  armed  forces  of  small  coastal  states  which  heretofore 

have  posed  few  dangers. 

Other  Tactical  Innovations 

The  addition  of  an  air  capability  to  medium-sized  com- 
batants, will  greatly  increase  the  tactical  effectiveness  of 
single  ships  in  both  surface  and  ASW  roles.  It  also  will  enhance 
their  defensibility  against  most  forms  of  attack.  As  noted 
earlier,  shipboard  aircraft  eventually  may  reduce  the  SSM  threat 
in  the  same  way  that  long  range  gunnery  reduced  that  of  the 
torpedo  boat — by  making  it  possible  to  destroy  an  attacker 
before  he  can  get  close  enough  to  launch  his  weapons.  Moreover, 


53 

The  U.S.  Navy  is  developing  laser  seekers  for  shore- 
bombardment  projectiles.  Congress  evidently  has  been  satisfied 
with  the  program  to  date.  See  U.S.  Congress,  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives, Armed  Services  Committee,  Keport  95~1035  Authorizing 
Appropriations  for  Military  Procurement  and  Research,  Develop- 
ment, Test  and  Evaluation,  93rd  Congress,  2nd  session  (Washing^- 
ton:   U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1 974) ,  p.  45. 

%r.  Geoffrey  Jukes,  Australian  National  University, 
interview,  June  18,  1974* 


32 


in  inshore  waters,  aircraft  would  permit  reconnaissance  before 
the  ship  itself  was  placed  in  danger.  However,  the  kinds  of 
vehicles  to  be  found  on  destroyer- type  ships  will  be  no  match 
for  shore-based,  fixed-wing  machines.  More  importantly,  they 
will  not  be  continuously  operable,  and  will  be  legally  restricted 
within  the  territorial  sea.  Thus,  the  danger  of  an  effective 
sudden  strike  by  a  coastal  state  remains  in  those  situations  on 
the  borderline  between  diplomatic  and  forcible  solution. 

Shipboard  lasers  will  enter  naval  inventories  in  the  next 
few  years,  probably  as  range-finders  or  designators  for  bombs  or 
shells.  The  state-of-the-art  in  high-energy  equipment  (death 
rays,  as  it  were)  is  very  highly  classified,  but  perhaps  they 
will  appear  in  point-defense  roles  before  too  long.  Still,  as 
optical  devices,  they  still  will  be  subject  to  atmospheric  limi- 
tations. 

The  most  rapidly  changing,  and  perhaps  the  most  important, 
military  field  is  that  of  electronic  warfare  (EST),  some  of  which 
was  discussed  in  the  previous  section.  Airborne  EW  equipment 
was  absolutely  essential  to  the  air  war  over  Vietnam  and  to  the 

Israeli  successes  in  the  Middle  East,  and  such  devices  have  a 

35 

full  range  of  shipboard  counterparts.   Tactical  data  systems 


35 

These  are  shipboard  digital  computer  systems  to  assist 

in  command  and  control  functions.  Examples  are  the  U.S.  Navy's 
NTDS  (Naval  Tactical  Data  System),  Britain's  ADAWS  (Action  Data 
Automation  Weapons  System)  and  France's  SENIT  (Systeme  d'Exploi- 
tation  Navale  des  Informations  Tactiques).   It  may  not  be  an 
exaggeration  to  say  that  effective  anti-aircraft  or  anti-missile 
operations  have  become  impossible  without  such  automated  infor- 
mation processing. 


33 

already  have  transformed  the  internal  organization  of  warships, 
and  promise  to  be  extended  still  further.  A  side  effect  will  be 
more  pressures  for  international  standardization,  if  not  in 
hardware,  then  at  least  in  software  to  permit  interfacing 
between  national  systems.  It  may  be,  someday,  that  battles  will 
be  decided  by  EW  operators  before  the  weapons  are  even  launched, 
but  the  balance  is  shifting  back  and  forth  so  rapidly  that  it  is 
difficult  to  make  any  long-term  statements  about  it. 

With  speeds  in  the  40-100  knot  range,  surface  skimming 
vehicles  can  greatly  improve  naval  mobility  and  flexibility. 
Hydrofoils  probably  will  continue  to  be  limited  to  tactical  roles 
because  of  size  and  range  restrictions.  However,  surface  effect 
ships  or  Wing- in-Ground-Ef feet  transports  eventually  may  grow 
large  enough  and  numerous  enough  to  become  a  factor  in  strategic 
planning.  Given  enough  capacity,  they  could  reduce  the  need  for 
overseas  bases.  Nevertheless,  such  breakthroughs  will  not  come 
quickly,  and  for  the  next  few  years,  surface  skimmers  probably 
will  be  confined  to  relatively  near-shore  operations. 

Often  overlooked,  but  of  major  importance,  are  mines. 
Though  there  have  been  few  dramatic  breakthroughs,  the  potential 


36 

'   For  many  years  the  naval  professional  literature  has 

been  full  of  debates  about  whether  or  not  a  commanding  officer 
should  fight  his  ship  from  the  traditional  position  on  the  bridge, 
or  from  the  integrated  sensor  environment  of  Combat  Information 
Center  (CIC).   Having  apparently  been  decided  in  favor  of  the 
latter,  the  question  now  arises  of  how  far  weapons  release 
authority  must  be  delegated  to  effectively  respond  to  the  ultra- 
short warning  times  of  modern  threats. 


34 


of  modern  devices  has  "become  so  great  as  to  have  both  tactical 
and  strategic  implications.  These  will  be  discussed  in  Chapter 
Nine. 

Finally,  there  are  environmental  modification  techniques. 
Proposed  activities  range  from  localized  rainmaking,  as  was 
practiced  in  Vietnam,  to  selective  destruction  of  the  earth's 

ozone  layer,  and  "acoustic  fields  on  the  sea  and  ocean  surface 

37 

to  combat  individual  ships  or  whole  flotillas."    It  must  be 

remembered  that  such  operations  currently  are  directed  at 
naturally  unstable  situations,  where  the  relatively  small 
energies  which  man  can  introduce  into  the  system  may  tip  the 
balance  one  way  or  the  other.    As  such,  artificial  tidal  waves 
and  typhoons  are  still  mostly  in  the  realm  of  science  fiction. 
However,  even  small-scale  successes  could  have  dramatic,  if 
unpredictable,  effects  on  navies.  One  can  imagine  a  group  of 
scientists  trying  to  keep  a  task  force  hidden  in  bad  weather 
while  the  opposition  seeks  to  bathe  it  in  sunshine. 


37 
Resolution  submitted  by  the  Soviet  Union  to  the  United 

Nations  to  ban  such  activities.  Reported  in  The  Washington  Post, 

October  23,  1 9T4>  P»  A27.   It  is  not  clear  what  is  meant  by 

"acoustic  fields."  Perhaps  they  simply  refer  to  the  Western 

hydrophone  arrays  noted  below.  Alternatively,  they  might  be 

sonic  devices  designed  to  blank  out  or  deceive  sonars.  The  use 

of  acoustic  energy  for  destructive  purposes  at  any  distance  is 

rather  limited  by  the  laws  of  physics. 


^  I  am  indebted  to  Captain  Don  Walsh,  U.S.  Navy,  for  this 


point. 


35 


Strategic  Developments 

Submarine  vs  An ti- Submarine 

Prom  the  dark  days  of  1941  and.  1942,  the  Allied  anti- 
submarine warfare  (ASW)  rebounded  spectacularly.  Towards  the 
end  of  World  War  II,  the  advantage  in  a  contest  between  a  sub- 
marine and  its  pursuers  lay  almost  entirely  with  the  latter. 
The  primary  reasons  were  four- fold.  First,  the  development  of 
high-frequency  sea  and  airborne  radar  denied  the  submarine  the 
time  on  the  surface  to  increase  its  operating  radius  and  recharge 
its  batteries.  Second,  the  availability  of  escort  carriers  made 
it  possible  to  provide  air  cover  for  merchantmen  all  the  way 
across  the  Atlantic.  Third,  improvements  in  sonar  capability, 
operator  skills  and  escort  tactics  gave  a  better  chance  of 
detecting  a  submarine  prior  to  attack.  In  any  event,  the  speed 
disparity  between  a  submerged  submarine  and  a  surface  escort 
(6-7  knots  vs.  20-35)  left  the  initiative  with  the  surface  ship 
once  the  sub  was  located.  Finally,  and  perhaps  most  important, 
the  organization  of  Allied  ASW  had  greatly  improved.  High- 
frequency  direction-finder  stations  ringed  the  Atlantic,  and  got 
generalized  fixes  as  the  U-boats  sent  their  nightly  messages  to 

Admiral  Doenitz.  The  U.S.  Navy  established  the  Tenth  Fleet  in 

39 

May  1943  to  coordinate  anti-submarine  activities.    Better 

cooperation  was  achieved  between  British  and  American  authorities. 


^Ladislas  Farago,  The  Tenth  Fleet  (New  York:   Ivan 
Obelensky,  1962). 


35 


Strategic  Developments 

Submarine  vs  An ti- Submarine 

From  the  dark  days  of  1941  and  1942,  the  Allied  anti- 
submarine warfare  (ASW)  rebounded  spectacularly.  Towards  the 
end  of  World  War  II,  the  advantage  in  a  contest  between  a  sub- 
marine and  its  pursuers  lay  almost  entirely  with  the  latter. 
The  primary  reasons  were  four- fold.  First,  the  development  of 
high-frequency  sea  and  airborne  radar  denied  the  submarine  the 
time  on  the  surface  to  increase  its  operating  radius  and  recharge 
its  batteries.  Second,  the  availability  of  escort  carriers  made 
it  possible  to  provide  air  cover  for  merchantmen  all  the  way 
across  the  Atlantic.  Third,  improvements  in  sonar  capability, 
operator  skills  and  escort  tactics  gave  a  better  chance  of 
detecting  a  submarine  prior  to  attack.  In  any  event,  the  speed 
disparity  between  a  submerged  submarine  and  a  surface  escort 
(6-7  knots  vs.  20-35)  left  the  initiative  with  the  surface  ship 
once  the  sub  was  located.  Finally,  and  perhaps  most  important, 
the  organization  of  Allied  ASW  had  greatly  improved.  High- 
frequency  direction-finder  stations  ringed  the  Atlantic,  and  got 
generalized  fixes  as  the  U-boats  sent  their  nightly  messages  to 

Admiral  Doenitz.  The  U.S.  Navy  established  the  Tenth  Fleet  in 

39 

May  1943  to  coordinate  anti-submarine  activities.    Better 

cooperation  was  achieved  between  British  and  American  authorities. 


^Ladislas  Farago,  The  Tenth  Fleet  (New  York:   Ivan 
Obelensky,  1962). 


39 


These  doubtless  will  be  augmented  soon  by  transfers  from  the 
U.S.  and  Soviet  fleets,  as  well  as  sales  of  European  designs. 
The  possession  of  similar  craft  by  several  states  could 
raise  serious  identification  problems  in  the  event  of 
unacknowledged  submarine  attacks.  Such  acts  are  not  unprece- 
dented. Italian  submarines  torpedoed  British,  French,  Spanish, 

Russian  and  Danish  vessels  bound  for  Republican  Spain  during 

46 
July  and  August  1 937  >   and  again  in  1939. 

This  leads  to  the  second  point,  namely  that  it  will  take 

organization  to  defeat  a  submarine  threat  or  perhaps  even  to 

identify  it.  Unconventional  approaches,  such  as  containerized 

helicopter  support  systems  aboard  merchantmen,  may  offer 

relatively  low-cost  solutions  to  tactical  problems.  These  will 

be  examined  in  later  chapters.   But  the  greater  difficulties  of 

early  warning  and  target  localization  will  require  a  complex, 

wide-area  intelligence  network.  This  is  something  which  the 

major  powers,  particularly  the  U.S.,  would  be  in  a  position  to 

offer  in  the  event  of  such  "Nth  Country"  submarine  attacks. 


See  Robert  Goldston,  The  Civil  War  in  Spain  (Greenwich: 
Fawcett,  1966),  PP«  1 63  and  176.   Also,  James  W.  Cortada, 
"Ships,  Diplomacy  and  the  Spanish  Civil  War:  Kyon  Conference, 
September  1937,"  II  Politico,  XXXVII,  #4  (Diciembre  1972),  pp. 
673-689.  Although  all  governments  knew  who  was  responsible,  the 
charges  could  not  be  proved  and  so  diplomatic  fiction  was  pre- 
served to  the  extent  of  giving  Italians  the  responsibility  for 
ASW  in  one  sector!   Whether  or  not  today's  acoustic  identifica- 
tion would  be  better  grounds  for  indictment  remains  to  be  seen. 


40 


Sealift  and  Airlift 

Despite  the  increasing  capacity  of  cargo  aircraft,  the 
merchant  ship  continues  to  be  the  foundation  of  the  international 
movement  of  both  military  and  civilian  goods.  In  the  United 

States,  in  1969,  79.65/*  by  value  and  99.8$  by  weight  of  U.S. 

47 

exports  went  by  ship.    Figures  for  other  industrial  countries 

are  comparable. 

Moreover,  with  the  advent  of  industrialization,  maritime 
commerce  developed  further  strategic  importance.  Guerre  de 
course  has  been  an  important  part  of  naval  activities  since  the 
days  of  mercantilism.  Piet  Heyn's  capture  of  a  silver  flota  off 
Cuba  in  1628  was  a  devastating  blow  to  Spain's  financial  credit 
in  Europe.    During  the  time  of  Louis  XIV,  commerce  raiders 

took  as  proportionately  heavy  a  toll  of  British  shipping  as  the 

49 
U-boats  of  1917  and  1942.    But,  since  the  only  real  strategic 

materials  of  that  period  were  masts  and  naval  stores,  there  was 

not  the  danger  of  starvation  or  industrial  paralysis  which 

characterized  the  blockades  of  Germany  and  Great  Britain  during 

Y/orld  War  I  and  Japan  and  Great  Britain  during  World  War  II. 

In  the  military  sphere,  the  strides  made  by  strategic 


*' Office  of  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations,  U.S.  Lifelines- 


09D-P1  (Revised),  June  1 971 . 

4  J.  H.  Parry,  The  Spa 
Pelican  Books,  1973),  pp.  261-262. 

49 

Robert  G.  Albion  and  Jenni 

time  (New  York:  W.  W.  Norton  &  Co.,  1942),  Chapter  1. 


Aft 

J.  H.  Parry,  The  Spanish  Seaborne  Empire  (Middlesex: 


49 
^Robert  G.  Albion  and  Jennie  B.  Pope,  Sea  Lanes  in  War- 


41 


airlift  were  dramatically  demonstrated  by  both  the  U.S.  and  the 
USSR  during  the  1973  Yom  Kippur  War.  In  566  missions  between 
October  and  December  1 973»  U.S.  C-5  and  C-141  aircraft  delivered 

22,395  tons  of  supplies,  the  Soviets  15,000  tons  in  934 

50 
missions.    The  importance  of  these  figures  was  not  so  much  in 

their  size — over  13,000  tons  were  delivered  in  one  day  during 
the  height  of  the  Berlin  airlift — but  in  the  distances  over 
which  they  were  carried.  It  is  nearly  12,000  kilometers  between 
Dover  Air/Force  Base  in  Delaware,  where  the  airlift  began,  and 
Lod  airport  in  Israel.  By  contrast,  Tempelhof  airfield  in  West 
Berlin  was  less  than  220  kilometers  from  some  of  its  supporting 
bases. 

The  rapid  response  capability  of  aerial  transport  has 
become  an  indispensable  part  of  modern  warfare.  Yet  the  move- 
ment of  the  quantities  of  equipment  needed  to  support  extended 
operations  and  even  to  replenish  stocks  expended  in  short,  high- 
intensity  combat  remains  the  domain  of  sealift.  The  Chairman  of 
the  U.S.  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  had  high  praise  for  the  Military 
Airlift  Command's  effort  during  the  Middle  East  War,  but  added: 

Not  so  well  publicized  is  the  fact  that  from 
October  6,  1973  to  date  (May  3,  1974)  sealift 
accounted  for  over  7O70  of  the  total  tonnage 
moved. 51 


Aviation  Week,  December  10,1973?  PP«  16—19. 

51 

J   Admiral  Thomas  H.  Moorer,  USN,  speech  to  the  Jacksonville 

Council  of  the  Navy  League,  May  3> 1974*  Quoted  in  Navy  Times 
(Pacific),  May  22,1974,  P«  13- 


42 


In  Vietnam,  well  over  95$  of  the  material  arrived  by  ship. 
It  can  be  argued,  of  course,  that  it  would  have  been  better  had 
we  not  had  the  capability  to  sustain  that  effort,  but  that  does 
not  detract  from  the  potential  of  shipping  itself. 

None  of  the  post-World  War  II  airlifts,  from  Berlin  to 
Lebanon,  to  the  Congo,  Vietnam  and  the  Middle  East,  were 
seriously  opposed  (except  for  diplomatic  problems  involving 
overflight).  Neither  were  the  post-war  sealifts,  with  the 
limited  exception  of  the  North  Korean  mines  off  of  Wonsan  in 
1950*  The  impact  of  active  resistance  on  modern  logistics 
remains  untested. 

The  role  of  sea  transportation  in  a  general  war  is  diffi- 
cult to  imagine.  See,  for  instance,  Peter  Gretton's  critique  of 

53 

NATO  resupply  strategy  in  his  Maritime  Strategy.    Neither  is  a 

54 
"Grey  War"  against  the  sea  lanes  alone  very  credible.    Never- 
theless, a  mine  or  submarine  campaign  against  the  British  Isles, 
Japan,  or  Taiwan  at  least  is  technically  feasible.  Japan's 
strengths  and  weaknesses  in  the  face  of  such  a  threat  will  be 


52 

Robert  J.  Blackwell,  Assistant  Secretary  of  Commerce  for 

Maritime  Affairs.  Statement  before  the  Sea  Power  Subcommittee 
of  the  House  Armed  Services  Committee  (hereafter  Blackwell 
Testimony) .  September  19,  1974  (Mimeo),  p.  74* 

55Gretton,  op.,  cit.  (note  1-1 ),  pp.  76-80  and  190-191. 

%ichael  MccGwire  has  provided  a  convincing  rebuttal  to 
scenarios  of  a  Soviet  attack  on  Western  shipping  alone.  See  his 
"The  Submarine  Threat  to  Western  Shipping"  in  J.  L.  Moulton, 
British  Maritime  Strategy  in  the  Seventies  (London:  Royal 
United  Services  Institute,  1969) • 


43 


explored  in  detail  later.  It  is  worth  noting,  however,  that 
although  strategic  airlift  may  be  invaluable  in  the  delivery  of 
weaponry  and  other  war  materiel,  there  is  little  that  it  can  do 
to  sustain  an  overall  economy. 

Based  on  the  experiences  of  the  World  Wars,  there  are 


indications  that  an  island  nation  could  suffer  up  to  a  bOfa 

55 
reduction  of  imports  without  complete  collapse.    From  the  food 

standpoint,  Japan  currently  produces  about  1,530  calories  per 

day,  some  40  per  cent  of  her  normal  consumption  in  terms  of 

56 

original  calories.  She  is,   of  course,  much  less  self- 

sufficient  in  many  other  critical  commodities. 

The  U.S.  Air  Force  has  some  77  C-5A  and  276  C-141    transport 
aircraft  available.     Using  loading  rates  similar  to  those  achieved 


55 

Interviews  with  Japanese  Maritime  Self  Defense  Force 

(hereafter  MSDF)  Officer,  April  20,    1974.     It  is  based  on  the 

fact  that  1942  British  imports  reached  a  minimum  of  about  43$  of 

1939-40  demand.     Japan's  war  production,    on  the  other  hand, 

deteriorated  rapidly  after  1944*   when  U.S.    submarines  reduced 

her  raw  materials   imports  to  35$  of  pre-war  amounts.     British 

data  from  C.    B.   A.   Behrens,   Merchant  Shipping  and  the  Demands  of 

War,   U.K.    Civil  Series   (London:      Her  Majesty's  Stationery  Office, 

1955)>   PP«   65-200.      Japanese   figures  from  United  States 

Strategic  Bombing  Survey  (USSBS),    "The  Effects  of  Strategic 

Bombing  on  Japan's  War  Economy,"  USSBS,   Yol.    53   (Washington: 

Government  Printing  Office,  1947)*   Similarly,  the  British 

blockade  of  Germany  in  World  War  I  cut  the  average  citizen's 

calorie  intake  to  1,431»  about  44 '5  per  cent  of  the  peacetime 

figure.  See  C.  Ernest  Fayle,  Seaborne  Trade ,  Yol.  II:   The 

Submarine  Campaign  to  the  End  of  19,16  (London:  John  Manning, 

1923),  p.  404. 

56 

Asahi  Shimbun  series,  "Food  and  People,"  installment  VT, 

July  14,  1973*  See  below,  Chapter  Five. 


44 


57 
during  the  1973  Mideast  War   to  cany  raw  materials  from  the 

West  Coast  to  Japan,  the  entire  U.S.  Air  Force  heavy  lift  capacity 
could  supply  less  than  six  percent  of  an  austere  (40/^  of  peace- 
time) Japanese  iron  ore  need  alone.  This  in  no  way  diminishes 
the  value  of  these  aircraft,  but  highlights  the  competitive 
advantage  of  ships  in  the  transport  of  the  bulk  cargoes  so 
necessary  to  everyday  life. 

Contrary  to  popular  opinion,  it  is  not  only  the  West  that 
is  dependent  on  this  trade.  Much  has  been  written  about  the 
Soviet  Union's  internal  lines  of  east-west  communications,  the 
Trans-Siberian  Railway,  the  canal  system,  etc.  However,  a  large 
percentage  of  the  goods  arriving  in  eastern  Siberia  comes  by 
ship  either  through  the  Indian  Ocean  or  by  the  Arctic  route. 


57                          C-141  C-5A 
Cargo  Loadings  (Yom  Kippur 

airlift)      15  tons  75  tons 

Speed                       465  kts.  465  kts. 

Distance  465O  n.m.  465O  n.m. 

Flying  Time  (Round  Trip)        20  hrs.  20  hrs. 

Sorties  per  aircraft/day  (est)   .75  »75 

Available  aircraft             276  77 

Total  Cargo/day  51 05  T  4556  T 

Japanese  Iron  Ore  Imports  118,785,000  tons/yr  =  325,458  tons/day 
4tyo  of  peacetime  imports  FY  1972  =  130,175  tons/day 

Source:   Aircraft  data  from  Jane ' s  All  The  World's  Aircraft, 
1973-74. 

Imports  from  Ministry  of  International  Trade  and  Industry  (MITl). 
Comparable  figures  for  other  commodities  (at  the  4.O/0   level)  are: 
Petroleum  -  jfo,   Coal  -  14$,  Foodstuffs  -  58^.  Note  that  cargo 
loads  could  be  increased  to  35  tons  and  110  tons  respectively 
over  shorter  distances  or  at  full  range  with  the  mid-air 
refueling  now  being  developed  for  the  C~5» 

CO 

Robert  E.  Athay,   "The  Sea  and  Soviet  Domestic 


45 


Thus,  it  would  seem  that  maritime  transportation  will 
continue  to  be  the  mainstay  of  peaceful  international  commerce* 
Over  a  wide  variety  of  wartime  scenarios  sealif t  capability  will 
be  important,  both  for  long-term  conflict  resupply  and  to  deter 
by  displaying  the  capacity  to  cope  with  blockades  of  long 
duration.  In  many  cases,  however,  an  airlift, may  be  necessary 
to  buy  enough  time  for  the  seaborne  supply  operations  to  become 
effective. 

Other  Strategic  Innovations 

Weapon  systems  with  strategic  implications  in  modern  naval 
warfare  range  from  the  attack  carrier  to  ballistic  missile 
submarines  to  land-based  bombers  and  missiles  which  could  be 
targeted  against  convoys,  task  forces,  etc.  Although  volumes 
could  be  written  on  each,  these  devices  generally  are  outside  of 
Japan's  purview  at  present.  They  will  be  referred  to  later  in 
more  specific  contexts. 


Transportation,"  USNIP,  XCVTII  (May  1972),  pp.  158-179,  does  not 
give  exact  figures,  but  states: 

.  .  .  large  areas  of  the  Soviet  Union,  chiefly  on  the 
Pacific  and  in  the  Arctic  .  .  .  rely  on  shipping  for 
their  main  transport  links  with  the  rest  of  the 
country  and  with  the  outside  world,  (p.  177) 

See  also  U.S.,  Congress,  House  of  Representatives,  Committee  on 
Foreign  Affairs,  The  Indian  Ocean:   Political  and  S_trategi_c 
Future,  92nd  Cong.,  1st  session  (Washington:   U.S.  Government 
Printing  Office,  1971),  P-  3» 


46 


Environment-Level  Developments 

Rarely  does  technology  actually  alter  the  arena  of  conflict 
itself.  The  aircraft  and  the  submarine  did,  of  course,  by  intro- 
ducing new  dimensions  to  the  battlefield.  Other  developments 
were  noted  at  the  beginning  of  the  chapter.  At  present,  however, 
there  are  two  interrelated  programs  underway  which  may  one  day 
have  similarly  far-reaching  effects. 

Real-Time  Ocean  Surveillance  Systems 

One  of  the  prerequisites  to  the  SALT  agreements  was  the 

development  of  "national  technical  means  of  verification," 

59 
primarily  reconnaissance  satellites.    Having  proved  their 

worth  in  strategic  intelligence,  attention  has  begun  to  turn  to 
their  tactical  potential.  This  has  profound  implications.  Should 
it  become  possible  to  monitor  the  movements  of  naval  vessels  on 
a  real-time  (as  occurring)  basis,  it  would  change  the  entire 
environment  of  warfare  at  sea. 

A  1972  study  indicated  that  satellite  cameras  could  resolve 
objects  of  about  one  foot  from  an  altitude  of  100  miles.  Infra- 
red sensors  and  side-looking  airborne  radar  (SLAR)  also  were  felt 
to  be  aboard  some  of  the  latest  vehicles.    Shipborne  radar 


59 

^SALT  I  Agreement,  Article  XII,  para.  1.  The  complete 

range  of  national  intelligence  assets  naturally  would  be  devoted 

to  such  work,  but  satellites  are  among  the  most  important  in  this 

case. 

Ted  Greenwood,   Reconnaissance,   Surveillance   and  Arms 
Control,   Adelphi  Papers  No.   88  (London:      International  Institute 


47 


signals  can  be  monitored  by  electronic  intelligence  satellites 

61 

which  have  been  orbited  since  the  early  1960s. 

There  is  thus  no  doubt  that  the  capability  exists  for 
satellites  to  detect  ships  at  sea  under  clear  skies,  both  day 
and  night.  All-weather  capability  will  depend  on  the  sophisti- 
cation of  the  satellite  radars,  but  this  seems  to  be  developing 

62 

rapidly.  '   The  important  words  thus  are  "real- time."  There 

also  is  a  significant  problem  with  identification. 

Treating  the  former  question  first,  there  are  two  ways  to 
obtain  data  from  satellite  sensors.  The  first  is  to  store  them 

in  a  recoverable  capsule,  which  is  ejected  at  intervals 

63 

(typically  three  days  or  longer  )  for  processing.  This  method 

is  ideal  for  high-resolution  photography,  locating  and  analyzing 


for  Strategic  Studies  (lISS),  1972),  pp.  6-8.  SLAR  gives  a 
photograph- like  image  even  through  cloud  cover.  Given  the  state 
of  current  technology,  the  primary  limitations  on  visual  sensors 
seem  to  be  from  atmospheric  distortions.  These  are  on  the  order 
of  6"  to  one  foot.  Greenwood  feels  that  existing  lenses  and 
films  could  come  close  to  these  limits.  Even  if  television  were 
less  clear  by  an  order  of  magnitude  or  two,  it  still  would  be 
adequate  for  detecting  ships.  See  also  Greenwood's  article 
"Reconnaissance  and  Arms  Control,"  Scientific  American,  228 
(February  1973),  pp.  14-25- 

61 

Stockholm  International  Peace  Research  Institute  (SIPRl), 

"Verification  Using  Reconnaissance  Satellites,"  SIPRI  Yearbook 
1973  (Stockholm:  SIPRI,  1973),  pp.  60-101. 


62u. 


S.  News  and  Y/orld  Report,  October  21,  1974,  P»  H, 


reported  that  Britain  "has  perfected  a  satellite  radar  system 
able  to  pinpoint  every  ship  in  the  Eastern  Atlantic." 

Greenwood,  Scientific  American  Article,  op.  cit., 
pp.  18-20. 


48 


fixed  electronic  emitters,  etc.  The  second  approach  is  to  trans- 
mit the  data  to  the  ground  via  radio  link,  often  after  processing 
aboard  the  satellite.  Such  systems  almost  never  would  be  out  of 
contact  with  U.S.  listening  stations  for  more  than  30  minutes. 

The  limitations  of  the  first  approach  for  ocean  surveillance 
are  evident.  In  72  hours  a  20  knot  task  force  could  be  anywhere 
in  a  22,342,000  square  kilometer  area.  In  other  words,  if  it 
were  detected  at  Guam,  three  days  later  it  could  be  off  TSkyo, 
the  Philippines,  New  Guinea  or  Wake. 

Even  with  a  continuous  data  link,  there  are  problems.  A 

satellite  with  an  orbital  period  of  exactly  90  minutes  will 

65 

retrace  its  path  over  the  earth's  surface  once  every  24  hours. 

A  satellite  in  a  200  km  orbit  could  cover  a  circle  roughly 


Aviation  Week,  August  19>  1 974>  reported  that  the  Earth 
Resources  Technology  Satellite  (ERTS)  would  store  data  on  its 
tape  recorder  when  out  of  touch  with  U.S.  ground  stations  and 
transmit  it  when  communication  was  re-established  about  30 
minutes  later.  The  U.S.  Air  Force  reportedly  maintains  a 
satellite  monitoring  station  at  Alice  Springs,  Australia  which 
might  reduce  the  time  even  more. 

65 

Such  a  satellite  would  complete  16  orbits  in  24  hours, 

bringing  it  back  over  its  starting  point  just  as  the  earth  began 

another  revolution,  thus  repeating  the  cycle.   If  the  period 

were  not  exactly  90  minutes,  the  satellite  would  trace  a 

different  path  each  day.   The  limits  of  latitude  covered  by  a 

satellite  are  defined  by  the  inclination  of  its  orbit  to  the 

Equator,  i.e.  an  inclination  of  90  degrees  would  reach  both 

poles,  while  one  of  75  degrees  or  105  degrees  would  go  only  to 

latitude  75  degrees  North  and  South. 


49 


66 

3120  km  in  diameter,   although  presumably  its  high- resolution 

sensors  have  a  much  narrower  field  of  view.  In  any  case,  to 

provide  coverage  of  a  given  point  once  every  90  minutes,  13 

67 

satellites  at  200  km  would  be  needed.    Given  that  such  an  orbit 

would  decay  fairly  rapidly  (in  about  a  month),  perhaps  as  many  as 

twelve  launches  per  year  would  be  needed  to  keep  each  satellite 

68 
on  station.  At  about  $25  million  per  launch,  '  such  a  program 

quickly  becomes  prohibitively  expensive. 

Obviously,  there  are  trade-offs.  Four  satellites  in  1000 

km  orbit  could  cover  the  equator  once  every  100  minutes  or  so 

and  remain  in  orbit  longer,  albeit  at  a  five-fold  sacrifice  in 

69 

resolution.  A  synchronous  satellite   at  36,000  km  could  provide 


66 

Calculations  as  follows: 

1.  Earth's  radius  (R)  =  3448  n.m.,  radius 

to  satellite  =  (R+108)  =  3556  n.m. 

2.  Cos  Q-  =  .9696,  Sin  Q-  =  /l-Cos2  Q-  =  .2446 

3.  X  =  (R+108)  Sin  Q-  =  869.8, 

Y  =  X  Cos  &  =  843.2  n.m.  =  1562  km 

67 

The  equational  circumference  of  the  Earth  is  about 

40,066  km.  If  the  diameter  of  each  satellite's  "view"  is  3104  km» 
then  12.9  would  be  needed  to  cover  the  equator  at  any  one  moment. 
Fewer  would  be  required  for  higher  latitude  coverage  (i.e.  11 
could  cover  all  areas  above  30  degrees) . 

68 

Estimate  from  Mr.  Philip  J.  Klass,  Aviation  V/eek,  tele- 
phone interview,  October  8,  1974* 

69 

A  synchronous  orbit  is  one  in  which  the  period  of  the 

satellite  is  24  hours,  thus  making  it  appear  to  x*emain  stationery 
over  some  point  on  the  equator.  The  orbital  plane  can  be  inclined 
slightly  to  cause  it  to  trace  out  a  North-South  figure-eight,  but 
such  satellites  are  basically  confined  to  low  latitudes. 


50 


continuous  coverage  of  an  entire  hemisphere  but  with  poor  reso- 
lution and  serious  angular  viewing  problems  near  the  poles.  The 
former  altitude,  incidently,  is  close  to  that  which  the  Soviets 

reportedly  have  used  for  their  recent  ocean  reconnaissance 

70 
vehicles.    Given  that  both  the  U.S.  and  the  Soviet  Union 

usually  have  maintained  only  one  photo  satellite  in  orbit  at 

71 

any  one  time  since  the  late  1960s,   it  is  evident  that  ocean 

surveillance  from  space  will  require  an  extensive,  and  expensive 

additional  effort.  Nevertheless,  both  superpowers  seem  committed 

72 

to  the  project. 

There  is,  however,  another  problem  which  may  be  even  more 
serious  than  the  detection  of  ships  at  sea — their  identification. 
In  1971»  some  22,900  merchant  ships  and  fishing  craft  were  at 


70 

'  Aviation  Week  September  9,  1974,  p.  26.  The  U.S.  Navy's 

Project  749?  however,  reportedly  is  looking  at  a  "low-altitude 

satellite,"  Aviation  Week,  August  9,  1972,  p.  12. 

71 

SIPrtI  Yearbook,    op.   cit. ,    figures  derived  from  Tables 

of  military  launches.     Both  countries,   however,    have  a  larger 

number  of  electronic   intelligence   (ELINT)  —  so  called  "ferret11 — 

satellites  in  orbit.     At  the   end  of  1972,    the  U.S.   had  17   still 

flying  to  the  Soviet's  15,    though  it  is  not  clear  how  many  still 

are  working. 

U.S.  Navy  officials  revealed  in  1973  that  the  Soviets 
were  using  satellites  for  ocean  surface  surveil lance,  stating 
that  the  U.S.  was  five  years  behind  in  the  field  (Aviation  Week, 
September  10,  1973).  Between  December  1973  and  May  1 974  the 
Soviets  launched  3  satellites  with  near-circular  orbits  which 
were  compatible  with  this  role.   (Aviation  Week,  September  9» 
1974)*  The  USAF  recently  has  alunched  a  number  of  vehicles 
using  the  TITAN  III-B  booster  which  may  be  dedicated  to  Navy 
Projects. 


51 


73 
sea  on  any  given  day.         The  figure  is  projected  to  grow  to 

30,437  by  1980.   4     By  contrast,    the  U.S.  Navy  in  1974  had  some 

268  ocean-going  surface  combatants  and  amphibious  ships  while 

the  USSR  had  270.    Even  assuming  that  50$  of  the  forces  would 

76 
be  at  sea  at  any  one  time,   they  would  constitute  only  slightly 

more  than  one  percent  of  the  ships  on  the  ocean,  and  only  about 

two  and  a  half  percent  if  fishing  boats  are  excluded. 

Thus  there  is  a  problem  of  identification.  Warships 

undeniably  have  electromagnetic  signatures  which  are  different 


73 

'^Robert  P.  Thompson,  "Establishing  Global  Traffic  Flows," 

Journal  of  Navigation,  XXV  (October,  1972),  pp.  483-495.  The 

1971  figure  was  arrived  at  by  applying  the  at-sea  percentages 

of  Table  I  to  the  vessel  categories  in  Table  IV. 

*7  A 

Ibid.  The  forecast  is  flawed  by  assumption  of  (1)  con- 
tinued expansion  of  per  capita  oil  consumption. in  the  indus- 
trialized countries  at  1960s  rates  and  (2)  continued  closure  of 
the  Suez  Canal,  but  it  is  useful  nonetheless. 

^Jane's  Fighting  Ships  1974-75,  pp.  642-643.  This 
includes:   Carriers,  cruisers,  destroyers,  frigates,  corvettes, 
assault  ships  and  landing  ships.  The  point  is  not  to  compare 
the  sizes  of  the  two  navies  but  to  point  out  the  relatively  small 
number  of  major  warships  as  a  percent  of  total  ships  at  sea. 

76 

Probably  a  high  estimate,  except  in  the  most  serious 

crises.  About  a  third  of  the  U.S.  fleet  normally  is  deployed 

overseas  in  peacetime,  with  the  figure  rising  to  50-to-60  per 

cent  in  periods  of  tension,  and  90  per  cent  in  a  general  v/ar. 

(Washington  Post,  October  29,  1974).  The  commander  of  the  U.S. 

Atlantic  fleet  stated  in  1974  that  the  U.S.  peacetime  target  was 

42  days  at  sea  per  quarter  (46^0),  but  that  the  tempo  of 

operations  had  fallen  to  about  38  days  (4?$)  for  deployed  units  and 

34  days  (3T/o)   for  others  because  of  fuel  and  budget  constraints.  See 

U.S.,  House  of  Representatives,  Committee  on  Armed  Services, 

Hearings  on  Military  Posture  and  H.R.  12564,  Department  of 

Defense  Authorization  for  Appropriations  for  Fiscal  Year  1975* 

Part  2  of  4,  93rd  Cong.,  2nd  session  (Washington:  U.S.  Government 

Printing  Office,  1974),  p.  940. 


52 


from  those  of  merchantmen.  Naval  radars  can  be  distinguished 
from  commercial  ones,  and  the  volume  of  communications  from  all 
but  the  smallest  man-of-war  is  likely  to  dwarf  that  from  the 
average  merchant  ship.  But  the  time  during  which  a  suspected 
reconnaissance  satellite  will  be  overhead  can  be  predicted,  and 
various  forms  of  deception  exercised  by  naval  and  selected 
merchant  units  during  that  period.  It  also  is  probable  that 
warship  infrared  signatures  are  different  from  those  of  com- 
mercial vessels,  especially  for  larger  units.  With  sensor 
resolutions  of  ten  feet,  a  satellite  should  be  able  to  distin- 
guish a  ship  with  two  active  firerooms  (i.e.  a  warship  or  fast 
liner)  from  one  with  only  one.  These  would  be  more  difficult  to 
mask,  but  presumably  some  ambiguities  could  be  introduced  if 
desired.  The  difficulties  are  compounded  if  it  is  desired  to 
know  which  warships  are  present  and  where  they  are  going  (other 
than  just  to  distinguish  between  warships  and  merchant  ships). 

A  small  vessel  can  simulate  a  larger  one  fairly  easily  through 

77 

a  number  of  devices.  Among  these  would  be:   increased  communi- 
cations traffic,  the  use  of  special  transmitters  to  simulate 
radars  not  actually  carried,  and  special  repeaters  to  enhance 
the  energy  of  reflected  signals  from  enemy  radars  to  make  a 
target  look  bigger  than  it  is.   If  a  ship  actually  is  being 


77 

Jane's  Weapon  Systems  1973-74,  pp.  241-251,  contains  an 

excellent  description  of  basic  Electronic  Warfare  (EW)  pro- 
cedures and  equipments,  from  which  the  examples  herein  are  taken. 


53 


tracked  by  certain  types  of  radar,  techniques  to  give  false 
direction  and  position  information  can  be  employed.  In  sum,  the 
problems  of  real-time  ocean  surveillance  are  formidable,  even 
with  satellites.  It  is  unlikely  that  a  U.S.  commander  soon  will 
be  able  to  ask  about  the  Kresta  class  cruiser  Krasnyi  Krim  and 
be  presented  with  immediate  television  coverage.  On  the  other 
hand,  it  is  not  unreasonable  to  expect  information  to  the  effect 
that  a  Soviet  destroyer- type  ship  was  reported  at  Lat.  X, 
Long.  Y  within  the  past  24  hours.  Anything  in  between  will 
depend  on  the  amount  of  assets  that  one  is  willing  to  commit. 
The  most  practical  approach  is  likely  to  be  through  the 

coordination  of  several  sensors.  In  addition  to  the  seabed 

Tft 
hydrophone  arrays  mentioned  earlier  (p.  36)  •   Over-The-Horizon 

(OTH)  radar  systems  can  track  ships  from  about  1500  to  2950 

79 
kilometers.    Land-based  patrol  aircraft  have  long  been  an 

essential  part  of  maritime  reconnaissance,  and  these  may  be 


7ft 

A  knowledgeable  trade  journal  has  reported  that:   "One 

early  experimental  installation  (of  seabed  listening  systems), 

emplaced  in  1956,  was  aimed  at  spotting  surface  and  submarine 

traffic  leaving  and  approaching  Vladivostok  and  Nachodka  [sic] 

through  the  Sea  of  Japan."  Compass  Publications,  Sea  Technology 

Handbook  Directory  1^74  (Arlington:   Compass  Publications, 

1974),  p.  A/12. 

79 

Donald  E.  Barrick,  "The  Use  of  Skywave  Radar  for  Remote 

Sensing  of  Sea  States,"  Marine  Technology  Society  Journal,  VII 
(January-February  1973) >  PP»  29-53*   In  addition  to  the  back- 
scatter  radar  at  the  Naval  Research  Laboratory  on  Chesapeake  Bay 
used  for  the  studies  reported  in  the  article,  the  U.S.  has 
deployed  OTH-B  radars  as  part  of  its  ballistic  missile  early 
warning  system  (BMEWS).  Whether  or  not  these  radars  can  (or 
will)  be  converted  for  sea  surveillance  is  not  known. 


54 


80 
supplemented  by  modified  U-2s  operating  from  carriers.    High 

Frequency  Direction-Finder  networks  have  been  used  with  great 

success  since  World  War  II.  Perhaps  the  most  cost-effective 

combination  would  be  a  satellite  to  provide  24  hour  position 

81 
checks  with  updates  provided  by  aircraft  or  "tattletail"  ships 

as  deemed  necessary  by  on-scene  commanders.  Alternatively, 

integrated  sensor  systems  could  be  developed  in  high-interest 

regions  (such  as  the  exits  from  the  Baltic,  the  Norwegian  Sea 

or  the  Sea  of  Japan,  or  the  approaches  to  the  Persian  Gulf. 

82 

Perhaps  as  in  NTDS,   targets  could  be  assigned  track  numbers, 

identified  by  electronic  or  other  means,  and  then  watched  until 
they  passed  out  of  the  surveillance  area  or  were  turned  over  to 
elements  dedicated  solely  to  their  monitoring.  In  the  near 
future,  the  Soviets  are  likely  to  have  an  edge  in  this  regard 
since  they  are  mainly  interested  in  the  relatively  few  U.S.  air- 
craft carriers,  which  can  be  trailed  if  necessary.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  U.S.  has  the  computer  technology  to  eventually  develop 
a  better  ocean-wide  surveillance  system  through  remote  sensors. 
Paradoxically,  it  may  be  easier  to  hide  valuable  ships  in 


80Aviation  Week,  May  8,  1972,  p.  26. 

81 

A  "tattletail"  is  a  surface  ship  assigned  to  follow  an 

opponent's  fleet  and  report  its  movements,  state  of  readiness, 

launches  of  missiles,  etc. 

82 

See  above,  note  35*  Aviation  Week,  August  9»  1972, 

reported  "A  .  .  .  series  of  three  small  software  studies  dealing 

with  track  correlation  for  the  ocean  surveillance  satellite  .  .  ." 

(emphasis  supplied) . 


55 


peacetime  than  in  wartime  since  there  are  merchantmen  to  get 
lost  among  along  the  normal  sealanes.  At  the  same  time,  the 
general  location  of  convoys  in  wartime  might  not  be  too  diffi- 
cult if  all  ships  were  moving  in  discrete  clusters.  This, 
incidently,  is  not  an  adequate  argument  for  abolishing  a  convoy. 
Its  purpose  is  not  to  hide,  but  to  provide  for  easier  defense. 
This  it  surely  does  in  all  but  a  nuclear  environment,  since  the 
initial  detection  problem  of  the  submarine  is  partly  solved  if 
it  is  known  that  he  must  come  to  the  vicinity  of  the  convoy. 

What  then,  are  the  implications  for  naval  operations  of  a 
partial  ocean  surveillance  system?  In  a  general  war  environment, 
it  is  uncertain.  If  there  is  no  "tattle tail"  in  physical  contact, 
there  probably  still  are  enough  deception  measures  available  to 
confuse  the  surveillance  systems  long  enough  to  launch  a  carrier 
strike,  especially  if  there  is  some  bad  weather  around  to  hide 
under. 

In  any  case,  the  information  likely  to  be  available  from 
any  sort  of  ocean  surveillance  system  over  the  next  few  years 
probably  won't  be  able  to  ensure  a  first  strike  capability 
against  ships  at  sea.   In  the  longer  term,  however,  it  could 
seriously  erode  the  effectiveness  of  surface  warships  by  pro- 
viding targeting  information  for  submarines,  ballistic  anti-ship 

missiles  (which,  by  then,  could  be  fitted  with  homing  war- 

•  83 
heads),    or  even  IRMs. 


This  discussion  has  avoided  the  detection  of  submerged 


56 


In  a  limited  wax,  surveillance  might  be  decisive,  but  the 
evidence  is  not  conclusive.  Even  if  ASM-carrying  aircraft  could 
find  a  task  force,  the  outcome  of  an  engagement  between  them  and 
an  alerted  group  of  fighters  carrying  the  60-mile-plus  Phoenix 
missile  certainly  is  not  a  foregone  conclusion,  especially  if 
the  ships  also  have  point-defense  systems. 

If  the  ships  themselves  are  not  targets,  the  surveillance 
does  not  seem  likely  to  make  too  much  difference.  A  Soviet 
intelligence  trawler  monitored  U.S.  operations  in  the  Gulf  of 
Tonkin  throughout  the  Vietnam  war  and  doubtless  passed  strike 
information  along  to  the  North  Vietnamese  if,  indeed,  they  could 
not  have  detected  it  themselves. 

In  many  peacetime  operations  it  is  helpful  to  have  your 
opponent  know  what  you  are  doing  as  soon  as  possible.  One  com- 
mentator has  noted  that,  in  the  1958  Quemoy  crisis  and  the  1967 
war: 

Warship  activity  appeared  to  be  an  excellent 
indicator  of  Washington's  intentions.  The  ^^6'J 
fleet  maneuvers,  in  keeping  with  U.S.  policy,  were 
deliberately  restrained  and  aggressive  only  at  the 
time  of  presumed  Soviet  threat.  Highly  publicized 
augmentations  in  1958  demonstrated  U.S.  determina- 
tion.  In  both  cases,  Soviet  emphasis  on  naval 


submarines  by  satellites.     Although  the  Skylab  astronauts 
followed  schools  of  fish  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,    some  progress 
has  been  made   in  the  use   of  blue-green  airborne   lasers  for 
shallow  water  sea  bed  mapping,    and  other  work  has  been  reported 
in  satellite-based  lasers,    it  does  not  appear  that  any  radical 
ASW  breakthroughs  will  be  forthcoming  in  the  next  few  years. 
See  Tsipis,    et  al.,   The  Future  of  the  Sea-Based  Deterrent,    op. 
cit.    (note  45),  pp.   121-1 50. 


57 


activity  as  a  true  reflection  of  American  intentions 
increased  the  significance  of  warship  movements.  4 

Thus,  the  two  principal  circumstances  in  which  ocean  surveillance 

could  undercut  the  political  effectiveness  of  naval  forces  are 

(1)  when  it  is  desired  to  make  your  opponent  think  that  you  have 

much  larger  forces  "just  over  the  horizon"  and  (2)  when  it  is 

desired  to  transit  a  strait,  or  arrive  on  the  scene  before  he 

has  a  chance  to  prepare  or  protest.  The  classic  example  of  the 

first  occurred  during  Graf  Spee 's  brief  stay  in  Montevideo  after 

the  1939  action  off  the  River  Plate.  Although  the  nearest  heavy 

reinforcements  were  several  hundred  miles  away,  the  British 

managed  to  convince  her  captain  that  the  cruisers  which  had 

brought  her  to  bay  had  been  reinforced  by  capital  ships.    This 

knowledge  doubtless  was  instrumental  in  the  decision  to  scuttle 

the  German  raider. 

An  illustration  of  the  second  might  have  been  during  the 

December  1970  Indo-Pakistani  war,  when  the  carrier  Enterprise 

and  her  escorts  entered  the  Indian  Ocean  via  the  Malacca  Straits. 

For  most,  the  first  word  of  this  movement  was  the  passage  of  the 

86 
task  force  through  the  straits,   thus  giving  the  riparian 


Tlowe,  _oj>.  cit.  (note  1-5) >  P»  331  • 

-^Dudley  Pope,  The  Battle  of  the  River  Plate  (London: 
William  Kimber,  1956). 

86 

U.S.  sources  officially  have  maintained  that  no  prior 

notification  was  given  for  this  transit  and  this  was  substanti- 
ated by  interviews  in  Malaysia  and  Singapore  during  June  1974* 


58 


government  no  chance  to  decide  on  a  course  of  action  or  lodge  a 
complaint  in  advance.  Similarly,  in  1958,  shortly  after  Sukarno 
proclaimed  Indonesia's  archipelago  doctrine,  U.S.  destroyer 
division  31  transited  Lombok  and  Makassar  straits  to  register 

displeasure  with  the  unilateral  enclosure  of  heretofore  open 

R7 
waters.    One  can  imagine  a  similar  scenario  in  which  the 

Soviet  Union,  or  U.S.,  might  make  the  movements  of  its  adver- 
saries known  to  a  coastal  state  in  order  to  allow  it  time  to 
prepare  an  embarrassing  protest  or  even  ready  some  of  the 
weapons  noted  earlier. 

This  once  again  emphasizes  the  value  of  organization. 
While  weapons  technology  may  temporarily  shift  the  advantage  in 
favor  of  attacker  or  defender,  organization,  particularly  in 
intelligence,  is  likely  to  be  a  permanent  feature  distinguishing 
major  maritime  powers  from  small  or  middle  power  navies. 

Command  Control  Communications  (c  ) 

Communications  is  the  key  to  the  effective  utilization  of 
this  intelligence.  The  revolution  which  has  taken  place  in  this 
field  with  the  advent  of  solid  state  electronics,  computers  and 
satellites  is  breathtaking.  At  the  shipboard  level  are  tactical 
data  systems.  More  sophisticated  equipment  is  required  to 
manage  the  world-wide  scope  of  current  U.S.  (and  Soviet) 
operations.  Finally,  it  is  necessary  to  ensure  that  the 


87 


Cable,  op_.  cit.  (note  1-5) »  P»  216. 


59 


strategic  nuclear  forces  can  still  receive  their  launch  orders, 
even  if  they  have  absorbed  a  first  strike . 

Errors  will  happen,  to  be  sure.  The  communications  failures 
which  preceded  the  Liberty  and  Pueblo  incidents  are  good  examples. 
The  trend,  however,  has  been  to  concentrate  more  and  more  control 
with  centralized  decision-makers.  On  occasion,  for  instance, 
President  Johnson  was  reported  to  have  personally  chosen  the 
targets  for  strikes  from  the  Yankee  Station  carriers. 

It  is  for  this  reason,  as  well  as  their  close  relationship 
to  surveillance  systems,  that  developments  in  C  have  been 
classed  as  an  environmental  change.  Besides  the  flexibility 
that  centralization  has  brought,  it  also  has  greatly  increased 
a  nation's  vulnerability  to  attacks  on  its  communications  net- 
work. By  deception,  cryptanalysis,  electro-magnetic  pulses, 
jamming,  or  a  host  of  other  exotic  measures,  conflicts  may  be 
effectively  decided  in  the  ether  while  the  opponents1  major 
forces  remain  intact. 


Chapter  Two 
THE  CHANGING  USES  OF  THE  OCEANS 

Traditionally,  there  have  been  three  occupations  for  those 
who  made  their  living  at  sea — as  naval  hands,  merchant  sailors, 
or  fishermen.  Since  the  end  of  World  War  II,  however,  indeed, 
in  the  past  15  years,  an  entirely  new  range  of  uses  has  emerged 
for  what  has  come  to  be  called  ocean  space.  Seabed  resources, 
ranging  from  alluvial  tin  deposits  to  continental  shelf  petroleum 
to  abyssal  manganese  nodules  may  bring  more  than  100  billion 
dollars  per  year  by  1 985 •  Man-in- the- sea  programs,  although 
they  have  not  lived  up  to  their  original  promise,  may  yet  make 
significant  contributions  to  continental  shelf  resource  develop- 
ment. The  press  of  population  growth,  industrial  land  use  and 
on-shore  pollution  have  increased  the  incentives  to  move  urban 
and  industrial  activities  afloat.  A  large  percentage  of  future 
nuclear  reactors  may  be  located  at  sea.  In  various  parts  of  the 
world,  fertilizer  plants,  waste  disposal  facilities,  airports 
and  oil  storage  tanks  already  are  being  constructed  offshore. 
A  growing  recognition  of  oceanic  pollution  has  emphasized  the 
need  for  multi-national  approaches  to  problems. 

In  the  meantime,  of  course,  the  historic  uses  of  the  sea 
also  have  been  radically  altered.  Naval  operations  have  been 


60 


61 


dealt  with  in  the  last  chapter  and  will  be  covered  again  in 
Chapter  Four.  Fish  are  being  tracked  by  satellite,  cultivated 
in  both  fresh  and  salt  water,  and  dangerously  over-caught  in 
some  areas.  Merchant  shipping  is  being  transfigured  by  tech- 
nology. 

The  unsettled  marine  political  climate,  which  will  be  dis- 
cussed in  the  next  Chapter,  is  intimately  related  to  the  changing 
economic  uses  of  the  seas.  As  a  preface,  therefore,  some  recent 
trends  in  ocean  commercial  activities  will  be  reviewed,  along 
with  some  likely  future  developments. 

Merchant  Shipping 

As  noted  in  the  previous  chapter,  maritime  commerce  domi- 
nates international  transportation  and  is  not  likely  to  be  dis- 
lodged in  the  near  future.  The  economics  are  quite  straight- 
forward: For  one  dollar,  a  ton  of  U.S.  freight  can  be  moved  330 
miles  by  water,  70  miles  by  rail,  14  miles  by  truck,  and  one 
mile  by  air. 

At  the  end  of  1 973 »  the  world's  merchant  fleet  totaled 

2 
over  59,600  ships  of  289,927,000  gross  tons,  broken  down  as 

follows: 


1 

Fairplay  (British  Shipping  Journal),  December  30,  1971, 
cited  in  George  H.  Miller,  "Necessary  for  the  National  Defense," 
Shipmate  (May  1974),  p.  16. 

sea  Technology  Handbook  Directory  1974,  cp_»  cit. 
(note  1-78),  pp.  A/4-5' 


62 


Table  2-1 
COMPOSITION  OF  THE  WORLD  MERCHANT  FLEET 


Percent 

Type 

GRT( 1,000) 

Number 

of  Tonnage 

Oil  Tankers 

115,360 

6,607 

39-8 

Bulk/Oil  Carriers 

19,539 

349 

6.7 

Ore  and  Bulk  Carriers 

53,110 

2,954 

18.3 

General  Cargo  Ships 

70,079 

21,629 

24.2 

LNG  Carriers  &  Othersa 

3,967 

838 

1.4 

Container  Ships         , 

5,900 

344 

2.0 

Non-Trading  Vessels 

21,972 

26,835 

7.6 

Source:      Sea  Technology 

Handbook  Direc 

story,   1974,  P. 

A/5 

Note:    Includes  chemical  tankers,  RO/ROs,  large  carriers, 
and  ocean  tug  barges. 

Tugs,  dredges,  cable  ships,  ice  breaker,  fishing 
vessels,  etc. 


In  1970,  some  240  million  gross  tons  of  ships  carried  2,510 
million  tons  of  seaborne  trade  (three  quarters  of  it  raw  materials 
and  grain)  and  generated  revenues  estimated  at  about  $40  billion 
dollars.   Marine  insurance  premiums  in  1972  totaled  some  2.5 

billion  dollars. 

5 
The  individual  and  collective  capacity  of  merchant  ships 


Charles  C.  Bates  and  Paul  Yost,  "Where  Trends  the  Flow  of 
Merchant  Ships,"  in  John  King  Gamble,  Jr.  and  Giulio  Pontecorvo 
(eds.),  Law  of  the  Sea:  The  Emerging  Regime  of  the  Oceans 
(Cambridge:   Bal linger  Publishing  Company,  1974),  P«  249« 

4 
George  W.  Handley,  "The  Role  of  the  Marine  Insurance 

Industry  in  the  Emerging  Regime  of  the  Oceans,"  in  ibid.,  p.  286. 

5 
The  size  of  ships  is  measured  by  several  different 

standards.  Merchant  ships  usually  are  registered  by  gross 

tons  and  have  their  carrying  capacity  expressed  in  deadweight 


63 


has  grown  dramatically,  more  than  doubling  since  1967*  Some 
evidence  of  this  may  be  seen  in  Table  2-2: 

Table  2-2 

A  COMPARISON  OF  THE  CARRYING  CAPACITY  OP  THE 
WORLD  FLEET  BY  BASIC  SHIP  TYPES  1967-1972 


1967^ 
DWT(10  ) 

1972, 

dwtOo  ) 

Percent 

Type 

Change 

Tankers 

105.5 

192.5 

82.5 

Bulk  Carriers 

49.6 

108. 5 

118.8 

Freighters 

89.5 

88.5 

-1.1 

Passenger  and  Cargo 

5.1 

4.0 

-21.6 

Barge  Carriers 

0 

.5 

- 

Container  Ships 

.6 

5'°  a 

733.3 

LNG  Carriers 

.07a 

•  54a 

671.4 

Source:  Kasputys,  pp.  140-142 
Note:   Trillions  of  Cubic  Meters 


tons.  Warships  typically  are  listed  by  displacement.  Defini- 
tions, and  rough  conversion  factors,  are  given  below. 
GROSS  TONS (GRT )  -  Total  number  of  cubic  feet  of  enclosed  space 

divided  by  100  (refers  to  space) 
NET  TONS(NRT)   -  That  part  of  Gross  Tonnage  which  may  be  utilized 

for  passenger  and  cargo  (refers  to  space) 
DISPLACEMENT  TONS-The  total  weight  of  the  vessel  and  its  contents 

expressed  in  tons  of  2,240  pounds  (long  tons) 
DEADWEIGHT  TONS(DWT)  -  The  difference  between  the  displacement 

of  the  ship  loaded  and  unloaded.  It  is  an 

indication  of  the  ship's  carrying  capacity 

(refers  only  to  weight) 


To  Find 

Multiply 

Multiply 

Multiply 

DWT.   by 

GRT.    by 

NRT.   by 

DEADWEIGHT  TONS 

1.00 

1.50 

2.50 

GROSS  TONS 

0.67 

1.00 

1.67 

NET  TONS 

0.40 

0.60 

1.00 

DISPLACEMENT  TONS 

1.50 

2.25 

3.75 

For  large  tankers  and  ore  carriers,  the  ratio  of  DWT  to  GRT  is 
considerably  greater  than  1.5:1. 


64 


Note  the  dominance  of  large  tankers  and  bulk  carriers,  the  rapid 
growth  of  specialized  designs  such  as  container  ships  and  LNG 
tankers,  and  the  stagnation  of  general  cargo  freighter  develop- 
ment. Japan  has  played  a  major  role  in  this  transformation  by- 
pioneering  the  mass  production  of  very  large  ships.  So  extensive 
has  such  construction  become  that  fully  40  percent  of  existing 
world-wide  tonnage  is  less  than  five  years  old.  From  inertia, 
if  nothing  else,  this  trend  will  continue,  as  fully  90  percent 
of  the  114*3  million  gross  tons  on  orders  in  world  shipyards  in 
September  1973  were  tankers  and  bulk  carriers. 

Thus,  the  past  twenty  years  have  witnessed  great  changes 
in  the  nature  of  merchant  ships  themselves,  and  these  have  had 
a  significant,  though  often  unappreciated,  impact  on  naval 
operations,  domestic  and  international  commerce,  and  even  world 
politics. 

The  Growth  of  Tankers  and  Bulk  Carriers 

The  economics  and  politics  of  ocean  transport  which  have 
driven  tankers  from  under  20,000  tons  in  1945  to  nearly  half  a 

million  tons  in  1973  have  been  eloquently  recounted  by  Noel 

7 
Mostert.  •  The  inflation  of  bulk. carrier  size  has  been  comparable. 


Sea  Technology  Handbook  Directory  1974»  P»  A/4-  The  total 
value  of  these  orders  was  some  $175  billion  for  4>678  new  ships. 
See  also  Joseph  Kasputys,  _op.  cit  (note  1-6). 

7Noe*l  Mostert,  Super ship  (New  York:   Alfred  A.  Knopf,  1974) < 
These  ships  frequently  are  referred  to  as  VLCCs  (Very  Large  Crude 
Carriers — generally  greater  than  100,000  tons)  and  ULCCs  (Ultra 
Large  Crude  Carriers — usually  above  300»000  tons). 


65 


Although  projected  1,000,000  ton  ships  seem  to  have  been 
deferred,  and  renewed  interest  shown  in  25-80,000  ton  craft,  the 
super  tankers  will  continue  to  be  a  dominant  feature  of  ocean 
commerce. 

The  political  problems  associated  with  ships  of  this  size 
mostly  have  been  related  to  pollution  and  will  be  discussed  in 
the  next  chapter.  At  the  same  time,  however,  the  massive  vessels 
have  raised  a  host  of  technical  issues.  Marine  insurance  values 
have  risen  from  $2,500,000  for  a  World  War  II  ship  to  $25,000,000 
for  the  Igara,  which  was  lost  off  Singapore  in  1973,   to  $80,000,000 
for  the  477,000  DWT  Globtik  Tokyo.  Liquified  natural  gas  (LNG) 

tankers  now  under  construction  may  push  this  to  $125,000,000  per 

9 
ship.   As  one  expert  has  noted: 

Right  now,  because  of  capacity  limitations,  it  is 
not  possible  to  insure  a  $125,000,000  vessel  com- 
pletely in  one  insurance  market,  be  it  London, 
Lloyd's,  the  United  States  or  Japan.   ...  we  are 
approaching  the  maximum  of  the  world  insurance 
resources  presently  available.  10 

Suggested  solutions  from  an  underwriter's  standpoint  have 
included  mandatory  traffic  separation  schemes  in  congested  water- 
ways, better  training  and  licensing  procedures  for  crews,  as  well 


ivlarine  Technology.  Society  Journal,  VIII  (February  1 974)  r 
p.  15»  This  was  the  largest  single  marine  insurance  loss  in 
history. 

9 

^Handley,    "The  Role   of  the  Marine  Insurance  Industry   .    .    .," 

op.   cit.    (note  2-4),    passim. 
10Ibid.,   p.   287. 


66 


as  diversification  of  risks  by  sharing  an  expensive  ship  among 
insurance  markets  in  several  countries. 

The  ships  also  pose  special  safety  problems.  200,000  DWT 
vessels  draw  more  than  21  meters,  which  already  limits  their 
operations  in  some  parts  of  the  North  Sea,  U.S.  coastal  waters, 
the  Straits  of  Malacca  and  the  Indonesian  Archipelago.  Moreover, 
the  tankers  are  singularly  unmaneuverable — requiring  as  many  as 
20  minutes  and  several  miles  to  stop.  This  has  strengthened 

calls  from  operators  and  coastal  states  alike  for  navigational 

12 

controls  ranging  from  total  bans  in  some  waterways   to  traffic 

13 

lanes  in  others.  Mostert  has  recognised  the  heart  of  the  issue: 

For  those  on  shore,  shipwreck  was  once  not  an 
unwelcome  event;  it  drew  the  plunderers  from  far 
and  near.  It  was  talked  about  for  generations,  with 
wistful  recollection  of  the  drama  and  the  spoils; 
but  shipwreck,  once  feared  principally  by  those  on 
board,  has  become  in  our  own  time  the  more  solemn 
dread  of  those  on  shore  than  those  on  board.  For  the 
first  time  we  on  land  have  more  to  lose  and  nothing 
to  gain.  Helicopters  get  the  sailors  off,  we  clean 
up  the  muck.  That  is  why  the  responsibility  for 
ships  has  become  ours,  and  is  no  longer  the  sailors1 

•   •   • 

Another  consequence  of  the  deep  drafts  has  been  the  develop- 
ment of  offshore  morring  facilities  (deep  water  ports  or  super- 
ports).  In  addition  to  environmental  and  navigational 


11Ibid.,  p.  291. 

ships  greater  than  200,000  DWT  are  not  permitted  in  the 
Straits  of  Malacca. 

1  3 

Supership,    op.   cit. ,   pp.   331-332. 


67 


considerations,  the  legal  status  of  these  structures  is 
uncertain.  There  is  a  growing  body  of  pertinent  literature, 
but  the  major  point  of  interest  to  this  study  is  the  extent  of 
additional  jurisdiction  which  coastal  states  can  derive  from 
off-shore  structures. 

C  on taineri  zat i  on 

A  freight  container  is  nothing  more  than  a  large  box  of 
standard  dimensions  to  simplify  cargo  handling.  Nonetheless, 

since  the  late  1950s,  the  container  revolution  literally  has 

15 

transformed  international  commerce. 

This  method  of  packing  has  reduced  pilferage  at  trans- 
shipment points,  minimized  customs  delays  (since  only  the  mani- 
fest of  the  sealed  container  need  be  inspected),  and  contributed 
to  world-wide  standardization.  Even  more  importantly,  it  has 
led  to  inter-modal  transportation  systems,  with  door-to-door 


%ee,  inter  alia,  Allan  Hirsch,  "Special  Circumstances: 
Superports,"  and  Albert  W.  Koers,  "Artificial  Islands  in  the 
North  Sea,"  with  commentary  in  Gamble  and  Pontecorvo,  op_.  cit. , 
pp.  217-245.  Can,  for  instance,  man-made  structures  be  used  as 
the  basis  for  claims  to  the  surrounding  water  area  or  continental 
shelf?  Can  they  be  used  to  draw  baselines? 

1  5 

The  advantages  of  containerization  for  the  shipping 

industry  have  been  given  by  K.  LI.  Johnson  and  H.  C.  Garnett, 

The  Economics  of  Containerization  (Glascow:   Social  and  Economic 

Survey,  No.  2077  1971.  Some  of  the  problems  of  integrating 

containers hips  and  ports  into  rail  and  road  networks  are  outlined 

in  European  Conference  of  Ministers  of  Transport,  A  Study  of  the 

Economic  Influence  of  Containerization  (Paris:   OECD,  1974}* 


68 


1  f\  17 

freight  rates,   land  bridges   and  multinational  outlooks. 

Special  ships  have  been  constructed  for  their  conveyance  which 

are  considered  6.5  times  as  productive  as  a  "conventional"  cargo 

.  .   18 
ship. 

One  drawback  of  container! zati on  is  its  lack  of  flexibility. 
It  is  ideally  suited  for  the  movement  of  large  quantities  of 
relatively  high- value  goods  between  modern  terminals  in  indus- 
trialized countries.   It  is  not,  however,  appropriate  for  bulk 
cargoes.  Also,  the  capital  requirements  for  supporting  infra- 
structure (container  ports,  rail  and  road  nets,  handling  equip- 
ment, etc.)  are  so  high  that  it  often  is  beyond  the  reach  of 
developing  countries.  Moreover,  container ships  are  not  nearly 
so  useful  to  the  military  planner  as  the  versatile  general  cargo 
ship  which  can  load  and  unload  a  wide  variety  of  goods  even  at 


1  6 

Denver  to  Paris,  for  instance.  In  the  past,  separate 

rates  would  have  been  cited  for  factory  to  rail-head  (truck), 
rail-head  to  port  (train),  port- to-port  (ship),  port  to  depot 
(train  or  truck),  etc.  Now  a  single  fee  can  be  quoted  from 
shipper  to  destination,  independent  of  the  transportation  mode. 

17 

See  George  D.  Saunders,  "Land  Bridge  Comes  of  Age," 

USNIP,  XCIX  (December  1973),  pp.  38-44.  The  two  most  important 
are  the  North  American  Land  Bridge,  which  links  major  Pacific 
ports  with  those  on  the  Atlantic  and  Gulf  coasts  via  U.S.  and 
Canadian  railroads,  and  the  Siberian  Land  Bridge  from  Japan  to 
Western  Europe.  Both  began  to  be  developed  around  1967  and  had 
matured  by  1972.  The  North  .American  bridge,  incidently,  also 
has  partly  undercut  the  strategic  value  of  the  Panama  Canal,  at 
least  for  the  United  States. 

1  fl 

Xasputys,  _op_.  cit.  (note  1-61 ) ,  p.  1 44-  A  conventional 

ship  is  defined  as  a  U.S.  C-2  type  freighter  or  T-2  type  tanker. 


unfinished  or  damaged  "bases. 


69 

19 


Barges,  Barge  Carriers  and  RO/ROs 

As  noted  above,  there  are  many  ports  (probably  the 
majority)  which  cannot  support  large-scale  container  operations. 
At  the  same  time,  virtually  any  coastal  pier  or  river  wharf  can 
service  barges,  which  still  carry  tremendous  volumes  of  cargo 
world-wide.    Since  the  late  1960s,  two  novel  approaches  have 
been  developed  to  combine  the  potential  of  barges  with  modern 
ocean  shipping.  The  first  is  the  barge  carrier,  or  LASH, 
standing  for  Lighter  Aboard  Ship.  Thus  far  they  have  been  used 
mostly  between  the  U.S.  Gulf  Coast  and  Europe,  but  they  also 


19 

Nonetheless,    containerisation  does  present  certain  mili- 
tary advantages,   which  the  armed  forces  are  beginning  to  exploit. 
See  the  essay,   "War  Logistics  and  the  Freight  Container,"  Jane j s 
Freight  Containers  1 973-74  (London:     Sampson  Lew,  Mars ton,    1973)» 
pp.   622-629. 

20 

In  1972,  domestic  water  traffic  handled  29.6%  of  U.S. 

intercity  trade  (in  terms  of  ton-miles).  The  cargo  carried  by 
these  vessels  was  156$  of  that  taken  by  vessels  of  all  flags  in 
U.S.  foreign  trade,  and  constituted  97^  of  all  cargo  moving 
under  the  U.S.  flag.  The  DWT  capacity  of  U.S.  barges  was  more 
than  double  the  total  of  all  self-propelled  U.S.  ships  on  domes- 
tic, foreign  and  Great  Lakes  runs.  See  Wallace  T.  Sansone, 
"Domestic  Shipping  and  American  Maritime  Policy,"  US II IP,  C  (May 
1 974) >  PP-  162-177*  Rear  Admiral  Hayes  points  out  that  the 
expansion  of  American  barge  use  has  been  " .  .  .  so  marked  that 
it  may  change  the  economic  focus  of  the  United  States  from  the 
Northeast  to  the  Mississippi  Valley  and  Gulf  Coast."  John  D. 
Hayes,  "The  Sea,  1967-1972,"  USNIP,  XCIX  (May  1973),  p.  297. 
European  river  traffic  also  is  tremendously  important  to  the  EEC, 
as  the  Soviet  Union's  canal  system  is  to  her  economy.  Throughout 
much  of  the  developing  world,  rivers  remain  the  primary  means  of 
internal  transportation. 


70 


have  potential  for  the  developing  country  trade.  A  larger 
design,  on  the  same  principle,  is  the  Seabee.  Each  of  these 
$125  million  vessels  carries  containers,  break  bulk  cargo  and 
38  large  barges  of  the  size  used  on  European  waterways.  Rated 
at  four  to  five- and- a-half  times  as  productive  as  the  C-2,  a 

three- fold  expansion  of  barge  carriers  under  the  U.S.  flag  is 

21 

forecast  by  1985*    Foreign  operators  are  expected  to  follow 

suit. 

The  second  innovation  is  the  ocean  tug-barge,  in  which  a 
pusher  tug  is  mated  with  an  ocean-going  barge.  Upon  arrival  at 
its  destination,  the  tug  need  not  wait  for  the  barge  to  be 
unloaded,  but  can  pick  up  a  return  cargo  almost  immediately. 
This  simply  is  an  oceanic  application  of  the  principle  that  the 
freight  vehicle  should  be  separated  from  its  propulsion  system — 
a  long  standing  practice  ashore. 

Another  interesting,  but  not-so-new,  design  which  is  gaining 
popularity  is  the  Roll-on/Roll-off  (RO/RO)  ship.  This  concept 
enables  wheeled  vehicles  to  be  driven  directly  on  and  off  via 
self-contained  ramps. 

The  barge-related  and  RO/RO  ships  have  restored  some  of 
the  flexibility  lost  by  containerization  and  larger  bulk 
carriers.  This  is  particularly  important  to  the  military. 
Eventually,  it  may  benefit  the  developing  countries  as  well, 


21 

Kasputys,  op.  cit.,  pp.  144»  149" 150* 


71 


although  the  high  cost  of  such  vessels  probably  will  concentrate 
them  in  trade  between  a  few  we 11- developed  river-mouths. 

LUG  Carriers  and  OBOs 

Although  they  are  related  to  the  bulk  carriers,  two  other 
recent  concepts  deserve  mention.  The  first  is  the  Liquified 

Natural  Gas  (LNG)  carrier,  which  is  now  seen  to  be  the  most 

22 

needed  ship  type  in  the  next  several  years.    The  problems  of 

handling  LNG  at  temperatures  less  than  -255  degrees  P  are 
formidable,  and  the  pollution  and  safety  hazards  are  not  yet 
fully  understood. 

The  other  is  the  Oil/Bulk/Ore  carrier  (0B0)  which  trades 
higher  building  costs  for  the  option  of  carrying  diverse  cargoes. 

Fisheries 

Estimate  of  the  world's  maximum  sustainable  fisheries  yield 

range  from  100,000,000  metric  tons  to  somewhat  over  twice  that 

23 

amount.    The  1970  catch  was  69  million  tons,  nearly  70  percent 


22 

John  D.  Hayes,  "The  Sea,  1967-1972, »  op.  cit.,  p.  301. 

The  author  goes  on  to  note  that  over  90  of  these  ships  will  be 
needed  in  the  next  fifteen  years — at  a  unit  cost  of  360-70 
million  (which  certainly  will  inflate  since  some  U.S.  ships 
already  are  over  $100  million).  Moreover,  construction  of  the 
associated  shore  facilities  may  require  $25  billion  in  the  same 
period.  He  also  illustrates  the  dangers  of  maritime  forecasting 
by  citing  a  1968  study  of  shipping  over  the  next  75  years  which 
completely  overlooked  LNG  carriers. 

25Asahi  Shimbun,  "Food  and  People,"  XVI  (July  30,  1972). 


72 


of  the  low  end  of  the  safe  range  and  three-and-a-half  times 
1950's  21  million  ton  harvest.  By  1985,  FAO  estimates,  the 
global  take  will  he  100,000,000  tons — very  close  to  the  minimum 
estimated  limit.  Moreover,  it  will  mostly  be  comprised  of  sar- 
dines, anchovies,  and  other  seafood  now  used  for  animal  feed 
meal  and  protein  concentrates.  This  implies  a  shortage  of  the 
high  and  medium  grade  fish  which  heretofore  have  made  up  most  of 
human  consumption. 

Even  today,  warning  signs  have  begun  to  appear  in  the 
guise  of  30  centimeter,  two  year  old  mackerel  in  the  Northwest 
Pacific  where  50  centimeter,  seven  year  old  ones  used  to  be 
commonplace.  Also  of  note  are  declining  yields  per  boat  in  the 
Gulf  of  Thailand,  and  the  temporary  collapse  of  the  Peruvian 
anchovy  industry. 

The  problems  have  stemmed  from  a  combination  of  techno- 
logical sophistication  and  unequal  geographic  and  species 
exploitation.  Japanese  and  Russian  fleets  sail  with  factory 
ships  for  on-scene  processing.  Their  new-construction  trawlers, 
equipped  with  advanced  detection  equipment,  and  backed  by  a 
strong  government  supported  research  effort,  have  been  accused 
of  overfishing  certain  regions.    In  U.S.  waters,  for  instance, 


^See  Barbara  A.  Keith,  Fisheries  of  Peru,  1972-75  (Wash- 
ington: National  Marine  Fisheries  Service,  July  1974) • 

25 

Charges  of  overfishing  by  foreigners  date  back  at  least 

to  the  early  19th  century  in  European  waters.     See  Colombos,    op. 
cit.   (note   1-2),   pp.   567-369,   374-376  and  385.     Thus  the  Soviet 


73 


American  fishermen  have  averaged  2  to  2.5  million  tons  per  year 
since  1960,  while  foreign  fleets  have  caught  3  to  3*5  million. 
Yet,  because  of  the  peculiarities  of  the  human  diet,  some  14  to 

15  million  tons  of  non-commercial  species  go  unused  in  the  same 

26 

area. 

Some  efforts  have  been  made  to  harvest  new  species  of  low- 
grade  fish  or  plankton  to  supply  human  protein  through  fishmeal 

27 

or  other  refined  products  rather  than  by  direct  consumption. 

Aquaculture  eventually  may  increase  the  supply,  but  now  accounts 
for  only  about  7  percent  of  the  total  catch.  Moreover,  it  so  far 

has  been  profitable  only  for  relatively  expensive  sea  foods  such 

28 

as  shrimp,  eel  and  shellfish. 


and  Japanese  fleets  have  created  a  problem  of  defree,  rather 
than  one  of  kind. 

26 

Sea  Technology  Handbook  Directory  1974*  _o£»  cit.  (note 

1-78),  p.  A/16. 

27 

For  a  detailed  analysis  and  specific  suggestions  on  the 

potential  increase  in  yield  through  conventional  and  non- 
conventional  species  (i.e.  shark,  krill,  porpoises),  see  James 
Joseph  and  Witold  L.  Klawe,  "The  Living  Pelagic  Resources  of  the 
Americas,"  Ocean  Development  and  International  Law  (hereafter 
ODIL),  II  (Spring  1974),  pp.  37-64. 

28 

A  "sea  ranch"  will  be  developed  in  Okinawa  for  the  1975 

Ocean  Expo.  There  has  been  talk  of  setting  off  parts  of  the 
Indonesian  Archipelago  for  fish  farms,  though  it  would  be  diffi- 
cult to  maintain  controlled  conditions  on  such  a  scale.  Some 
experts  doubt  if  aquaculture  ever  vail  be  able  to  provide  large 
quantities  of  relatively  low-cost  food.  Even  if  the  economic 
problems  could  be  overcome,  they  argue,  the  formidable  hurdles 
of  distribution,  increasing  pollution  and  traditional  non-seafood 
diets  will  remain.  While  it  recognizes  the  difficulties,  EAO  has 
given  high  priority  to  aquaculture,  noting  that  "several  million 


74 


Fishing  disputes  and  attempts  at  resolution  will  be  treated 
more  fully  in  the  next  chapter.  But  whatever  solutions  are 
sought,  the  harvesting  of  living  ocean  resources  will  remain  an 
important  and  controversial  activity  which  will  continue  to  focus 
attention  on  coastal  state  interests  at  the  expense  of  distant- 
water  ones. 

Non-Living  Marine  Resources 

These  can  "be  divided  into  four  principle  categories: 
Alluvial  and  continental  margin  minerals,  offshore  petroleum  and 
natural  gas,  deep  seabed  deposits,  and  materials  extracted  from 
seawater. 

29 

Alluvial  and  Continental  Shelf  Minerals 

Nearly  all  of  the  minerals  found  on  land  also  exist  on  the 
seabed,  although  higher  recovery  costs  have  not  made  them 
economically  attractive.  Sand  and  gravel  are  the  most  widely 
exploited,  and  sometimes  contain  placer  deposits  of  minerals 


hectares"  could  be  developed  for  cultivation.  Particular  hope 
is  held  for  fresh  and  brackish  water  herbiverous  species,  such 
as  carp  and  milkfish.  The  Organization  also  has  pointed  to  the 
danger  that  excessive  harvesting  of  krill  may  reduce  the  catch 
of  animals  higher  in  the  food  chain  which  feed  on  them.  For 
overviews,  see  FAO,  "The  State  of  Food  and  Agriculture  1973" 
(C73/2,  August  1973,  pp.  29-38)  and  "World  Situation  and  Outlook: 
Fisheries  Problems"  (C73/13,  September  1973). 

^See  Manfred  G.  Krutein,  "Ocean  Mining,"  JJSJTP,  XCV  (May 
1969),  PP.  135-140. 


75 


30 
such  as  magnetite.    Tin  has  been  dredged  for  years  off  the 

mouths  of  rivers  in  Thailand  and  Malaysia,  and  diamonds  are  taken 

along  the  western  coasts  of  South  Africa  and  Namibia.    Other 

minerals  being  recovered  from  relatively  shallow  water  around 

32 

the  world  include  phosphorite  and  potassium.    Offshore  coal 

shafts  have  been  sunk  in  some  countries,  usually  from  natural 
islands  but  occasionally  from  artificial  ones.  Figure  2-1  shows 
the  distribution  of  these  activities. 

There  were  some  1,000  ocean-going  dredges  world-wide  in 
1 973 >  with  another  50  units  under  construction.  Offshore 
minerals  production  certainly  will  increase  and  may  become  very 
important  in  some  areas.  On  a  global  scale,  however,  it  probably 
will  have  only  a  peripheral  impact  on  marine  affairs. 

33 

Offshore  Hydrocarbons  y 

As  one  review  noted:   "The  one  'gold-plated,'  guaranteed 


30 

Placer  deposits  contain  mineral  ores  in  sizes  large 

enough  to  be  separated  by  physical  means,  such  as  washing. 

Magnetite  is  a  form  of  iron  ore. 

See  Evan  Luard,  "Who  Gets  What  on  the  Seabed,"  Foreign 
Policy,  9  (Winter  1972-73),  pp.  132-1 47.  With  the  advent  of 
high  gold  prices,  some  Alaskan  alluvial  deposits  might  again 
become  profitable. 

bea  Technology  Handbook  Directory  1974»  op.  cit.,  p.  k/3* 
For  more  details  see  U.S.,  Department  of  the  Interior,  Minerals 
Yearbook,  3  volumes  (Washington:  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
annual)"  Offshore  (vice  coastal)  diamond  mining  off  Namibia  was 
suspended  in  1 971 • 

•Ttfany  of  the  forecasts  and  statistics  in  this  section  are 
taken  from  "Annual  Drilling  and  Production  Report,"  Offshore, 
June  20,  1974>  passim* 


76 


Figure  2-1 


*:--S # -■•■--- Jv£ ■■  ■■  A is^'iOh  iy^-     m h^fZm 

^.j   VC  <:-..  ~-r;'_vL   •      •.-•.■>     ,...-•  .'.•■•      -  <    ,        ■>        —.      .  «*«ro»  V'V'.--»  -.     . 

>^t.X    ■•-  •'-  ■•■■  s      ■    »:-*     :-.■'..     :  \'    ~-      J '•       •■  •     '      »' .--       !  A^  '  - 


1.  Salt  extraction  from  sea  water  S.   Diamondj  dredged  from  jea  floor  9.   Phosphorite  nodule* 

2.  Oyster  shells  dredged   from  sea  floor'  6.   Gold  from  sea  floor  10.  Mangonese  nodules 

3.  Iron    sends   dredged   from   lea    floor  7.  Coal  underground  below  sea  floor 

4.  Tin  ores  dredged  from  seo  floor  8.   Sulfur  underground  belcw  sea  floor 


SEABED  MINING  ACTIVITIES 
(from  Krutein) 


77 


growth  industry  around  the  world  is  offshore  petroleum  and 
gas,  ... 

Experience  in  offshore  oil  production  grew  from  the  gradual 
extension  of  onshore  fields  into  the  swamp  lands  of  Louisiana  and 
the  shallow  waters  of  the  Caspian  Sea.  Only  in  1947  was  the 
first  platform  erected  in  20  feet  of  water  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico. 

By  1973t  offshore  output  had  grown  to  10. 4  million  barrels 
per  day,  or  some  18^  of  the  world's  pre-embargo  output  (22^  of 
non-Communist  production).  Mid-1974  estimates  indicate  that  as 
many  as  25  million  barrels  per  day  (35?°)>  matf   come  from  offshore 
fields  by  1985- 

In  1973>  Venezuela  was  the  largest  producer  of  offshore 
oil,  followed  by  Saudi  Arabia,  and  the  United  States.  Table  2-3 
illustrates  oil  and  natural  gas  production  by  leading  countries. 

Note,  however,  that  this  reflects  discoveries  made  several 
years  ago  and  does  not  include  a  number  of  recent  developments, 
such  as  the  British  North  Sea  fields.  These  are  expected  to 
produce  3  to  4  million  barrels  per  day  by  1980. 

As  of  mid-1974  the  Persian  Gulf  and  Lake  Maracaibo  held 
the  lion's  share  of  the  proved  offshore  oil  resources,  with  53 
and  21  percent  respectively.  The  Persian  Gulf  and  the  North  Sea 
held  the  major  gas  fields,  with  ^O/o   and  \y/o   each. 

Aside  from  the  U.S.  and  Venezuela,  the  most  intensive 


34 


Sea  Technology  Handbook  and  Directory  1974»  P»  A/1 . 


78 


Table  2-3 
LEADING  OFFSHORE  PETROLEUM  AND  NATURAL  GAS  PRODUCERS 


Pe  troleum 


Natural  Gas 


1973 

1972-73 

1973 

1972-73 

Production 

Percent 

Production 
(l06cu.ft/d) 

Percent 

Country 

(106  b/d) 

Change 

Country 

Change 

Venezuela 

2.70 

+1 

U.S. 

7,130.8 

-21 

S.  Arabia 

1.90 

+33 

Iran 

3,360.0 

-25 

U.S. 

1.70 

0 

U.K. 

3,000.0 

+17 

Nigeria 

.52 

+26 

Italy 

762.0 

7 

Abu  Dhabi 

•45 

+31 

S.  Arabia 

721.7 

+4 

World 

10.43 

+15 

World 

16,938.1 

-3 

The  Fastest-Growing  Producers  were: 

Congo  .03  +340  Angola  558.1  +409 

Brunei-  Trinidad/ 

Malaysia  .26  +210       Tobago  16.8  +57 

Indonesia  .17  +149  U.K.  3,000.0  +17 

Source:   Offshore ,  June  20,  1974,  pp.  86-87 


drilling  activities  in  1973  were  centered  in  Indonesia  ( 1 43  wells), 
the  United  Kingdom  (82),  Mexico  (49)  and  Brazil  (48).  The  desired 
rate  of  both  exploration  and  exploitation  has  been  limited  by 

shortages  in  drilling  rigs  and  tubular  products.  While  some  of 

35 

these  constraints  will  be  eased  in  the  next  few  years,   it  should 

not  be  expected  that  offshore  discoveries  alone  will  rapidly  shift 


35 

The  Japanese  Ministry  of  Transportation  estimates  that 

620  drilling  ships  or  platforms  will  be  required  by  1985  (vs. 
about  250  in  operation  in  1974) •  Zosen,  September  1974,  P«  48. 
Some  117  are  planned  for  1974~76.  Nihon  Keizai:  Shimbun  Inter- 
national Weekly  (hereafter  NKIW),  March  26,  1974,  P»  6- 


79 


the  center  of  gravity  of  international  oil  away  from  the  Persian 
Gulf.  Proven  and  probable  offshore  petroleum  reserves  total  137 
billion  barrels,  compared  with  453  billion  ashore.  It  is  esti- 
mated that  these  figures  could  be  increased  to  571  and  1038 
billion,  respectively. 

The  Middle  East  continues  to  be  the  most  promising  location 
for  future  discoveries,  followed  by  the  North  Sea.  Other  areas 
with  good  potential  include  the  USSR,  Southeast  Asia,  West 
Africa  and  the  Atlantic,  Pacific  and  Arctic  shelves  of  North 
America.  Exploration  of  the  Northeast  Asia  Seabed  has  been 
restrained  by  the  complex  political  situation  there,  while  U.S. 
leases  have  been  slowed  by  environmental  concerns. 

These  new  projects  doubtless  will  produce  finds  which  will 
be  great  boons  to  certain  countries,  as  recent  ones  have  been 
(or  soon  will  be)  to  Norway,  Great  Britain,  and  Nigeria.  How- 
ever, it  takes  two  and  a  half  to  ten  years  to  convert  discovery 
wells  into  commercial  production,  so  a  dramatic  short-run  trans- 
formation of  the  world  energy  picture  through  offshore  efforts 
is  improbable. 

Perhaps  the  most  immediate  physical  problem  of  seabed 
drilling  is  the  hazard  it  poses  to  navigation.   It  is  difficult 

to  learn  how  many  wells  actually  are  in  place,  but  the  figure  is 

36 

considerable.    Most  such  platforms  have  safety  zones  of 


36 

Over  25OO  "oil  well  structures"  are  reported  in  the  Gulf 

of  Mexico  by  itself.  John  D.  Hayes,  "The  Maritime  World  in  1973»" 
USNIP.  C  (May  1974),  p.  252. 


80 


37 
500  meters   around  them,  thus  effectively  restricting  navigation 

in  the  vicinity.  Nevertheless,  some  50  collisions  in  a  three- 
year  period  have  been  reported  between  merchant  ships  and  off- 
shore  platforms  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  alone.    Therefore,  more 
stringent  measures  probably  will  be  necessary,  especially  in 
busy  areas  like  the  North  Sea. 

Whether  or  not  a  coastal  state  intends  it,  the  development 
of  offshore  resources  cannot  help  but  bring  expanded  national 
jurisdiction.  The  rumor  of  a  terrorist  plot  to  blow  up  Britain's 

North  Sea  oil  rigs  in  1974  made  headlines  as  far  away  as  New 

39 

Zealand.    In  any  case,  it  followed  by  only  a  few  months  the 

revelation  that  V/hitehall  was  "considering  security  problems 
presented  by  North  Sea  oil  and  gas  field  development."    Since 
some  of  the  fields  lie  over  120  miles  offshore  some  extension  of 
sovereign  rights  (if  only  those  of  self-defense)  at  least  is 
implied. 

The  deepest  well  now  spudded  (mid-1 974) ,  is  656  meters  off 
Gabon,  and  drilling  vessels  capable  of  working  in  900  meters  are 
in  operation.  Production  operations  currently  are  no  deeper 
than  112  meters,  but  North  Sea  development  will  extend  this 


37 

•"Permitted  under  Article  5  of  the  1958  Geneva  Convention 

on  the  Continental  Shelf. 

58Hayes,  "The  Maritime  World  in  1973,"  op.  cit . ,  p.  252. 
59The  New  Zealand  Herald  (Auckland),  July  1,  1974- 
4°IDR,  VII  (February  1974),  PP-  23-24. 


81 


beyond  120,  and  plans  for  the  Santa  Barbara  Channel  call  for 
production  from  about  255  meters.    While  some  of  the  deeper 
water  systems  probably  will  be  completely  subsurface,   thus 
reducing  the  navigational  hazards,  it  is  evident  that  the  limits 

of  national  interest  already  extend  beyond  the  200  meter 

43 

isobath. 


Deep  Seabed  Mining 

Between  1872  and  1876,  H.M.S.  Challenger,  on  her  historic 
cruise,  recovered  some  unimpressive  objects  resembling  smooth 
lumps  of  coal  from  the  deep  ocean  floor.  Chemical  analysis  later 
showed  them  to  contain  ores  of  manganese,  nickel,  copper,  cobalt, 
zinc,  molybdenum,  and  other  metals,  but  because  of  their 
inaccessibility  little  attention  was  paid  to  them  for  nearly  a 
century. 

By  the  mid  1960s,  however,  the  progress  of  technology,  the 
growth  of  world-wide  minerals  demand  and  (presumably),  the 
increased  possibility  of  expropriation  of  land-based  facilities, 


*   H.  R.  Brannon,  C.  G.  Lyons,  D.  E.  O'Brien,  "Offshore 
Drilling  and  Production  Technology  for  Deep  Water,"  in  Marine 
Technology  Society  (MTS),  10th  Annual  Conference  Proceedings, 
September  23-25,  1974,  pp.  517-528. 

^  bee  J.  C.  Shore  and  C.  B.  Reeds,  "Subsea  Oil  Drilling 
and  Completion,"  ibid. ,  pp.  547~555» 

The  situation  only  is  complicated  by  the  ambiguous 
language  of  the  1958  Continental  Shelf  Convention  which  defines 
the  depth  of  the  continental  shelf  limit  in  terms  of  exploita- 
tion capability. 


82 


44 
sparked  an  interest  in  deep  seabed  mining.    By  1 974»  firms 

from  Canada,  France,  West  Germany,  Great  Eritain,  Japan  and  the 

U.S.  were  actively  engaged  in  the  field,  and  commercial  pro- 

45 
duction  may  begin  as  early  as  1976. 

The  most  promising  nodule  locations  discovered  to  date  are 

46 
in  the  Central  Pacific,   but  experts  emphasize  that  only  about 

three  percent  of  the  ocean  floor  has  been  extensively  surveyed. 

The  nodules  occur  most  commonly  at  depths  beyond  4000  meters 

(13»100  feet),  but  have  been  found  in  much  shallower  regions, 

and  even  in  the  Great  Lakes.  Just  what  causes  them  to  form  is 

uncertain,  but  they  seem  to  grow  around  shark's  teeth,  pieces  of 

bone,  or  other  previously-existing  cores.  Whatever  their  origin, 

they  are  being  formed  continuously  at  a  rate  which  makes  them 

effectively  non-deple table. 

The  approximate  metal  content  per  unit  weight  of  dry 

nodules  is:  Manganese  24$,  Nickel  1.6$,  Copper  1 .4$»  Cobalt  .21$, 


%ee  descriptions  of  preliminary  survey  efforts  in  United 
Nations,  Third  Conference  on  the  Law  of  the  Sea,  Economic  Impli- 
cations of  Seabed  Mineral  Development  in  the  International  Area: 
Report  of  the  Secretary  General  ( hereof ter  Seabed  Mining  Impli- 
cations) (A7conf.  62/25),  May  22,  1974,  pp.  14-15.  One  U.S. 
recovery  system  was  patented  in  1965. 

45 

Ibid.,  p.  8.  With  the  possible  exception  of  Howard 

Hughes'  venture,  the  principal  constraints  thus  far  appear  to 

have  been  at  least  as  much  political  as  technical.  See  the  next 

chapter.  The  USSR  also  has  done  nodule  surveys. 

*   Roughly  from  latitude  6°N  to  20°N  and  from  longitude 
110°W  to  180°W,  an  east-west  belt  extending  from  a  few  hundred  kilo- 
meters off  Acapulcoto  about  1850  kilometers  WSW  of  Hawaii. 


83 


trace  metals  .37$.  By  1985,  the  UN  has  estimated  that  15 
million  tons  of  nodules  may  be  recovered  annually,  yielding 
metals  as  shown  in  Table  2-4. 

The  economic  implications  of  these  operations  depend  on  a 
variety  of  assumptions,  but  the  estimated  gross  return  for  a 
3  million  ton  per  year  mine  site  ranges  from  about  250  to  300 

million  dollars  per  year,  yielding  net  revenues  from  236  to  152 

48 
million.    Nickel  and  copper  are  expected  to  be  the  most  valu- 
able metals  extracted,  but  recent  studies  have  found  traces  of 
precious  metals  such  as  platinum.  Even  in  small  amounts,  these 
might  be  economically  significant.  Aside  from  the  commercial 
benefits  for  the  firms  involved,  these  developments  could  have 
important  strategic  consequences.  Industrialized  states  could 
reduce  their  dependence  on  Third  World  resources  while  improving 
their  balance  of  payments.  Developing  countries,  however,  have 
been  more  concerned  with  the  potential  damage  to  land-based  pro- 
ducers from  price  reductions  caused  by  seabed  mining.  Gabon, 
for  instance,  gets  some  2C^S  of  its  foreign  exchange  from 
manganese,  while  Zaire  produces  two- thirds  of  the  world's  mined 
cobalt. ^ 

After  careful  scrutiny,  it  has  become  apparent  that 
manganese  nodules  will  be  a  less  lucrative  source  of  funds  for 


Seabed  Mining  Implications,  op.  cit. ,  p.  28. 
48Ibid.,  p.  71. 
49Ibid.,  p.  39. 


84 


3 

«H 

u 

«H 

o 

<M 

d 

o 

■p 

n 

o 

05 

& 

-p 

0 

3 

•H 

-p 

CO 

a 

+> 

o 

a 

0) 

TJ 

O 

Q) 

pj 

•3 

Pf 

-p 

1 

i-l 

d 

cd 

o 

"3  J 

o 

-d 

u 

-p 

a"cf 

H 

o 

cd 

CD 

0) 

c 

ft 

e 

ft 

rt 

FH 

•rH 

PI 

o 

fe 

£3 

o 

a 

Eh 

e 

§ 

co 

a 

3 

o 

o 

IH 

EH 

M 

5, 

&H 

0? 

O 

S 

H 

Pi 

&H 

o 

g 

l 

Ph 

O 

^        EH        B 


pq 


rH 

a) 

-P    H 

p 

Pi       PlrO 

nd 

(4 

ID-P    01 

0) 

o 

8   to    cd 

p 

ft 

co   d  -h 

cti 

H   TJ     Pi 

a 

■3 

•d  g  -£ 

3  -H     PJ 

p 

-p 

a1        3 

CO 

(D 

a)  =h   o 

W 

c 

Pi  o  o 

a 
o 
u 

«H    cd 


O 

W 

Pi   co 

« 

Eh 

o   cd 

"* 

ft 

e 

s-' 

•H 
-P    CO 

1 

Eh 

LPv 

O    CD 

CM 

•  • 

CO 

3  d 

Eh 

CT\ 

tj     £ 

(1) 

£ 

T— 

O  th 

rH 

Eh 

Pi     O 

cd 

o 

CO 

Pi 

P4    Pi 

E-< 

o 

<H 

O  t3 

CD  § 

cd  cd 

•P  T3 

Pi 

<d  t3 

O  pH 

U  U 

CD  o 

ft  -5 


T3 


W    £  T3 


CO 

0 

fl    rH 

O    53 

o 

•H   t* 

rH 

P    O 

rQ 

o   p! 

CJ 

3 

rQ 

TH     g 

o 

O    O 

Pi 

u  u 

Ph 

ft  ft 

rr\ 


LP. 

cd 

• 

• 

VO 

LP* 

Pi 

C\J 

io> 


O 


cd 
O 

o 

VO 


K> 


VO 


CO 


O 

LP\ 


cd 

o 

o 

o 

o 

o 

CM 

o 

VO 

"Hr 

CM 

ON 

vO 


o 

CM 

ON 


o 

CM 
CM 


O 

o 

CM 


O 


CD 

CO 

CD 

fl 

rH 

Pi 

•p 

3 

CD 

CD 

rH 

(3D 

^ 

ft 

cd 

s 

O 

ft 

-£> 

■H 

O 

o 

2 

S3 

o 

o 

u 

o 

1 


J* 

o 
o 


cd 
o 

•H 

P 

oa 

•H 

-p 
cd 

p 

CO 

§1 


hf     >> 


o 

CO 


CVJ 

ON 


3 


CO 


8 


O        CO        CO 
X        01        01 


85 


50 
international  distribution  than  once  thought.    However,  they 

are  sufficiently  promising  for  Howard  Hughes'  Summa  Corporation 

to  make  the  necessary  quarter-of-a-billion  dollar  initial 

investment  on  a  ship  and  processing  facilities.  They  also  have 

induced  a  number  of  international  consortia  among  less  well 

endowed  firms.  Once  considered  to  be  an  area  only  for  the  very 

rich  and  technologically  sophisticated,  there  are  signs  that 

participation  may  become  much  more  widely  accessible  as  deep  sea 

mining  matures — rather  as  jet  aircraft  now  can  be  found  in  a 

51 
host  of  developing  country  airlines. 

Yet  it  has  been  simply  the  attention  paid  to  the  nodules 

itself  which  has  brought  some  of  the  most  profound  changes  to 

the  oceans.  Wide  recognition  of  their  potential  began  to 

52 
develop  in  the  mid  1960s.    More  importantly,  the  prospect  of 

seabed  mining  was  one  of  the  primary  motivations  behind  Ambassa- 
dor Arvid  Pardo's  famous  1967  speech  to  the  United  Nations  and 

53 

Foreign  Affairs  article   which  led  the  way  to  the  "Common 


50 
Several  million  dollars  a  year  could  be  made  available, 

but  competing  demands  will  spread  this  very  thin. 

51 

John  L.  Mero,  Ocean  Resources  Incorporated,  comments  at 

Johns  Hopkins  School  of  Advanced  International  Studies  (SAIS) 
Conference,  "Conflict  and  Order  in  Ocean  Relations,"  October  21- 
24,  1974- 

52 

See,  for  instance,  John  L.  Mero,  The  Mineral  Recources 

of  the  Sea  (Hew  York:  Elsevier  Publishing,  1965  J  ajld  William  T. 

Burke,  Ocean  Sciences,  Technology,  and  the  Future  International 

Law  of  the  Sea  (Athens,  Ohio:  Ohio  University  Press,  1966). 

^"Who  Will  Control  the  Seabed?"  Foreign  Affairs,  XLVII 
(October  1968),  pp.  123-137. 


86 


Heritage  of  Mankind"  concept  and  the  Third  UN  Law  of  the  Sea 
Conference.  It  seems  unlikely  that  deep  sea  mining  alone  will 
transform  the  oceans  in  the  same  way  that  weapons  technology, 
containerization  and  petroleum  drilling  have  done.  Neither  is 
it  clear  what  kind  of  a  regime  will  govern  such  operations.  But, 
by  focusing  national  interest  on  the  riches  beneath  the  deep 
seas  (as  opposed  to  adjacent  waters),  the  nodules  have  contributed 
to  the  death  of  nes  nullius,  and  accelerated  the  demise  of  nearly 
all  traditional  concepts  of  order  in  ocean  space. 

The  Extraction  of  Materials  from  Seawater 

It  has  long  been  known  that  ocean  water  contains  vast 
amounts  of  dissolved  minerals — 165  million  tons  of  solids  in 
each  cubic  mile  of  the  sea,  350  million  cubic  miles  of  the  sea 
itself.  Most  chemical  elements  have  been  detected,  but  only  the 

extraction  of  salt,  magnesium  and  bromine  now  are  commercially 

54 
attractive.    In  the  future,  however,  more  uses  certainly  will 

be  found.  Japan  recently  announced  a  study  for  securing  stable 

55 
uranium  supplies  from  seawater.    Should  fusion  power  ever  be 


54., 

TSdward  Wenk,  Jr.,  "The  Physical  Resources  of  the  Oceans," 

Scientific  American  (September  1 969) ,  pp.  82-91.  Over 
89  percent  of  U.S.  magnesium  and  the  majority  of  bromine  pro- 
duction came  from  seawater  or  brine. 

•^Nihon  Keizai,  July  29,  1974*  There  are  about  14  tons  of 
uranium  in  every  cubic  mile  of  sea  water.  A  similar  British 
study  in  1972  found  seawater  extraction  to  be  competitive  if 
uranium  ore  prices  rose  to  about  $70  to  5140  per  pound.   (1974 
prices  are  in  the  $8-10  range.)  Even  such  highly  priced  uranium 
could  produce  economical  electricity  in  breeder  reactors. 


87 


developed,  the  oceans  would  become  an  unlimited  energy  source 

since  the  deuterium  which  could  be  used  to  fuel  such  a  plant 

occurs  naturally  as  an  isotope  of  hydrogen. 

Fresh  water  itself  is  an  ocean  extract  whose  importance 

will  grow,  particularly  in  the  developing  countries,.  The 

problem,  as  usual,  is  the  uneven  increase  in  demand  associated 

with  improved  living  standards.  In  the  words  of  one  authority: 

In  highly  industrialized  lands,  the  demand  for 
water  will  increase  about  5Q/°  in  the  next  10  years, 
for  some  developing  countries,  an  increase  of  as 
much  as  5OO/0  is  expected  during  this  period. 5° 

The  minimum  subsistence  level  of  fresh  water  per  person  is  about 

2  litres  per  day  ( »73m  per  year).  In  Tropical  Africa  the  annual 

per  capita  consumption  averages  about  1.5m  ,  compared  with  about 

3 
500m  in  V/estern  Europe,  and  twice  that  in  the  U.S.  Yet,  some 

projections  hold  that  world-wide  demand  soon  will  reach  1500m  / 

57 
year  per  person. 

There  is  plenty  of  natural  fresh  water  available  to  support 
this  demand,  but  it  is  inequitably  distributed.  Figure  2-2 
indicates  the  coastal  regions  which  have  shortages  of  fresh 
water. 

Some  800  desalinization  plants  now  in  operation  produce 
about  1.2  million  m  of  fresh  water.  Most  of  it  comes  from  the 


56 

Hubert  K.  J.  Hauser,  "Desalinization:   The  Sea  as  a 

Source  of  Fresh  Water,"  Underwater  Journal  (February  1 973) » 

pp.  9-17. 

^7Ibid.t  pp.  9-10. 


88 


r— 

ON 


CM 

I 

CM 


•H 

P"4 


G  CO 

§  a 

O  A 

■-3  PM 

u  £ 

CU  CO 

-p 

c3  « 


s 

W 
CO 

1 

1 


o 

M 


E-i 

o 
o 


89 


sea,  but  some  facilities  purify  brackish  water,  rivers  or 
sewerage.  This  capacity  is  expected  to  increase  between  5  and 
8  times  by  1980. 

To  date,  energy  costs  have  been  the  principal  constraint 
on  the  widespread  production  of  fresh  water  from  the  sea.  This 
is  reflected  in  the  concentration  of  existing  facilities  in 
regions  like  Kuwait,  where  energy  is  cheap  or  on  Ascension 
Island,  where  there  is  no  alternative.  In  time,  however,  the 
press  of  demand,  together  with  new  technology  and  the  spread  of 
nuclear  reactors  (whose  waste  heat  can  be  used  for  desaliniza- 
tion)  will  combine  to  make  fresh  water  plants  both  more  competi- 
tive and  more  important. 

Other  new  and  potentially  exciting  sources  of  undersea 
wealth  are  the  hot  brine  pools  discovered  in  1964  ^n  ^he  ^e^  Sea. 
With  concentrations  of  minerals  nearly  ten  times  as  high  as  those 
found  in  ordinary  sea  water,  they  are  associated  with  bottom 
sediments  rich  in  heavy  metals  such  as  zinc,  copper,  lead, 
silver  and  gold.    Similar  outflows  were  discovered  along  the 
mid-Atlantic  ridge  in  1974* 

Ocean  Engineering  Structures 

Quite  apart  from  oil  rigs  and  seabed  storage  tanks,  the 
proliferation  of  man-made  offshore  structures  seems  only  to  have 


wenk,  op_.  cit.,  p.  352. 


90 


begun.  Simultaneous  developments  in  military  and  petroleum 
technology,  on-shore  crowding  and  pollution,  and  the  growth  of 
tanker  size  have  pushed  more  and  more  urban  and  industrial 
activities  out  into  the  coastal  zone.  A  recent  summary  of 

potential  uses  for  offshore  islands  and  platforms  developed  the 

59 
following  list: 

Table  2-5 

POTENTIAL  USES  OF  MULTI-PURPOSE 
OFFSHORE  ISLANDS  AND  PLATFORMS 


DEVELOPMENT  AND  NUISANCE  USES— Possibly  harmful  to  the  environment 


Waste  disposal  &  recycling 

Solid  waste 
Dredge  material 
Sewage  sludge 
Incineration  plants 
Y/aste  treatment  plants 

Transportation  &  Access 

Terminals,  storage  &  shipping 
-petroleum  products  &  LNG 
-dry  bulk  cargoes 
-general  cargo  &  container- 
ship,  import,  export, 
transfer 
-pipelines 
Airports 
Highways  and  bridges  across 

sounds 
Access  to  is lands- -Causeway, 
tunnel,  ferry,  workboat, 
cables,  pipeline,  trestle, 
belt  conveyor 


Power  &  energy 

Steam  electric  generating 

plants 
Nuclear  plants 
Lesalinization 


Industry 

Manuf  ac  turing 

Oil  refineries 

Ship  building,  repair, 

base  for  offshore 

operations 
Commercial  fishing  port 

&  processing  plant 

Oceanographic  &  research 
activities 


59 

^John  McAleer,  "Multi-use  Potential  of  Offshore  Facilities, 

Artificial  Islands  and  Platforms  in  Bays  and  Estuaries, "  10th 

Annual  MTS  Conference  Proceedings,  1974*  PP»  697-714* 


91 


CONSERVATION  AND  ATTRACTIVE  USES— Compatible  with  or  enhancing 

environment 

Fish  &  Wildlife  habitat  Public  recreation  &  cultural 

Marine  parks  (limited  visitors)  Marine  parks,  museums 

and  preserves  Aquariums,  underwater 
Wetlands  tourism 

Artificial  reefs  Beaches,  swimming,  water 
Mariculture  ski  areas 

Boating,  marinas,  moorings, 
Private  recreation  &  limited  harbor  of  refuge 

residential  use  Fishing  piers  and  diving 


Same  headings  as  above, 

plus  coastal  tourism 
Restaurants,  sport  &  bait  shops 
Motels,  hotels — boat  charter  & 

rental 
Amusement  park  &  boat  rides 
Residential 


reefs 


All  of  these  proposals  are  within  the  current  state-of-the- 
art  in  ocean  engineering.  Indeed,  construction  of  a  special 
shipyard  to  build  floating  reactors  has  been  begun  in  Jackson- 
ville, though  its  status  is  uncertain  since  some  potential  custo- 
mers recently  have  postponed  their  orders.  The  new  Osaka  airport 
will  be  located  offshore.  A  floating  city  prototype  has  been 
built  in  Hawaii  which  could  have  real  estate  costs  below  those 
in  Waikiki.  Additional  uses  of  such  platforms  have  been  sug- 
gested by  the  Navy's  Mobile  Ocean  Basing  System  (MOBS)  and  the 
need  for  mid-ocean  weather  monitoring  stations.  Their  construc- 
tion has  been  facilitated  by  recent  advances  in  materials  tech- 
nology (notably  cement)  for  ocean  engineering.  One  of  the  major 
current  problems,  however,  is  a  world-wide  lack  of  maritime 


92 


capacity.  Offshore  petroleum  exploration  is  being  delayed  by  a 
shortage  of  drilling  rigs  and  tubular  products.  New  construction 
is  limited  by  the  supply  of  steel  and  skilled  personnel.  This 
condition  is  expected  to  persist  for  several  years. 

Other  studies  have  indicated  the  competitiveness  of  several 
ocean-atmosphere  energy  systems,  with  primary  attention  being 
given  to  the  Solar  Sea  Power  Plant  (SSPP)  employing  of  solar 
cells  and/or  ocean  thermal  gradients.    Table  2-6  outlines  some 
of  the  possibilities: 

Table  2-6 


Amount  of  Energy 
if  Harnessed 


Technologies 

World-Wide 

Currents 

small 

Tides 

small 

Winds 

small 

Salinity 
gradients 

medium/large 

Thermal 
gradients 

large 

Percentage  of  U.S.  Electricity 

Demands  Y/hich  This  System 

Could  Meet  in  the  Year  2000 


10#-19# 


12^-17$ 


% 


Mr.  Roger  L.  Nelson,  Triton  Oil  and  Gas  Co.  (Manila), 
interview,  May  15,  1 974»  and  Mr.  James  Blake,  Geological  Services 
Ltd.  (Singapore),  interview,  May  50,  1974 

See  Richard  Frye,  "The  Economics  of  Unconventional  Energy 
Resources,"  Patricia  J.  McWethy,  "Process  for  Determining  the 
Federal  Role  in  Stimulating  Development  of  Ocean  Energy  Tech- 
nologies," and  L.  Wechsler,  et   al.,  "Engineering  Analysis  of 
Systems  for  Extracting  Useful  Energy  from  the  Sea,"  in  10th  MTS 
Conference  Proceedings,  pp.  455— 499- 


93 


The  implications  of  these  proposals  are  consistent  with 
other  trends  to  focus  attention  on  near-shore  areas  and  to 
broaden  the  range  of  off-shore  equivalents  to  traditionally  land- 
based  activities.  Moreover,  they  contain  the  seeds  of  innumerable 
disputes,  not  only  over  ownership  and  responsibility,  but  also 
over  onshore  effects  from  seaward  projects.  A  classic  example 
was  offered  by  the  reactions  of  New  York,  New  Jersey,  Pennsyl- 
vania, Delaware  and  Maryland  to  the  possible  location  of  a 
superport  off  of  Delaware.  In  addition  to  environmental  worries, 
there  were  questions  of  revenue  sharing,  compensation  for 
business  lost  by  the  Port  Authorities  of  New  York,  Philadelphia, 
Baltimore  and  other  cities,  rail  and  road  access,  coastal  storage 
and  piping  facilities,  and  a  myriad  of  other  problems.  One  can 
imagine  the  difficulties  if  the  location  had  involved  inter- 
national interests. 

Conclusions 

None  of  the  developments  outlined  in  this  chapter  has  been 
conducive  to  the  continued  minimum  regulation  of  ocean  space. 
Moreover,  with  the  exception  of  manganese  nodule  mining,  the 
effect  of  technology  has  been  to  reinforce  demands  to  bring  the 
adjacent  waters  more  under  national  control.  Should  no  inter- 
national regime  of  the  deep  seabed  be  negotiated  (or  perhaps 
even  if  it  is),  pressures  for  the  partition  of  the  abyssal  floor 
may  follow  as  well.  The  struggle  between  proponents  of 


94 


unilateral  and  multi- lateral  solutions  will  be  considered  in 
more  detail  in  the  next  chapter. 

Distant-water  interests  remain  strong  among  the  shipping 
companies,  offshore  oil  producers  (if  they  drill  off  others' 
coasts),  certain  fishermen  and  the  great  power  navies.  The 
first  three,  however,  are  increasingly  learning  to  live  with 
the  restrictions  through  multinational  operations,  while  the 
last  are  constrained  by  political  and  technical  factors  which, 
though  changeable,  are  largely  beyond  their  control. 


Chapter  Three 
THE  UNSETTLED  MARINE  POLITICAL  CLIMATE 

In  response  to  advances  in  both  military  and  commercial 
technology  the  marine  political  climate  also  is  changing-. 
For  the  most  part  the  legal  and  political  changes  have  been 
directed  at  specific  new  activities,  but  the  cumulative  effect 
has  been  to  undercut  the  basis  of  unimpeded  maritime  commerce 
and  naval  operations. 

The  Foundations  of  Freedom  of  the  Seas 

The  freedom  of  maritime  commerce  was  codified  at  Paris,  in 
1856.   In  fact,  this  was  the  culmination  of  a  lengthy  process, 
corresponding  in  part  to  the  replacement  of  mercantilism  by  free- 
trade  liberalism.   In  1805,  Britain  gave  up  her  demand  for 
Channel  salutes.  The  Royal  Navy  started  its  work  as  the  world's 

policeman  even  before  the  end  of  the  Napoleonic  Wars,  and  soon 

2 

was  pressing  for  a  universal  three-mile  territorial  sea. 


Where  Britain  finally  accepted  the  principle  that  free 
ships  make  free  goods — to  her  great  regret  in  1914*  This  decla- 
ration also  eliminated  privateering,  although  privateers  were 
sponsored  by  the  Confederacy  as  late  as  February  I863. 

Michael  Lewis,  The  History  of  the  British  Navy  (London: 
George  Allen  and  Unwin,  1959),  PP«  189-197. 


95 


96 


In  1855»  Denmark  began  the  abolition  of  the  Sound  Dues — the  last 
of  the  government-imposed  tolls  in  international  straits. 
Finally,  by  the  mid-1 850s  the  multitude  of  coastal  jurisdictions 
which  had  harbored  the  Barbary  Pirates,  the  East  and  West  African 
slavers  and  the  Asian  pirates  nearly  had  been  eliminated. 

The  process  by  which  piracy  and  slave  trade  finally  were 
brought  under  control  deserves  consideration  at  some  length. 
Not  only  is  it  illustrative  of  the  fragility  of  the  concept  of 
freedom  of  the  seas,   and  the  conditions  necessary  for  its 
maintenance,  but  it  also  provides  some  pertinent  analogies  for 
the  present  era  of  expanding  coastal  state  jurisdictions.  This 
is  not  to  suggest  that  coastal  state  claims  are  equivalent  to 
piracy.  Neither  is  the  resumption  of  widespread  slave  trading 
expected.  The  point  is  that  infringements  on  maritime  commerce 
usually  are  concentrated  in  a  fairly  limited  geographic  region. 
If  there  are  no  universally  accepted  norms  governing  the 
relations  between  coastal  states  and  shipping,  or  if  there  is 


See  Charles  E.  Hill,  The  Danish  Sound  Dues  and  the 
Command  of  the  Baltic  (Durham:   Duke  University  Press,  1 926) , 
pp.  228-67. 

"Freedom  of  the  Seas"  has  been  used  in  a  variety  of  ways. 
In  fact,  it  is  much  easier  to  define  what  it  is  not  than  what  it 
is.   Herein  it  shall  mean  the  establishment  of  an  environment  at 
sea  which  is  conducive  to  the  free  and  safe  passage  of  maritime 
commerce,  subject  to  a  minimum  of  disruptions  in  peacetime  by 
governments  or  other  organizations.  This  description  is  offered 
in  clarification  of  a  general  concept.   Further  precision 
probably  would  lead  to  more  semantic  difficulties  than  it  would 
solve . 


97 


no  single  power  or  coalition  capable  of  defending  the  freedom  of 
navigation  world-wide,  it  quickly  will  be  restricted  somewhere . 
Thus,  it  is  in  the  interest  of  the  trading  nations  to  see  that 
there  are  naval  forces  in  each  region  which  are  strong  enough  to 
protect  seaborne  trade.  These  may  belong  to  the  maritime  powers 
themselves,  or  to  regional  states.  In  the  latter  case,  however, 
it  behooves  the  trading  states  to  ensure  that  the  regional  power 
in  question  has  enough  of  a  stake  in  free  maritime  commerce  to 
defend  it  rather  than  control  it  for  her  own  interests. 

The  brief  histories  that  follow  may  seem  unrelated  to 
modern  Japanese  seapower.  Hopefully,  however,  they  will  illus- 
trate some  of  the  problems  of  restoring  order  at  sea  once  it  has 
broken  down.  Of  particular  note  is  the  coordination  necessary 
between  political  and  military  activities  in  the  resolution  of 
regional  maritime  problems. 

The  Barbary  Corsairs  (1 500-1 850) 

The  Barbary  Corsairs  evolved  from  the  Moors  expelled  from 
Spain  in  the  late  15th  and  early  16th  centuries.  At  first 
motivated  as  much  by  political  and  religious  motives  as  by  the 


5 
Captain  Walsh  has  argued  that  merchant  shipping  may  be 

exempt  from  many  of  the  North-South  disputes  since  the  flow  of 

goods  also  has  become  critically  important  to  the  developing 

countries.  This  may  well  be  true  in  general,  but  such  an 

exemption  will  require  that  all  countries  take  a  more-or-less 

unemotional  view  of  their  interests.   It  seems  at  least  equally 

likely,  therefore,  that  there  also  will  be  exceptions 

(restrictions  on  commerce)  from  time  to  time. 


98 


search  for  plunder,    they  soon  became  identified  with  the  Turkish 

cause.     One  of  their  number,  Kehyr-ed-Din  actually  supervised 

the  building  of  the  Ottoman  Navy  in  1534*     After  the  myth  of  the 

"Invincible  Turk"  was  shattered  at  Malta  (1565)   an<^  Lepanto 

(1571)>    the   seamen  of  the  Barbary  coast  reverted  to  piracy,   at 

which  they  remained  until  the   19th  century. 

Lane-Poole  charges  that  there  was  no  real  European  attempt 

to  suppress  the  piracy  between  the  death  of  Andrea  Doria  in  1 56O 

and  the  British- Dutch  bombardment  of  Algiers  in  181 6.  The  reason 

was  basically  that  the  European  states  had  recognized  the 

sovereignty  of  the  Barbary  Pirates  and  used  them  in  various 

alliances  against  each  other.  Pella  repeats  this  charge,  noting: 

L' Eur ope,  dont  1' unite  fut  detruite  par  la  Reforme, 
se  refusait  a  faire  bloc  contre  le  danger  commun.7 

Some  relief  was  provided,  however,  by  Louis  XIV s  Ordonnance  de 

la  Marine  of  1681. 

The  United  States'  campaign  on  the  Barbary  Coast  between 

1801  and  1805  was  the  first  serious  effort  against  the  pirates 

since  the  16th  century.   It  led  to  the  freeing  of  U.S.  commerce 

from  tribute  and  the  release  of  prisoners,  albeit  at  the  cost  of 

an  indemnity.  But  when  American  warships  were  withdrawn  from 

the  Mediterranean  in  1812   the  piracy  began  again  and  another 


c 

Stanley  Lane-Poole,   The  Story  of  the  Barbary  Corsairs 

(New  York:   G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons,  1890)7" 

7 
Vespasien  Pella,  "La  Repression  de  la  Piraterie,"  Recueil 

des  Cpurs,  XV  (1926-V),  p.  162. 


99 


naval  exercise  was  necessary  in  1815*  By  this  time,  however, 
European  attitudes  toward  freedom  of  the  seas  had  begun  to  change 
and  further  tolerance  of  the  pirates  was  short-lived. 

In  1816,  the  response  to  an  especially  outrageous  set  of 
demands  by  the  Dey  of  Algiers  was  a  bombardment  of  the  city  by 
a  British  squadron  with  some  Dutch  units  in  company.  Although 
several  concessions  were  extracted,  by  1820  nearly  all  had  been 
abrogated  and  another  bombardment  followed  in  1824. 

Piracy  on  the  Barbary  Coast  was  not  finally  suppressed 
until  1830,  however,  when  the  French  invaded  Algeria  and  exiled 
the  Dey. 

Thus  the  maritime  strength  of  the  Barbary  States  was 
developed  for  religious  and  political  wars  and  turned  to  piracy 
in  the  absence  of  adequate  police  authority  at  sea.  Their 
immunity  was  guaranteed  by  the  struggles  for  European  hegemony, 
and  the  piracy  remained  until  the  political  climate  on  the  coast 
itself  was  changed  by  the  imposition  of  French  rule.  Seapower 
alone  was  insufficient. 

The  Chinese  Pirates  (1 832-1 869)8 

Although  piracy  had  existed  along  the  China  coast  for 
thousands  of  years,  Admiralty  interest  really  stemmed  from  1832 


lAost  of  this  section  is  from  Grace  Fox,  British  Admirals 
and  Chinese  Pirates,  1832-1869  (London:  Kegan  Paul,  Trench, 
Trubner  &  Co.,  Ltd.,  1940)  and  Harry  Miller,  Pirates  of  the  Far 
East  (London:   Robert  Hall  &  Co.,  1970). 


100 


under  the  influence  of  Sir  James  Graham's  economy  reforms  and 
fleet  re-deployments.  Even  more  important  was  the  expiration  in 
1834  of  the  East  India  Company's  monopoly  of  the  China  trade. 
Heretofore,  the  company  had  used  its  own  resources  to  protect 
its  ships  and  His  Majesty's  warships  rarely  were  required. 
Thereafter,  however,  especially  after  the  Opium  War  (1839~42), 
the  Koyal  Navy's  responsibilities  in  the  region  increased 
markedly. 

Significant  problems  with  multiple  jurisdictions  soon  were 
encountered.  The  Admiral  commanding  the  station  was  responsible 
for  activities  on  the  high  seas,  the  Peking  government  for  those 
within  Chinese  territorial  waters,  and  the  British  Consul  at 
Hong  Kong  (a  pirate  center)  for  those  within  his  sphere.  In 
1848,  the  standing  orders  to  flag  officers  on  the  China  Station 
were  changed  to  include  the  suppression  of  piracy  in  Malaysian 
and  Chinese  waters  as  a  major  target  of  the  Royal  Navy.  The 
Navy  also  was  ordered  to  cooperate  with  Chinese  authorities  in 
coastal  regions. 

Britain  bore  this  burden  alone  between  1848  and  1860, 
without  great  success.  Chinese  authorities  usually  insisted  on 
primacy  in  their  own  areas  which  led  to  the  ineffective  enforce- 
ment of  anti-piracy  laws.   In  1858,  however,  the  Treaty  of 
Tientsin  included  a  provision  on  piracy,  thus  becoming  the  first 
formal  agreement  between  London  and  Peking  which  specifically 
dealt  with  the  issue.  Hong  Kong  finally  took  effective  measures 


101 


to  control  pirates  in  her  harbors  in  1866.  More  significantly, 
liability  soon  was  extended  to  those  who  traded  in  pirated  goods 
as  well.  Finally,  concluding  a  momentous  year,  Britain  proposed 
that  (a)  China  should  let  the  Royal  Navy  handle  pirates  anywhere 
on  the  coast,  (b)  other  maritime  powers  should  assist  in  the 
campaign  and  (c)  China  should  pay  for  the  increased  British 
involvement.  By  1869  "the  international  force  was  operating, 
although  Britain  still  carried  the  lion's  share. 

At  last,  in  1869,  after  his  own  attempts  to  disarm  junks 
had  proved  unenforceable,  the  Viceroy  of  Canton  established  a 
junk  register,  which  reduced  the  problems  of  junk  identification. 
Once  this  was  implemented,  the  British  tended  to  leave  the  sup- 
pression of  pirates  which  preyed  only  on  non-European  shipping 
to  the  Chinese,  while  their  own  task  was  greatly  simplified. 
Within  a  year  (!)  attacks  on  foreign  merchantmen  had  all  but 
ended,  and  the  Royal  Navy  soon  restricted  itself  to  the  high 
seas  and  those  remote  parts  of  the  coasts  where  the  Chinese 
needed  assistance. 

There  was  some  resurgence  of  piracy  during  the  1920s  and 
30s  in  connection  with  the  general  breakdown  of  internal  order 
in  the  country.  This  eventually  was  curtailed  by  strict  security 
measures  aboard  merchant  ships  and  the  large  number  of  foreign 
warships  then  on  China  station. 

The  problem  of  maintaining  freedom  of  the  seas  along  the 
Chinese  coast  was  largely  one  of  overcoming  sanctuaries  created 


102 


by  multiple  jurisdictions,  some  of  which  did  not  have  the  power 

to  enforce  their  regulations.  Similar  circumstances  are  evident 

9 

in  the  history  of  the  Caribbean,  Indian  Ocean  and  Malay  pirates. 

The  Slave  Traders  ( 1807-1 890)1° 

The  Royal  Navy  began  its  campaign  against  the  West  African 
slave  traders  in  1808,  a  year  after  the  Abolition  Act.  For 
nearly  twenty  years  it  was  an  almost  unilateral  activity.  More- 
over, it  was  frustrated  by  insufficient  forces,  the  unwillingness 
of  France  and  the  United  States  to  permit  foreign  searches  of 
their  vessels,  excessively  strict  rules  of  evidence,  the 
personal  financial  liability  of  British  commanders  in  cases  of 
nonconviction  and  the  reluctance  of  governments  and  businessmen 
alike  to  suppress  a  profitable  trade. 

Progress  was  made  with  the  enlistment  of  French  assistance 

in  1828  and  the  progressive  acceptance  of  the  equipment  clause 

1 1 

by  various  countries.    The  Webster-Ashburton  Treaty  of  1842 


9 
See,  for  instance,  George  A.  Ballard,  Rulers  of  the 

Indian  Ocean  (London:   Houghton  Miff lin  Co.,  1928),  Nicholas 

Tarling,  Piracy  and  Politics  in  the  Malay  World  (Singapore:   D. 

Moore,  1973),  and  Albion  and  Pope,  op_.  cit.  (note  1  -49) »  PP«  139" 

147. 

10 

Most  of  this  section  is  from  E.  A.  Alpers,  The  East 

African  Slave  Trade  (E.  African  Publishing  House,  1969),  sond 

W.  E.  F.  Ward,  The  Royal  Navy  and  the  Slavers  (London:   George 

Allen  and  Unwin,  1 969) . 

1 1 

This  clause  considered  the  presence  of  irons  and  other 

slaving  equipment  to  be  sufficient  evidence  that  a  vessel  had 

been  slaving.  Previously  it  was  necessary  to  catch  a  ship  with 

slaves  aboard. 


103 


led  to  the  establishment  of  an  American  West  African  squadron 
(although  USS  Dolphin  had  patrolled  the  coast  two  years  earlier) 
which  was  well  coordinated  with  the  British.  This  was  important, 
since  a  ship  could  no  longer  avoid  search  merely  by  hoisting 
American  colors.  About  the  same  time,  anti- slaving  treaties 
were  concluded  with  some  of  the  African  chiefs. 

By  1850,  the  principal  surviving  trades  were  with  Brazil, 
and  with  the  U.S.  via  Cuba.  The  first  was  notoriously  slow  to 
enforce  its  anti- slavery  laws  and  so,  after  five  years  of  unsuc- 
cessful negotiations,  a  British  admiral  finally  acted  on  his  own 
against  slave  ships  in  Brazilian  waters.  Numerous  diplomatic 
protests  ensued,  but  the  measure  was  successful  and  the  Brazilian 
slave  market  was  closed  by  1853* 

Throughout  the  1850s  British  presence  and  commerce  increased 
along  the  West  African  Coast,  further  restricting  the  sources  of 
slaves.  The  American  Civil  War  was  the  coup  de  grace,  and  the 
final  closure  of  the  Cuban  market  came  in  1869* 

The  East  African  slave  trade  was  slower  to  develop  but 
outlived  its  West  Coast  counterpart.  In  part  its  growth  was 
stimulated  by  the  British  campaign  in  the  Atlantic.  For  many 
years,  the  Atlantic  south  of  the  equator  was  beyond  the  juris- 
diction of  the  anti- slavery  patrols.  Therefore,  Brazil  began  to 
shift  its  procurement  to  Mozambique. 

The  Royal  Navy  established  a  patrol  in  the  Indian  Ocean  in 
1822  following  the  Moresby  Treaty  with  the  Sultan  of  Oman. 


104 


Although  French  and  Brazilian  merchants  drew  slaves  from  this 
area,  the  principal  demand  was  generated  by  the  growth  of  plan- 
tation economies  in  Zanzibar  and  the  Pemba  Islands,  as  well  as 
the  Omani  commercial  empire  in  the  northwest  Indian  Ocean. 
When,  in  1840,  the  Omani  capital  was  moved  from  Muscat  to  Zanzi- 
bar, the  task  of  the  naval  patrols  became  almost  impossible. 
Slave  ships  now  proceeded  along  coastal  routes  controlled  by 
sympathetic  rulers  and  needed  only  to  put  ashore  whenever  a 
warship  hove  into  sight. 

The  trade  was  at  its  height  in  1873  when  a  threatened 
British  blockade  against  the  Sultan  of  Zanzibar  forced  the  Anglo- 
Zanzibar  Treaty.  This  forbade  the  exportation  of  slaves  and 
included  a  promise  from  the  Sultan  to  close  his  slave  markets. 
By  1880  the  overt  trade  had  virtually  disappeared,  although  it 
was  reported  to  have  persisted  in  less  obvious  forms  well  into 
this  century  and  even  today. 

Summary 

Several  conclusions  may  be  drawn  from  these  examples. 
Among  them  are: 

(1)  That  naval  power,  by  itself,  rarely  is  decisive.  The  inter- 
vention of  troops,  either  army,  marines,  or  shore  parties,  or  the 
conclusion  of  political  agreements  nearly  always  was  necessary  to 
achieve  a  permanent  settlement.  To  cite  an  example  from  a 
different  setting,  Trafalgar  removed  the  invasion  threat  to 
Britain,  but  it  would  not  have  done  Napoleon  very  much  harm  had 


105 


no  troops  been  available  to  pour  into  the  Peninsula.  A  host  of 
studies  and  surveys  since  World  War  II  make  it  possible  to 
extend  this  conclusion  to  the  solitary  exercise  of  air  power 
as  well. 

(2)  That  the  freedom  of  the  seas  is  a  fragile  concept,  requiring 
at  least  three  elements  for  its  establishment  and  maintenance, 
(a)  A  community  of  interest  among  the  maritime  powers. 
Note  the  rapidity  which  the  Barbary  Pirates  dis- 
appeared once  Britain  and  France  stopped  using  the 
pirates  to  harass  each  other.  G.  S.  Graham   also 
has  argued  that  the  lack  of  major  conflict  at  sea 


12 

For  instance,  United  States  Strategic  Bombing  Survey 

(European  War),  208  vols.,  and  (Pacific  War),  108  vols.  (Wash- 
ington:  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1946-48),  and  Raphael 
Littauer  and  Norman  Uphoff,  eds.,  The  Air  War  in  Vietnam  (Boston: 
Beacon  Press,  1972).  The  closest  things  to  exceptions  in  the 
Twentieth  Century  have  been  the  submarine  campaigns  against 
Britain  and  Japan.  Had  the  U-Boats  not  been  defeated,  Britain 
probably  would  have  been  unable  to  continue  to  play  an  active 
part  in  the  War.  Whether  or  not  surrender  could  have  been 
induced  without  invasion  is  not  clear.   By  the  same  token, 
although  Japan  was  prostrate  from  the  destruction  of  her  trans- 
portation and  from  naval  and  aerial  bombardment,  invasion  would 
have  been  necessary  without  the  dual  shocks  of  the  atomic  bombs 
and  the  Soviet  entry  into  the  War.  The  U.S.  Navy  played  an 
important  role  in  the  Cuban  Crisis,  but  without  the  nuclear 
threat,  it  is  hard  to  assert  that  the  affair  would  have  been 
settled  so  neatly.   Those  who  claim  that  the  1972  mining  of 
Haiphong  and  the  Christmas  bombing  of  Hanoi  brought  the  Vietnam 
war  to  a  close  neglect  the  intricate  diplomatic  arrangements 
which  preceded  and  accompanied  these  acts.  In  any  case,  until 
the  North  Vietnamese  archives  are  opened,  such  arguments  are 
circumstantial. 

*G.  S.  Graham,  The  Politics  of  Naval  Supremacy  (Cambridge: 
University  Press,  1965). 


106 


during  Pax  Britannia  depended  as  much,  if  not  more 
on  the  European  equilibrium  and  the  interests  of 
the  Continental  powers  in  free  trade  than  on  the 
strength  of  the  Royal  Navy. 

(b)  The  elimination  of  conflicting  jurisdictions  which 
offer  sanctuary  to  offenders.  Key  victories  in 
the  suppression  of  the  slave  trade  were  the 
abolition  of  havens  south  of  "The  Line"  in  West 
Africa  and  along  the  East  African  coast  after  the 
Treaty  of  Zanzibar.  Chinese  piracy  was  under  con- 
trol within  four  years  after  the  elimination  of 
Hong  Kong  sanctuary  and  the  granting  to  the  inter- 
national force  of  the  right  to  pursue  its  quarry 

1  A 

anywhere  along  the  coast. 

(c)  The  presence  of  naval  forces  adequate  to  protect 
shipping  where  necessary.  Despite  multi-national 
assistance  on  occasion,  the  bulk  of  this  task  usually 
has  been  borne  by  a  single  global  naval  power  both 
in  Roman  and  recent  days.  In  principle,  however, 
there  is  no  reason  why  two  or  more  navies  could  not 


An  interesting  confirmation  of  these  principles  was  pro- 
vided by  U.S.  Coast  Guard  efforts  against  the  rum  runners  during 
prohibition.  Key  elements  in  the  campaign  were  agreements  with 
Britain,  Germany  and  Sweden  extending  the  area  where  the  U.S. 
could  carry  out  searches.  Among  the  smugglers  themselves, 
piracy  soon  became  commonplace.  See  Malcolm  F.  Willoughby,  Rum 
War  at  Sea  (Washington:   U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1964)  > 
pp.  21-59. 


107 


act  jointly  or  separately  in  different  geographical 
areas.  These  points  will  be  explored  at  length 
below. 

The  Current  Status  of  Maritime  Politics 

The  concept  of  freedom  of  the  seas  is  thus  a  fragile  one. 
All  three  of  its  basic  elements  are  in  danger  today,  and  are 
likely  to  remain  so  for  some  time.   (1)  In  the  law  of  the  sea 
negotiations  many  coastal  states  have  indicated  that  the  status 
quo  in  ocean  economic  activities  is  not  in  their  interest. 
Regardless  of  the  final  treaty  wording,  such  differences  of 

opinion  will  persist.  At  the  same  time,  (2)  a  host  of  conflict- 

1  5 
ing  jurisdictions  is  on  the  verge  of  appearing.    Furthermore, 

it  is  precisely  within  the  areas  bounded  by  such  zones  where 

surface  ships  will  be  most  vulnerable  to  SSMs  or  ASLls.  Thus, 

(j)  the  worldwide  exercise  of  naval  power  is  threatened  by 

extensive  legal  and  political  claims  which  are  backed  by  a 

newly- expanded  coastal  state  ability  to  enforce  them. 

The  Limitations  on  Global  Naval  Force 

It  must  be  reiterated  that  the  present  shackles  on  the 
major  naval  powers  are  only  partly  technological.  At  least  in 


1  5 

Proposals  have  included  over  100  exclusive  economic  zones 

of  up  to  200  miles,  an  equal  number  of  territorial  seas,  mostly 

of  12  miles  but  with  broader  exceptions,  and  various  other 

regimes  of  the  deep  seabed  and  continental  margin  whose  form  is 

not  yet  clear. 


108 


the  West,  they  stem  more  from  electorates'  unwillingness  to  sup- 
port military  campaigns  against  developing  coastal  states  than 
from  an  actual  imbalance  of  power  at  sea.  This  is  particularly 
true  if  such  an  operation  were  likely  to  be  costly  or  embarrassing. 
The  remoteness  (to  the  man  on  the  street)  and  complexity  of  most 
law  of  the  sea  issues  reduces  the  expected  amount  of  support 
still  further.  This  does  not  make  the  shackles  any  less  real, 

although  it  does  imply  that  they  may  only  be  temporary.  As 

1 6 

Robert  Osgood  noted: 

.  .  .  the  political  costs  of  the  United  States 
forcibly  protecting  American  tuna  fishers  against 
the  claims  of  sovereignty  by  Peru  always  seemed 
excessive  compared  to  what  could  be  gained  by  such 
drastic  measures  and  what  would  be  lost  without  them. 
But  it  is  misleading  to  infer  from  this  situation 
that  the  United  States  would  be  equally  passive  in 
the  face  of  some  threat  to  a  more  serious  economic 
interest  or  to  a  military  security  interest. 

Many,  of  course,  would  not  lament  the  demise  of  global 
naval  forces,  for  both  the  U.S.  and  the  Soviet  Union.  The  fact 
remains,  however,  that  only  twice  in  recorded  history  has  mari- 
time commerce  been  able  to  move  without  widespread  interference 
by  piracy  or  government- imposed  tolls  of  one  form  or  another. 


"U.S.  Security  Interests  in  Ocean  Law,"  ODIL,  II  (Spring 
1974) ,  p.  29.  Professor  Hedley  Bull  of  the  Australian  National 
University,  put  forth  the  interesting  proposition  that  the 
present  European  and  American  wariness  over  the  use  of  forces 
comes  from  having  been  on  the  wrong  side  in  a  recent  series  of 
colonial  wars.  Similarly,  the  developing  countries  have  had  an 
almost  unbroken  string  of  successes.  Interview,  June  19>  1974* 
Presumably,  such  sentiment  would  be  reversible  if  the  tide  of 
battle  changed. 


109 


The  first  period  was  from  the  Battle  of  Actium  (31  BC)  to  the 

middle  of  the  3rd  century  AD  while  the  Roman  Navy  dominated  the 

17 
Mediterranean.    The  second,  from  the  mid  19th  century  onward 

as  the  Royal  Navy,  in  concert  with  those  of  other  powers,  com- 

1  fl 
pie ted  the  suppression  of  piracy  world-wide. 

The  inability  of  naval  (and  air)  power  to  achieve  a  final 
conclusion  is  likely  to  continue,  if  not  become  even  more  pro- 
nounced. All  the  convoy  escorts  in  NATO  would  not  help  the 
Indian  Ocean  sealanes  if  oil  supplies  were  cut  off  at  the  well- 
head. The  full  tactical  aviation  resources  of  the  7th  Fleet  and 
the  7th  Air  Force  could  not  halt  the  1972  North  Vietnamese 
invasion  of  the  South  until  the  South  Vietnamese  ground  forces 
stood  and  fought.  A  submarine  blockade  might  in  principle  be 
able  to  bring  Japan,  or  even  the  U.S.  to  her  knees,  but  it  is 
unrealistic  to  think  that  such  a  campaign  would  remain  strictly 
at  sea  if  the  nations'  survival  were  genuinely  threatened.  Even 
the  ultimate  exercise  of  air  (and  sea)  power,  a  nuclear  exchange, 


1  7 

See  John  Van  Duyn  Southworth,  The  Ancient  Fleets  (New 

York:  Twayne  Publishers,  1968),  pp.  218-222,  297.  Also  William 

L.  Rodgers,  Naval  Warfare  Under  Oars  (Annapolis:  USNI,  1939)* 

pp.  3-4  and  Pella,  _op.  cit.  (note   3-7)  •  In  point  of  fact, 

Pompey  had  conducted  an  extremely  successful  campaign  against  the 

pirates  in  67  BC,  but  they  returned  amidst  the  power  struggles 

which  eventually  led  to  Actium. 

1  8 

It  is  not  true,  of  course,  that  piracy  was  totally  eradi- 
cated. The  immediate  effect  of  the  Royal  Navy's  entry  into 
Chinese  coastal  waters  was  to  discourage  attacks  only  on  European 
merchantmen.  The  fate  of  local  sailors  had  to  await  the  arrival 
of  strong,  anti-pirate  local  governments.  In  Southeast  Asian 
seas  (and  probably  elsewhere),  a  similar  situation  prevails  to 
this  day.  Disorder,  not  tranquillity,  is  a  natural  condition  on 
an  un-patrolled  ocean. 


11Q 


could  not  prevent  some  groups  of  citizens  on  both  sides  from 
re-establishing  their  governments  and  continuing  the  struggle 
if  they  so  chose. 

None  of  this  is  to  decry  the  utility  of  naval  and  air 
forces.  They  are  indispensable  tools  in  a  nation's  military  and 
diplomatic  arsenal.  But  their  limitations  must  be  remembered. 
So  long  as  the  majority  of  people  live  on  the  land  there  can  be 
no  ultimate  weapon  at  sea  or  in  the  air  alone.  If  communities 
were  located  on  the  seabed,  then  control  of  the  water  column  in 
itself  would  be  sufficient.  Until  that  time,  other  elements  of 
persuasion  also  must  be  employed. 

Extended  Coastal  State  Claims 

The  variety  of  claims  which  have  been  made  on  the  world's 

19 

oceans  since  1945   has  been  the  subject  of  an  enormous  volume 

20 

of  literature.    Still,  some  review  is  necessary  for  background. 

The  claims  may  be  grouped  into  (1)  territorial  sea,  (2)  economic 
zones  on  the  seabed  and  in  the  water  column,  (3)  anti-pollution 
zones.  It  will  be  contended  later  that  these  are  indicative  of 


19 

The  process  was  started  by  the  two  "Truman  Declarations" 

of  September  23,  1945,  by  which  the  United  States  laid  claim  to 

the  "subsoil  and  seabed  of  the  continental  shelf"  and  to  certain 

historic  fisheries.  Peru  responded  with  a  200  mile  territorial 

sea  in  1947»  and  the  process  has  accelerated  ever  since. 

20 

By  September  1974,  the  Third  UN  Law  of  the  Sea  Conference 

documents  had  run  to  over  13,000  pages. 


111 


a  fundamental  change  in  the  nature  of  thinking  about  the  oceans 

themselves. 

(1)     The  Territorial  Sea 

Territorial  Sea  olaims  may  themselves  be  subdivided  into 
three  categories — the  12  mile  limit,  archipelegos,  and  broader 
claims. 

(a)     The  12  mile  limit.     One  likely  outcome  of  the  UN  Law 

of  the  Sea  Conference  will  be  a  general  extension  of  the  histori- 

21 

cal,  but  outmoded,  three  mile  limit  to  12  miles.    Even  with  a 

treaty,  however,  some  states  probably  will  continue  to  claim 

22 

broader  areas. 

Under  such  limits  some  116   straits  between  6  and  24  miles 
in  width  would  fall  entirely  within  the  territorial  waters  of 

9 A 

their  riparian  states.  Since  the  rules  of  innocent  passage 
apply  within  the  territorial  sea,  the  transit  of  these  straits 


21 

See  S.  A.  Swart ztrauber,  The  Three  Mile  Limit  of  the 

Territorial  Sea  (Annapolis:  USNI,  1972). 

22 

In  October  1 974>  &  breakdown  of  territorial  sea  claims 

was  as  follows: 

Less  than  12      J2      15  to  50      51  to  200      Other 
46         52         8  11  4 

Source:   Office  of  the  Geographer,  U.S.  Department  of  State. 

23 

The  number  varies,  ranging  from  105  to  121  depending  on 

the  source.   116  is  the  figure  used  by  the  U.S.  Department  of 
State. 

^The  basic  conditions  of  innocent  passage  are  that  (1) 
navigation  shall  not  be  "prejudicial  to  the  peace,  good  order  or 
security  of  the  coastal  state,"  (2)  submarines  must  navigate  on 
the  surface,  and  (})  there  is  no  right  of  aircraft  overflight 
above  territorial  waters. 


112 


is  exposed  to  the  coastal  state's  definition  of  innocent.  The 
major  naval  powers  contend  that,  since  the  straits  historically 
have  been  high  seas,  their  accessibility  cannot  suddenly  be 
conditioned  by  such  subjective  judgments.  Moreover,  in  an  era 
of  strategic  missile  submarines  and  intercontinental  airlift, 
the  provisions  of  innocent  passage  are  inadequate  for  the  pro- 
tection of  great  power  interests. 

The  security  implications  of  straits  transit  have  been  the 

25 

subject  of  extensive  debates,       which  need  not  be  repeated  here. 

In  any  event,    the  issue  will  be  re-examined  later  in  connection 
with  Japan's  particular  needs  (see  page   246).     Whatever  the  out- 


2S 

The  U.S.  view,  and  the  enunciation  of  the  "Free  Transit" 

doctrine,  was  presented  in  Subcommittee  II  of  the  UN  Seabed 
Committee  on  July  30,  1971  (A/AC.138/SCIl/L.4;  A/8421,  pp.  241- 
245)»  The  Soviet  Union,  which  has  been  closely  aligned  with  the 
U.S.  on  this  issue,  announced  its  view  on  international  straits 
on  July  25,  1972  (a/AC.133/SCII/L.7;  A/8721,  pp.  16  -163). 
Typical  coastal  state  objections  and  counter-proposals  were  made 
by  an  interesting  alliance  of  Cyprus,  Greece,  Indonesia,  Malaysia, 
Morocco,  Philippines,  Spain  and  Yemen  (a/AC.1 38/SCII/L.18  of 
March  27,  1973).  The  People's  Republic  of  China  (PRC)  consis- 
tently has  denounced  the  imperialistic  ambitions  of  both  super- 
powers.  At  one  time,  the  U.S.  seemed  ready  to  back  off  from  the 
overflight  and  submerged  passage  provisions  of  "Free  Transit," 
but  the  denial  of  landing  rights  by  European  allies  during  the 
Yora  Kippur  War  airlift  forced  the  aircraft  to  overfly  the  Straits 
of  Gibraltar  (Aviation  Week,  December  12,  1973)  and  may  have 
hardened  the  U.S.  position  again.  Within  and  without  the  U.S. 
government  a  debate  has  continued  over  the  advisability  of  risking 
other  American  interests  solely  for  the  sake  of  free  transit.  For 
a  detailed  analysis,  and  dissenting  conclusions,  see  Robert  E. 
Osgood,  "U.S.  Security  Interests  in  Ocean  Law,"  _op_.  cit.  (note 
3  -  16),  wnose  publication  was  bitterly  opposed  by  the  Navy.  In 
an  effort  to  make  "Free  Transit"  more  palatable,  it  recently  has 
been  slightly  re-defined  and  re-presented  under  the  title 
"unimpeded  passage." 


115 


come  of  the  1975  meeting  in  Geneva  or  later  conferences,  the  dis- 
agreement is  likely  to  persist.  If  the  developing  country 
majority  insists  on  a  convention  stipulating  innocent  passage, 
the  superpowers  probably  will  not  ratify  it,  thus  destroying  its 
practical  utility.  If  a  convention  with  an  acceptable  guarantee 
of  transit  is  concluded  it  almost  certainly  will  be  challenged 
by  a  future  revolutionary  government  which  can  claim  that  it  was 
not  represented,  or  by  a  present  one  which  refuses  to  sign  the 

agreement.  If  no  compromise  is  reached,  the  issue  is  likely  to 

26 

be  tested  by  force  sooner  or  later. 

Even  without  transit  restrictions,  there  are  a  variety  of 

economic  advantages  which  a  coastal  state  could  reap  from  its 

27 

newfound  sovereignty.  One  such  measure  would  be  tolls.    Others 

are  more  subtle.  For  instance,  Singapore's  Foreign  Minister 

Rajartnam,  offered  the  following  comments  about  the  Straits  of 

Malacca  in  a  Japanese  press  interview: 

I  have  no  such  idea  [to  collect  tolls.  But]  for 
providing  facilities  useful  for  correct  and  safe 
navigation,  mainly  buoys,  communication  facilities 


26 

In  a  sense,  it  already  has,  with  the  blockade  of  the 

Straits  of  Tiran  in  1557  and  again  a  decade  later.  Also,  the 

dispatch  of  the  U.S.  carrier  Ticonderof.a.  into  the  Red  Sea  in 

early  1974*   The  fact  that  the  major  power  warships  have  not 

actually  opened  fire  in  straits  recently  does  not  remove  the 

threat  inherent  in  their  presence. 

27 

There   are   several  reminders  of  past  practices  of  this 

sort.     For  instance,    the   town  of  Tarifa,    on  the  Spanish  side  of 

the  Straits  of  Gibraltar,    derives  its  name  from  its   function  as 

a  collection  point  during  the  Moorish  occupation. 


114 


and  light  houses,  and  for  dredging  operations  in 
the  strait,  a  huge  amount  of  expenses  [sic]  is 
required.  We  want  those  nations  using  the  strait 
to  bear  them  proportionately. 28 

(b)  The  Archipelago  Doctrine.  As  first  enunciated  by  the 
World  Court  in  195%  the  basis  for  this  doctrine  is  that  straight 
base  lines  longer  than  twice  the  width  of  the  territorial  seas 

may  be  drawn  between  points  in  an  archipelago  in  order  to  dis- 

29 

tinguish  it  as  a  single  geographic  entity.    There  are  a  number 

of  coastal  and  mid-ocean  archipelagoes  whose  limits  are  in  dispute, 
but  the  principle  areas  of  international  concern  are  the  five 

archipelagic  states:  The  Bahamas,  Fiji,  Indonesia,  Mauritius, 

30 

and  the  Philippines.    The  key  to  their  claims  lies  in  the 

31 

"intimate  and  inseparable  combinations  of  land  and  sea"   for  an 

archipelagic  state.  From  the  standpoint  of  the  maritime  powers 
the  principle  objections  have  been  (1)  a  lack  of  historical  and 
legal  precedents,  (2)  the  relatively  small  land-to-water  ratio 
in  most  of  the  archipelegos,  (3)  the  implications  for  transit, 
(4)  the  implications  for  marine  resources. 


%ainichi  Shimbun  (hereafter  Mainichi),  August  6,  1974- 
Translation  from  U.S.  Embassy,  Daily  Summary  of  the  Japanese 
Press  (hereafter  Press  Summary) . 

9ICJ  Reports,  1951. 

30 

Papua-New  Guinea  is  likely  to  claim  similar  status  for 

the  Bismarck  and  Louisiade  archipelagoes  when  it  becomes  inde- 
pendent in  1975* 

31 

J   Judge  Jorge  Coquia,  quoted  in  "The  National  Territory," 

New  Philippines  (Manila),  February  1974>  P»  1» 


115 


In  point  of  fact,  most  of  the  important  international 
straits  which  would  be  affected  by  the  Archipelego  Doctrine 
(Lombok,  Sunda,  Ombai-Wetar,  New  Providence  Channel)  also  would 
be  enclosed  by  a  12  mile  territorial  sea.  The  most  important 

difference  is  that  the  archipelagic  states  consider  the  waters 

32 

within  their  base  lines  as  internal. 

Archipelagoes  also  have  been  the  subject  of  extended 
debates,  with  the  result  that  the  concept  has  won  steadily 
increasing  acceptance.  Even  the  United  States  has  indicated  a 
willingness  to  recognize  the  principle  in  exchange  for  some 
agreement  on  transit  rights. 

Whether  or  not  the  Law  of  the  Sea  Conference  resolves  the 
issue,  the  Archipelago  Doctrine  will  not  be  dismantled.  It  pro- 
vides exceptional  potential  for  the  political  and  economic 
development  of  appropriately  situated  states.  Moreover,  it  is 
in  keeping  with  the  growing  world-wide  tendency  to  blur  the  dis- 
tinction between  land  and  sea.  (See  below,  p.  1 35 • ) 

(c)  Broader  Coastal  State  Claims.   In  1974>  22  states 

34 
claimed  territorial  seas  greater  than  12  miles.    Some  of  these 


32 

Internal  waters  are  completely  subject  to  coastal  state 

control,  i.e.  there  is  no  right  even  of  innocent  passage. 

33 

It  was  reported  by  various  sources  in  Indonesia  and  the 

Philippines  during  interviews  with  the  author  in  Llay  and  June 

1974,  that  a  U.S.  negotiating  team  had  brought  up  the  subject 

while  visiting  the  area  in  the  Spring  of  1974* 

*  H[J.S.  Department  of  State,  Office  of  the  Geographer 
(includes  archipelagic  states).   One  of  the  four  states  listed 
under  "other"  on  page  111  has  put  forth  no  specific  claim. 


116 


were  subject  to  disclaimers  about  not  infringing  on  the  freedom 
of  navigation.  Others  probably  will  be  converted  to  economic 
zones  if  a  12  mile  limit  were  universally  agreed  upon.  Some 
holdouts  for  extended  claims  probably  will  remain  even  if  a 
general  convention  were  negotiated,  but  none  of  these  is 
strategically  critical  in  the  sense  that  such  a  stand  would 
infringe  on  a  major  waterway.  There  is,  however,  a  danger  of 
territorial  sea  claims  expanding  again  in  the  future,  possibly 
under  the  guise  of  increasingly  strict  controls  over  economic 
or  pollution  zones.  This  will  be  discussed  more  fully  in  the 
next  chapter. 
(2)  Economic  Zones 

Economic  Zones  are  designed  to  give  coastal  states  prefer- 

35 

ential  or  exclusive  rights   to  exploit  the  living  and  non-living 

resources  of  the  seabed,  the  subsoil  thereof,  and/or  the  super- 
adjacent  water  column.  The  alternative  proposals  for  such  zones 
have  been  bewildering,   but  it  appears  that  some  form  of  coastal 


35 

A  preferential  right  allows  a  coastal  state  to  exploit 

the  resources  to  the  full  extent  of  its  capability,  after  which 
it  is  open  to  the  international  community  within  the  limits  pre- 
scribed by  conservation.  Exclusive  rights,  as  the  name  implies, 
leave  the  admission  of  foreigners  totally  at  the  discretion  of 
the  coastal  state. 

No  less  than  29  sets  of  declarations  or  proposals, 
falling  into  9  major  groups  were  put  forward  in  the  Law  of  the 
Sea  Conference  preparations.   See  Tentative  Comparative  Table  of 
Proposals,  Declarations,  Working  Fai>ers,  etc. ,  Relating  to 
Subjects  and  Issues  Allocated  to  Sub-Committee  II  (SC  II/v7G/ 
Paper  No.  4,  with  Revision  1  through  July  1 9> 1 973) • 


117 


state  primacy  will  be  established  within  a  200  mile  limit  and 

37 
possibly  further  in  some  cases. 

Table  3-1  summarized  the  ocean  areas  which  would  accrue  to 
each  of  the  top  10  coastal  states  under  four  different  regimes; 
a  40  mile  limit,  200  miles,  the  200  meter  isobath,  and  the  edge 
of  the  continental  margin.  Note  that,  in  most  cases,  the  200 
mile  limit  also  includes  the  edge  of  the  margin.  Not  surprising- 
ly, the  major  beneficiaries  usually  are  the  developed  countries. 
What  is  more  important,  however,  is  the  potential  ocean  contri- 
bution to  the  national  resource  base  under  the  exclusive  economic 
zone.  Table  3-2  presents  some  of  the  likely  allocations  of  off- 
shore minerals,  petroleum  and  natural  gas  within  a  200  mile  zone. 
For  several  countries,  notably  Mexico,  Britain,  Norway,  Nigeria, 
Angola,  Indonesia  and  Malaysia,  offshore  petroleum  deposits 
represent  a  major  expansion  of  the  national  resource  base.  It 
goes  without  saying  that  every  effort  will  be  made  to  strengthen 
the  states'  grip  on  these  reserves.  It  also  seems  likely  that 
such  claims  will,  in  time,  spread  from  the  seabed  to  the  water 
column  above  it. 

Despite  the  tremendous  importance  of  minerals  within  the 


37 

Australia,  for  instance,  has  proposed  a  200  mile  limit 

or  the  edge  of  the  continental  margin,  whichever  is  further. 

Moreover,  in  cases  of  overlap  between  a  200  mile  zone  and  another 

state's  continental  margin,  "...  The  natural  phenomenon  of  the 

margin  should  always  prevail  over  the  artificial  rule  of  200 

miles  ..."  See  "Preventing  a  Scramble  for  the  Seas,"  xerox 

copy  from  an  unidentified  magazine,  p.  653 i   provided  by  the 

Australian  Foreign  Office,  Canberra. 


118 


Table  3-1 
RANK  ORDER  OP  SEABED  AREAS  ACCRUING  TO 
COASTAL  STATES  UNDER  DIFFERENT  CLAIMS 


(in  Sq.  Nauti- 

cal miles) 

Rank 

40  n.m. 

200  n.m. 

200  meters 

Edge  of  Margin 

1 

Indonesia 
(1,031,100) 

U.S. 
(2,222,000) 

Canada 
(846,500) 

Australia 
(1,445,400) 

2 

Canada 
(963,000) 

Australia 
(2,043,300) 

Indonesia 
(809,600) 

Canada 
(1,240,000) 

3 

Soviet  Union 
(857,200) 

Indonesia 
(1,577,300) 

Australia 
(661,600) 

Indonesia 
(1,229,800) 

4 

U.S. 
(731,900) 

New  Zealand 
(1,409,500) 

U.S. 
(545,400) 

U.S. 
(862,600) 

5 

Australia 
(408,600) 

Canada 
(1,370,000) 

Soviet  Union 
(364,300) 

Soviet  Union 
(735,900) 

6 

Mexico 
(236,100) 

Soviet  Union 
(1,309,500) 

Argentina 
(232,200) 

New  Zealand 
(571,100) 

7 

Philippines 
(230,200) 

Japan 
(1,126,000) 

PRC 
(230,100) 

Argentina 
(484,100) 

8 

Brazil 
(189,700) 

Brazil 
(924,000) 

Brazil 
(224,100) 

Norway 
(463,700) 

9 

Japan 
(180,100) 

Mexico 
(831,500) 

U.K. 
(143,500) 

Japan 
(440,900) 

10 

Norway 
(178,000) 

Chile 
(667,300) 

Japan 
(140,100) 

Brazil 
(435,700) 

Source 

s:  U.S.  Departi 

nent  of  State, 

"Theoretical  Areal  Allocations 

of  Seabed  to  Coastal  States  ..."  International 
Boundary  Study  Series  A,  Limits  in  the  Seas,  No.  46, 
August  12,  1972. 


119 


Table  3-2 


OCEAN  RESOURCE  POTENTIALS 


Distance  to 


Offshore 

Offshore 

Nodule  Concentration 

Country 

Oil 

Natural  Gas 

(nautical  miles) 

N.  America 

Bahamas 

■>■ 

- 

50-200 

Canada 

III 

Ill 

50-200 

Dominican 

Republic 

- 

- 

50-200 

Haiti 

- 

- 

50-200 

Honduras 

- 

- 

50-200 

Mexico 

II 

II 

0-50 

USA 

II 

I 

50-200 

S.  America 

Argentina 

III 

III 

- 

Brazil 

- 

III 

- 

Chile 

- 

III 

50-200 

Columbia 

- 

III 

- 

Ecuador 

- 

III 

- 

Trinidad  & 

Tabago 

- 

III 

- 

Venezuela 

Ill 

II 

— 

Europe 

Italy 

- 

III 

- 

Netherlands 

- 

III 

- 

Norway 

Ill 

III 

- 

Poland 

- 

- 

0-50 

Sweden 

- 

- 

0-50 

UK 

Ill 

Ill 

— 

Africa 

Angola 

- 

III 

- 

Egypt 

Ill 

III 

- 

Gabon 

- 

III 

- 

Libya 

II 

II 

- 

Nigeria 

III 

III 

- 

S.  Africa 

- 

- 

200-400 

120 


Country 

Asia 

Bangladesh 
Burma 
PRC 
India 
Indone  sia 
Iran 

S.  Korea 
Kuwait 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Qatar 

Saudi  Arabia 
USSR 

Union  Arab 
Emirates 


Offshore 
Oil 


III 
III 
III 
III 
III 
III 

III 
II 
II 

III 


Offshore 

Natural  Gas 


III 
III 
.III 
III 
III 
II 
III 

III 

III 

III 

II 

II 

III 


Distance  to 
Nodule  Concentration 


0-50 


Oceania 


Australia 
New  Zealand 


III 


II 
III 


200-400 


III  -  10  to  100  billion  bbls  of  petroleum _or  10  to  100  trillion 
cubic  feet  of  natural  gas 
II  -  100  to  1000  billion  bbls  of  petroleum  or  100  to  1000 
trillion  cubic  feet  of  natural  gas 
I  -  Greater  than  1000  billion  bbls  of  petroleum  _or  1000 
trillion  cubic  feet  of  natural  gas 

Dash  indicates  fewer  than  10  billion  bbls  or  trillion  cubic  feet, 
not  that  there  are  no  reserves  at  all. 

Potential  reserves  are  estimates  based  on  general  geological 
structure.  They  usually  are  a  few  orders  of  magnitude  larger 
than  proved  recoverable  reserves,  but  have  been  used  because 
extensive  investigation  of  offshore  fields  has  only  recently  begun. 

Distance  to  manganese  nodule  concentrations  is  the  distance  to 
sites  with  moderate  density  or  greater.  Sparse  density  sites  have 
been  disregarded. 

Source:   John  P.  Albers,  _et  al.,  Summary  Petroleum  and  Selected 
Mineral  Statistics  for  120  Countries,  Including  Offshore  Areas, 
Geological  Survey  Professional  Paper  817  (Washington:  U.S. 
Government  Printing  Office,  1973) • 


121 


economic  zone,  disagreements  over  the  living  resources  of  the 
sea  are  likely  to  be  the  most  frequent  and  visible  of  ocean 
controversies.  Fisheries  disputes  always  have  been  volatile. 
However,  with  catches  of  traditional  fish  approaching  physical 
limits,  they  are  bound  to  intensify.  The  initial  impact  of 
this  technological  progress  has  been  two-fold.  Coastal  fishermen 
in  developing  and  developed  countries  alike  have  demanded 
increased  national  protection.  An  offshoot  has  been  the  spread 
of  the  South  American  view  that  fish  are  natural  resources, 
having  a  similar  status  to  the  mineral  deposits  of  the  continen- 
tal shelf. 

At  the  same  time,  many  distant  water  operators  have  come 
to  approach  national  claims  more  with  an  attitude  of  compromise 
than  of  defiance.  Joint  ventures  and  foreign  subsidiaries,  in 
particular,  have  become  popular  means  of  getting  at  least  some 
of  the  fruits  from  catches  in  foreign  coastal  waters. 


Bote  the  disputes  which  led  to  the  Anglo-French  Agree- 
ment of  1839,  and  the  North  Sea  Convention  of  1882.  Practically 
the  entire  history  of  U.S. -Canadian  relations  along  the  Atlantic 
coast  has  been  marked  by  one  fishery  problem  or  another.   Cable, 
op.  cit. ,  (note  1-5)  lists  79  cases  of  naval  intervention 
between  1946  and  1969.   Of  these,  10  involved  fisheries.   But 
this  does  not  include  the  hundreds  of  fishing  boats  that  are 
taken  every  year,  particularly  in  the  Northwest  Pacific.   In 
addition,  since  1970,  there  have  been  the  second  Cod  War  between 
Britain  and  Iceland,  several  incidents  of  shooting  in  the  Gulf 
of  Thailand,  continuing  seizures  of  foreign  tuna  boats  off  South 
America,  the  arrest  of  a  fisheries  research  ship  of  an  inter- 
national organization  by  Burma,  and  other  problems. 


122 


(3)  Pollution  Zones 

Among  the  broadest  restrictions  which  nations  unilaterally 
have  placed  on  the  uses  of  the  ocean  in  recent  years  have  been 
anti-pollution  zones.  These  have  not  been  limited  to  developing 
countries,  as  Canada  has  been  among  the  leaders  in  its  domestic 
legislation.  Efforts  to  control  pollution  represent  a  signifi- 
cant step  in  the  extension  of  land-based  control  over  the  seas, 
although  their  full  impact  may  not  be  felt  for  some  time. 

One  major  problem  is  the  disparity  of  standards  between 
different  nations.  Even  since  the  potential  danger  was  high- 
lighted by  the  1967  Torrey  Canyon  sinking,  various  forms  of 

limitations  on  pollution  in  national  waters  have  been  imple- 

39 

mented,  and  international  standards  on  ocean  dumping  codified. 

Unfortunately,  however,  the  approaches  which  different  nations 
have  taken  sometimes  have  been  incompatible.  The  U.S.,  for 
instance,  requires  certain  safeguards  in  the  construction  of  the 

ship  itself.    Iran,  on  the  other  hand,  has  proposed  that  ships 

41 
entering  the  50  mile  zone  must  have  adequate  insurance  coverage. 


39 

Mostert  argues  compellingly  that  even  these  efforts  are 

inadequate  in  view  of  the  destructive  potential  of  the  VLCCs  and 

ULCCs. 

See  the  proposed  Coast  Guard  changes  to  the  Ports  and 
Waterways  Safety  Act  of  1972  (33  U.S.C.,  1221  _et  seq.)  in 
Federal  Register,  June  28,  1974.  Parts  of  the  Federal  Water 
Pollution  Control  Act  of  December  21,  1972  also  apply. 

4  Robert  Osgood,  "U.S.  Security  Interests  in  Ocean  Law," 
op.  cit. ,  p.  27. 


123 


Japan's  laws,    despite  severe  local  pollution  problems,   are 

42 

relatively  mild. 

Preliminary  results  from  Caracas  point  to  a  future  effort 
to  set  international  standards  while  leaving  coastal  states  free 
to  establish  more  restrictive  laws  in  their  own  waters.  The 
difficulties  lie  in  the  authority  assigned  for  enforcement  of 
these  standards.  Some  claim  that  the  coastal  state  should  have 
full  powers  to  arrest  vessels  polluting  in  its  territorial  sea. 
Others  want  minimum  coastal  state  control  to  avoid  the  possi- 
bility that  exaggerated  pollution  claims  may  be  used  to  restrain 

43 
or  fine  foreign  vessels.    The  U.S.  Navy,  for  one,  has  gone  to 

great  lengths  to  minimize  vessel-source  pollution.  This  is  not 

only  because  of  U.S.  regulations,  but  also  to  avoid  future 

restrictions  on  mobility  through  coastal  state  pollution 

regulations. 

The  Regime  of  the  Deep  Seabed 

One  of  the  most  publicized  issues  at  the  Law  of  the  Sea 
conference  has  been  the  mining  of  deep  seabed  manganese  nodules. 


4  The  Marine  Pollution  Prevention  Law  (#1$6  of  1970)  con- 
tains no  construction  or  insurance  provisions  and  imposes  a  maxi- 
mum fine  of  only  200,000  yen   (about  $670)  for  vessel  discharge. 

45The  U.S.  proposal  (A/AC.1J8/SC  IIl/L.40  of  July  18,  1973) 
distinguishes  between  flag  state  (state  of  registry),  coastal 
state,  and  port  state  duties  and  responsibilities.  Although  the 
coastal  state  can  take  emergency  measures  to  safeguard  its 
shores,  under  normal  conditions,  a  complaint  is  to  be  filed  and 
the  action  delayed  until  the  vessel  reaches  its  next  port  of 
call. 


124 


It  already  has  suggested  that  the  prospect  of  nodule  exploitation 

was  partly  responsible  for  the  1970  declaration  that: 

The  Seabed  and  Ocean  Floor,  and  the  subsoil 

thereof,  beyond  the  limits  of  national  jurisdiction 

.  .  .,  as  well  as  the  resources  of  the  area,  are  the 
common  heritage  of  mankind. 44 

Consequently,  a  number  of  alternatives  were  proposed  for 

an  international  regime  to  ensure  that  the  proceeds  from  seabed 

operations  will  be  adequately  shared  within  the  international 

45 
community. ^J     The  debates  over  this  body  have  been  long  and  con- 
tentious, with  no  sign  of  resolution  as  of  the  end  of  the 
Caracas  session.  Their  content  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this 
inquiry,  but  whatever  form  the  seabed  regime  will  take  will  mark 
another  departure  from  the  freedom  of  action  on  the  high  seas. 
Should  no  organization  be  created,  operations  conducted  in  its 
absence  will  be  the  subject  of  contention,  and  possibly  even 
violence,  for  years  to  come. 

Shipping 

Not  only  the  technology,  but  also  the  organization  of 
international  shipping  has  undergone  great  changes  in  the  last 
few  years.  There  are  doubts  (in  early  1975)  about  the  future 
course  of  vrorld  trade  in  general.  Moreover,  two  historical 


44General  Assembly  Resolution  2799  (XXV)  of  December  17, 
1970. 

45 
^These  have  ranged  from  a  licensing  body  for  private 

ventures  to  "The  Enterprise" — a  completely  international  organ 

for  exploitation  and  revenue  distribution. 


125 


maritime  freedoms — of  the  choice  of  shippers  and  of  navigation — 
have  been  subject  to  restrictions. 

International  shipping  is  organized  into  Liner,  Tramp  and 
Tanker  trades.  Liners  ply  regularly  scheduled  routes,  incorpo- 
rating the  latest  available  technology,  such  as  containers. 
They  are  regulated  through  about  J60  "Conferences,"  which  set 
freight  rates,  assign  routes,  and  determine  cargo  shares  among 
the  vessels  of  the  member  shipping  lines.    Tramps  are 
unscheduled  bottoms  in  search  of  cargoes  of  opportunity,  often 
carrying  bulk  materials,  such  as  coal,  ore  and  cereals.  His- 
torically, their  only  regulation  has  been  through  international 
safety  and  sanitary  conventions,  and  some  port  state  limitations. 
Tankers  carry  a  variety  of  liquids,  from  LNG  to  palm  oil.  They 
are  divided  into  spot  (short- term/ single  voyage)  and  long-term 
charter  markets.  For  a  number  of  reasons,  the  long-term  pros- 
pects  for  each  of  these  markets  are  cloudy.    This,  in  itself, 


The  history  and  economics  of  conferences  in  the  British 
trades  through  1970  are  examined  in  Brian  M.  Deakin  and  T. 
Seward,  Shipping;  Conferences  (Cambridge:  University  Press,  1973) 

In  addition  to  the  political  problems  described  in  the 
next  few  pages,  long-range  shipping  plans  are  hampered  by  the 
uncertain  world  economic  outlook,  and  the  general  inflation. 
Higher  fuel  costs  mostly  have  been  passed  on  to  consumers,  but 
developed  country  vessels  have  the  additional  problem  of 
spiralling  wages,  which  cannot  be  completely  offset  by  labor- 
saving  technology.   Tanker  and  liner  operators  both  suffer  in 
an  inflation  because  they  cannot  guarantee  long-term  rates, 
which  may  be  a  condition  of  government  subsidies  or  profitable 
charters.  Particularly  in  the  former  trade,  the  availability  of 
long-term  charters  has  been  a  key  to  the  structure  of  fleets 


126 


is  not  unusual — the  shipping  business  always  has  been  risky,  and 

a  gloomy  picture  in  one  year  often  has  been  replaced  by  a  bright 

48 
one  in  the  next.    However,  the  political  climate  in  which 

international  shipping  operates  has  been  radically  altered  since 

the  1950s,  and  particularly  since  the  late  1960s. 

The  first  significant  change  was  the  development  of  flags 

of  convenience,  dating  almost  entirely  from  1949  when  Liberia 

49 
opened  its  registry  to  foreign  ships.    By  1973,  nearly  3 1  percent  of 

the  world's  deadweight  tonnage  sailed  under  Liberian  or 
Panamanian  colors.  Aside  from  the  limited  ties  on  the  Effective 
U.S.  Control  (EUSC)  fleet,  these  vessels  are  free  from  the  con- 
trols of  their  owner's  governments.  Although  Lieutenant  Emery 


world-wide,  since  the  number  of  ships  actually  owned  by  the  oil 
companies  could  be  reduced  accordingly.  Additional  problems  of 
the  moment  include  an  over-supply  of  tankers  because  of  (1) 
large  building  programs  undertaken  over  the  past  several  years, 
(2)  the  reduced  demand  for  petroleum  products  at  current  prices 
and  (3)  the  desire  of  producing  states  to  shift  refineries 
closer  to  the  well  head.  This,  in  turn,  has  shifted  some  tanker 
bottoms  to  the  tramp  market,  contributing  to  its  slackness. 
Liners,  however,  are  doing  fairly  well,  at  least  in  the  short 
run.   (Shipping  and  Trade  News  [TokyS],  March  22,  1974;  Nihon 
Keizai,  May  2,  1 974;  KKJW,  October  22~  1974.)   Further  uncer- 
tainty, particularly  for  tankers  and  bulk  carriers,  will  be 
introduced  by  the  re-opening  of  the  Suez  Canal. 

AR 

In  1970-71,  for  instance,  the  tanker  market  was 

depressed.   It  rebounded  in  1972-73  to  reach  the  highest  points 

in  history,  and  now  is  depressed  again. 

4°See  S.  W.  Emery,  "The  United  States  Effective  Control 
Fleet,"  USNIP,  XCVI  (May  1970),  pp.  158-177,  and  John  D.  Hayes, 
"The  Sea,  1967-72,"  op.  cit.  (note  2-20),  pp.  303~305.  Foreign 
registry,  however,  was  used  as  early  as  the  16th  century  when 
British  merchants  sailed  under  the  Spanish  flag  to  gain  access 
to  the  West  Indies. 


127 


concluded  in  1968  that  the  EUSC  ships,  if  requisitioned  in  an 

50 
emergency,  could  meet  the  needs  of  the  U.S.  civilian  economy, 

more  recent  studies  have  questioned  their  availability  at  such 

51 

times.    In  any  case,  flags  of  convenience,  together  with 

intermodal  (often  international)  transportation  systems,  and  the 

dispersal  of  the  insurance  markets  have  greatly  reduced  the 

feasibility  of,  or  indeed  the  justification  for,  sole  reliance 

on  national  assets  for  international  commerce.  In  the  words  of 

a  high-ranking  U.S.  Maritime  Administration  official. 

.  .  .  Trading  centers  now  are  connected  by  a  compli- 
cated network  of  common  carrier  merchant  fleets, 
flying  the  flags  of  many  nations,  that  provide 
regular  and  reliable  service  ....  it  is  difficult 
to  conceive  of  goods  not  moving  across  the  North 
Atlantic  due  to  the  lack  of  shipping  under  any 
particular  flag. 52 

This  declining  perception  of  the  utility  of  national 

merchant  marines,  however,  definitely  has  not  applied  in  the 

Third  World,  Shipping  issues  were  raised  at  the  First  UN 

Conference  on  Trade  and  Development  (UNCTAD)  in  1 9^4>  a^d.  have 

53 
grown  in  importance  ever  since.    Developing  country  demands 


50 

J   Emery,  op.  c  i  t . ,  p.  175*  EUSC  ships  are  registered 

under  foreign  flags,  but  their  American  owners  are  obligated  to 

make  them  available  for  U.S.  needs  in  times  of  crisis.   One 

problem,  of  course,  is  finding  the  ships  in  a  port  where  U.S. 

jurisdiction  applies. 

51 

Kasputys,  op_.  cit. ,  p.  1 45 • 

52Ibid.,  p.  136. 

53 

yySee  UNCTAD,  Review  of  International  Trade  and  Development 

1969  (TDB.  257,  Rev.  1),  Chapter  V, 


128 


for  a  larger  share  of  maritime  commerce  are  not  without  justifi- 
cation, for,  as  the  following  table  illustrates,  their  share  in 
World  trade  has  deteriorated: 

Table  5-5 
COMPOSITION  OF  WORLD  TRADE 


World 

Developing 
Countries 

Centrally  Planned 
Economies 

Developed 
Countries 


Percentage  Share      Compound  Annual 

Growth  Rate  of 
Exports       Imports    Exports  1960-1970 

1960   1970    1960   1970 


100.0     100.0       100.0     100.0 


21.3   17.1    23.7   18. 5 


11.8   10.6    11.9   10.5 


66.9   72.3    64.4   71.0 


9.3 


7.1 


8.2 


10.2 


Source:  OECD,  Policy  Perspectives  For  Inte mat i onal  Trade  and 
Economic  Relations  (Paris:   OECD,  1972),  p.  140. 


Accordingly,  two  conferences  were  held  under  UN  auspices 
(hereafter  Liner  Conferences)   in  1973  and  '74»  From  them 
emerged  a  "Declaration  of  Principles,"  which  was  signed  in  April 
1974*  Some  claimed  that  this  destroyed  the  principle  of  the 


%ote  that  the  UN  meetings  about  the  liner  conferences 
are,  themselves,  called  Liner  Conferences.  To  minimize  con- 
fusion, the  meetings  will  be  capitalized,  and  the  organizations 
referred  to  as  freight  or  shipping  conferences. 


129 


55 
freedom  of  shipping.    In  reality,  of  course,  the  freight 

conferences  themselves,  tied  aid  provisions,  and  a  host  of  other 

devices  had  stifled  free  competition  for  years. 

The  declaration  covered  three  principal  areas:  Cargo 

sharing,  freight  rates,  and  dispute  settlements. 

(1)  Cargo  sharing.  Cargoes  should  be  shared  equally 
between  importers  and  exporters.  If  parties  of  third  countries 
are  involved,  20  percent  of  the  cargoes  may  be  carried  in  ships 
not  of  the  exporting  or  importing  country,  with  40  percent  each 

carried  by  ships  of  the  trading  partners.  This  is  the  so-called 

56 

40- 40-20  formula.  (Obviously,    if  one  party  does  not  have   the 

shipping  capacity  to  carry  its  40  percent,    someone  else  can  make 
up  the  difference . ) 

(2)  An  obligatory  150-day  advance  notice  before 

57 

conferences  can  raise  freight  rates. 

(3)  Compulsory  international  mediation  of  disputes 
between  shippers  and  the  conferences,  with  limited  participation 
of  governments  concerned. 

Developing  countries  also  demanded  that  trampers,  and 


55 

J   See,  for  instance,  the  Kyodo  News  dispatch  from  Geneva 

in  Mainichi  Daily  News,  April  9,  1974* 

J   "Convention  On  a  Code  of  Conduct  for  Liner  Conferences" 
(Mimeo),  Part  I,  Chapter  II,  Article  2,  paragraphs  10-1 3. 

57Ibid. ,  Article  49 • 

58Ibid.,  Part  II,  Chapter  VI,  Article  6. 


130 


non-conference  vessels  be  totally  excluded  from  trade,  but  this 
was  not  accepted.  A  number  of  them  already  have  enacted  dis- 
criminatory legislation  forcing  the  use  of  national  ships  or 

requiring  foreign  ships  work  through  the  agents  of  national 

59 
lines. " 

It  is  not  clear  how  much  advantage  the  developing  countries 
will  be  able  to  take  of  their  newly- legitimized  cause.  National 
shipping  lines  in  the  Third  World  have  been  notoriously 
inefficient  and  unprofitable.  In  times  of  increasing  containeri- 
zation,  their  reliance  on  relatively  unsophisticated  general 
cargo  ships  is  not  likely  to  improve  their  position. 

Furthermore,  the  developed  maritime  states  have  begun  to 

take  countermeasures.  Japan  is  considering  a  "Foreign  Ships 

61 

Control  Law,"   and  the  U.S.  and  several  European  states  have 

legislation  pending.  More  important  than  these  national 
responses,  however,  is  the  International  Council  of  Containership 
Operators  (ICCO).  Formed  in  1972,  the  group  still  is  informal, 
but  there  are  signs  that  it  will  grow  more  powerful.  The 
expansion  of,  and  projections  for  containerized  trade  have  been 
noted  in  the  previous  chapter.  The  lack  of  growth  of  ICCO  thus 


(59 
^See  details  of  the  Venezuelan  law  in  Nihon  Keizai, 

April  16,  1974. 

See  R.  0.  Gross,  Studies  in  Maritime  Economics  (Cambridge! 
University  Press,  1968),  Chapter  3  for  a  consideration  of  the 
balance  of  payments  issues  in  merchant  marine  expansion. 

61 

Nihon  Keizai,  April  16,  1974- 


131 


far  is  due  mostly  to  European  resistance  to  U.S.  government 

62 

requirements  that  its  talks  be  reported.  '   But  competition 

among  container ship  operators  and  the  current  state  of  maritime 
trade  in  general  have  become  sufficiently  restrictive  that  the 
European  shipowners  now  appear  ready  to  proceed  with  ICCO  even 
if  the  U.S.  Government  listens  in. 

The  likely  result  of  such  a  drive  would  be  to  concentrate 
high  value  trade  between  major  ports  in  ICCO  hands,  relegating 
conventional  vessels  to  the  less  profitable  feeder  runs  between 
non-container  ports  and  the  containerization  centers.  This 
would  force  developing  countries  to  pool  their  resources  and  buy 
container ships,  cooperate  in  regional  arrangements  to  handle  the 
feeder  services  for  the  container  ports  (i.e.  an  ASEAN  merchant 
marine),  or  become  flags  of  convenience.  There  is,  of  course, 
an  option  open  to  a  wealthy  few  to  take  advantage  of  the  high 
wage  rates  and  other  costs  on  developed  country  ships  to  build 
up  their  own  merchant  marines.  "  But  the  concept  of  a  national 
flag  carrier  for  every  flag  is  not  economically  viable,  whatever 


62 

Gross,  op.  cit.,  Chapt.  2,  has  examined  the  impact  of 

U.S.  anti-monopoly  laws  on  foreign  shipowners. 

63 

Far  Eastern  Economic  Review  (PEER),  April  22,  1 974> 

PP»  45-46. 

^Several  of  the  Persian  Gulf  States,  for  instance,  are 
building  tanker  fleets. 


132 

65 

declarations  of  principle  may  be  adopted. 

In  the  face  of  this,  Third  World  countries  may  either  opt 
for  the  cooperative  ventures  noted  above,  or  seek  the  regulation 
of  shipping  on  a  global  basis,  rather  as  utilities  currently  are 
regulated  nationally.  They  may,  of  course,  continue  to  press 
for  national  solutions,  but  this  will  not  lead  most  of  them  very 
far.  On  the  other  hand,  it  might  be  profitable  for  the  maritime 
states  to  encourage  the  development  of  the  merchant  marines  of 
strategic  coastal  states  in  order  to  give  them  enough  of  a  stake 
in  the  freedom  of  navigation  to  keep  them  from  disrupting  it. 

Conclusion 

If  anything,  the  political  demands  for  control  over  ocean 
areas  have  outstripped  the  technological  imperatives  of  the 
previous  chapter.  Early  prospects  for  enlightened  international- 
ism have  been  replaced  by  successively  more  self-interested 
unilateral  claims.  Although  some  of  these  may  be  primarily 
negotiating  positions,  the  potential  for  disputes  over  marine 
jurisdiction  has  been  increased. 

The  disparity  in  the  willingness  of  developing  and 
developed  countries  to  use  force  may  be  only  a  temporary 
phenomenon.  It  can  equally  be  argued,  however,  that  perceptions 


^See  Olav  Knudsen,  The  Politics  of  International  Shipping 
(London:  Lexington  Books,  1973)* 


133 


of  national  interest  in  coastal  waters  almost  always  will  be 
more  intense  and  easily  justifiable  than  those  far  offshore. 
This,  coupled  with  expanded  national  jurisdiction  is  likely  to 
subject  merchantmen  to  a  variety  of  regimes  in  the  course  of 
their  voyages.  Some  of  these,  certainly,  will  be  more  restrictive 
and  disorderly  than  that  of  the  high  seas  which  we  have  come  to 
be  used  to. 


Chapter  Pour 
THE  OCEAN  SETTING  1975-85 

Several  distinguished  authors  recently  have  examined  the 
future  uses  of  military  force  in  support  of  diplomacy  and  as  a 

reserve  " .  .  .  to  which  the  public  will  turn  in  moments  of 

2 
crisis."   Aside  from  the  general  danger  that  the  most  serious 

crises  in  the  modern  world  may  be  so  complex  and  subtle  that  the 

public  will  not  realize  what  is  happening  until  it  is  too  late 

(momentary  policies,  environment  modification  by  industrial 

usage,  etc.),  there  are  signs  which  point  to  increasing  disorder 

at  sea  over  the  next  few  years.   Although  most  of  the  incidents 

are  likely  to  be  limited  in  scope  and  violence,  their  nature  may 

be  such  as  to  undermine  the  usefulness  of  naval  forces  in 

diplomacy  vis  a  vis  coastal  states.    The  indications  of  this 


1 
See,  among  others,  Stanley  Hoffmann,  Laurence  Martin,  and 

Ian  Smart  in  Force  in  Modem  Societies:   Its  Place  in  Inter- 
national Politics,  Adelphi  Paper  102  (London:   IISS,  1973),  and 
Samuel  P.  Huntington,  "After  Containment:   The  Function  of  the 
Military  Establishment,"  The  Annals,  Vol.  406  (March  1973), 
pp.  1-16. 

Martin's  phrase,  in  "The  Utility  of  Military  Force," 
Adelphi  102,  op_.  cit.,  p.  21. 

Somewhat  paradoxically,  however,  this  may  have  little 
effect  on  the  role  of  warships  in  U.S. -Soviet  negotiations.  See 
below,  p.  148. 


134 


135 


stem  from  the  accumulated  impacts  of  the  changes  which  have  been 
considered  separately  in  the  previous  chapters. 

Signs  of  Disorder 

The  Changing  Character  of  the  Oceans 

The  first  sign  is  a  fundamental  change  in  the  nature  of 
thinking  about  the  oceans  themselves — literally  a  blurring  of 
the  distinction  between  the  sea  and  the  land.  Its  basis  lies  in 
four  factors,  three  technological  and  one  political.  They  are: 

(1)  The  ability  to  project  power  into  a  rival's  heartland 
from  land  bases.  As  noted  in  Chapter  One,  the  advent  of  inter- 
continental weapons  means  that  the  expansion  of  a  land  power  into 
the  maritime  dimension  now  poses  only  an  incremental  threat  to 
the  security  of  a  maritime  state.  A  strong  Soviet  or  Chinese 
navy  may  bring  great  flexibility  to  its  owner  in  dealing  with 
the  U.S.  or  Japan,  but  it  does  not  imply  the  same  life-or-death 
challenge  as  the  fleets  of  Europe  once  did  for  England. 


It  has  been  suggested  that  the  sea  power-land  poy/er  schism 
was  the  unre solvable  dilemma  of  the  European  balance  of  power. 
For  reasons  of  her  ovm  security,  England  (and  later  the  United 
States)  could  not  tolerate  the  maritime  expansion  of  any  state 
with  a  lar^-e  standing  army.  For  a  land  power  to  achieve  true 
great  power  status,  it  was  necessary  for  her  to  acquire  some  of 
the  wealth  from  overseas  trade  and  colonies.  This,  plus  the 
utility  of  seapower  in  attracting  allies,  led  to  maritime 
expansion  by  aspiring  continental  states,  thus  threatening 
Britain.   Furthermore,  in  the  process  of  acquiring  the  strength 
necessary  for  even  a  try  at  global  leadership,  France,  and  later 
Germany,  came  to  pose  a  direct  and  immediate  menace  in  Europe 
itself.  This  provided  a  succession  of  willing  allies  which 
London  wielded  into  coalitions.  In  turn  these  spurred  attempts 


136 


(2)  The  development  of  inter-modal  transportation  systems. 
Land-bridges,  door-to-door  freight  rates  and  the  standardization 
brought  by  containers  are  in  keeping  with  commercial  trends 
towards  multi-nationalization  and  the  elimination  of  trade 
barriers,  be  they  nationalistic  or  geographic.  The  political 
implications  of  these  changes  are  only  beginning  to  be  felt. 
Even  in  the  military,  after  years  of  partisan  squabbling,  there 
is  growing  recognition  that  sealift  and  airlift  offer  comple- 
mentary rather  than  competitive  solutions  to  logistics  problems. 

(3)  The  current  state  of  ocean  development  technology. 
The  increased  value  of  marine  resources  has  changed  the  image  of 
the  seas  from  one  of  a  neutral  medium  of  communication  and  com- 
merce to  one  in  which  portions  of  ocean  space  may  be  seen  as 
major  additions  to  the  national  resource  base.  The  future 
development  of  floating  nuclear  power  plants,  offshore  industrial 
sites,  airports  and  perhaps  even  cities  will  accentuate  this 
image.   Failure  to  agree  on  an  international  regime  for  the  deep 
seabed  would  only  expand  the  area  open  for  division,  not  change 
its  basic  nature. 

(4)  The  expanded  impact  of  near-shore  marine  issues  on 
domestic  politics.  Whatever  the  outcome  at  Geneva,  Caracas,  or 
wherever  future  Law  of  the  Sea  Conferences  may  be  held,  the 


by  the  land  power  to  avoid  encirclement  through  accelerated  naval 
development.   In  whatever  sequence  the  cycle  proceeded,  the  net 
effect  was  to  preclude  the  co-existence  of  maritime  and  continen- 
tal powers. 


137 


combination  of  shortages,  pollution  and  overcrowding  will  focus 
even  more  attention  on  the  adjacent  seas  as  safety  valves  for 
pressing  national  problems.  Infringements  on  these  areas  will 
be  resisted  accordingly.  Also  of  interest  is  the  tendency  to 
diplomatically  link  maritime  activities  with  otherwise  remote 
events  ashore.  Thus  the  Cod  War  became  tied  to  Iceland's 
membership  in  NATO,  while  the  blockade  of  Bab-el-Mandeb  was 
maintained  until  some  relief  was  arranged  for  the  Egyptian 
Third  Army  encircled  east  of  the  Suez  Canal. 

The  net  result  of  these  changes  will  be  to  reduce  the 
apparent  importance  of  distant-water  maritime  activities — 
commercial  or  military — while  highlighting  that  of  the  coastal 
region.   Distant-water  interests  certainly  will  continue,  but 
their  bargaining  power  will  be  diminished  when  they  conflict 
with  coastal  ones,  either  domestic  or  foreign.  Moreover,  near- 
shore  disputes  probably  will  continue  to  be  more  visible  and 
sensitive  in  developing  countries  than  in  industrialized  ones, 
if  only  because  of  the  fewer  issues  competing  for  the  public's 
attention. 

Asymmetrical  Acceptabilities  of  Force 

The  second  indicator  is  the  oft-noted  asymmetry  in  the 
acceptability  of  force  between  developed  and  developing  states. 
The  U.S.,  Britain  and  France  showed  a  surprisingly  consistent 
willingness  to  commit  naval  forces  in  support  of  major  interests 
between  the  end  of  World  War  II  and  1967,  particularly  if 


138 


5 
strategic  waterways  were   involved.       Nevertheless,   one  wonders 

if  the  British  concessions   in  the  Cod  War,    and  the  U.S.   restraint 

in  the  South  American  tuna  boat  disputes  may  not  be  more  typical 

of  future  responses  than  the  attack  on  Suez  or  the  Gulf  of 

Tonkin  reprisals.     Even  leaving  aside   the  Pueblo  and  EC-121 

incidents  (where  American  options  were  limited  by  over- commitment 

in  Indo China  and  the  decision  to  recover  the  Pueblo  crew)  and  the 

attack  on  USS  Liberty  (which  might  have  been  differently  received 

had  it  been  made  by  an  Arab  state),  the  trend  since  the  late 

1960s  has  been  toward  Great  Power  forebearance.   Hence  there  has 

been  little  response  to  such  heretofore  unacceptable  acts  as  the 

1973  Libyan  attack  on  a  U.S.   EC-130  in  the  Mediterranean,    or  the 

Cuban  seizure   of   two  Miami- based  Panamanian  cargo  ships  in 

December  1971*     So  long  as  these   limitations  on  the  use  of  force 

c 

remain  political,  they  also  are  reversible,   but  it  may  become 


-^Mediterranean  (U.S.),  1946;  Corfu  Channel  (Britain),  1946; 
Taiwan  Straits  (U.S.),  1950;  Gulf  of  Aqaba  (Britain),  1951;  Suez 
(Britain),  1 951-52;  Suez  (France,  Britain),  1956;  Straits  of 
Tiran  (U.S.),  1957;  Makassar  and  Lombok  Straits  (U.S.),  1958; 
Lebanon  (U.S.),  1958;  Quemoy  (U.S.),  1958;  Kuwait  (Britain), 
1961;  Bizerte  (France),  1961;  Cuba  (U.S.),  1962;  Tanganyika 
(Britain),  1964;  Gulf  of  Tonkin  (U.S.),  1964;  Dominican  Republic 
(U.S.),  1964;  Straits  of  Tiran  (Britain,  U.S.),  1967;  Aden 
(Britain),  1967.   Data  from  Cable,  op_.  eft.  (note  1-5),  PP»  206- 
229.  This  list  is  not  complete,  but  it  indicates  a  certain  con- 
sistency of  behavior.  See  also  the  list  of  73  "Wars  and  Near 
Wars"  in  which  U.S.  naval  forces  were  involved  (18  of  them 
[deleted])  in  CVAN-70  Hearings,  op.  cit.  (note  1-4),  pp.  163-165. 

Luttwak,  op_.  cit.  (note  1-5),  has  suggested  that  the  key 
to  this  moderation  is  detente,  and  that,  should  one  superpower 
actually  use  force  unilaterally  it  not  only  would  invalidate  the 
principle  of  asymmetrical  acceptability,  but  also  the  structure 


139 


more  and  more  difficult  as  precedents  of  coastal  state  authority 
accumulate. 

Current  Weapons  Technology 

The  net  effect  of  the  sophisticated  weapons  now  finding 
their  way  into  coastal  state  hands  will  be  to  increase  their 
freedom  of  action  at  the  expense  of  the  maritime  powers.  This 
latitude  vanishes,  of  course,  should  the  latter  choose  to  employ 
all  the  means  at  their  disposal,  but  at  lower  levels  of  conflict, 
the  new  equipments  can  reduce  some  of  the  distant  water  navy's 
advantages  in  training  and  maintenance.  Moreover,  the  simple 
knowledge  of  their  possession  may  lead  to  an  over- rating  of  the 
developing  country's  power,  and  thus  dissuade  attempts  to  test 


which  supports  it.  Whether  or  not  an  American  military  inter- 
vention in  the  Middle  East  would  destroy  detente  is  not  clear, 
but  it  certainly  would  re-establish  the  credibility  of  the  use 
of  force  by  Western  states  (assuming,  of  course,  that  it  was 
successful). 

7 
The  Persian  Gulf  States  may  be  a  current  example. 

Although  it  has  been  argued  that  homing  weapons  reduce  the  level 
of  operator  proficiency  needed  to  pose  a  serious  threat,  there 
must  be  some  skill  there  in  the  first  place.  A  South  American 
nation  with  years  of  experience  in  propeller  or  elderly  jet  air- 
craft could  upgrade  its  capability  almost  immediately  upon 
receipt  of  some  of  the  ordnance  discussed  in  Chapter  One. 
Saudi  Arabia  and  Kuwait,  on  the  other  hand,  may  buy  the  same, 
or  better,  weapons  and  fit  them  on  superior  aircraft.  In  time 
this  will  produce  a  much  more  credible  force,  but  not  until  the 
pilots  and  mechanics  are  trained  to  keep  the  launch  platforms 
flying.  Given  the  quantum  jump  in  technology  involved,  this 
may  be  several  years,  unless  mercenaries  or  "advisors"  are 
brought  in. 


140 


Diminished  Freedom  of  the  Sea3 

Finally,  there  is  the  erosion  of  the  foundation  of  the 
freedom  of  the  seas,  closely  related  to  the  points  above  and 
discussed  at  length  in  Chapter  Three. 

The  Use  of  Force  at  Sea 

Prototypes  of  the  most  likely  kinds  of  future  maritime 
disputes  already  have  taken  place.  Among  those  which  may  be 
expected  are: 

(a)  Continued  conflicts  over  fishing.  Shooting  has  been 

Q 

underway  since  the  Spring  of  1974  in  the  Gulf  of  Thailand,  not 
to  mention  the  dozens  of  other  controversies  from  Iceland  to 
New  Zealand. 

(b)  Fights  over  ocean  resource  boundaries — notably  those 
involving  petroleum.  Not  counting  the  PRC's  claim  to  most  of 
the  East  Asian  continental  shelf,  there  are  at  least  seven  sea- 
bed boundary  disputes  in  that  part  of  the  world  (Indonesia- 
Vietnam,  Vietnam-Malaysia,  Thailand-Cambodia,  Cambodia-Vietnam, 
Japan-Korea,  Japan-Taiwan,  and  the  Philippine  concessions  west 


South  Vietnam  extended  its  territorial  sea  to  62  miles 
on  April  5,  1974,  thus  touching  off  a  series  of  incidents  which 
led  to  the  killing  of  a  Thai  fishing  boat  captain.  See  The 
Nation  (Bangkok),  April  26,  1974,  The  World  (Bangkok),  May  9, 
1974,  and  FEER,  May  13,  1974,  p.  13.  At  one  point  the  Thai  Navy 
was  reportedly  developing  a  contingency  plan  to  protect  the 
fishermen.   (The  Nation,  May  10,  1974). 


141 


of  Palawan  passage  around  the  Spratly  Islands).   The  Aegean  and 
Norwegian  Seas  also  are  sensitive. 

(c)  Additional  harrassment  of  ocean  commercial  activities. 

The  reported  terrorist  threat  to  North  Sea  oil  rigs  in  1974  may 

10 

only  be  a  beginning.    Another  prospect,  perhaps  more  serious  in 

the  long  run,  is  that  of  interference  with  merchantmen.  In  the 
Spring  of  1974  a  lumber  ship  nearly  was  hijacked  by  rebels  in  the 
southern  Philippines.  Naval  responses  to  such  actions  may  be 

limited  by  the  fact  that  politically-motivated  seizures  may  not 

1 1 

be  dealt  with  as  piracy.    Between  July  1st,  1964  an(i  June  1st, 


9  / 

Each  issue  of  Petroleum  News  Southeast  Asia  (hereafter 

PNSEA) ,  has  a  map  of  the  Southeast  Asian  region  showing  national 
claims,  company  leases,  and  existing  wells.  For  more  detail, 
including  Northeast  Asia,  Oceania  and  the  Indian  Ocean,  see  the 
annual  "Map  and  Contract  Issue,"  most  recently  IV  (#10,  1974)* 

10 

In  1970,  R.  Ota,  a  Japanese  radical  theoretician  wrote 

a  piece  entitled  "Modern  Systematic  Methods  of  Destruction."  In 
it  he  proposed  to: 

Cut  off  crude  oil  transportation;  hijack  or  destroy 
J.A.L.  (Japan  Air  Lines)  Middle  East  routes  and  tankers 
carrying  oil  from  the  Gulf  of  Persia  in  order  for  Japan 
to  change  her  policy  towards  Israel;  attack  Singapore, 
make  it  the  starting  point  in  [sic]  armed  revolution 
in  Tokyo. 

(Quoted  in  Patrick  Low,  "New  Dimension  to  the  Oil  Crisis,"  PNSEA, 
[February  1974],  p»  30.)  These  words  acquired  new  meaning  late 
in  1973>  when  a  Palestinian  terrorist  group  attacked  the  Shell 
Pulau  Bukom  Refinery  in  Singapore.  Although  it  did  little 
damage,  and  apparently  was  directed  against  supplies  to  Vietnam 
rather  than  Japan,  it  was,  in  Low's  words,  "The  first  attempt 
by  a  multinational  revolutionary  front  to  destroy  a  major 
installation  of  an  international  oil  company." 

1 1 

This  was  a  factor  limiting  U.S.  and  British  assistance 

during  the  1961  seizure  of  the  Portuguese  liner  Santa  Maria. 


142 


1965,  there  were  42  reported  piracies  in  the  Straits  of  Malacca. 

Fourteen  of  these  were  not  attributed  to  Indonesian  units 

12 

operating  under  Konfrontasi.    The  spectre  of  coastal  states 

extracting  payments  in  the  guise  of  tolls  for  the  maintenance  of 

navigation  aids  or  pollution  funds  has  been  raised  in  the  Law  of 

13 
the  Sea  negotiations.    Even  guerrilla  submarine  attacks,  often 

discussed  but  not  seen  since  the  1930s,  were  suggested  by  the 

reported  Libyan  attempt  to  use  an  Egyptian  submarine  to  sink  the 

British  passenger  liner  Queen  Elizabeth  II  enroute  to  Israel  in 

February  1973.  4 

Professor  Martin  has  suggested  that  disputes  at  sea  will 

1 5 

be  self-limiting  on  four  accounts:   (1)  for  most  states,  ocean 

1 6 
interests  are  important,  but  not  vital,    (2)  both  sides  will 

be  trying  to  win  legal  acceptance  of,  or  at  least  political 

support  for,  their  position,  (3)  warships  can  be  effective 


Malaysia,  Ministry  of  External  Affairs,  Indonesian 
Aggression  Against  Malaysia,  Volume  II  (Kuala  Lumpur,  June  1965)> 
pp.  18-24.  " 

^See  above,  p.  122. 

Reported  by  Egyptian  President  Anwar  Sadat  in  a  BBC 
interview,  July  16,  1974.  Sadat  did  not  name  Libya  directly, 
but  later  accounts  did. 

1  5 
^Laurence  Martin,  The  Role  of  Force  in  the  Ocean,  paper 

presented  to  the  SAIS  Conference  on  "Conflict  and  Order  in  Ocean 

Relations,"  October  22,  1974,  pp.  10-12. 

Maritime  commerce  certainly  is  vital  to  most  trading 
states,  but  the  disputes  in  question  probably  will  not  cut  off 
such  services,  though  they  may  increase  their  costs. 


143 


without  actually  opening  fire  and  without  violating  their 
opponents  sovereignty  and  (4)  naval  force,  once  applied,  can  be 
readily  tailored  to  maintain  a  balance  between  challenge  and 
response.  These  points  are  well  taken,  to  the  extent  that  ocean 
issue  conflicts,  by  themselves,  are  not  likely  to  escalate  to 
another  Vietnam  War,  or  a  super-power  confrontation.  However, 
some  states  are  likely  to  be  more  self-limiting  than  others,  and 
it  may  be  that  maritime  problems  could  provide  pretexts  or 
aggravate  other  grievances  to  create  potentially  expansive  situ- 
ations. Moreover,  a  series  of  low-level  disorders  in  which  the 
imbalance  of  usable  force  was  clearly  displayed  eventually  could 
undermine  the  utility  of  great  power  naval  forces  in  diplomatic 
roles. 

Case  studies  of  the  mechanisms  by  which  gunboat  diplomacy 
actually  affects  decision-making  in  a  developing  coastal  state 
are  rare.  During  the  summer  of  1 974»  however,  a  series  of  inter- 
views were  conducted  in  East  Asia  concerning  local  perceptions  of 

17 
seapower.    The  net  result  was  the  not-very-surpris- 


17 

93  in  Taiwan,  the  Philippines,  Thailand,  Malaysia,  Singa- 
pore and  Indonesia,  and  38  more  in  Australia,  New  Zealand  and 
Hawaii  between  May  6  and  July  5,  1974*  Although  the  content  of 
individual  interviews  varied,  the  overall  purpose  of  the  study 
was  to  examine:   (1)  the  prospects  for  Japanese  contributions  to 
East  Asian  security,  (2)  the  local  perceptions  of  regional  and 
distant-water  navies,  and  (3)  the  ocean  development  programs  of 
the  countries  concerned.   Obviously,  an  average  of  1 5  interviews 
in  each  country  is  statistically  tenuous  and  may  even  be  mis- 
leading. But,  in  the  absence  of  alternative  written  sources,  it 
was  useful  as  a  first  approximation.  In  any  case,  the  responses 
to  the  first  two  questions  in  different  countries  were  sur- 
prisingly consistent.  They  will  be  referred  to  again  later. 


144 


ing  conclusion  that,   while  the  force  levels  of  adjacent  or 
nearby  powers  are  watched  with  care,  the  influence  of  foreign 
warships  stems  at  least  as  much  from  memories  of  past  actions  as 
from  a  detailed  analysis  of  their  current  capabilities  and  limi- 
tations. 

Although  the  presence  of  great  power  warships  off  one's 
coast  is  unlikely  to  lead  to  a  bombardment  or  invasion,  there  is 

some  justification  for  coastal  state  fears.  After  all,  since 

1  ft 
1956  the  U.S.  actually  has  intervened   with  its  naval  and  marine 

19  20 

forces  seven  times.    Britain  has  done  so  five  times,   France 

21  22 

twice,   and  the  People's  Republic  of  China  once   in  the  same 

period.  Note,  however,  that  with  the  exception  of  the  comic- 
opera  Anguila  operation,  there  has  been  no  Western  naval  inter- 
vention for  nearly  ten  years.   (This  assumes  that  the  1972  mining 
of  North  Vietnamese  waters  and  the  bombardment  of  her  coasts  were 
a  continuation  of  an  intervention  begun  much  earlier.) 


1  ft 

Here  considered  to  be  the  firing  of  shots,  imposition  of 

a  blockade,  or  the  landing  of  troops.  Not  included  are  offshore 

patrols  or  the  evacuation  of  nationals. 

Alexandria  and  other  mid-East  posts  (1956),  Lebanon 
(1958),  Thailand  (1962),  Cuba  (1962),  North  Vietnam  (1964),  South 
Vietnam  ( 1 965) >  the  Dominican  Republic  ( 1 9^5) • 

20Suez  (1956),  Kuwait  (1961) ,  Tanganyika  (1964),  Beira 
(1965-66),  Anguila  (1969). 

21 

Suez  (1956),  Tunisia  (1961).   In  addition,  during  the 

Algerian  War,  France  stopped  and  searched  the  merchant  ships  of 
at  least  ten  countries. 

22The  Paracels  (1974). 


145 


Given  the  destabilizing  forces  in  the  world  today,  it  is 
possible  to  imagine  that  some  future  incident  will  involve  a 
major  power  warship  and  a  coastal  state.  If  the  warship  is  fired 
upon,  the  maritime  power  has  two  choices — to  respond  with  force, 
or  to  respond  diplomatically.  At  present,  it  is  unlikely  that 
Western  electorates  will  support  military  campaigns  in  the  Third 
World,  particularly  if  they  promise  to  be  costly.  In  any  case, 
there  will  be  many  who  will  argue  (with  some  justification)  that 
U.S.,  British  or  French  interests  are  not  sufficiently  threatened 
by  any  one  incident  to  justify  a  forcible  response.  At  the  same 
time,  however,  diplomatic  redress,  however  complete,  will  be  much 
less  dramatic  (and  hence  less  impressive)  than  the  original 
challenge.  If  the  above  comments  on  the  nature  of  warships' 
influence  are  correct,  then  it  would  not  take  many  such  incidents 
to  cast  doubt  on  the  credibility  of  any  use  of  force  by  Western 
naval  powers,  and  hence  on  the  diplomatic  usefulness  of  their 
fleets.25 

One  analysis  might  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  only  three 
choices  are  open  to  the  maritime  state.  A  relatively  small  amount 
of  force  in  response  to  early  challenges,  a  larger  amount  later 
to  re-establish  it  as  a  viable  policy  option,  or  acceptance  of  a 


27) 

'This  discussion  mostly  has  involved  the  ability  of  war- 
ships to  directly  influence  a  coastal  state  on  a  particular  issue— 
what  Luttwak  has  called  "active  suasion."  Presumably  this  also 
would  effect  the  more  general  case  where  the  mere  presence  of 
one's  forces  in  a  region  equates  to  influence  ("latent  suasion"), 
but  the  linkage  is  less  clear. 


146 


radical  transformation  of  the  marine  environment.  In  point  of 
fact,  there  may  be  other  alternatives  as  well.  For  instance,  if 
a  particular  state,  organization  of  states,  or  non-national 
group  frequently  and  consistently  acts  in  ways  unacceptable  to 
the  majority  of  interested  parties,  it  will  become  easier  to 
respond  more  firmly  as  time  goes  on.  The  diminished  willingness 

of  governments  to  agree  to  hijackers'  or  terrorists'  demands  is 

•  +  24 
a  case  m  point. 

Perhaps  some  radical  transformation  is  inevitable.  Although 

declarations  of  ocean  areas  as  zones  of  peace,  neutrality,  etc. 

are  unlikely  to  have  much  effect,  extended  jurisdiction  eventually 

may  lead  to  the  exclusion  of  non-littoral  power  warships  from 

25 

semi-enclosed  seas,   either  by  convention  or  by  physical  control 

of  access  points.  Well  before  such  situations  develop,  the 
superpowers,  at  least,  will  begin  to  nurture  middle  power  surro- 
gates within  the  region  itself.  This  is  not  a  new  approach.  The 
British  devolution  of  power  to  the  United  States  in  the  Caribbean 
and  Japan  in  the  Far  East  foreshadowed  the  consolidation  of  the 


Admittedly  there  is  little  evidence  for  coordinated, 
hardened  responses  by  the  international  community.  Within  many 
individual  states,  however,  more  stringent  security  measures  and 
the  use  of  force  against  skyjackers  became  more  acceptable  as 
the  number  of  incidents  mounted.  See  "Aerial  Piracy"  in 
Strategic  Survey  1975  (London:   IISS,  1974),  pp.  82-83- 

25 
^Such  as  the  Mediterranean,  Baltic  or  the  Persian  Gulf. 

The  Black  Sea  already  is  controlled  by  the  Montreux  Convention. 

See  Lewis  M.  Alexander,  "Special  Circumstances:   Semi-enclosed 

Seas,"  in  Gamble  and  Pontecorvo,  op_.  cit.  (note  2-3),  pp-  201- 

216. 


147 


26 

Royal  Navy  in  European  waters  in  1904.    More  recently,  Iran's 

development  as  a  major  force  in  the  Persian  Gulf  and  Northwest 
Indian  Ocean  has  made  her  a  plausible  candidate  for  such  a  role 
since  Britain's  withdrawal  east  of  Suez.  Suggestions  that  Japan 
should  he  groomed  for  a  similar  part  in  the  We stern  Pacific  will 
be  treated  at  length  in  later  chapters. 

Whether  or  not  one  wishes  to  entrust  the  primary  responsi- 
bility for  regional  peacekeeping  to  a  surrogate  must  hinge  on 
factors  beyond  the  scope  of  this  study.  Even  if  one  does  not, 
such  allies  still  can  be  useful.  British  fleet  movements, for 
instance,  were  of  considerable  importance  to  the  United  States 

during  both  the  Lebanon  operation  of  1958  and  the  1967  Middle 

27 

East  war.    Although  a  comparable  degree  of  trust,  coordination 

and  capability  will  be  hard  to  find  elsewhere,  a  regional, 
middle  power  navy  dedicated  to  keeping  a  certain  amount  of  order 
could  free  one's  own  diminishing  assets  for  higher  priority  tasks, 

It  is  recognized  that  the  price  that  might  have  to  be  paid 
for  such  stability  would  be  infringements  on  maritime  activities 
by  the  middle  power  itself — perhaps  Iranian  tolls  on  shipping 
entering  the  Straits  of  Hormuz,  or  an  Indian  Oceanwise  pollution 
zone.  Still,  such  penalties  might  be  preferable  to  turmoil,  and 
can  be  partly  countered  by  ensuring  that  the  strategic  states  in 


2f> 

See  Harder,    op.   cit.    (note   1-2),   pp.   427-450, 


27 


See  Howe,  op.  cit.  (note  1-5)  >  passim. 


148 


question  have  enough  of  a  stake  in  the  freedom  of  the  seas 
(possibly  by  encouraging  them  to  build  large  merchant  fleets 
along  with  their  navies)  that  totally  unreasonable  demands  could 
be  met  with  counter  pressures.  Such  leverage,  of  course,  also 
could  be  exerted  through  non-maritime  issues. 

Should  the  seas  be  divided,  merchant  shipping  may  find 
adequate  freedom  under  flags  of  convenience  and  multi-national 
control.  This  is  not  unreasonable,  commercial  aircraft  have 
operated  across  sovereign  airspace  since  their  inception. 
Already  some  ocean  policy  studies  are  examining  parallels  between 
air  law  and  an  emerging  law  of  the  sea. 

Despite  these  factors,  however,  visions  of  the  imminent 
relegation  of  aircraft  carriers  to  the  protection  of  oil  rigs, 
floating  cities  and  fisheries  zones  are  premature.  For  all  the 
restrictions  on  their  activities,  naval  vessels  still  are  a 
useful  (if  expensive)  way  for  the  superpowers  to  signal  to  each 
other.  Although  other  governments  may  not  be  cowed  in  the  way 
they  once  might  have  been,  neither  would  a  major  shift  in  deploy- 
ments go  unnoticed.  Moreover,  in  those  situations  where  critical 
interests  truly  are  threatened,  the  presence  of  a  few  symbolic 
ships  can  be  significant.   In  the  words  of  one  commentator: 

When  naval  forces  are  introduced  in  order  to  affirm 
the  commitment  of  national  power  in  all  its  dimensions, 
their  actual  tactical  capabilities  do  not  delimit  their 
political  effectiveness. ^Q 


28 

Luttwak,  op_.  cit. ,  p.  52. 


149 


Even  the  restriction  of  movement  will  come  slowly,  for 
there  will  continue  to  be  enough  insecure  states  to  practically 
guarantee  bi-lateral  access  agreements  (with  which  the  Air  Force 
has  always  operated)  under  the  most  pessimistic  Law  of  the  Sea 
Conference  outcome. 

Nevertheless,  trends  do  seem  to  point  to  an  eventual  demise 
of  the  freedom  of  naval  mobility,  with  consequences  well  beyond 
unemployment  for  those  skilled  in  such  arts.  This  is  not 
unprecedented.  The  spread  of  civilization  to  the  European 
steppes  impeded  the  movements  of  the  Cossacks  and  Tartars  just 
as  surely  as  ocean  economic  activities  and  extended  national 
jurisdictions  (and  the  ability  to  enforce  them)  will  limit  the 
military  mariner. 

The  consequences  of  this  may  not  be  entirely  bad.  Regional 
hegemonies  may  arise  in  some  areas,  but  cooperative  solutions  may 
be  found  in  others.  If  fisheries  and  pollution  could  be  managed 
on  a  regional  basis,  it  certainly  would  be  an  improvement  over 
current  practices.  The  superpowers  also  may  be  discouraged  from 
intervening  in  disputes  which  are  not  really  in  their  national 
interests.   (For  those  that  are,  it  will  be  many  years  before 
the  sanctity  of  ocean  boundaries  v/ill  be  a  binding  constraint.) 

In  any  case,  it  is  against  this  changing  background  that 
Japan  must  examine  her  ocean  programs,  even  to  the  point  of 
relinquishing  some  of  the  traditional  concepts  which  have  served 
her  so  well  to  date. 


PART  II 

THE  SETTING  OP  JAPAN'S  SEAPOWER: 
PURPOSES,  PROBLEMS  AND  PROSPECTS 


Chapter  Five   .  .  .  Japanese  Interests  and  Strategic  Thinking  1974 
Chapter  Six   .  .  .  The  Status  of  the  MSDF  and  Its  Constraints 
Chapter  Seven  .  .  .  The  Evolution  of  the  Constraints 


Chapter  Five 
JAPANESE  INTERESTS  AND  STRATEGIC  THINKING  1974 

It  always  is  risky,  if  not  presumptious,  to  comment  on 
such  a  value-laden  and  variable  subject  as  the  national  interest. 
This  is  particularly  true  for  an  American  writing  of  a  land  as 
foreign  to  his  own  as  Japan.  Nevertheless,  certain  elements  of 
Japanese  national  interests  are  relatively  fixed  by  geography, 
population  and  natural  resources.  Others,  involving  industrial 
structures,  dietary  habits,  the  cultural  heritage,  etc.,  may  be 
variable,  but  will  not  change  very  quickly.  Those  interests 
most  volatile  and  difficult  to  assess  result  from  the  interplay 
of  domestic  pressure  groups  or  from  the  need  to  satisfy  some 
national  cultural  or  psychological  demand.  Typically,  they 
really  are  strategies  for  the  protection  of  more  permanent  con- 
cerns. For  instance,  one  way  of  preserving  the  social  and 

political  structure  would  be  through  the  containment  of  Communism. 


1 
John  M.  Collins,  in  his  Grand  Strategy  (Annapolis:   USNI, 

1973),  states  that  "National  Survival  is  the  only  abiding 
interest."  (p.  3).  He  does,  however,  define  national  interests 

S.S  * 

A  highly  generalized  concept  of  elements  that  consti- 
tute a  state's  compelling  needs,  including  self- 
preservation,  independence,  national  integrity, 
military  security,  and  economic  well-being,  (p.  273) 

He  further  distinguishes  them  as  being  of  long,  short  or  medium 
term. 


151 


152 


Alternatives  could  be  neutrality  or  an  anti-imperialist  stance. 
Another  example  would  be  to  support  domestic  fisheries  (and 
fishermen)  by  declaring  a  200  mile  economic  zone  (instead  of  a 
more  internationalist  approach,  or  by  increasing  the  competitive- 
ness of  one's  own  fleets). 

With  these  caveats  in  mind,  some  of  the  interests  which 

2 

currently  are  of  major  importance  to  Japan  are  outlined  below. 

Obviously  all  are  not  related  to  seapower,  and  some  choices  may 
be  open  to  dispute.  Still,  a  listing  of  this  sort  may  provide  a 
background  for  later  chapters  and  clarify  the  author's  biases 
and  shortcomings. 

A.  The  Physical  Security  of  the  Japanese  People  (fixed) 
1 .  Protection  of  the  home  islands  (fixed) 

(a)  Diplomatic:   avoidance  of  war/isolation  (interest 
fixed,  arrangements  variable) 

(1)  Ties  with  U.S.  and  West 

(2)  Improved  relations  with  PRC 

(3)  Improved  relations  with  USSR 

(4)  Shedding  of  neo-imperialist  image  in  Third 
World  (to  reduce  terrorist  targets) 

(5)  Membership  in  international  organizations 

(b)  Military 

(1)  Maintenance  or  modification  of  Japan-U.S. 
Security  Treaty 

(2)  Other  arrangements 

(3)  Level  of  Self- Defense  Forces'  unilateral 
capabilities 

(4)  Nuclear/non-nuclear  stance 


2 

Insofar  as  possible,  the  issues  have  been  approached  from 

the  Japanese  point  of  view.  All  these  points  have  been  discussed 
by  Japanese  officials  or  commentators  over  the  last  two  years. 


153 


2.  Disaster  relief  program  (fixed) 


(3 


a}  Domestic  relief  capability 

b)  Reliance  on  international  agencies 


B.  Maintenance  of  Economic  Weil-Being  (basically  fixed, 
but  definitions  of  "well-being"  vary) 

1 .  International  measures 

(a)  Protection  against  resources  nationalism  and 
cartelization  (including  food) 

(1)  Diversification  of  suppliers 

(2)  Flexible  diplomacy 

(3)  Provisions  to  transport  raw  materials 
and  finished  goods 

(4)  Development  of  effective  countermeasures 
if  possible,  and  a  willingness  to  use  them 
if  necessary 

(b)  Maintenance  of  existing  markets/opening  of  new  ones 

(1)  Joint  ventures 

2)  Measures  to  increase  competitiveness 

3)  Improvements  of  the  image  of  Japanese 
businessmen 

(c)  Avoidance  of  isolation 

1)  Minimization  of  trade  barriers 
2;  Formation  of  alliances,  resource-sharing 
programs,  improved  financial  associations 
(3)  Promotion  of  interdependence 

2.  Domestic  measures 

a)  Inflation/recession  countermeasures 

b)  Appropriate  restructuring  of  the  economic  structure 

(c)  Pollution  control 

(d)  Increased  stockpiles  and  food  buffers 

(e)  Improvement  of  the  social  capital  structure 

Preservation  of  Political  Autonomy/independence  (fixed) 

1 .  Closely  related  to  A.  and  B.  above 

2.  In  Japan's  case  avoidance  of  isolation  is  especially 
important 


154 


D.  Contributions  to  the  Development  of  the  International  System 
(variable) 

1 .  Demonstration  effect  of  Japan  as  an  economic  power 
without  military  power 

2.  Projects  for  the  integration  of  developing  countries 
into  the  international  system 

3.  Projects  for  promoting  interdependence 

E.  Maintenance  of  Psychological  Well-Being  (interest  fixed, 
needs  variable) 

1 .  Preservation  of  social  cohesion 

2.  Determination  of  Japan's  world  role 
(a)  Must  be  greater  than  Japan,  Inc. 

3.  Search  for  international  acceptance 

This  list,  of  course,  is  not  all-inclusive,  but  it  is 
indicative  of  the  breadth  of  the  problems  which  Japan  faces  today. 
There  is  a  general  consensus  on  the  interests  themselves,  but  much 
less  of  one  on  the  strategies  for  protecting  them.  The  balance  of 
this  chapter  briefly  will  summarize  the  thinking  and  debates  on 
these  issues  as  of  late  1974* 

The  Physical  Security  of  the  Japanese  People 

The  Setting 

The  dominant  fact  of  Japanese  life  is  overcrowding.   In 
early  1975,  more  than  110  million  people  lived  on  the  four  main 
islands,  an  area  slightly  smaller  than  California.  Although  this 
already  creates  one  of  the  highest  population  densities  in  the 


155 


3 

world,   the  problem  is  compounded  by  unequal  distribution.  In 

1970,  51  •  4$  of  the  nation  lived  in  the  so-called  "Tokaido 
Megalopolis"  (along  the  eastern  seaboard  from  Tokyo  to  Kobe), 
which  accounts  for  only  18.8%  of  the  land  area.   Thus  the  region 
around  Tokyo  supports  over  5300  persons  per  square  kilometer 
while  the  Northern  Island  of  Hokkaido  has  only  66.  (Lest  this 
seem  too  sparse,  however,  it  should  be  noted  that  Hokkaido  is 
more  crowded  than  40  of  the  50  United  States.)  Although  the 
population  growth  rate  has  been  stabilized  at  about  1  percent, 
this  still  means  an  increase  of  over  a  million  persons  per  year. 
Threats  to  Japan's  physical  security  may  be  either  natural 
or  man-made.  The  former  are  quite  important  psychologically, 
although  their  hazards  have  been  reduced  in  recent  times.  For 
instance,  the  life  and  property  damage  from  earthquakes  in  an 
average  year  is  fairly  light,  but  the  threat  of  another  major 
disaster  like  the  one  in  1 923  is  not  far  from  anyone's  mind.  An 
average  of  six  or  seven  typhoons  strike  the  country  each  year, 
beginning  in  Okinawa  about  August,  and  gradually  moving  northward 
through  October.  Although  improved  weather  forecasts  and 


5287  people/km2  (1972),  vs  22/km  for  the  U.S.   (A  similar 
U.S.  density  would  equate  to  a  population  of  over  2,600  million.) 
On  a  world-wide  basis,  Japan's  population  density  is  between  that 
of  Belgium  (318)  and  West  Germany  (248).  Data  from  Sorifu  Tokei 
Kyoku  (Statistics  Bureau,  Prime  Minister's  Office),  Kokusai  Tokei 
Yoran  (international  Statistics  Handbook),  Tokyo:  March  1974- 

4Statistics  Bureau,  Prime  Minister's  Office,  Statistical 
Handbook  of  Japan  1 97 1  (Tokyo:   June  1971),  P-  20. 


156 


Figure  JM 


^cS^v^i^v^--^  ■ 


JAPAN  IN  ASIA 


157 


construction  techniques  have  lessened  the  dangers  from  these 
storms,  they  cannot  help  but  have  a  major  impact  on  those  in 
their  paths.  Some  60  volcanoes  also  are  active,  but  these  rarely 
pose  problems. 

By  contrast,  except  for  terrorism,  which  will  be  discussed 
later,  few  Japanese  can  envision  a  credible  military  threat  to 
the  homeland  itself.  An  invasion  of  Japan  would  hardly  be  justi- 
fied by  someone  else's  need  for  living  space  or  raw  materials. 
She  has  few  boundary  or  territorial  disputes,  although  the  search 
for  ocean  resources  will  add  new  ones  and  may  intensify  others. 
Except  for  limiting  the  Soviet  navy's  access  to  the  Pacific,  she 
does  not  stand  in  the  way  of  any  great  power's  line  of  advance. 
Japan's  strategic  value,  on  the  other  hand,  lies  in  her  industrial 
potential  (which  probably  would  be  severely  damaged  in  the 
fighting),  her  availability  for  U.S.  bases  in  the  Northeast  Asia 
(which  seems  to  be  declining)  or  for  a  Soviet  window  on  the 
Pacific,  and  the  impact  which  her  defection  from  the  Western  camp 
might  have  on  the  psychological  balance  of  power.  Even  should  an 
invasion  succeed,  it  is  argued,  it  would  be  difficult  to  ensure 
that  the  efforts  of  such  a  closely-knit  people  could  be  directed 
towards  one's  own  ends.  With  the  reduced  tensions  in  the  region 
resulting  from  detente  and  the  American  withdrawal  from  Vietnam, 
the  direct  threat  from  any  of  her  neighbors  appears  to  have 
diminished  even  farther. 

It  is  possible,  of  course,  for  these  warming  trends  to  be 


158 


reversed,  and  to  be  reversed  rapidly.  Therefore,  classical  mili- 
tary doctrine  holds  that  the  capabilities  of  possible  opponents, 
rather  than  their  intentions,  should  be  the  guide  to  one's 
defenses.  Most  Japanese,  however,  do  not  subscribe  to  this 
thesis,  on  four  grounds:   (1)  the  nuclear  threshold  is  such  that 
much  of  the  superpowers'  capability  is  effectively  unusable, 
(2)  Japan  is  sufficiently  important  that  she  could  count  on 
foreign  assistance  if  any  great  power  deployed  its  forces  against 
her,  (3)  even  if  she  could  not  count  on  such  help,  her  geographi- 
cal situation  is  such  that  she  could  not  defend  herself  against, 
or  absorb,  even  a  moderate  nuclear  attack,   (4)  whatever  the 
physical  situation,  the  constitutional  limitations  and  the 
domestic  political  realities  absolutely  preclude  the  development 
of  military  forces  to  compete  with  the  superpowers.   Therefore, 
it  becomes  pointless  to  argue  in  terms  of  capabilities  alone. 
At  the  same  time,  the  consideration  of  intentions  shifts  the 
focus  outside  of  the  military  plane.  Indeed,  it  has  been  in  the 


5 
Due  to  the  concentration  of  cities  and  industrial  areas 

(70/o  of  the  industry  is  located  in  20;£  of  the  land  area),  it  has 

been  estimated  that  as  few  as  eight  megaton-range  weapons  could 

destroy  virtually  the  entire  productive  capacity  of  the  Tokaido 

region  and  Northern  Kyushu.   Jack  D.  Salmon,  "Japan  as  a  Great 

Power:   The  Military  Context  and  Policy  Options,"  Japan 

Interpreter,  VII  (1972),  pp.  396-408. 

This  is  separate  from  the  issue  of  Japanese  nuclearization 
itself.   The  domestic  and  international  merits  and  demerits  of 
a  few  nuclear  weapons  could  be  argued  endlessly.  Almost  no  one, 
however,  considers  that  Japan  could  build  a  warfighting  capa- 
bility comparable  to  that  of  the  U.S.  or  the  Soviet  Union. 


159 


realm  of  diplomacy  and  economics  (which  Tokyo  has  managed  to 
separate  so  skillfully)  where  Japan  has  pursued  her  primary  quest 


7 
for  security. 


Diplomatic  Security 
(1)  The  United  States. 

At  present,  the  United  States  is  Japan's  official  guarantor, 
both  through  the  "nuclear  umbrella"  and  the  conventional  forces 
which  might  be  activated  under  the  Japan-U.S.  Treaty  of  Mutual 

Cooperation  and  Security.   Although  relations  between  the  two 

q 
countries  in  early  1975  were  relatively  tranquil,   there  are 

several  long-range  problems  which  could  cause  frictions  in  the 

future.    Among  these  are:   (1)  U.S.  bases  in  a  Japan  where  land 

is  increasingly  scarce  and  where  their  use  in  support  of  Japan's 

interests  (as  opposed  to  America's)  is  seen  to  be  more  and  more 


7 

See  Okumiya  Masatake,  "Proposal  for  a  Weil-Balanced 
National  Security,"  Shin  Boei  lionshu,  March  1974*   Translation 
in  American  Embassy,  Tokyo,  Summary  of  Selected  Japanese  Maga- 
zines (hereafter  Magazine  Summary) ,  June  1974*  Also  F.  C 
Langdon,  Japan' s  Foreign  Policy  (Vancouver:  University  of 
British  Columbia  Press,  1 973) . 

o 

Hereafter  "Security  Treaty." 

q 

^The  column  "Japan  Currents"  in  Sekai,  July  1974>  suggests 

that  this  may  be  because  both  sides  are  avoiding  a  real  dialogue 

in  the  hope  of  avoiding  the  exposure  of  differences. 

1 0 

Shiratori  Rei,  "U.S. -Japan  Relations  Headed  Toward 

Dangerous  and  Unstable  Period,"  Economist,  June  4>  1974*  Trans- 
lation in  Magazine  Summary,  June  1 974- 


160 


1 1 
unlikely.    (2)  Continued  U.S.  reminders  that  Japan  should  be 

grateful  for  the  security  it  receives  when  the  Japanese  have 

1 2 

begun  to  question  the  need  for  such  protection.    (3)  Intensified 

competition  in  a  number  of  markets  in  which  Japan  recently  has 
lost  many  of  the  competitive  advantages  which  it  held  for  so 
long.    (4)  Competition  for  scarce  world-wide  resources. 


11 

This  question  frequently  was  raised  during  Vietnam,  and 

in  the  debates  over  the  homeporting  of  the  U.S.  aircraft  carrier 
Midway  at  Yokosuka.   It  surfaced  again  during  the  summer  of  1974 
when  U.S.  ICEM  warning  radars  were  found  to  be  located  in  Japan. 
American  bases  are  permitted  under  Article  VI  of  the  Security 
Treaty,  which  states: 

For  the  purpose  of  contributing  to  the  security  of 
Japan  and  the  maintenance  of  international  peace  and 
security  in  the  Far  East,  the  United  States  of  America 
is  granted  the  use  by  its  land,  air  and  naval  forces 
of  facilities  and  areas  in  Japan. 

Taoka  Shunji  provides  a  number  of  cogent  arguments  for  the  abo- 
lition of  the  formal  U.S.  base  structure  in  the  interests  of 
better  overall  relations.  See  "Japan's  Strategic  Situation  and 
the  U.S.  Military  Presence."   (Copy  provided  by  author.  Publica- 
tion forthcoming.)   These  were  strengthened  by  the  release  of 
evidence  from  several  sources  during  September  and  October  1974 
which  pointed  to  the  presence  of  nuclear  weapons  aboard  U.S. 
ships  in  Japanese  ports. 

12 

A  frequently-heard  criticism  is  that  the  nuclear  umbrella 

really  is  a  by-product  of  the  U.S. -Soviet  balance  and  thus  would 
be  equally  effective  whether  or  not  Japan  had  formal  security 
arrangements  with  the  U.S.  Royama  Michio  made  this  point  in  an 
interview  on  January  J,    1973*  See  also  Shiratori,  _op_.  cit. 
There  also  is  an  interesting  difference  in  perception  in  that 
many  Japanese  feel  that  it  is  the  U.S.  which  should  be  grateful 
(for  the  base  rights),  rather  than  the  other  way  around. 

1  "5 
^In  Southeast  Asia,  for  one,  U.S.  firms  recently  have  been 

making  strong  inroads.   See  the  3~part  New  York  Times  series, 
"The  United  States  and  South  Asia,"  June  24-26,  1974.  For  a 
radical  critique  (and  book  review),  which  holds  that  the  U.S. 
always  has  been  dominant,  see  T.  A.  Bisson,  "The  American- 
Japanese  'Co-Prosperity  Sphere,1"  BCAS,  VI  ( January-March  1974) » 


161 


(5)  The  asymmetry  between  American  and  Japanese  dependence  on 
foreign  suppliers,  which  might  make  Japan  vulnerable  to  counter- 
measures  for  U.S.  actions.  4  (6)  Japanese  reliance  on  the  U.S. 
for  a  number  of  crucial  commodities,  such  as  food.  Should  the 
U.S.  be  unable  to  provide  Japan  with  the  materials  it  needs  in 

times  of  shortage,  serious  ramifications  are  possible,  as 

15 

presaged  by  the  1973  soy  bean  embargo. 

Relations  with  the  United  States  are  likely  to  remain  as 
the  keystone  of  Japanese  diplomacy.  This  certainly  will  be  true 
so  long  as  conservative  governments  are  in  power,  and  probably 

would  be  even  for  a  coalition.  Nevertheless,  Tokyo  also  will 

16 

continue  to  seek  greater  independence  from  Washington. 


pp.  52-64.  A  good  summary  of  Japanese  competitive  problems  was 
provided  in  Asahi  Shimbun  (hereafter  Asahi),  September  17,  1974, 
p.  9. 

Since  before  the  oil  embargo,  Japan  consistently  has 
rejected  U.S.  proposals  for  agreements  among  oil  consumers  which 
might  lead  to  confrontations  with  producing  countries.  Japan's 
contradictory  allegiances  are  outlined  in  Mainichi's  September  JO, 
1974  summary  of  Foreign  Minister  Kimura's  U.S.  visit. 

1  5 

Although  the  September  21,  1974  communique  between 

President  Ford  and  Prime  Minister  Tanaka  included  a  denial  of 

U.S.  intent  to  restrict  the  export  of  foodstuffs,  the  imposition 

of  de-facto  controls  on  grain  shipments  to  the  Soviet  Union  less 

than  three  weeks  later  was  highly  disturbing.  Thus  far, 

Japanese  demand  for  U.S.  cereals  is  not  large  enough  to  fall 

under  the  regulations,  but  the  future  is  uncertain.  See,  inter 

alia,  Sankei,  October  11,  1974  (editorial). 

1 6 

For  instance,  Eto  Shinkichi  and  Miyoshi  Osamu,  'What  is 

the  Axis  of  Japanese  Diplomacy?"  Keizai  Orai,  December  1973* 

Translation  in  Magazine  Summary,  April  1974* 


162 


A  Japanese  Foreign  Minister  stated  in  September  1974  that; 

Japanese  diplomacy,  from  now  on,  must  be  a  diplomacy 
in  which  the  centripetal  force  and  the  centrifugal 
force  are  balanced.  "Centripetal  force"  means,  in 
other  words,  efforts  to  make  the  U.S. -Japan  cooperation 
policy  line,  which  has  been  the  axis  of  post-war 
Japanese  diplomacy,  still  more  solid.  By  "centrifugal 
force,"  I  mean  the  steady  establishment  of  friendly 
and  good-will  relations  with  countries  with  which  our  17 
country  did  not  have  such  close  political  ties  so  far. 

This  trend  has  become  stronger  and  more  visible  since  the  Nixon 
shocks  of  1971 »  but  it  really  began  earlier  as  an  offshoot  of  the 
economic  recovery.  It  has  been  evidenced  by  the  increasingly  far- 
ranging  trips  of  high  government  officials,  from  Peking  to  Moscow 
to  Europe  on  the  one  hand,  and  to  Latin  America,  the  Middle  East 
and  Africa  on  the  other. 

All  of  these  moves  have  been  designed  to  increase  Japan's 
flexibility.  But  they  also  are  contingent  on  the  continued 
relaxation  of  tensions  in  the  Western  Pacific.  Eventually,  Japan 
may  achieve  enough  of  a  balance  in  her  multi- lateral  relations  to 
safeguard  an  independent  course  even  if  the  political  climate  in 
Northeast  Asia  worsened.  For  the  time  being,  however,  such  a 
trend  almost  certainly  would  drive  her  back  towards  Washington. 

(2)  The  Soviet  Union 

Relations  with  the  Soviet  Union  are  burdened  with  a  long 
history  of  distrust  and  conflict,  not  to  mention  ideological 
differences  and  a  territorial  dispute.  Although  there  are  strong 


1  "^Quoted  in  Mainichi,  September  10,  1974,  P-  2.  Trans- 
lation from  Press  Summary ,  September  19,  1974,  P»  9« 


163 


anti- communist  factions  within  the  Japanese  government,  the  ideo- 
logical fervor  of  the  Cold  War  has  eased  in  Tokyo,  as  elsewhere, 
in  recent  years.  Moscow's  principal  offerings,  besides  a  general 

reduction  in  tensions,  are  resources,  fish,  and  the  northern 

1  ft 
islands.   '      Siberian  development  projects  provided  the  initial 

basis  for  Japanese  commercial  interest,   but  recent  circumstances, 

especially  the  growing  availability  of  Chinese  oil,    increasingly 

severe  Soviet  terms,   and  a  lack  of  U.S.   co-participation  have 

19 

reduced  their  attractiveness.    Fisheries  disputes  are  an  on- 
going source  of  irritation  for  Tokyo,  since  several  thousand  of 
her  seamen  have  been  seized  since  1945  and  a  Soviet  200  mile 
economic  zone  is  seen  as  a  serious  threat  to  the  pelagic  catch. 
The  northern  islands  issue  remains  the  stumbling  block  to  a 
formal  World  War  II  peace  treaty.  Relations  were  normalized, 


1  fl 

Habomai,   Shikotan,  Kunashiri  and  Etorofu,  which  the 

Soviets  acquired  at  the  end  of  World  War  II.   Japan  maintains 
(and  the  USSR  agrees)  that  the  former  pair  are  related  to  Hokkaido, 
rather  than  to  the  Soviet-ovmed  Kuriles.  The  latter  pair,  it  is 
claimed,  belong  to  the  Southern  Kuriles,  which  are  said  to  be  a 
distinct  island  group.  Moreover,  since  all  of  the  islands  were 
settled  peacefully  and  belonged  to  Japan  before  she  began  her 
imperial  expansion  (a  fact  recognized  by  19th  century  Russo- 
Japanese  treaties),  they  are  not  covered  by  the  Potsdam  declara- 
tion. Moscow  has  offered  to  return  the  first  two  as  part  of  a 
peace  treaty,  but  holds  that  the  others  are  not  negotiable  since 
war-related  boundary  issues  cannot  be  re-opened.  The  Japanese 
arguments  are  given  in  the  Foreign  Ministry  publication,  The 
Northern  Territorial  Issue  (Tokyo,  1970). 

19Tokyo  Shimbun,  September  JO,  1974,  P«  3»  A  key  factor 
was  the  Soviet  decision  to  build  a  new  track  for  the  Trans- 
Siberian  railway  rather  than  a  pipeline  as  originally  discussed. 
The  strategic  implications  of  this  choice,  plus  a  reduction  in 
the  guaranteed  amount  from  40  to  25  million  kiloliters,  raised 
doubts  not  only  in  Tokyo,  but  also  in  Washington  and  Peking. 


164 


however,  by  a  joint  agreement  in  1956. 

The  Soviet  Union  has  headed  the  list  of  "disliked  countries" 

20 
in  Japanese  opinion  polls  for  years.    Nevertheless,  both  sides 

can  profit  from  increased  cooperation  and  it  appears  that  this 
will  be  the  governing  factor  in  the  near  future.  Such  cooperation 
is  possible  under  the  correct,  if  lukewarm  relations  now  prevail- 
ing. Some  further  warming  may  be  expected,  but  the  deep-seated 
anti- communism  of  most  Japanese  leaders,  and  their  probable 
successors,  will  continue  to  discourage  very  close  ties. 

(3)  The  People's  Republic  of  China 

Despite  more  than  75  years  of  often  violent  hostility, 
Japan' s  basic  relationship  with  China  is  much  closer  than  with 
the  Soviet  Union.  In  addition  to  a  long  history  of  cultural 
borrowing,  there  still  is  some  Japanese  guilt  about  the  wartime 
experiences.  While  it  is  recognized  that  the  economic  potential 
of  the  "China  Market"  will  not  be  realized  for  years,  the  PRC 
recently  has  become  a  supplier  of  petroleum.  Though  initial 
shipments  have  been  fairly  small,  the  expansion  potential  and 

lack  of  strings  have  distracted  attention  from  Siberian  develop- 

21 

ment.  In  the  next  few  years,    China's   importance  as  a  determi- 

nant of  Japan's  course  will  grow.     Specific  predictions  are 


20 

For  instance,  Sankei,  September  17,  1964,  P«  6.  Part  of 

the  distrust  stems  from  Moscow's  attack  on  Japan  in  the  last 
days  of  World  War  II  in  violation  of  a  non-aggression  pact,  and 
her  slowness  in  repatriating  prisoners  of  war. 

21 

Sankei,  August  16,  1974,  P»  9» 


165 


impossible,   given  the  ■uncertainties  of  the  post-Maoist  period, 
but  some  alternatives  and  Japan's  possible  reactions  to  them  will 
be  offered  in  Chapter  Seven. 

(4)     Taiwan  and  Korea 

Taiwan  and  Korea  are  the  other  two  areas  of  immediate  con- 
cern to  Japan's  security.     With  the  decline  of  East-West  tensions, 
the   likelihood  that  Japan  will  be  drawn  into  a  conflict  over 
either  area  also  has  diminished.      This  probably  is  more   true  of 

Taiwan  than  of  Korea.      Once  declared  "important"    to   the   security 

22  -  - 

of  Japan,   the  ties  between  Tokyo  and  Taipei  have  been  cool 

since  the  former  established  diplomatic  relations  with  Peking. 
The  abortive  1974  negotiations  over  the  Japan-China  air  route 
made  matters  even  worse.   This  has  not  prevented  the  growth  of 
economic  links,  but  Japan  now  has  little  ideological  reason  to 
become  directly  involved  in  a  conflict  between  the  two  Chinas. 

Korea,  on  the  other  hand,  remains  of  primary  importance. 

23 

Traditionally  the  "dagger  pointed  at  the  heart  of  Japan,"   there 

has  been  a  history  of  mutual  animosity  at  least  since  Hideyoshi's 
invasion  of  the  peninsula  at  the  end  of  the  16th  century.  Recent 


Nixon-Sato  communique,  November  21,  1 9^9- 

*The  two  invasions  by  Kublai  Khan  in  the  13th  century  were 
launched  from  Korea.   Some  reports  even  credit  an  attempted 
Chinese  invasion  in  the  7th  century.  Fear  of  foreign  possession 
of  Korea  played  a  particularly  important  role  in  Japanese  foreign 
policy  in  the  late  19th-early  20th  centuries.  Japan's  perspec- 
tive on  Korea  is  similar  to  Britain's  historical  view  of  the 
Netherlands. 


166 


problems  have  included  fishing  disputes,  sometimes  involving 
violence,  continental  shelf  boundary  issues,  and  the  Korean 
occupation  of  Takeshima,  an  island  in  the  Sea  of  Japan.  The 
1969  Nixon-Sato  communique  affirmed  that  the  security  of  South 
Korea  (ROK)  was  "essential"  to  that  of  Japan,  but  the  Kim  Dae 
Jung  kidnapping  and  the  assassination  attempt  on  President  Park 
have  brought  relations  between  the  two  countries  to  a  post-World 
War  II  low.  In  fact,  a  Japanese  Foreign  Minister  recently  made 
the  highly  controversial  remark  that  the  essential  element  for 
Japan  now  was  "stability  on  the  Korean  Peninsula,"  rather  than 
the  ROK's  security.  At  the  same  time  he  decried  President  Park's 

9  A 

warnings  of  the  threat  from  the  North."    Whether  or  not  Korean 
instability  results  from  internal  or  external  pressures,  it  is 
likely  to  be  of  more  direct  interest  to  Japan  than  almost  any 
other  single  issue. 

(5)  Other  States 

Diplomatic  relations  with  the  rest  of  the  world  have  varied 
in  direct  proportion  to  Japan's  economic  interest  therein.  Some 
measure  of  this  interest  may  be  indicated  by  Tables  5~1  through 
5-3 •  Note  the  truly  world-wide  nature  of  her  resource  dependence, 
the  importance  of  the  North  American  and  Southeast  Asian  markets, 
and  the  growing  level  of  investment  in  Europe. 

The  economic  basis  of  this  interest  has  been  well  described 


^omiuri  Shimbun  (hereafter  Yomiuri),  October  10,  1974, 
p.  7. 


167 


Table  5-1 

JAPANESE  STRATEGIC  REGIONS 

FY  1972  RESOURCES  SUPPLY 


North  America  (11.5$) 

Soy  Beans 

Wheat 

Lead  Ore 

Coal 

Copper  Ore 

Forestry  Products 

Central  and  South  America  (6.7$) 

Sugar 

Raw  Cotton 

Iron  Ore 

East  and  Southeast  Asia  (11.7%) 

Crude 

Forestry  Products 

Bauxite 

Copper  Ore 

Rubber 

Africa  (3«7%) 

West  Asia  and  Middle  East  (40.9%) 

Crude  Oil 
Iron  Ore 

Oceania  (16.7%) 

Wool 

Nickel  Ore 
Bauxi  te 
Iron  Ore 
Coal 


%  of 

% 

%  Total 

Imports 

Dependency 

Demand 

91 

96 

88 

80 

91 

73 

71 

76 

54 

54 

57 

31 

39 

99 

39 

23 

51 

12 

44 

89 

39 

36 

100 

36 

22 

99 

22 

I 

13 

99.8 

13 

53 

51 

27 

42 

100 

42 

40 

99 

40 

96 

100 

96 

85 

99.8 

85 

16 

99 

16 

93 

100 

93 

83 

100 

83 

56 

100 

56 

42 

99 

43 

35 

57 

20 

Source:  MITI 


168 


Table  5-2 
JAPANESE  STRATEGIC  REGIONS 
TRADE 


a. 

Exports  (percent  of 

value) 

I9601 

19702 

19735 

19804 

19854 

N.   America 

32.8 

33-7 

28.3 

Central  &  S.  America 

4.4 

6.1 

7.5 

rH 

rH 
rH 

W.   Europe 
Southeast  Asia 

11.7 
23.3 

15.0 
25.4 

17.4 
24.2 

cd 

rH 

•a 

Africa 

8.7 

7.4 

8.5 

0 

5 

-P 
O 

W.  Asia  and  Middle  East 
Oceania 

12.4 
4.9 

2.8 
4.2 

4.4 
4.4 

Communist 

1.8 
4,055 

5-4 
19,318 

50 

36,930 

TOTAL   (8x10  ) 

43,419 

61,039 

a/o  of  GNP 

9.4 

9.5 

9.2 

9.6 

9.9 

b. 

Imports   (percent  of 

value) 

I9601 

19702 

19735 

19804 

19854 

N.   America 

42.8 

34.1 

29.5 

Central  &  S.  America 
W .   Europe 

3.2 

8.8 

7.2 

10.2 

5.1 

10.5 

rH 

rH 

■3 

East  and  Southeast  Asia 

Africa 

W.  Asia  and  Middle  East 

Oceania 

14.0 
3.7 

15.7 
9.0 

16.0 
5.8 

12.0 
9.6 

20.8 

4-6 

12.6 

11.1 

rH 

•H 

-p 
0 

rH 
•H 

s 

0 

Communist 

2.8 

4,491 

.Ail 

18,881 

6.0 
38,314 

G 

K 

TOTAL   ($x106) 

39,879 

57,046 

°/o  of  GNP 

10.4 

9.3 

9.6 

8.8 

9.2 

Sources: 

1MITI 

IJKIW     Industrial  Review  74,   P« 

8 

"TfllTI,   International  Trade  White  Paper  1974,Data  Summary,  pp.   18-19 
TCETI.     Computed  in  real   terms  in  Yen;  converted  at  $1   =  ¥  300 


169 


Table 

5-5 

JAPANESE  STRATEGIC  REGIONS 

INVESTMENT 

a.      Cumulative  Direct 

Investments  by  Japanese  Pj 

.rms   (pe 

rcent) 

1968 

1970 

1972 

1980 

1985 

N.  America 

29.5 

25.5 

22.9 

<D 

Central  and  S.  America 

21.0 

15.9 

14.6 

crj 

€ 

Europe 

10.6 

17.9 

24.5 

■H 

rH 

I 

Asia 

19.3 

21.0 

20.5 

crj 

Africa 

3.0 

2.6 

2.2 

5 

Sd 

Middle  East 

130 

9-3 

8.9 

-p 
0 

-P 
O 

Oceania 

3.4 

7.8 

6.4 

fl 

PI 

TOTAL   ($x10   ) 

2,008 

3,577 

6,773 

45,000 

93,500 

io  of  World  Inv.                                                                            9.3  12.0 

b._     Investment  by  Foreign  States   in  Japan  (percent) 

1968          1970          1972          1980  1985 

N.  America                                    69. 1          64.6         67.8           Q  «  Q  d 

Europe                                             21.7          21.8         17*5           rt  ^  c  % 


TOTAL   ($x106)  411  596        1,012 


Source:      Bank  of  Japan 


170 


by  the  term  "Resources  Diplomacy"  (shigen  gaiko)  (discussed  more 
fully  below)  and  by  the  rash  of  Foreign  Ministry  interest  in 
Arabia  since  the  Yom  Kippur  War.  Nevertheless,  as  noted  above 

(p.  162),  there  are  signs  that  a  broader-based  policy  may  be  in 

25 

the  making,  especially  with  regard  to  Africa  and  Latin  America. 

Despite  formation  of  such  groups  as  the  Trilateral  Commission, 
interest  in  Europe  mostly  seems  limited  to  possible  EEC  restric- 
tions on  Japanese  products  and  the  availability  of  petrodollars 

26 

through  the  Eurodollar  market. 

There  is  little  feeling  that  Japan  should  try  to  play  the 

role  of  a  major  power.  Indeed,  almost  all  such  visions  of  her 

27 

have  come  from  abroad.    Domestic  views  usually  have  stressed 

28 
Japan's  weaknesses  rather  than  her  strengths.    In  this  sense, 


25, 

vVitness  Prime  Minister  Tanaka's  September  1974  visits  to 

Brazil,  Canada  and  Mexico,  plus  Foreign  Minister  Kimura's  Septem- 
ber 24,  1974  speech  to  the  UN  and  his  October-November  1974  trip 
to  five  Black  African  states.  It  may  be  that  these  moves  are 
more  superficial  than  substantive,  but  they  also  are  consistent 
with  Japan's  tendency  to  retain  as  many  options  as  possible. 

A  broader  view  was  taken  in  Curt  Gasteyger  (ed.),  Japan 
and  the  Atlantic  Y/orld  (Atlantic  Papers  3)  (Westmead:   Saxon 
Hill,  1972),  but  this  has  not  been  representative. 


Most  conspicuously,  Herman  Kahn's  The  Emerging  Japanese 

")). 


2\ 

Superstate   (Englewood  Cliffs:     Prentice-Hall,    1970).     Many 
Marxist  writings  also  have   stressed  the   imperialist  nature  of 
Japan's   economic  influence  and  the  potential  for  a  revival  of 
militarism.     One  of  the  most  recent  is  Jon     Halliday  and  Gavin 
McCormack,    Japanese   Imperialism  Today  (New  York:     Monthly  Review 
Press,    1973). 

28 

Zbigniew  Brzezinski's  The  Fragile  Blossom  (New  York: 

Harper  and  Row,  1972)  seems  to  have  been  closer  to  the  thinking 

of  most  Japanese  than  Kahn's  work. 


171 


the  energy  crisis  and  oil  embargo  may  have  been  useful  in 
bringing  foreign  expectations  of  Japan  more  in  line  with  reality. 

(6)  Some  Alternatives 

This  leaves  several  options  in  the  search  for  security 
through  diplomacy:   (a)  continued  alliance  with  a  major  power  in 
the  Northwest  Pacific;  (b)  adoption  of  an  equidistant  posture 
within  the  Northeast  Asian  balance  of  power;  (c)  participation 
in  an  Asian  Collective  Security  System;  (d)  realignment  as  a 
champion  of  the  Third  World  (especially  that  part  which  is  rich 
in  resources);  (e)  a  search  for  allies  among  countries  with 
previously  unexploited  common  interests.  This  might  include  a 

Pacific  Regional  grouping,  or  the  promotion  of  ties  among 

29 
emerging  oceanic  states. 

So  far  the  first  has  been  chosen.  A  departure  from  it  will 
depend  on  such  diverse  but  inter-related  factors  as  the  progress 
of  detente,  the  state  of  U.S. -China  relations  and  the  health  of 
the  world  economy,  among  others.  Space  does  not  permit  an  ade- 
quate analysis  of  any  of  the  alternatives,  but  it  must  be  remem- 
bered that  Japan  is  not  completely  free  to  choose  among  them.  A 
stable  equidistant  posture  is  attractive,  but  it  will  be  many 
years  before  such  non-alignment  would  be  respected  in  times  of 
stress.  Similarly,  an  Asian  collective  security  pact  has 


29 

Ambassador  Arvid  Pardo's  term,  referring  to  those  nations 

which  would  be  particularly  advantaged  by  broad  extensions  of 

national  jurisdiction  at  sea.  (See  below,  Chapter  Seven.) 


172 


theoretical  advantages,  "but  the  only  current  proposal  was  put 
forth  by  the  Soviet  Union  in  1954  and  revived  in  1972.    This 
automatically  makes  it  suspect  in  Tokyo's  eyes.  By  the  same 
token,  though  Japan  may  he  able  to  dilute  the  suspicions  of  many 
developing  countries,  there  is  little  prospect  that  they  will 
accept  her  as  their  champion.  The  fifth  option  may  bear  fruit 
one  day,  but  any  broad-based  cooperation  among  the  Pacific  Basin 
states  is  out  of  the  question  for  the  near  future.  Similarly, 
oceanic  states  may  support  each  other  in  law  of  the  sea  negoti- 
ations or  related  disputes,  but  this  is  not  enough  of  a  founda- 
tion for  an  entire  foreign  policy. 

Thus,  although  there  are  pressures  to  modify  the  present 
Japanese  diplomatic  approach,  there  are  not  many  options  immedi- 
ately available.  The  most  consistently  cited,  and  easily  remedied 
weakness  is  the  inadequacy  of  her  intelligence.  This  was  particu- 
larly criticized  in  the  aftermath  of  the  oil  boycott,  which 
almost  no  one  had  foreseen.    The  Self  Defense  Forces  recently 
have  reorganized  their  intelligence  structure,  and  it  is  assumed 
that  the  Foreign  Ministry  also  has  taken  this  to  heart. 

Revision  of  the  Security  Treaty  is  another  possibility. 


50 

See  the  essays  by  Kotani  Hidejiro  and  Gennady  V.  Astafiev 

in  Council  on  National  Security  Problems  (CNSP),  Peace  in  A3ia 

(Toky5:  CNSP,  August  1975),  pp.  27-44. 

51 

y  This  is  not  to  say  that  awareness  of  an  approaching  energy 

crisis  did  not  pre-date  the  Yom  Kippur  War.  The  coming  supply 

shortage  officially  had  been  recognized  at  least  by  the  Spring  of 

1973.  NOT,  April  3,  1973,  P.  1. 


173 


Though  it  has  served  Japan  well  over  the  years,  there  is  increas- 
ing talk  that  it  has  outlived  its  usefulness.  In  view  of  the 
uncertainties  of  the  next  few  years,  Tokyo's  diplomats  probably 
would  prefer  to  de-emphasize  the  Treaty  quietly  rather  than 
abandon  one  of  the  more  constant  elements  of  their  foreign 
policy.  They  may,  however,  be  overpowered  by  domestic  pressures 
on  this  point. 

Mil i tar:/  Security 

At  the  heart  of  military  security  issues  in  Japan  is 

Article  IX  of  the  Constitution,  which  states: 

Aspiring  sincerely  to  an  international  peace  based 
on  justice  and  order  the  Japanese  people  forever 
renounce  war  as  a  sovereign  right  of  the  nation  and 
the  threat  of  force  as  a  means  of  settling  inter- 
national disputes. 

In  order  to  accomplish  the  aim  of  the  preceding 
paragraph,  land,  sea  and  air  forces,  as  well  as  other 
war  potential,  will  never  be  maintained.  The  right 
of  belligerency  of  the  state  will  not  be  recognized. 

The  Japanese  Government  has  maintained  ever  since  194&  that 

" .  .  •  the  renunciation  of  war  does  not  directly  deny  the  right 

33 
of  self-defense."    Accordingly,  despite  a  relatively  low 

priority  and  often  severe  domestic  opposition,  defense  capabili- 
ties have  been  systematically  developed  under  a  variety  of  names 


^  For  instance,  the  Gaimusho  (Foreign  Ministry)  has  favored 
the  ratification  of  the  Ilon-Proliferation  Treaty  (NPT)  as  well  as 
an  internationalist  position  in  the  Law  of  the  Sea  negotiations. 
It  has  been  overruled  on  both  occasions. 

■^Prime  Minister  Yoshida  Shigeru,  June  26,  1946,  quoted  in 
John  K.  Emmerson,  Arms,  Yen  and  Power  (Tokyo:  Charles  E.  Tuttle, 
1972),  p.  53. 


174 


(some  of  them  American- imposed) ,  culminating  in  the  present  Air, 

Ground  and  Maritime  Self-Defense  Forces  (SDF). 

The  basic  Japanese  defense  policies  were  outlined  by  the 

Cabinet  and  National  Defense  Council  in  1 957 •  They  are: 

(1)  Basic  Policies  for  National  Defense 

The  objective  of  National  Defense  is  to  prevent 
direct  and  indirect  aggression,  and  once  invaded,  to 
repel  such  aggression,  thereby  preserving  the  inde- 
pendence and  peace  of  Japan  founded  upon  democratic 
principles. 

To  achieve  this  objective,  the  Government  of  Japan 
hereby  establishes  the  following  principles: 

A.  To  support  the  activities  of  the  United  Nations, 
and  promote  international  cooperation,  thereby 
contributing  to  the  realization  of  world  peace. 

B.  To  stabilize  the  public  welfare  and  enhance  the 
people's  love  for  country,  thereby  establishing 
the  sound  basis  essential  for  Japan's  security. 

C.  To  develop  progressively  the  effective  defense 
capabilities  necessary  for  self-defense,  with  due 
regard  to  the  nation's  resources  and  the  prevailing 
domestic  situation. 

D.  To  deal  with  external  aggression  on  the  basis  of 
the  Japan-U.S.  security  arrangements  pending  more 
effective  functioning  of  the  United  Nations  in  the 
future  in  deterring  and  repelling  such  aggression. 


See  James  E.  Auer,  The  Postwar  Rearmament  of  Japan's 
Maritime  Forces  (New  York:   Praeger,  1 97 3 ) »  iisnerson,  cp_.  cit., 
Michael  Hughes,  "Japan's  Airpower  Options"  (unpublished  Ph.D. 
dissertation,  Fletcher  School  of  Law  and  Diplomacy,  1972), 
Martin  E.  Weinstein,  Japan's  Postwar  Defense  Policy,  1947-1968 
(New  York:   Columbia  University  Press,  1 971 ),   and  James  H.  Buck, 
"Japan's  Defense  Policy,"  Asian  Affairs  3  (January/February 
1974),  PP.  136-150. 

-^ Japan  Defense  Agency,  Defense  of  Japan  1973,  p.  !• 


175 


In  order  to  win  public  acceptance  for  the  Self-Defense 
Forces,  the  official  literature  has  placed  particular  emphasis 
on  their  non-combat  roles  such  as  disaster  relief,  civil  engi- 
neering and  educational  training. 

As  noted  earlier,  the  nature  of  the  direct  military  threat 
is  obscure.  The  Fourth  Defense  Build-up  Plan  (1972-76)  is 
designed  to  produce:   "An  efficient  defense  force  capable  of 

dealing  effectively  with  aggression  on  a  scale  not  greater  than 

37 

a  localized  war  in  which  conventional  weapons  are  used."    In 

the  face  of  more  serious  threats,  the  SDF  are  to  resist  until 
U.S.  forces  can  be  deployed  to  defeat  the  attack.  Renewed 
fighting  in  Korea  is  a  potential  problem,  but  the  most  frequently 
discussed  direct  threat  to  Japan  itself  would  come  from  Sakhalin 

7Q 

and  the  Soviet  Far  East.    Certainly  the  concentration  of  the 
Air  (ASDF)  and  Ground  Self  Defense  Forces  (GSDF)  in  Hokkaido  and 
Northern  Honshu  reflects  this  view. 

It  has  been  suggested  that  the  limited  range  of  Soviet 
tactical  aircraft,  the  geographic  obstacles  of  the  Tsugaru 


■*   Japan  Defense  Agency,  The  Defense  of  Japan  (Defense  White 
Paper),  October  1970,  pp.  46-56. 

Japan  Defense  Agency,  Japan' s  Fourth  Five -Year  Defense 
Plan  (TokyS,  1972). 

^  In  1973,  it  wa3  reported  that  Japan  planned  to  hold  out 
as  long  as  possible  against  a  Soviet  invasion  and  then  surrender 
if  no  U.S.  help  was  forthcoming.  The  principal  Chinese  threat 
was  considered  to  be  infiltration,  which  Japan  could  mostly 
handle  alone.  (Richard  Halloran,  Herald  Tribune  (international), 
March  5,  1973.) 


176 


Strait  and  the  mountainous  terrain  in  Northern  Honshu,  the  rela- 
tively small  amphibious  capability  of  the  Soviet  Pacific  Fleet, 
and  the  need  to  operate  at  the  end  of  the  Trans-Siberian  railroad 
with  a  hostile  China  on  her  flank  would  restrict  the  ability  of 

the  USSR  to  achieve  a  quick  decision  over  Japan  with  conventional 

39 

weapons*    Others  have  emphasized  Japan's  vulnerability  to  air 

strikes  and  the  restricted  mobility  of  the  Ground  Self-Defense 
Forces*  Whichever  view  prevails,  the  ASDF  and  GSDF  at  least 
have  a  threat  axis  on  which  to  base  their  planning. 

This  is  not  the  case  with  the  Maritime  Self-Defense  Force 
(MSDF).  Torn  between  theoreticians  who  argue  for  a  coastal 
defense  fleet  to  repel  invasions,  or  for  a  "blue  water  navy"  to 

protect  the  sea  lanes,  its  assignment  never  has  been  clarified 

41 
officially.    Consequently,  it  is  mainly  deployed  along  the 

Pacific  Coast,  towards  the  sea  lanes  which  it  can  only  partly 

defend  and  away  from  the  direction  faced  by  its  sister  services. 

The  future  make-up  and  employment  of  the  MSDF  will  be  examined 

in  later  chapters,  but  it  is  worth  noting  that  some  observers 

have  suggested  that  the  greatest  dangers  to  the  physical  security 

of  the  Japanese  people  are  earthquakes,  typhoons,  and  traffic 


Taoka,  cp_.  cit.  (note  ^-^\) . 

^  Kaihara  Osamu,  "Study  on  Realistic  National  Defense,"  7 
parts,  Mainichi  Daily  News  (hereafter  MDN) ,  January  30-February 
5,  1973- 

41See  Auer,  op_.  cit.,  pp.  128-153,  for  a  review  of  these 

arguments . 


177 


accidents.  Therefore,  it  can  be  argued,  the  SDF  training  and 
organization  should  be  oriented  towards  disaster  relief  and 
safety  measures,  rather  than  external  aggression. 

In  any  case,  whatever  their  capabilities,  the  most  impor- 
tant function  of  the  SDF  may  be  performed  by  their  very  existence. 
Without  any  self-defense  effort  of  her  own,  Japan  would  have  much 
less  claim  to  great  power  protection.  Moreover,  in  the  absence 
of  any  forces  at  all,  a  decision  to  develop  a  defense  capability 
would  be  a  qualitative  policy  shift  of  possibly  destabilizing 
proportions.  As  it  is,  the  levels  of  the  SDF  can  be  adjusted  to 
the  international  environment. 

The  Maintenance  of  Economic  Well-Being 

International  Measures 
(1)   Food 

Physical  security  has  little  meaning  without  enough  to  eat. 
Since  domestic  production  provides  for  less  than  half  of  Japan' 3 
caloric  intake,  even  in  peacetime  she  is  vulnerable  to  changes 
in  the  delicate  balance  of  world  food  distribution. 

In  monetary  terms,  self-sufficiency  in  food  declined  from 

43 
over  90  percent  to  73  percent  between  1960  and  1972.    The 

reasons  are  manifold.  One  is  the  fact  that  less  than  20  percent 


4  Ii\ikushima  Yasuto,  interview,  March  20,  1974* 

^Ministry  of  Agriculture  and  Forestry,  White  Paper  on 
Agriculture,  1973.  Reported  in  Japan  Times,  April  19,  1974* 


178 


of  the  mountainous  country  is  arable.  In  the  years  following 
World  War  II  agricultural  productivity  reached  remarkable 
levels.    Nevertheless,  with  restricted  space  there  is  a  limit 

to  the  ability  of  technology  to  meet  the  added  demand  generated 

45 

by  affluence  and  population  growth. 

A  second,  and  possibly  even  more  important  reason  has  been 
the  changes  in  the  Japanese  diet.  Meat  and  dairy  products  have 
become  more  popular  in  recent  years,  partially  replacing  pre-war 
staples  such  as  fish  and  rice  (see  Table  5-4) • 

Table  5~4 
LIVESTOCK  SLAUGHTERED  (1,000  MT) 

1967     1970     1972 
Adult  Cattle  154      269      313 

Pigs  103      734      885 


Source:  Agriculture  and  Forestry  Ministry,  Abstract 
of  Statistics  1973* 


^hiice  -  5.85  metric  tons/hectare,  second  only  to  Australia; 
White  Potatoes  -  24.33  M.T. /hectare,  6th  in  the  world;  Wheat  - 
2.31  M.T. /hectare,  greater  than  the  U.S.,  but  less  than  most 
European  producers. 

Source:  Ministry  of  Agriculture  and  Forestry,  Abstract  of 
Statistics  on  Agriculture,  Forestry  and  Fisheries  1 973  (Tokyo, 
1973),  Table  IV. 

^Despite  a  relatively  low  growth  rate  of  1.3$>  Japan  added 
nearly  1,400,000  people  during  fiscal  1973*  This  is  equivalent 
to  almost  100,000  additional  hectares  of  rice  fields.  NKIW, 
July  30,  1974,  p.  2. 


179 


The  difficulty  with  meat  is  that  it  is  an  inefficient  way 
of  providing  nourishment.  It  has  been  estimated  that  7  calories 
of  feed  grains  are  needed  for  each  calorie  of  beef  consumed. 
A  more  important  measure  than  per  capita  calorie  consumption  is 
thus  "original  calories,"  i.e.  including  the  amount  needed  to 
feed  the  livestock  and  poultry  which  later  went  for  human  con- 
sumption. The  differences  can  be  startling.  In  1971 ,  the 
average  Japanese  consumed  2,840  calories  per  day,  230  of  which 
came  from  meat.  This,  however,  was  equivalent  to  3,860  original 
calories.    For  the  average  American,  11,000  original  calories 
were  needed  to  generate  a  daily  per  capita  consumption  of  3200. 

It  is  in  terms  of  original  calories  that  Japan's  dependence 

on  imported  food  is  most  evident.  By  this  measure  she  is  less 

Aft 
than  50  percent  self-sufficient.    Some  80  to  90  percent  of 

meat,  milk,  and  dairy  products  are  produced  domestically,  but 

49 
fully  two-thirds  of  the  feed  grains  must  be  imported.    Indeed, 


See  the  excellent  Asahi  Evening  News  series,  "Food  and 
Feople"  (30  installments,  July  7,  1973  to  August  21,  1973), 
especially  installment  VI,  "The  Shadow  Islands,"  July  13,  1973. 
Other  estimates  put  the  ratio  as  high  as  10:1. 

4'2480-230+( 230x7)  =  3860.  The  Japanese  consumption  of 
2840  calories  is  equal  to  the  1971  world  nutritional  standard. 
Food  and  Feople  V,  "Earth's  Capacity  to  Feed  Mankind." 

4  Published  figures  vary  from  4O70  (Agriculture  and  Forestry 
Minister  Kuraishi,  March  14,  1974)  to  49$  (Food  and  People  VI) . 
Along  with  Great  Britain,  this  is  one  of  the  lowest  rates  in  the 
world.  Even  Italy  and  West  Germany  are  nearly  8O/0  self-sufficient 
in  original  calories. 

49 Japan  Times,  April  19,  1974- 


180 


nearly  twice  the  total  amount  of  arable  land  would  be  needed  to 

50 
grow  all  the  foodstuffs  now  imported. 

Should  all  imports  of  food  cease,  domestic  production 

initially  could  provide  about  1,530  calories  per  day — enough  to 

sustain  life,  but  little  else.  In  a  year  or  so,  some  2,100 

calories  could  be  produced  by  replanting  paddies  now  set  aside, 

and  by  such  emergency  measures  as  converting  two- thirds  of  the 

51 

nation's  golf  courses  into  sweet  potato  farms.    Such  a  drastic 

event  seems  unlikely.  The  Japanese  also  have  endured  austere 
diets  before — most  recently  in  the  mid  1940s.  The  fact  remains, 
however,  that  this  aspect  of  her  prosperity  is  a  fragile  one, 

particularly  if  some  of  the  projected  world-wide  food  shortages 

52 

appear. 

Government  countermeasures  were  promulgated  in  1974  with 

the  goal  of  raising  the  level  of  self-sufficiency  to  70  percent 

53 
by  1 985 •    A  revision  of  farm  policy  to  reduce  inefficiencies 

is  planned.  Efforts  will  be  intensified  to  halt  the  pollution 

which  has  diminished  yields  per  hectare  and  caused  the  stagnation 


5°Pood  and  People  VI,  July  13,  1973- 

51NKIW,  October  22,  1974,  p.  5  and  Mainichi,  September  19, 
1974. 

52 

J   See,  for  instance,  Lester  R.  Brown,  "The  Next  Crisis?" 

Foreign  Policy  #13  (Winter  1973-74) »  PP»  3~33-  The  Agriculture 
and  Forestry  Ministry  has  forecast  shortages  of  rice,  beef  and 
milk  by  1980,  and  of  wheat,  feed  grains  and  soybeans  by  1985* 
Asahi,  August  19,  1974*  P«  2. 

-^  Japan  Times,  April  19,  1974;  Sankei,  March  28,  1974- 


181 


54 
of  coastal  fisheries.  ^  Aquaculture  will  be  stressed. 

In  the  international  arena,  efforts  are  under  way  to 

solidify  ties  with  agriculture  producers  and  states  with  rich 

coastal  fisheries.  Although  this  has  received  less  publicity 

than  "resources  diplomacy,"  it  is  no  less  important.  Indeed, 

the  potential  volatility  of  the  issue  can  be  gauged  by  the 

Japanese  reaction  to  the  1973  American  soy  bean  embargo.  Japan 


already  takes  20  percent  of  the  world's  corn  exports  and  30  per- 

y 

56 


55 
cent  of  those  of  soy  beans.    Such  imports  cost  her  nearly 


$6  billion  in  1973 t  an  increase  of  66  percent  in  one  year.' 

It  may  be  that  the  food  problem  is  the  most  serious,  long 
term  threat  to  U.S. -Japan  relations,  especially  if  supply  cuts 
are  made  in  response  to  future  crises.  The  impact  can  be  reduced 
by  the  restraint  of  both  governments  and  Tokyo's  success  at 
altering  Japan's  environment,  farm  patterns,  eating  habits  and 
other  measures  to  increase  self-sufficiency.  But  it  also  will 
hinge  on  factors  beyond  the  control  of  either  nation,  and  will 
remain  a  source  of  friction  for  years  to  come. 


%!he  potential  impact  of  continued  pollution  on  Japan's 
agriculture  and  indeed  on  the  health  of  the  nation  as  a  whole 
is  very  serious.  Pesticide  poisoning,  in  particular,  is  a 
problem.  See  Japan,  Environment  Agency,  The  Quality  of  the 
Environment  in  Japan  (Tokyo,  December  1972). 

55 

-^Nihon  Keizai  (editorial),  June  3,  1974* 

56 

Japan  Economic  Yearbook  1 974>   P»   49* 


182 


(2)  Resources  Diplomacy 

Lacking  natural  resources,  Japan  imports  enormous  quantities 

57 

of  raw  materials.    Some  projections  hold  that,  by  1980,  the 

Japanese  steel  industry  alone  will  generate  nearly  three-fourths 
of  the  world-wide  demand  for  seaborne  trade  in  iron  ore  and 

coal.    While  they  are  valued  at  only  34  percent  of  her  total 

/  \59 

imports  (and  3*3  percent  of  GNP;   these  fuel  and  ore  supplies 

clearly  are  crucial  to  the  maintenance  of  the  economy. 

Well  before  the  oil  embargo,  Japan  recognized  her  vulnera- 
bility to  the  actions  of  raw  material  suppliers.  Accordingly, 
Tokyo  adopted  a  policy  of  "Resources  Diplomacy"  which  was 
designed  to  provide  maximum  diversity   and  long  term  stability 
of  supply,  while  bringing  as  much  of  it  as  possible  under 
Japanese  control.    This  has  led  her  to  remarkable  lengths  to 


57 

See  Table   5-1    for   the  degree   of  dependence  on  foreign 

supplies. 

58 

Fa-r  Eastern  Economic  Review,  May  20,  1972,  p.  39 •  This 

probably  will  not  be  realized,  however,  since  it  was  based  on  an 
assumption  of  continued  rapid  growth. 

59 

Economic  Affairs  Bureau,  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs, 

Statistical  Survey  of  Japan's  Economy,  1972.  Table  38. 

One  of  the  foremost  proponents  of  such  wide-ranging 
relationships  has  been  economist  Okita  Saburo.  See  his  "Natural 
Resource  Dependency  and  Japan's  Foreign  Policy,"  Foreign  Affairs 
LII  (July  1974),  pp.  714-724.  The  limits  to  Japan's  choices  are 
summed  up  in  John  Surrey,  "Japan's  Uncertain  Energy  Prospects: 
The  Problem  of  Import  Dependence,"  Energy  Policy,  II  (September 
1974),  pp.  204-230. 

fi1 

Miyoshi  Shuichi,  "Japan's  Resource  Policy  at  a  Turning 

Point,"  Japan  Quarterly  XVIII  (July-September  1971),  pp.  281- 


183 


accommodate  resource  rich  states — some  say  to  the  point  of 
servility.  Nowhere  is  this  better  illustrated  than  by  her 
reaction  to  issues  involving  petroleum.   In  May  1 973»  ITI 
Minister  Nakasone  Yasuhiro  refused  to  join  a  "common  front" 

against  OPEC,  calling  instead  for  an  "understanding"  between 

62 
the  oil  consuming  and  oil  producing  states.    Six  months  later, 

in  the  face  of  reduced  Arab  production,  Tokyo  altered  its  stand 
on  the  1967  UN  Mid-East  Peace  Resolution  (242)  from  a  call  for 
mere  implementation,  to  support  of  the  Arab  view  that  the  terms 
require  a  return  to  Israel's  19&7  borders.  At  the  same  time, 
much  effort  has  been  devoted  to  joint  ventures  and  industrializa- 
tion plans  to  enhance  Japan's  image  among  the  suppliers  of  this 
crucial  commodity.  Even   though  the  increase  in  oil  prices  has 
hurt  deeply,  she  has  shown  little  interest  in  policy  coordination 
with  other  consumers. 

Resource  supply,  however,  has  two  parts.  The  first  is 
getting  the  materials  out  of  the  ground  (or  out  of  the  sea).  The 
second  is  getting  them  to  Japan.  The  latter  problem,  of  course, 
requires  ships.  The  Japanese,  therefore,  have  become  wary  of  the 
growing  Arab  control  over  tanker  fleets,  although  they  are 


287.  An  example  of  this  policy  was  the  purchase,  early  in  1973, 
of  some  30;o  of  British  Petroleum's  holdings  in  the  Abu  Dhabi 
Marine  Areas  (ADMA)  by  a  group  of  Japanese  firms.  The  target  is 
that  30$  of  domestic  oil  consumption  should  be  under  Japanese 
control.  The  scope  of  foreign  drilling  operations  is  outlined 
in  Figure  5-2  and  in  MM,  July  31,  1974,  P»  13. 

The  Washington  Post,  May  9,  1973,  P-  A27. 


184 


contributing  to  it  by  building  ships  and  training  seamen.  During 
the  Mid-East  embargo,  Western  control  of  most  tankers  enabled 
them  to  re-route  shipments  in  such  a  way  to  minimize  the  impact 
of  the  sanctions  on  the  United  States  and  Holland.  As  the  Arabs 

gain  more  influence  over  the  transport  facilities  such  diversions 

63 

will  become  proportionately  more  difficult. 

In  addition  to  food,  already  noted,  timber  also  may  be 
coming  into  short  supply  through  a  combination  of  commercial 
efforts  and  resources  nationalism.   The  implications  for  Japan 
are  particularly  serious  in  light  of  widespread  use  of  wood  in 
the  housing  industry.    Cartels  in  other  materials,  such  as 

copper  or  bauxite,  are  cause  for  concern,  but  will  not  be  as 

65 
serious  as  OPEC. 

(3)  Avoidance  of  Isolation 

One  of  Japan's  greatest  fears  is  economic  isolation  through 
the  erection  of  tariff  barriers,  nationalism,  cartels,  or  other 
measures.  The  increasing  trade  liberalization  within  Japan 
itself  offers  some  potential  for  counter-leverage,  but  she  can 
hardly  afford  to  exercise  it  vigorously.  More  characteristic  is 


G7) 

^Robert  L.  Johnson,  Mobil  Sekiyu  Kabushiki  Kaisha,  inter- 
view, July  23,  1974. 

^Forestry  White  Paper,  1974*  Reported  in  Yomiuri,  April 
13,  1974. 

-^See  the  debate  begun  by  C.  Fred  Bergsten's  "The  Threat 
from  the  Third  World,"  Forei/yn  Policy,  11  (Summer  1973)  and 
continued  over  several  issues  of  that  journal. 


185 


C\J 

I 


•H 


36      PETROLEUM  NEWS  SEA..  DECEM3ER  1973 


186 


the  diversification  of  resource  suppliers  and  recent  overtures 
towards  the  Third  World.  While  this  may  reduce  the  risk  of  over- 
dependence  on  any  one  region,  it  also  may  bring  Japan  into  con- 
flicting relationships,  particularly  if  she  maintains  her 
security  ties  with  the  U.S.  For  example,  TSkyC's  continued 
reluctance  to  commit  herself  to  cooperative  oil  consumption  plans 
eventually  may  force  her  into  the  choice  between  restricted 
energy  supplies  or  restricted  access  to  U.S.  or  European  markets. 

(  4)  Maintenance  of  Markets 

Other  measures  for  the  maintenance  of  markets  (see  Tables 
5-2  and  5-3)  require  both  foreign  and  domestic  efforts. 
Japanese  competitiveness  has  been  hurt  by  her  own  inflation  and 
the  1974  round  of  wage  hikes  which  averaged  30  percent.   The 
damage  has  been  particularly  evident  in  the  sale  of  industrial 
plants  which  was  one  of  the  keys  to  the  future  restructuring  of 
the  economy.  Especially  since  mid-1 97 4 >  U.S.  and  European  firms 
have  won  contracts  over  Japanese  firms  from  Southeast  Asia  to  the 
Middle  East.   It  is  likely  that  the  future  will  see  more  efforts 
to  concentrate  in  technologically- intensive  industries  to  maxi- 
mize competitiveness,  but  the  experience  gained  in  petrochemicals, 
steel  and  other  heavy  industries  cannot  be  redirected  easily. 
Most  recent  studies  have  been  quite  pessimistic,  especially  for 
the  next  two  to  three  years. 


See  Naraiki  Nobuyoshi,  "Japanese  Industry's  Competitive 
Power  Examined,"  Economist,  July  2,  1974*   (Translation  in 


187 


Joint  ventures  have  been  an  important  means  of  securing 
host  country  cooperation.  Recently,  however,  even  this  approach 
has  been  challenged.   One  factor  has  been  a  general  increase  in 
nationalism,  but  the  aggressive  tactics  of  Japanese  businessmen 
also  have  brought  ill-will  and  charges  of  exploitation.   It  has 
been  widely  recognized  that  such  concentration  on  short- run 
profits  and  their  rapid  repatriation  is  completely  antithetical 
to  Japan's  broader  interests.  Nevertheless,  the  changes  to  date 
have  been  more  cosmetic  than  substantive. 

In  the  long  term,  Japan's  exports  and  investments  will  have 
to  satisfy  increasingly  strict  criteria  of  benefit  to  the 
recipients.  Technological  assistance,  or  the  programmed  phase- 
out  of  Japan's  participation  in  joint  ventures  may  become  pre- 
requisites for  entrance  into  future  markets,  at  least  in  those 
states  with  enough  resources  to  be  able  to  bargain. 

Domestic  Measures 

( 1 )   Inflation  Countermeasures,  Industrial  Restructuring 
and  Pollution  Control 

International  measures  alone  will  not  suffice  if  present 
domestic  trends  continue  in  Japan.  The  1 975— 74  inflation  rate 
of  24  percent  was  one  of  the  highest  in  the  industrialized  world, 
and  it  certainly  was  not  helped  by  the  Spring  1974  round  of  wage 


Magazine  Summary,  July  1 974) •  Also  Asahi,  September  17,  1 974> 
p.  9,  and  the  report  by  the  Mitsubish  General  Research  Institute, 
"Rise  in  Costs  and  Prospects  for  International  Competitive 
Power,"  August  15,  1974. 


188 


increases.  Opinion  polls  have  shown  this  to  be  the  primary  issue 
in  the  public's  mind.  Another  problem  concerns  the  social 

capital  structure,  which  is  inadequate — only  21  percent  of  the 

67 
roads  are  paved,  for  instance.    Pollution  is  among  the  worst 

in  the  world.  Buffers  against  food  and  resource  shortages  will 
be  needed.  Finally,  the  economy  must  be  restructured  to  take 
into  account  not  only  the  physical  limits  of  present  day  Japan, 
but  also  the  future  international  climate. 

Recognition  of  these  problems  led  to  sporadic  demands  for 
a  modification  of  the  goal  of  unimpeded  economic  growth  in  the 
late  1960s  and  early  70s.   The  need  for  a  revision  of  the  indus- 
trial structure  itself  finally  was  acknowledged  in  1971 »  when 
the  Industrial  Structure  Deliberation  Committee  produced  a  docu- 
ment  entitled  "Trade  and  Industrial  Policies  in  the  1970' s." 
This  proposed  a  concentration  on  knowledge-intensive  industries 
and  marked  a  drastic  shift  away  from  the  heavy  and  chemical 
industries  which  had  formed  the  basis  of  the  "Economic  Miracle" 
of  the  1960s.   It  was  on  the  crest  of  this  new  wave  of  thinking 

that  Prime  Minister  Tanaka  launched  his  vaunted  proposal  for 

69 
remodeling  the  Japanese  Archipelago. 


'Hational  Police  Agency,  1973  White  Paper.  By  comparison, 
the  U.S.  figure  is  about  43/o.  Similarly,  only  about  9.2/o   of 
Japanese  houses  have  flush  toilets — roughly  on  a  par  with  Jordan 
and  Nepal . 

68Toky5,  May  1971. 

"Note  that  the  heart  of  Tanaka' s  plan— regional 


189 


Little  progress  was  made  in  this  direction,  however,  until 
the  oil  crisis  refocused  attention  on  the  impossibility  of  main- 
taining the  status  quo.  Accordingly,  in  July  1 974>  MITI  sub- 
mitted a  more  comprehensive  report  which  called  for  emphasis  on 
the  aircraft  and  computer  indus tries,  somewhat  reduced  economic 
growth  and  diversification  of  secondary  industrial  sites.  The 
net  result  was  to  be  a  reduction  in  resource  imports,  improve- 
ments in  the  social  capital  structure,  an  easing  of  pollution 
and  population  dispersal.   It  remains  to  be  seen  how  workable 
this  particular  plan  is,   but  the  general  direction  is  one  in 
which  Japan  will  have  to  move. 

(2)   Stockpiles 

In  the  wake  of  the  oil  crisis,  the  decision  was  made  to 
build  up  petroleum  stocks  from  60  to  90  days  by  1980.  This  will 
entail  tremendous  capital  investments.   In  addition  to  storage 
facilities,  a  three  month  supply  of  crude  oil  at  $10.00  per 


development — had  been  proposed  ten  years  earlier  in  a  MITI  paper 
entitled  Industrial  Location  in  Japan  (Tokyo,  1962). 

70 

There  have  been  several  criticisms  of  the  report,  not  the 

least  of  which  were  that  it  predicted:  (a)  a  7  to  6  percent  real 

growth  rate  annually  between  1975  and  1985,  ( b)  a  $10  billion 

balance  of  payments  surplus  by  1980  and  (c)  an  average  inflation 

rate  of  7-8/0  between  1873  and  1980  (the  1973~74  rate  was  about 

2470).   Furthermore,  its  vaunted  reduction  in  petroleum  as  an 

imported  energy  source  is  nearly  matched  by  the  rise  in  imported 

LNG.   (See,  for  instance,  Sankei  and  TSkyg  Shimbun  editorials, 

July  12,  1974.  Kenneth  R.  Stunkel  offers  considerable  evidence 

that  the  Japanese  environment  could  not  support  the  plan  even  if 

it  was  fulfilled.   See  below,  Chapter  Seven. 


190 


barrel  is  worth  some  $4,500,000,000.  Furthermore,  some  2000 
additional  hectares  of  land  will  be  needed  for  storage.  In 
October  1974,  MITT  recommended  ¥1,700  billion  (about  $5-7  billion) 

for  this  program  over  a  five  year  period.  The  measure  must  be 

71 

approved  by  the  Diet. 

Japan's  effective  reserves  are,  in  fact,  somewhat  larger 
than  officially  stated.  For  instance,  the  oil  in  tankers  already 
enroute  from  the  Persian  Gulf,  on  their  20  day  voyage  to  Japan 

may  be  considered  part  of  her  stockpile  under  some  circum- 

72 

stances.    In  addition,  the  huge  central  terminal  storage  (CTS) 

to  be  built  in  Indonesia  (and  perhaps  in  Thailand)  will  provide 
a  buffer  against  sudden  supply  interruptions.   However,  it  is  the 
policy  of  the  Japanese  government  only  to  consider  as  stockpiles 
those  supplies  which  are  actually  under  national  control.  Even 
during  the  1974  oil  shortage,  in  fact,  they  rejected  a  proposal 
by  western  oil  companies  to  set  up  so-called  off-shore  reserves 

in  foreign  countries  in  order  to  alleviate  the  high  cost  of 

73 

establishing  such  facilities  in  Japan  itself.    Whether  or  not 

they  will  be  able  to  continue  this  policy  in  the  face  of  the 
local  opposition  to  the  Okinawa  CTS   (and  presumably  to  those 


71 

Nihon  KPfyo,  September  5,  1974« 

Moreover,  the  speed  of  the  ships  can  be  varied  if  neces- 
sary to  compensate  for  domestic  supply-demand  conditions.   This 
was  done  in  September  1974,  when  the  tankers  were  slowed  down  in 
response  to  surplus  stocks. 

'^Robert  L.  Johnson,  Mobil  Sekiyu,  interview,  July  23,  1974* 

\ihpn  Keizai,  September  27,  1974,  P»  3» 


191 


storages  associated  with  the  90  day  reserves  as  well)  remains  to 
be  seen. 

In  late  1 974»  decisions  also  were  made  to  establish  stock- 

75 

piles  for  lumber  and  non-ferrous  metals. 

Preservation  of  the  Political  Autonomy/independence 

This  is,  of  course,  closely  related  to  the  degree  of  physi- 
cal and  economic  security  that  Japan  can  muster.  Some  would 
charge  that,  in  fact,  Japan  already  is  so  close  to  the  United 
States  as  to  be  unable  to  move  independently.  It  is  not  clear, 
however,  that  Tokyo  could  be  more  flexible  should  it  disassociate 
itself  from  Washington.   Certainly  there  would  not  be  much  more 
freedom  in  ties  with  Moscow.  Some  of  the  problems  of  alliances 
with  other  states  or  neutrality  will  be  discussed  in  later 
chapters. 

All  Japanese  feel  the  country's  resource  poverty  and  over- 
population. Moreover,  there  is  general  recognition  that  these 
cannot  be  overcome  unilaterally.  Thus  the  problem  again  becomes 
one  of  avoiding  isolation.  This  is  a  frequent  press  theme  when- 
ever international  negotiations  arise,  for  instance  at  the  Caracas 

76 
Lav/  of  the  Sea  Conference,   or  at  the  time  of  the  oil  crisis. 


75Ibid.,  September  11,  1974,  P»  3« 

"Japan  is  now  completely  isolated"  (in  her  opposition  to 
200  mile  economic  zones),  Japan  Times,  July  24,  1974-  This  was 
a  very  interesting  position,  and  one  which  bodes  ill  for  future 
Japanese  diplomatic  efforts  should  it  become  commonplace. 


192 


Contributions  to  the  Development  of  the  International  System 

The  first  step  in  this  process,  obviously,  is  the  determi- 
nation of  what  Japan's  role  should  be.  It  is  widely  felt  that, 
over  the  long  run,  something  more  satisfying  than  "Japan,  Inc.," 
or  the  "economic  animal"  must  be  found.  Proposals  have  ranged 
from  becoming  a  benevolent  friend  of  developing  countries  to  a 
reassertion  of  Japan's  prewar  spirituality,  but  no  consensus  has 
yet  developed.  A  few  of  the  alternatives  will  be  examined  in 
Chapter  Seven. 

In  the  long  run,  the  most  likely  threats  to  Japan's 
security  probably  will  come  from  the  world-wide  maldistribution 
of  resources  and  wealth.  Japan  is  a  status  quo  power,  in  a  world 
where  the  status  quo  rapidly  is  changing.   Despite  the  fact  that 
she  is  Asian  she  also  is  industrialized  power,  and  this  image 
will  dominate.  The  December  1973  attack  on  Singapore's  Pulau 
Bunom  refinery  complex  already  has  been  noted  as  a  part  of  a 

global  offensive  by  the  Japanese  Red  Army  and  the  PFLP  against 

77 
"Japanese  Imperialism."    Such  an  approach  may  ha.ve  only  margi- 

nal  value  in  inducing  "armed  revolution  in  Tokyo,"  but  it 
certainly  can  have  a  major  impact  on  governments  and  multi- 
national corporations.  Moreover,  with  the  proliferation  of 
fissionable  materials,  the  eventual  likelihood  of  terrorism  via 


77 

See  above,  note  4-10. 

78— 

Ota's  phrase,  ibid. 


193 


nuclear  weapons  in  the  developed  countries  themselves  has 
increased. 

There  is  probably  little  that  Japan  can  do  alone  to  reduce 
its  status  as  a  target  for  such  groups.  Defenses  might  be 
bolstered  around  strategic  installations,  intelligence  services 
improved,  and  ports  of  entry  checked  more  closely,  but  these  will 
neither  deter  nor  detect  truly  determined  adversaries.  Despite 
the  fact  that  there  always  will  be  violently  dissident  minorities, 
however,  it  still  will  be  in  the  nation's  long  run  interests  to 
promote  the  developing  countries'  stake  in  the  international 
system.   The  alternative  would  leave  some  of  them  in  the  position 

where  they  could  only  gain  by  trying  to  bring  it  down.  Already 

79 
there  has  been  official  recognition  of  this  fact,   but  it 

remains  to  be  seen  what  the  actual  impact  will  be  on  Japan's 

diplomatic  and  economic  activities. 

Several  volumes  could  have  been  devoted  to  each  of  the 

interests  which  this  chapter  has  attempted  to  summarize.  The 

emphasis  has  been  on  existing  conditions,  however  some  possible 

changes  will  be  examined  later  in  relation  to  Japan's  seapower. 

The  next  two  chapters  will  return  to  the  ocean  setting  with  a 

review  of  the  Maritime  Self- Defense  Force  and  its  possible  future. 


^For  instance,  Prime  Minister  Tanaka's  September  28,  1974 
press  conference. 


Chapter  Six 

THE  PRESENT  STATUS  OF  THE  MARITIME  SELF-DEFENSE  FORCE 
AND  THE  CONSTRAINTS  ON  ITS  DEVELOPMENT  AND  EMPLOYMENT 


The  Current  Status  of  the  MSDF 


In  mid-1974,    the  Maritime  Self- Defense  Force  was  composed 
as  follows: 

Table   6-1 


Fleet  Strength 

Type  Ship 

Number  (Build: 

ing) 

Tonnage   (Building) 

Destroyers/Frigates 

45  (5) 
14  (2) 

85,550  (12,960) 
19,810  (    5,700) 

Submarines 

Minecraft 

50  (6) 

18,789   (    1,626) 

Subchasers  &  Torpedo 
Amphibious  Ships 

Boats            25   (1) 
6  (2) 

8,180  (        100) 
8,650  (  3,480) 

Service  Forces 

18  (0) 
61    (0) 

21,997            (0) 

2,528               (0) 

Misc.  Small  Craft 

219  (16) 


Fleet  Air  Arm 


166,254  (21,866) 


1 2     Anti-submarine  Squadrons 
5     Air  Training  Squadrons 
1      Transport  Squadron 

Approximately  200  Aircraft 

Source:      Sobi  Henkan   '73,      Jane ' s  Fighting  Ships   1974~75 


In  English,    in  addition  to  works  already  cited,    see  James 
H.   Buck,    "The  Japanese  Self -Defense  Force,"  Naval  War  College 
Review,   XXVI   (January-February  1974),   PP»   40-54;      Sekino  Hideo, 
"Japan  and  Her  Maritime  Defense,"  PS NIP t    XCVII   (May  1971), 


194 


195 


Each  ship  is  assigned  a  homeport  in  one  of  the  five 
Regional  District  Commands  (see  Figures  6-1  and  6-2),  which  are 
responsible  for  the  personnel  administration,  repair  and  mainte- 
nance of  their  ships,  as  well  as  logistics  support  to  the  fleet 
in  general.  Although  some  units  are  permanently  attached  to  the 
Districts,  the  majority  of  combatant  vessels  and  aircraft  are 
included  in  the  organization  of  the  Self -Defense  Fleet.  Roughly 

45  percent  of  the  MSDF's  38,325  personnel  were  assigned  to  these 

2 

ships.   Another  26  percent  were  with  the  fleet  air  squadrons. 

In  time  of  emergency  and  when  otherwise  directed  by  the  Director 
General  of  the  JDA,  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Fleet  will 

assume  operational  control  over  all  forces. 

Japan's  naval  power  lias  been  developed,  since  1 957>  through 
a  series  of  four  Defense  Power  Consolidation  Programs  which  are 
summarized  in  Table  6-2.  Although  the  current  plan  (the  fourth) 


pp.  93-121;  and  Uchida  Kazutomi,  "The  Rearmament  of  the  Japanese 
Maritime  Forces,"  Naval  V/ar  College  Review,  XXVI  (November- 
December  1 973) y  PP«  41-48.  An  analysis  which  stresses  strength, 
rather  than  weakness,  is  contained  in  Herbert  P.  Bix,  "Report  on 
Japan  1972.  Part  One:  The  Military  Dimension,"  Bulletin  of  Con- 
cerned Asian  Scholars  (hereafter  BCAS),  IV  (7/2),  pp.  22-32.  The 
writings  in  Japanese  are  voluminous.  Note  especially  the  on- 
going debate  between  Sekino  Hideo  and  Kaihara  Osamu.   The  Jietai 
Sobi  Nenkan  (Self-Defense  Force  Equipment  Yearbook)  (Tokyo: 
Asagumo  Shimbunsha,  annual),  is  a  convenient  reference.  The 
excellent  magazine  Sekai  no  Kansen  (Ships  of  the  World)  provides 
particularly  good  coverage  of  the  MSDF.   It  also  is  one  of  the 
finest  publications  in  any  language  on  current  naval  developments 
world-wide . 

2 

The  combined  complements  of  the  MSDF  ships  listed  in 

Table  6-2  is  slightly  over  17,000.  According  to  the  JDA, 
10,100  were  assigned  to  the  aircraft  squadrons. 


196 


Figure  6-1 


Organization  of  the  Maritime  Self-Defense  Fore* 
as  of  April  1,  1971 

JDA  Director  General 

of  Mar  ft!  r 


Chief 


lme  Staff 


Maritime  Staff  Offlc* 


Self 

-Defense- 
Fleet 


—  Self  Defense  Fleet  Headquarters  (Tokosuka) 

Fleet  Escort  Force  Headquarters 
(YoVosuka) 

-  1st  Escort  Flotilla 
— Escort  Divisions 

Fleet         ]-   2nd  Escort  Flotilla 

—  Escort --Escort  Divisions 

Force        \~  3rd  Escort  Flotilla 

--Escort  Divisions 

-  4th  Escort  Flotilla 
--Escort  Divisions 

-  Other  Units  under  Direct  Command 


-  Fleet  Air  Force  Headquarters  (Shonan  Town, 
Higashi-Katsushika-Gun,  Chiba  Prefecture) 

-  1st  Air  Wing  (Kanoya  City) 

-  2nd  Air  Wing  (Hachlnohe  City) 

-  3rd  Air  Wing  (Tokushima  City) 

-  4th  Air  Wing  (Shonan  Town,  Higashi-Katsushika-Gun,  Chiba 
Prefecture) 

-  21st  Air  Wing  (Tateyama  City) 

-  51st  Flight  Squadron  (Shonan  Town,  Higashi- 
Katsushika-Gun,  Chiba  Prefecture) 


Fleet 
-Air  — 
Force 


— 1st  Minesweeper  FlotiUa 

--Minesweeper  Divisions 

—  2nd  Minesweeper  Flotilla 
--Minesweeper  Divisions 

—  1st  Submarine  Flotilla   (Kure) 

—  Fleet  Training  Command   (Yokosuka) 
--Fleet  Training  Groups 

—Other  Units  under  Direct  Command 
Yokosuka  Regional  District 

Typical  Regional  Districts 

includes: 
Headquarters 
Escort  Units 
Patrol  Units 
Subchaser  Units 
Minesweeper  Units 
Torpedo  Boat  Units 
Landing  Craft  Units 
Local  Bases 
Air  Stations 


Kure  Regional  District 
Sasebo  Regional  District 
Maizuru  Regional  District 
Omlnato  Regional  District 


Source:     Auer,   p.   106. 


196a 


Figure  6-1    (c*mt) 


Organlratlon  of  the  Maritime  Sell-Defense  Fore* 
a.  o!  April  1,  1971 

JDA  Director  General 

Chief  of  Maritime  Stall  " 

Maritime  Stili  Olflc* 


Alx 

--Training- 
Co  mmand 


Recruit  Training  Cenlei 
Communications  Station 
Base  Oper.  and  AcUy. 
Base  Aclly.  Onlt 
Base  Oper.  Onlt 

I — Headijiiarters,  Air  Training  Command  (Uts-unornij-a) 

Kanoya  Air  Training  Group 
—  Utsunomlya  Air  Training  Group 
— OzuW  Alx  Training  Group  (ShlmODOSeld) 

Other  Units  under  Direct  Command 
-   MSDF  Staff  College  {Sh!njuku-Vu,  Tokyo) 

■  MSDF  Officer  Candidate  Schcol  (HTtaJima  Town,  Akl-Gun,  Hiroshima 

Prefecture) 

■  MSDF  1st  Service  School  (Etajlma  Town,  AJd-Ojn,  Hiroshima  Pre- 

fecture) 

■  MSDF  2nd  Service  School  (Yokosuka) 

•   MSDF  3rd  Service  School  (Shona_n  Town,  Hi£ashi-Katsushika-Giin,  Chiba 
Prefecture) 
MSDF  Youth  Basic  Service  School  (Etajlma  Town,  Aki-Cun,  Hiroshima  Prefec- 
ture) 
MSDF  Yokosuka  Hospital  (Yokosuka) 

MSDF  Etajima  Hospital  (Etajlma  Town,  Aid-Gun,  Hiroshima  Prefecture) 

MSDF  Maizuru  Hospital  (Maizuru)    ' 

MSDF  Ominalo  Hospital  (Mutsu) 

Other  Units  under  the  Director  General's  Direct  Command 

Miscellaneous  Ur.its  including; 

Central  Communications  Center 

Oceanographic  Unit 

Print   Supply  Unit 

MSDF  Intelligence  Service  Unit 

Operational  De\elopment  Croup 

MSDF  Shore  Folice  Command 

Supply  Demand  Control  Point 

MSDF  Tokyo  Band 

MSDF  Tokyo  Service  Activity 


Source:   Japan  Defense  Agency. 

Auer,   p.   107* 


197 


Figure  6-2 


no.ooaooo 


Satabo    District     » 


Source:      Auer,    p.    1 38 


MSDF  BASES  AND  INSTALLATIONS 


198 


M3 

VD 

* — 

^~ 

CM 

r— 

ON 

T~ 

ft 

LTN 

d 

CO 

VD 

CM 

^ — 

r<-s 

r- 

tJ 

ft 

ON 

H^~> 
•H  VD 
d  VO 

Pi 

CD 

P         w 

3 

* — 

CD 

CD           crj 

CO 

m  on 

>s^ 

>»          CD 

«tf 

* — 

-O  U 

«H 

VO 

CM 

^ — 

, — 

CM 

CD     1 

P^ 

p  p  O 

O 

ON 

CO   C\J 

O    O 

OOP! 

Pi  VO 

H      rH 

•H   -H    -H 

-p 

CO    -P 

CO 

-p 

CO 

4^> 

0)   ON 

I— 1     1— 1 

H   H 

p 

P    «H 

P 

■a 

P 

H 

<H    T- 

■H   rH 

H   H     CD 
•H   -H     QO 

CD 

O   cd 

o 

o 

Dj 

rT> 

Q)  ■-— ' 

•H    -H 

O 

-P     fH 

-P 

fH 

-p 

U 

VD 

CM 

r_ 

r— 

CM 

o 

rQ    ,£3 

fH 

CD 

o 

O     fH 

o 

o 

fH 

O 

o 

fH 

o> 

xJ    1 

o    b£ 

LTN  l*N 

•   CM 

Li"N  [-— 
•    t-     CO 

ft 

8'3 

o 

CM 

•H 

cd 

o 

CM 

•H 

r<-\     . 

CM       .     CO 

ON 

w. 

•» 

•» 

CM 

o   o 

VO    N"\ 

^J-  NN    CD 

• 

KN  LPv 

vO 

CD 

o 

ON 

VD 

v— 

r— 

CM 

CD     fH 

t-   «» 

T-   C^   H 

CM 

•^  KN 

r— 

CM 

-3-  kn 

ON 

CO   ft 

'     > — 

t—  v_>".       • 

CM 

t-    CM 

T— 

CM 

*"" 

CM 

r— 

t — 
VD 

CM 

CM 

<y> 

v~ 

ft 

CO 

d 

ft 

T«,^-> 

•H 

H  O 

A 

o 

•r-j    VO 

3  ON 

p 

£ 

CO 

VO 

(— 

CM 

CM 

f~ 

^ — 

CD 

CD 

ON 

1 

^ 

^ 

O 

,r" 

CD   03 

P    O 

P  o 

CO     Lf> 

O   -H 

O      rH 

-P 

CO    -P 

CO 

p"  on 

•H    r-H 

•H    H 

£ 

ti    <H 

CO 

PS 

ON 

CD   t- 

r-l    rH 

H    H 

CD 

o   cd 

P 

o 

LO 

CM 

CM 

r<N 

OJ 

T™ 

H  -~- 

H    -H 

H   -H 

O 

•P     fH 

o 

-p 

o^ 

CD 

•r-1     rQ 

•H   ^ 

fH 

o 

-P 

V" 

rQ 

rO 

CD 

O     fH 

o 

VO 

KN 

ft 

O   H 

o 

o 

CO     S 

cm  eg 

^  x- 

O    cd 

o 

o 

•       • 

•              • 

CM 

►. 

o 

■* 

CO 

P)     O 

KN  ■<- 

r—  t- 

• 

"=4"  CM 

*> 

CM 

lo 

CM 

CM 

"5t 

T — 

•H      fH 

LfN  «^ 

O  tf> 

to* 

CM   CM 

ON 

T— 

o> 

fe  ft 

«v)-^_- 

^t^^ 

CM 

t-  CM 

ON 

T" 

,~ 

P 

o 

r  (DEH) 
royer  (DDG) 
,    DDK) 
DE) 

IvlSO) 

PTM) 

iaries 

•  » 

•H 

-o 

•P 

CO 

CD    P    -ai  ^^                                       H  ^-~ 

CD 

O 

p> 

troy 
Des 
,    DD 
rts 

) 

PC) 

ders 
(PT, 
Auxi 
(LST 

tSJ 

CD 

'pT 

B 

05 

fH 

.. 

•H 

| 

o 

r, 

a 

o 

fH 

•H 

•p 

-p 

PI 

O 

X! 

CO 

CO 

05 

CO 

co   ©  Pi   o  en  v — ■ — "  P!      ^->. 

» 

.3 

CO 

CO 

Pi 

CO 

CDHPlOcO                     CDC0C0C0 

-P 

•H 

o 

'J 

P! 

PI   -rt 'CO — '-P     CQ^H^     ftp. 

>> 

d 

-p 

H 

£3 

o 

m 

o 

CO           C£J           H     H\   Cd   -H   -H 

fncoco         codcDcoo^x; 

£i 

•5 

& 

CO 

qJ 

g 

•H 

H 

P 

O 

m 

c 

-P 

CD-H     fH     fH     CDfH     ftf-lPPOJcn 

xJ 

>> 

TJ 

cd 

-P 

o 

CD 

•H 

O 

-p^cdcdPocdcd 

CD 

H 

d 

o 

O 

tj 

g 

ft           >^>j-H            ^^Of^f 

!> 

H 

,JQ 

to 

cd 

fl 

Pj 

TJ 

OrcJOOfHH£cdTifHP! 

O 

i 

•H 

p 

p! 

HJ 

OCDfHfHCdOCOr-HCDO-H 

fH 

pq 

pq 

Pn 

N S 

tj 

CO 

•Hld-P-PS     fH     CDCDftft'd 
rH-rHCOCOrQ-PP!p!fHftPi 
CDpOCDdfJ-H-HOptO 

ft 

+> 

P) 

Pi 

P) 

Pi 

ft 

O 

^ 

• 

• 

o 

«=4 

<4 

s 

LH 

K) 

^> 

o 

W 

o 

Pi 

PI 

CO 

Ph 

a 

13 

EH 

CO 

PI 

199 


CM 

VO 

T— 

• 

1           » 

CO     <JJ 

r-T    CD     CD 

Lf\  +> 

ft 

+>    CO     t* 

ft  *-    cd 

rt 

CO    01     CD   -H 

^         R 

Tj 

05     O   XI    rH 

3?   a) 

t*    • 

i-l 

■H    ft««l 

•H 

t*                  CD 

•rH    ftR 

pi 

CD              ~   U 

5       *"» 

pq 

+2    •  rt 

pp    •■ 

rt  Ti    O    CD 

fc 

d> 

Q)    O'H^J 

Q)     0)      .. 

CO 

CO     CO   -P 

w  3  a 

£ 

cd  o  cd  -p 

rt   «=>1    O 

CD 

M     ftrH     o 

0)           r( 

<H 

ftO<H     Cj 

CD   u    d 

«h  a  «h 

0 

cd  o 

Q 

pi  fn  a 

rH 

r,     CO     S) 

•p 

CO     >>«H   -H 
•H   r-T   O     £ 
r-J 

•  • 

f°>  a  o 

S   a5   cd   co 
g  rt  co  p 

CD 

3  fn 

o 

o 

3 

1    &* 

•  • 

CD 

t* 

S)  S)  cd    5*0 

-p   o  ,rt 

-P 

CD 

O  -H    o   H 

M     fH     CD     CO 

0 

co    M  +> 

O 

XI 

co 

r-    PL,   *tf 

a 

EH 

PL,       O     rO      -P 

T3 
CD 

l 

•H 
-P 

rt 
o 
o 


CM 
I 


x> 

CO 

E-i 


^-> 

VO 

• 

r~- 

^ — 

- — 

, — 

c- 

, — 

CM 

S£ 

o> 

> 

T— 

cd 

CO 

ft 

& 

K> 

•H 

<T\ 

^ 

r— 

Jq 

r— 

CM 

t— 

T— 

l«r 

* — 

r— 

Td 

s — ■ 

I 

CO 

o> 

r-»/— N 

CO 

CM 

•rlVO^i 

CD 

r— 

<M 

3   C--  tJ 

P  -P 

o 

PQ  Ch  tt) 

£   cd  cd 

S 

"=^- 

v-  rt 

0)            fH 

CO    -P 

t — 

t — 

T- 

■^ — 

T — 

•<■• 

r- 

^ — 

CD      I      C 

>j  rt 

o   cd 

CT\ 

co  cm    cd 

O    CD 

v— 

rt  r—  <h 

Ci  -H    5 

H-> 

-P      fH 

CD   CT\    p. 

O    rH    rt 

rt 

o 

<+H  t- 

•H   rH    Cd 

CD 

O     fH 

N^ 

CD  — '-P 

rH   -H^! 

O 

O    -H 

f — 

t — 

^~ 

v— 

u~ 

CM 

CM 

Q         co 

HPO 

fH 

O    cd 

ON 

a  ^ 

•H            X 

CD 

•s 

« — 

XI     CO   -H 

PO   (1) 

ft 

^t-o 

E&r 

• 

-r-    t— 

O  lTNCM 

CM 

CM  r- 

CM 

3     O    CO 

r^r-r- 

• 

f- 

N> 

<  — 

-^r 

Sf 

CM 

O    fH    rt 

VO   -^>ON 

rv> 

•            • 

o> 

Ph  P-,--> 

^f^r- 

CJ 

o   o 

r- 

CM 

-H- 

CV) 

b> 

% — 

CO 

ft 

•H 

o 

ft 

Xl 

r- 

^ — 

CM 

■^ 

OJ 

i — 

^=1- 

T — 

rt 

CO 

o> 

-r)^— 

^ — 

r-i    v- 

rt 

rt 

<M 

•h  r>- 

CD 

CD 

o 

3  o> 

>s 

>> 

a> 

m  t- 
1 

rt  — 

X'Z? 

CO    -P 

vo 

ON 

*~ 

' 

«" 

CM 

CM 

T 

Q)  f- 

o  rt 

o   ^ 

o  cd 

^~ 

CO  VO 

•H    o 

•H     O 

-P 

-P     fH 

rt  o> 

rH    -H 

rH    -H 

rt 

o  8 

CD  T~ 

rH    <-\ 

rH    rH 

CD 

CD 

<H^ 

•H    rH 

•H    rH 

o 

8  -a 

VO 

<r— 

CM 

■^ 

CM 

CD 

,0    -H 

X>    -H 

fH 

o> 

q  a 

X> 
O 

O 

CD 

PI 

cm"  q 

o 
o 

T— 

•    LP 

•    N^ 

v3-  O 

o 

o     • 

Y"~          • 

o> 

t-  CM 

«* 

c^- 

•H     O 

^t-vo 

CO  vo 

• 

'H-O 

vo 

r— 

^— 

T— 

CM 

^r^ 

XJ     fH 

N"\  «r> 

CM    Cf> 

"3- 

•      • 

^r-     i 

cr> 

EH   PL, 

CM  v_. 

CM 

CM 

o  o 

t-  CM        I 

^ — 

200 


has  been  severely  undermined  by  inflation  and  several  other 

factors,  the  eventual  target  of  a  280,000  ton  fleet  has  not  been 

officially  repudiated. 

As  noted  in  Chapter  Five,  the  mission  for  which  the  MSDF 

is  to  prepare  itself  remains  imprecise.  The  maritime  goal  of 

the  Fourth  Defense  Plan  however  is: 

To  improve  defense  capabilities  in  the  sea  areas 
around  Japan  and  the  ability  to  ensure  the  safety 
of  the  sealines.3 

In  the  "sea  areas  around  Japan"  the  focus  is  on  invasion 
defense.  Never  officially  defined,  their  width  has  been  taken 
to  be  about  200-300  nautical  miles  (kairi)  in  the  Pacific,  and 
100-200  miles  in  the  Sea  of  Japan.   Sealane  protection  has  con- 
centrated on  the  southeast  and  southwest  route  zones.  These 
corridors,  extending  roughly  1,000  miles  in  each  direction,  run 
south  from  Tokyo  along  the  islands  of  the  Nampo  Shoto,  Bonin  and 
Kazan  Ret  to  on  the  one  hand,  and  southwest  from  Osaka  along  the 


"Japan's  Fourth  Five  Year  Defense  Plan,"  _op_.  cit.  (note 
5~37)>  p«  5«  There  is  some  ambiguity  in  this  statement.  The 
official  translation  reads: 

to  improve  defense  capabilities  in  the  sea  areas 
around  Japan  and  the  ability  to  ensure  the  safety 
of  the  sealines  in  those  areas,   [emphasis  supplied] 

The  Japanese  text  is  subject  to  both  interpretations.  Critics 
of  a  blue  water  role  for  the  MSDF  choose  the  latter  meaning,  since 
it  admits  only  the  protection  of  coastal  shipping.  MSDF 
officials,  however,  steadfastly  maintain  that  the  "safety  of  the 
sealine"  mission  extends  beyond  the  "sea  areas  around  Japan." 

Tokyo  Simbun,  May  24,  1973,  and  Mainichi,  September  20, 
1973. 


201 


Ryukyus  on  the  other.   (See  Figure  6-3.)   Should  fixed  hydro- 
phone arrays  be  developed  for  initial  contacts,  the  protection 
of  convoys  could  be  improved  by  coordinating  acoustic  data  with 
anti-submarine  aircraft  from  the  island  bases.  In  this  way  an 
effective  escort  might  be  extended  at  least  as  far  as  Taiwan  and 
the  Marianas. 

Aside  from  submarines  and  the  few  PT  boats,  little  atten- 
tion apparently  has  been  given  to  the  role  of  the  MSDF  in  invasion 
defense.  This  is  understandable,  given  the  improbability  of  the 
event  and  the  preference  of  naval  officers  for  offshore  operations. 
Nonetheless,  the  ocean  escorts  which  comprise  the  bulk  of  the 
naval  firepower  are  ill-suited  to  operations  in  restricted  waters 
in  the  face  of  an  even  moderate  air  threat. 

One  area  in  which  the  MSDF  is  well  equipped,  however,  is 
mine  warfare,  particularly  mine sweeping.   This  is  prudent,  for 
Japan  is  uniquely  vulnerable  to  the  interdiction  of  her  water- 
borne  domestic  transportation  by  minefields.  This  somewhat 
uninspiring  field  of  warfare  consistently  has  received  inadequate 

attention,  only  to  play  a  major  part  in  most  of  the  naval  conflicts 

7 

of  the  century.   Already  returned  to  the  "back  burner"  after  the 


•'ibid.  Also  Tokyo  Shimbun,  July  2,  1973*  One  of  the 
islands  to  be  used  as  a  base  is  Iwo  Jima. 

Indeed,  minesweeping  was  central  to  the  development  of 
postwar  Japan's  maritime  forces.  See  Auer,  _op_*  cit.  (note  5-34) > 
passim,  especially  pp.  49-89 • 

n 

To  cite  but  a  few  examples,  the  irreparable  Russian  loss 


202 


Figure  6-5 


THE  SOUTHEAST  AND  SOUTHWEST  ROUTE  ZONES 


203 


dramatic  demonstration  of  their  potential  in  Haiphong,  mines  are 
certain  to  reassert  their  importance  in  connection  with  the 
growing  controversies  over  strategic  straits. 

Much  of  the  peacetime  work  of  protecting  the  safety  of  life 
at  sea  is  assigned  to  the  327  ships  and  11,000  men  of  the  Mari- 
time Safety  Agency  (MSA — the  Japanese  Coast  Guard). 

Despite  the  lack  of  guidance,  the  leaders  of  the  MSDF  have 
built  up  an  impressive  array  of  ships.  Their  "blue  water"  con- 
ventional forces  are  exceeded  only  by  the  U.S.  and  USSR  in  Asia 
and,  on  paper  at  least,  may  be  sufficient  to  rank  Japan  behind 
France  and  Britain  as  the  world's  fifth  naval  power.  Such  a 
comparison  is  presented  in  Table  6-3«  One  purpose  of  this  and 
later  chapters  will  be  to  illustrate  that  such  macro- analyses  of 
military  strength  usually  conceal  more  than  they  illuminate.  But 
the  fact  remains  that  the  very  size  of  Japan's  fleet,  and  the 
economic  potential  behind  it,  can  be  manipulated  to  her  disadvan- 
tage. This  is  particularly  true  among  the  still-suspicious 

Q 

peoples  of  the  7/estern  Pacific. 


of  Admiral  Makarov  when  his  flagship  was  mined  in  1904>  the 
North  Sea  mine  barrage  of  1 918>  the  mining  of  Japanese  home 
waters  from  March  1945  which  thereafter  crippled  the  economy  even 
more  effectively  than  the  U.S.  submarine  campaign,  the  Corfu 
Channel  incident  of  1946,  North  Korea's  denial  of  control  of  the 
seas  to  the  U.S.  Navy  off  Wonsan  in  October  1950,  and  the  closure 
of  North  Vietnam's  ports  and  inland  waterways  in  1972. 

8Halliday  and  LIcCormick,  op_.  cit.  (note  5-27) »  state:  "By 
1975,  Japan  will  be  the  mightiest  non-nuclear  power  in  the  world" 
(p.  89).  Bisson,  in  his  review,  op_.  cit.  (note  5-1 3)  ?  comments: 
"that  Japan  is  a  weak  military  power  is  a  widely  accepted  myth, 
but  the  facts  are  otherwise." 


204 


8 


cm 

00 
C\J 


m     O 


o             r—  r- 

8*3"  ITN 

CO  CM 

•.       I           »  » 

VO                t-  CM 

m  CM 


CM        I        N"\     "3- 


o  r- 

^  S 

O  en 

^r  *    » 

O  CM 


CO 


CM 


N"N     CM 

O  T- 

^         • 


r—    "^1    "* 

CO 


CO 
ON 


m. 


vo 


X> 
Eh 


E8 

E-i 

Ci3 


CO 


« 


pi 


P»4 
O 

co 
o 

CO 

M 

& 

s 


CO 


=ft 


<dI 

ti£ 

a 

c3 

•H 

d 

a 

-p 

o 

■H 

R 

H 

pq 

=d 

CO  O  Q 

CM  IA  O 

VO  CM  CO 

VO  VO  ON 


vt        I        IA     C\       | 


o 

m 
O 


o 
o 


o    o 

iTN       LT\ 


r—    co    a\ 


VO        x- 
m      CM 


•>     I 


CM 


vo 


r<"N  O 

o  o 

3      °° 


IT\        I       VO        I 

•^-  r- 


o  o  o 

T-  CO  '* 

co  c—  vo 

ON  CM  LPi 


Nfr     CM       O        I 


o 

vo 

o 

o 
r— 

O 

o 

^ 

at 

B» 

CO 
vo 

NA 

-     I 


8  8 

CT\  O 

ON  "<3- 

N-\  CM 


co 
in 


O      in     O     O 
rn,     t —     tA     N 

ON      tA      r       tA 


CM 
CM 


ON 
VO 


ON 
NA 


o  o 

o  o 

O  CM 

VO  T- 


CM 

r— 

o 

ON 

vo 

*v 

■ 

ON 

f~ 

CM 

o 

CM 

o 

CM 

^ — 

CM 


00 
O 
ON 

ITN 
O 


N"N 


CM 
"<fr 
CM 

CM* 

■<fr 


*"N 
m 


o 
o 

VO 

O 
CO 

VO 

o 
o 
o 

o 

VO 

o 
o 

o 

LTN 
CM 

5- 

CO 
ON 

o 

o 

vo 

f- 

in 

ON 

in 

T — 

in 

"3- 

LTN 

CO 
CM 

T— 

ON 

ON 

KN 

CO 
KN 

** 
CM 

r- 

T— 

co 

in 

CM 

CM 

"* 

*3- 

CM 

CM 

ON 

^ — 

ON 
LTN 

CM 

CO 

in 

CM 

vo 

r— 

<< — 

in 
O 
in 

On 

5" 


m 


co 


r— 

ON 


co 

f 

co 
> 

•H 
-P 
O 

CO 
ft 
•rl 
P! 
CO 


in 

i 

-^ 

r— 

ON 


CO 

ft 

CI 


co 

^.^ 

-p 

CO 

• 

5fl 

U 

a) 

^ 

CO 

CO 

CO 

CO 

R 

CD 

o 

tf 

rO 

ft 

ft'—"* 

•H 

& 

CO 

o 

CO 

•H 

9 

2 

CO 

o 

3 

^  O 

-P 
^1 

u 

U 

w 

u 

CO 

CO  P) 

tx 

-P 

CO 

J 

^ 

•H 

CO 

>s 

n 

o 

-p 

S  "^ 

r^ 

CO 
PI 

s 

0) 

CO 

-p 

o 

rH 
3 

cd  p> 

CO 

-p 

o 

-p 

a 

tH    O 

— 

CD 

GO 

s 

u 

M 

«: 

CO 

3* 

0 

i-l 

CO 

-p 

o 

CO 

§ 

•H 

PI 

PI 

CO 

cd 

rH 

fH 

<* 

*gp 

C0^^ 

~\^ 

CO 

-p 

d 

CO 

CO 

^ 

CO   o 

^ 

CO 

PI 

•p 

c! 

u 

p< 

CO 

CO   -H 

•H  rq 

CO 

u 

oj 

o 

CO 

o 

3 

3   ^ 

CO 

s  n 

+» 

V 

CO 

•H 

c^ 

CO 

o 

o  ^ 

CO 

•  • 

p< 

>J 

CD 

^ 

-P 

^ 

•H 

•H  >-\ 

+> 

CO 

aided 
(DDG, 

o 

o 

•p 

£ 

P} 

CO 

rQ 

£>    O 

+> 

CO 

o 

•H 

-p 

03 

•H 

CO 
rH 
O 

CO 

CO 

s 

5 

ft 

ft»^ 

CO 

4 
s 

o 

CO 

co 

fc 

3 

o 

■H 

•H 

4 

i 

o 

o 

o 

w 

PI 

fe 

!Z| 

o 

s 

S 

o 

EH 

CO 

ON 

o 

ON 


CO 


•H 
N 

Oj 

U 
PQ 


O 


ON 

o 


vo 
00 


a  co 


CO 

•p 
o 


205 


For  all  its  apparent  strength  the  Maritime  Self- Defense 
Force  operates  under  a  number  of  severe  constraints,  both  domes- 
tic and  international.  Some  of  these  limit  the  freedom  with 
which  existing  ships  can  be  employed,  others  hinder  the  develop- 
ment of  the  SDF  in  general.  In  any  case,  in  combination,  they 
are  sufficient  to  offset  many  of  the  MSDF's  apparent  strengths. 
The  present  constraints  will  be  summarized  below,  and  their 
possible  evolution  examined  in  Chapter  Nine.  It  should  be  noted, 
however,  that  several  are  deeply- rooted,  and  will  not  be  easily 
changed  (for  better  or  for  worse). 

Domestic  Constraints 

Constitutional-Political 

As  noted  in  Chapter  Five,  Article  9  of  the  Constitution  is 
central  to  most  debates  over  Japan's  security.  The  controversy 
has  focused  on  two  points:   (1)  are  the  Self -Defense  Forces  them- 
selves "war  potential"  and  hence  unconstitutional,  and  (2)  at 
what  level  of  capability  do  the  SDF  become  "war  potential"? 
Since  the  courts  so  far  have  refused  to  rule  on  the  first 
question,   the  opposition  arguments  of  inherent  unconstitutionality 


"The  Supreme  Court  upheld  Japan's  sovereign  right  of  self- 
defense  in  the  1959  Sunakawa  decision,  but  did  not  rule  on  the 
constitutionality  of  the  SDF  themselves.   In  September  1975  a 
Hokkaido  Judge  in  the  Naganuma  case  held  that  the  SDF  are  land, 
sea  and  air  forces  "in  view  of  their  scale,  equipment  and  capaci- 
ties," and  are  unconstitutional.  This  is  being  appealed  to  the 
Supreme  Court,  where  it  probably  will  be  overturned  on  the 


206 


have  "been  kept  alive,  although  there  are  differences  between 
the  parties.  On  the  other  hand,  the  absence  of  a  definitive 
interpretation  on  prohibition  has  permitted  the  Government  to 
preserve  and  expand  the  SDF. 

The  dispatch  of  forces  overseas  has  been  prohibited  not 
only  on  a  constitutional  basis,  but  also  as  a  result  of  a  House 
of  Councillors  resolution  at  the  time  of  the  creation  of  the  SDF 
in  1954*  In  addition  to  limiting  Japan's  ability  to  comply  with 
collective  security  agreements,  the  restriction  has  precluded  her 
participation  in  UN  peacekeeping  operations.  Though  the  oppo- 
sition parties  have  been  quick  to  question  any  statement  which 
might  indicate  a  change  on  this  position,  the  government  has  not 
pressed  the  issue. 

The  net  result  has  been  to  focus  attention  on  the  design 
of  specific  weapons  systems  and,  in  recent  years,  the  total  pro- 
curement levels.  One  debate  centered  on  the  mid-air  refueling 
system  of  the  F-4  fighter.   Charges  were  made  that  such  a 


grounds  that  the  determination  of  SDF  equipment  is  a  political 
decision  outside  of  the  competence  of  the  judiciary.   See  Ninon 
Keizai,  September  8,  1973,  and  Tokyo  Shimbun,  September  8,  1 973 • 
The  government  opinion  was  in  Yomiuri,  October  2,  1973* 

10 

U.S.  hints  for  greater  Japanese  participation  in  Asian 

security  have  been  embarrassing  in  this  regard,  as  was  Lee  Kuan 

Yew's  1973  call  for  Japanese  units  in  a  multinational  task  force 

in  Southeast  Asian  waters.  For  a  recent  denial  of  overseas 

dispatch  intentions,  see  Defense  Agency  Director  General 

Yamanaka's  Diet  Remarks   in  Asagumo,   May  30,    1 974-      It  should  be 

noted,   however,    that  an  IvISDF  training  squadron  is  permitted  to 

visit  foreign  ports  every  year. 


207 


capability  would  enable  the  aircraft  to  be  used  in  offensive 
roles  since  its  range  would  be  increased.  The  government,  which 

had  plated  over  the  fuel  ducts  prior  to  the  controversy,  now  was 

11 
forced  to  remove  the  associated  piping  entirely.    Another 

objection  was  that  a  newly  proposed  anti-submarine  escort  group 

'  12 
should  not  be  designated  as  a  "hunter-killer  unit"  in  peacetime. 

Finally,  there  was  the  Diet  member  who  questioned  whether  or  not 

a  new  conventional  submarine  could  be  converted  into  a  nuclear 

one  simply  by  the  insertion  of  a  reactor. 

This  relatively  low  level  of  inquiry,  however,  still  has 

resulted  in  serious  restrictions  on  the  development  of  the  SDF. 

One  of  the  most  significant  developments  was  the  "limits  to 

defense  power  in  peacetime"  controversy  in  early  1973*  Although 

defense  spending  consistently  has  been  less  than  one  percent  of 

GNP,    the  tremendous  growth  of  Japan's  economy  had  given  her  the 

tenth  largest  military  budget  in  the  world  by  1971  >  and  could 

have  driven  it  to  sixth  or  seventh  place  by  the  end  of  the  Fourth 

Defense  Plan.  Moreover,  though  the  defense  buildup  was  expected 


11Mainichi,  March  21,  1973;  Sankei,  (eve)  April  10,  1973- 

1  ? 

Yasui  Yoshinori,  Japan  Socialist  Party  (JSP),  in  Lower 

House  Budget  Committee  interpellations,  February  5,  1973* 

^Narazaki  Yanosuke  (JSP),  in  Lower  House  Budget  Committee 
interpellations,  February  7,  1974.  Reported  in  Asahi,  February 
8,  1974- 

^Compared  with  2.&/o   in  West  Germany  and  3.7$  in  Sweden  in 
1971. 


208 


to  be  completed  by  1981  with  the  conclusion  of  the  Fifth  Program, 
the  lack  of  specific  planning  guidance  and  seemingly  limitless 
economic  expansion  led  to  calls  in  the  early  1970s  for  the 
establishment  of  a  firm  upper  limit  on  the  size  of  the  SDF. 
This  also,  it  should  be  recalled,  came  soon  after  a  period  of 
widespread  warnings  of  the  revival  of  Japanese  militarism  and 
a  spate  of  predictions  of  Japan's  future  as  a  superpower.  The 
result  was  an  effective  freeze  on  the  quantity  of  SDF  equipment 

at  Fourth  Defense  Program  targets  (except  for  naval  vessels)  but 

15 
with  few  controls  on  future  qualitative  advances. 

Closely  related  to  the  political  climate  is  public  opinion 

which,  at  best,  is  ambiguous  about  the  SDF.  Although  public 

acceptance  has  grown  since  their  formation,   there  is  no  strong 

pressure  for  their  expansion.  Moreover,  any  attempt  at  overseas 

deployments  almost  certainly  would  be  vigorously 


15  / 

See  the  Defense  Agency  "view"  (to  avoid  involvement  of 

the  cabinet-level  National  Defense  Council)  of  January  26,  1973> 

and  the  succeeding  debate  through  early  February.  The  final  ' 

Program  was: 

GSDF:   5  Area  Armies;  13  divisions,  180,000  men 

MSDF:   5  Regional  Units;  4~5  escort  Flotillas,  280,000 

tons  of  ships  (vs  4  Flotillas  and  214,000  tons 

under  the  4th  Defense  Plan) 
ASDF:   3  Regional  Air  Defense  Forces  (8  wings);  1  composite 

air  wing,  about  800  aircraft  (vs  about  770  under  the 

4th  Defense  Plan) 

16 

Emmerson,  op.  cit.  (note  5-33) »  indicates  that  support 

for  the  SDF  rose  from  58?  in  1956  opinion  polls  to  75$  in  1969 
(p.  118).  A  survey  taken  right  after  the  Nagamuna  verdict  showed 
a  58-1  Qfo   margin  for  the  SDF  with  245S  undecided.   (Sankei,  Septem- 
ber 15,  1973). 


209 


17 
opposed.    In  part,  this  stems  from  the  generally  homogeneous, 

skeptical  attitude  of  the  media  towards  defense.  A  high  literacy 

1 8 
rate,  the  huge  circulations  of  the  three  major  newspapers,   and 

a  vast  television  audience  makes  the  Japanese  public  particularly 
susceptible  to  such  pressures.  The  corollary,  of  course,  is  that 
should  the  media's  stance  change,  the  public's  could  quickly 
follow. 

Another  aspect  of  public  opinion,  which  is  particularly 
difficult  for  the  ASDF  and  GSDF,  is  local  opposition  to  bases. 
Such  objections  usually  stem  either  from  the  nuisance  effects 
and  peripheral  dangers  of  military  operations  (aircraft  noise, 
unexploded  shells,  etc.)  or  from  the  feeling  that  the  large  land 
areas  could  be  better  used  in  such  a  crowded  country.  Except  for 
the  air  squadrons,  the  MSDF  is  relatively  immune  to  such  pres- 
sures, but  it  is  affected  insofar  as  such  controversies  reflect 
negatively  on  the  SDF  (and  the  U.S.  military  presence)  in  general. 


17 
Taoka,  _op_.  cit.  (note  5-1  1)i  notes  that  Hideyoshi's 

abortive  Korean  campaign,  the  subsequent  250  years  of  isolation 

and  domestic  tranquillity,  and  the  following  era  of  imperial 

expansion  and  foreign  wars  have  meant  that  "in  the  Japanese 

language  'war'  is  now  almost  synonymous  to  'expedition'  in 

nuance."  Thus  the  concept  of  defensive  wars  and  overseas 

deployments  in  stabilizing  or  peacekeeping  roles  is  inconsistent 

with  their  historical  experience.  Whether  or  not  these  qualms 

also  would  apply  to  extensions  of  Japan's  claims  to  heretofore 

uncertain  territories,  such  as  broader  ocean  resource  zones  or 

some  of  the  East  China  Sea  islets,  is  not  clear. 

1  ft 

The  Asahi,  IJainichi  and  Yomiuri  morning  circulations  each 

exceed  four  and  a  half  million,  compared  with  2-3  million  for  the 

largest  U.S.  daily  (The  New  York  Daily  News).  Moreover,  the 

Japanese  papers  are  nationally  distributed,  thus  reducing  the 

influence  of  local  journals. 


210 


Bureaucratic 

The  Defense  Agency  is  hampered  in  the  intra- governmental 
power  struggle  by  its  bureaucratic  weakness.  As  an  agency 
located  within  the  Prime  Minister's  office,  it  is  one  level  below 
the  twelve  ministries  on  the  organizational  ladder.  In  itself, 
this  is  not  critical.  The  National  Police  Agency  is  very  strong, 
some  ministries  are  weak.  However,  the  Defense  Agency  has 
acquired  a  reputation  for  a  lack  of  political  influence  over  the 
years.  Furthermore,  many  of  its  important  functions  are  performed 

by  personnel  on  loan,  notably  from  the  Police  Agency,  MIT I  and 

19 
the  Finance  Ministry.    Since  their  loyalty  is  to  their  parent 

organization  rather  than  to  the  Agency,  the  latter' s  autonomy  is 

undermined  further. 

Another  problem  is  the  fief-like  nature  of  the  Japanese 

20 
bureaucracy.    In  a  recent  example,  centering  on  the  Caracas 

negotiations,  the  Transportation  Ministry  and  Defense  Agency 

virtually  stopped  communications  over  the  issue  of  free  transit 


1  Q 

Hughes,  op_.  eft.  (note  5~34)  >  contains  a  detailed 

description  of  the  way  in  which  this  has  affected  the  Air  Self 
Defense  Force. 

20 

In  the  weeks  prior  to  the  Caracas  conference,  a  search 

was  made  for  a  suitable  ministry/cabinet  level  delegate.  The 
infighting  became  so  intense  that  a  Foreign  Ministry  spokesman 
remarked:   "Regardless  of  whoever  is  dispatched,  it  is  hoped 
that  he  will  rise  above  the  government  office  under  his  juris- 
diction and  that  he  will  work  as  a  state  minister  of  Japan." 
Ninon  Keizai,  June  19,  1974.  This  problem,  of  course,  is  not 
unique  to  Japan. 


211 


21 

through  international  straits.    This  lack  of  coordination  is 

further  evidenced  by  the  fact  that  no  contingency  plans  for 
naval  control  of  shipping  in  war  time  have  been  developed — 

despite  the  lessons  of  two  World  Wars  that  such  authority  is 

22 

essential  to  the  survival  of  an  island  state.    Finally,  this 

communications  gap  will  seriously  hamper  efforts  to  develop, 
much  less  install,  containerized  weapon  and  point  defense  systems 
for  merchantmen.  (See  Chapters  Eight  and  Nine.) 

Economic  and  Industrial 

Soon  after  the  limits  of  defense  power  debates,  there  was 
talk  of  shifting  the  appropriations  basis  from  a  five-year  pro- 
gram to  an  annual  "rolling  budget"  following  the  end  of  the 

23 

Fourth  Consolidation  Plan  ( 1 97 7 ) -    As  price  hikes  and  personnel 

costs  pushed  the  4th  Program's  4»630  billion  year  budget  towards 
6  trillion,  fewer  references  to  the  Fifth  Program  were  heard,  if 
only  because  announcements  of  year  by  year  outlays  would  be  less 
provocative  than  that  of  a  huge  sum  for  a  five  year 


21  -  - 

Tokyo  Shimbun  (eve),  June  12,  1974  and  Nihon  Keizai,  June 

19»  1 974*   In  an  interesting  variation  from  the  Pentagon's 
stance,  the  Defense  Agency  called  for  a  straits  regime  of  inno- 
cent passage,  largely  because  it  did  not  want  to  grant  the 
Soviets  free  access  through  Tsugaru  Strait.  The  Transportation 
Ministry,  on  the  other  hand,  sought  to  avoid  possible  restric- 
tions on  supertankers. 

22 

See  Eehrens,  op.  cit.  (note  1-55) »  P»  9»  ?°r   tne  British 

case  in  both  wars,  and  USSBS,  The  War  Against  Japanese  Transpor- 
tation, 1941-1945,  op.  cit.  (note  1-55) »  -for  the  Japanese 
experience . 


^Nihon  Keizai,  June  16,  1973. 


212 


package.    Throughout  1974,  each  successive  month's  inflation 
brought  further  reduction  in  Fourth  Defense  Plan  targets.  "*  At 
the  same  time,  the  MSDF  peacetime  limits  of  280,000  tons  and  the 

use  of  military  power  itself  as  the  basis  of  national  security 

26 

policy  also  were  called  into  question. 

The  current  inflation,  however,  only  compounded  a  number 


^Pokyo  Shimbun,  March  14,  1974*  Figures  mentioned  for  the 
5th  plan  were  10  trillion  yen   ($36  billion  at  March  1974  exchange 
rates) — once  again  more  than  doubling  the  previous  program.  An 
interesting  sidelight  is  that,  although  the  Japanese  name  of  the 
Defense  Plan  has  not  changed  (Boei-Hyoku  Seibi  Keikaku) ,  the 
Defense  Agency^   English  language  publications  referred  to  it  as 
a  "Build-up  Plan"  in  1971,  while  the  1973  materials  used  the 
less- suggestive  term  "consolidation  plan." 

25 

First  were  douots  about  the  fifth  escort  flotilla  which 

the  MSDF  might  have  acquired  under  the  280,000  ton  peacetime 
limits  (Tokyo1  Shimbun,  March  2,  1974)*  Then  a  proposal  was  made 
to  reduce  the  quality  of  the  equipment  on  the  10  ships  programmed 
for  FY1974  (the  Japanese  fiscal  year  runs  from  April  1  to  March 
31),  and  construction  of  a  landing  ship  (LST)  had  been  deleted. 
(The  contracts  still  had  not  been  signed  by  August.)  Moreover, 
the  whole  question  of  what  constituted  "necessary  defense  power" 
was  under  review  (Ninon  Keizai,  April  5,  "1974)  •  The  following 
month  the  Defense  Agency  Director  General  admitted  that  he  had 
given  up  the  idea  of  "achieving  completely"  the  Fourth  Defense 
Plan  (Sankei,  May  5)«  Finally,  in  September,  he  stated  that 
accomplishment  of  the  plan  now  was  "hopeless"  ( Yomiuri ,  Septem- 
ber 7)-  The  extent  of  this  escalation  is  indicated  by  the 
following  cost  estimates  (JDA  Data): 

(million  yen) 
1974      1972    Percent  Increase 

Helicopter  Destroyer  (DDH)   44,372 


Anti-Submarine  Destroyer     oc  Q,n 
(DDK)  25'83° 

Submarine  (SS)  26,789 

26Asahi,  May  7,  1974,  and  Yomiuri,  October  10,  1974- 


20,471 

116.8 

11,089 

132.9 

12,801 

121.7 

213 


of  long*- standing  problems  in  the  defense  industry.  '  For  years, 
military  production  in  Japan  has  been  relatively  unprofitable. 

In  a  1972-73  study  by  Keidanren,  it  was  found  that  only  in  11  of 

28 

293  defense  projects  were  builders1  costs  below  contract  price. 

Most  warship  construction  in  particular  was  10  to  30  percent 
above  contract.  In  another  study  of  67  contractors,  the  busi- 
nesses averaged  7  percent  losses  on  defense  work.  When  asked 
why  they  accepted  such  orders  and  their  likely  unprofitability, 
the  answers  given  in  Table  6-4  resulted. 

In  Fiscal  1972  (April  1972-March  1973),  average  costs  were 
17.4  percent  over  budget,  with  warships  running  46.6  percent. 
As  noted  above,  the  situation  now  has  deteriorated  even  further. 

Quite  apart  from  issues  of  profit,  the  complexity  of  modern 
warships  also  is  a  problem.  The  fact  that  they  require  construc- 
tion techniques  which  are  markedly  different  (more  labor- 
intensive)  from  those  of  the  merchantmen  in  which  Japanese 


27 

The  25-part  series  "Defense  Industry  in  Japan,"  NKIW, 

July  4- December  19,  1972,  is  a  good  introduction  in  English. 
.Recent  structural  shifts  were  outlined  on  April  23,  1974,  P»  12. 
Also  Auer,  op_.  cit.  (note  5~34) ,  chapter  13*  For  critical  views 
(whose  ominous  predictions  seem  to  have  been  premature),  see 
Herbert  P.  Bix,  "The  Security  Treaty  System  and  the  Japanese 
Military- Indus trial  Complex,"  BCAS,  II  (January  1972),  pp.  30-53 
and  Albert  Axel bank,  Black  Star  Over  Japan  (TOkyO:  Charles  E. 
Tuttle,  1973),  PP.  29-45. 

28 

Keidanren,  Boei  Seisan  I-inkai  Jimukyoku  (Defense  Pro- 
duction Committee  Secretariat),  "Chotatsukaku  no  Jittai  ni 
Kansuru  Chosa  Kenkyu  Hokokusho"  (investigative  Research  Heport 
Concerning  the  Realities  of  Procurement  Costs)  (So-called 
Kurosawa  2nd  Report),  1973,  provided  by  Keidanren,  p.  4«  Here- 
after Kurosawa  Report. 


214 


Table  6-4 
COMPANY  REASONS  FOR  ACCEPTING  UNPROFITABLE 
DEFENSE  CONTRACTS 


1.  To  support  the  Company's 
work  scale 

2.  Expectations  of  Techno- 
logical spin  off 

3.  Cooperation  with  National 
Defense  Policy,  not  profit 

4.  Expectations  of  Improving 
the  Conditions  for  Receiving 
Future  (Government)  Business 

5.  Had  carried  out  preparation 
for  production  prior  to 
(receipt  of)  contract 

6.  Thoughts  of  Publicity  from 
the  equipment 

7 .  Other 


#1 

Priority 

a 

Weighted 
Average 

17 

19 

10 

99 

2 

16 

13 

51 

16 

18 

13 

97 

33 

13 

0 
5 


14 

14 

5 
0 


17 

8 
0 


130 

84 

14 
15 


Source:  Kurosawa  Report,  p.  16 

Note:   1st  priority  =  3  pts.,  2nd  =  2  pts.,  3rd  =  1  pt, 


215 


shipyards  have  specialized  makes  them  inherently  less  attractive 
to  shipbuilders.  The  business  incentives  for  defense  production 
might  increase  if  the  economy  continues  to  weaken  but,  without 
foreign  sales,  it  is  doubtful  that  such  work  could  absorb  more 
than  a  small  fraction  of  Japan's  industrial  capacity. 

Closely  related  to  the  state  of  the  defense  industry  is  the 
issue  of  domestic  production  itself.  This  has  been  most  hotly 
contested  in  the  aircraft  sector,  and  so  has  affected  the  MSDF 
mostly  in  the  case  of  the  PXL  (new  anti-submarine  patrol  plane) . 
The  first  post-war  destroyers  and  frigates  were  completed  by 

Japanese  yards  in  1956,  and  all  construction  has  been  domestic 

30 
since.    The  structural  quality  of  the  ships  has  won  high 

31 
praise,   and  dependence  on  the  U.S.  for  shipboard,  weapon, 


29 

In  any  case  the  firms  themselves  are  not  counting  on  it. 

Medium  and  small  manufacturers  who  have  specialized  in  defense 
sub-contracting  now  are  seeking'  to  diversify.   (Nihon  Keizai, 
July  31  2nd  August  2,  1974)*  There  are  not  that  many.  Defense 
production  in  Japan  has  accounted  for  about  .4/°  of  industrial 
output  in  recent  years.  One  survey  of  83  firms  engaged  in  such 
work  showed  that  it  accounted  for  less  than  10$  of  total  business 
in  52  cases  (64^).   (NKIW,  December  19,  1972).  Foreign  arms 
sales  will  be  discussed  in  Chapter  Nine  but,  in  sum,  the  pros- 
pects for  Japanese  defense  production  (with  the  possible 
exception  of  the  electronics  sector)  are  not  considered  bright. 
Fusano  Natsuki,  Defense  Production  Committee  of  Keidanren, 
interview,  August  6,  1974*  See  also  Nihon  Keizai,  May  16,  1 974- 
This  is  more  a  matter  of  policy  and  public  opinion  than  of  capa- 
bility, but  the  fact  remains  nonetheless. 

vVashington  has  transferred  some  U.S. -built  ships  and 
funded  two  Japanese-built  destroyers,  however. 

Although  some  regret  that  newer  designs,  such  as  the 
helicopter  destroyer  (DDIl)  Haruna,  have  not  been  more  innovative. 
Fukui  Shizuo,  interview,  January  20,  1973* 


216 


sensor  and  communication  systems  has  been  steadily  reduced. 
Indeed,  defense  electronics  is  one  area  where  there  is  a  hopeful 
outlook  for  expansion  as  an  offshoot  of  the  general  economic 
shift  to  technologically- intensive  industry.    Nevertheless, 
given  the  interrelationship  between  air  and  sea  power,  the  MSDF 

cannot  really  be  considered  independent  so  long  as  the  ASDF  is 

34 
not.    At  the  same  time,  the  scale  of  projected  SDF  aircraft 

demand  hardly  justifies  domestic  production,  while  the  drain  on 
currency  reserves  mitigates  against  foreign  procurement.  Thus 
the  eventual  decision  could  favor  the  curtailment  of  aircraft 
acquisition  (which  probably  would  be  accompanied  by  calls  for 
general  defense  spending  limitations),  an  easing  of  the  restric- 
tion on  foreign  sales  (see  Chapter  Nine),  or  a  concentration  on 
missiles  and  technologically-advanced  installable  equipment. 
There  also  is  the  possibility  that  defense  contracts  could  be 
used  for  economic  "pump  priming,"  but  this  does  not  seem  likely. 


Nearly  all  l.ISDF  equipments  now  are  home-made,  though 
they  are  compatible  with  American  ammunition  and,  to  a  lesser 
extent,  with  U.S.  spare  parts. 

^NKIW,  April  23,  1974,  P-  12. 

XA 

One  example  of  the  dangers  of  relying  on  foreign 
weaponry  was  given  in  April  1 974,  when  the  U.S.  announced  that 
it  was  phasing  out  its  Nike-Hercules  SAM  system.  Since  Japan 
uses  a  similar  missile  there  eventually  will  be  difficulties  in 
obtaining  spare  parts.   However,  domestic  production  of  spares 
is  unlikely  since  the  missiles1  1950s-vintage  electronics  con- 
tain vacuum  tubes  which  are  so  outdated  that  Japanese  firms  are 
unwilling  to  make  them.  Asahi,  April  4»  1974* 


217 


A  further  impact  of  inflation  on  the  MSDF,  of  course,  has 
been  a  reduction  in  operating  time  due  to  higher  fuel  costs. 

Manpower 

The  Self-Defense  Forces  long  have  had  recruiting  and 
retention  problems.  In  the  short  run,  this  situation  may  ease 
if  the  economy  worsens.  In  the  longer  term,  however,  demographic 
forecasts  predict  a  reduction  in  the  size  of  the  18-25  age  group 
from  which  the  SDF  (and  industry)  draw  most  of  their  recruits. 
These  problems  are  compounded  by  anti-military  sentiment  and  the 
low  prestige  of  the  Self-Defense  Forces.  Concern  has  been  voiced 
about  the  quality  of  recent  officer  candidates.  Further  diffi- 
culties have  been  added  by  the  restrictive  measures  placed  on 
voting  permits  for  SDF  personnel  by  some  local  governments  in 
the  wake  of  the  Naganuma  decision. 

The  MSDF  has  achieved  more  than  95  percent  of  its  overall 
personnel  target,  but  this  figure  is  somewhat  overstated  since 

the  manning  levels  of  some  critical  shipboard  rates  are  only 

56 
about  80  percent.    As  a  result,  both  maintenance  and 

operational  proficiency  have  suffered.  Shortages  of  fuel  and 

airspace  for  training  have  compounded  the  difficulties. 


3S 

Asahi  Evening  News,  November  8,  1 97 3 • 

Figures  cited  by  Kaihara  Osamu,  interview,  March  24,  1974' 
The  manning  level  issue  actually  is  quite  complicated,  involving 
reserves,  personnel  away  at  schools  or  detached  for  new  construc- 
tion units,  and  many  other  factors.  Moreover,  it  is  a  problem 
faced  by  nearly  all  navies  in  one  form  or  another.  Nonetheless, 
it  has  affected  the  MSDF's  operational  readiness. 


218 


37 

Logistical 

Despite  the  impressive  hardware  which  the  S elf-Defense 
Forces  operates,  their  logistics  backup  is  woefully  inadequate. 
For  instance,  ASDF  interceptors  have  as  few  as  four  anti-air 
missiles  per  aircraft.  The  Ground  Self  Defense  Forces  have  been 
estimated  to  have  only  about  30  minutes  of  combat  stores.  The 
MSDF  surface-to-air  missile  inventory-  consists  of  about  50 
weapons — which  can  be  expended  at  a  rate  of  more  than  10  per 
minute.  Moreover,  there  are  few  facilities  in  Japan  capable  of 
producing  relatively  sophisticated  ammunition.  Most  of  the 
missiles  and  artillery  shells  are  supplied  from  the  U.S. 

It  must  be  noted,  however,  that  this  has  been  the  result 
of  a  conscious  decision  on  the  part  of  SDF  leaders.  Since  the 
beginning  of  the  defense  build-up,  the  emphasis  has  been  on  long 
lead-time  items  such  as  ships  and  aircraft.  There  would  be 
enough  warning,  it  is  argued,  to  upgrade  the  logistics  structure 
in  the  event  of  an  increase  in  regional  tensions  or  a  divorce 
from  the  United  States.  This  approach  has  served  Japan  well  to 
date.   It  remains  to  be  seen,  however,  whether  or  not  the  warning 
time  will  be  available,  and  whether  or  not  her  leaders  will 
respond  to  it  in  time. 


57 

""Mostly  from  Auer,  op.  cit.,  Chapter  14. 


*  A  study  of  20th  century  wars  by  the  Australian  Central 
Studies  Establishment  concluded  that  the  mean  warning  time  has 
been  about  four  years,  but  that  there  have  been  large  variances. 
The  Korean  War,  for  instance,  came  with  only  about  two  days' 


219 


International  Constraints 

Among  the  international  constraints  on  Japanese  seapower 
are  the  reactions  of  great  powers  and  those  of  East  Asian 
developing  countries.  The  Arab  view  also  has  become  a  consider- 
ation since  the  oil  crisis. 

Great  Power  Reactions 

Short  of  nuclearization  it  is  difficult  to  see  that  the 
United  States  would  have  any  objection  to  an  increased  share  of 
the  defense  burden  by  Japan.  The  People's  Republic  of  China, 
which  once  accused  the  S elf-Defense  Forces  of  being  the  reincar- 
nation of  Japanese  militarism,  now  seems  to  view  them  as  a 
stabilizing  force,  so  long  as  they  remain  within  the  framework 
of  the  Security  Treaty  and  confine  themselves  to  local  waters. 
Within  these  limits,  she  probably  would  have  little  objection  to 
an  expansion  of  Japanese  naval  forces.  The  Soviet  Union  is  some- 
thing of  an  enigma.  In  1971  and  72  it  was  bitterly  attacking, 
along  with  the  People's  Republic,  the  prospect  of  renewed 
Japanese  militarism.  These  attacks  abated  dramatically  in  the 
wake  of  the  Nixon  and  Tanaka  visits  to  Peking  as  Moscow  sought 
to  improve  relations  with  TokyC  and  attract  capital  for  Siberian 
development.  Since  increased  Japanese  naval  power  almost 
certainly  would  be  directed  against  the  USSR  in  time  of  war, 


notice  to  the  West.  Author's  interview  with  CSE  personnel, 
June  20,  1974. 


220 


she  probably  would  not  encourage  an  SDF  buildup.  However,  if 
such  a  move  were  conducted  in  the  framework  of  abolishing  the 
Security-Treaty  and  the  establishment  of  an  Asian  collective 
security  system,  it  might  be  more  welcome. 

Developing  Country  Reactions 

The  results  of  the  Southeast  Asia  interviews,  noted  in 
Chapter  Four,  were  not  surprising.  With  the  exception  of  Singa- 
pore, which  seeks  security  in  a  local  balance  between  as  many 
great  powers  as  possible,  the  reaction  of  observers  in  all 
countries  to  a  Japanese  naval  presence  (even  as  part  of  a  multi- 
lateral force)  was  overwhelmingly  negative.  These  _a  priori 
objections,  however,  do  not  imply  an  effective  constraint. 
Should  Japan  unilaterally  decide  to  expand  her  naval  forces,  and 
even  the  sphere  of  their  employment,  there  would  be  very  little 
that  they  could  do  about  it.  In  an  actual  engagement,  however, 
the  SSMs  of  the  coastal  state  patrol  boats  could  be  effective, 
particularly  since  MSDF  ships  are  mainly  ASW  configured. 

Some  Arab  states  have  shown  an  interest  in  buying  Japanese 
weaponry,  although  they  are  not  likely  to  get  it.  Japan's  own 
defense  programs  probably  will  have  little  influence  on  her 
Middle  East  diplomacy  so  long  as  her  forces  remain  outside  of 
the  Indian  Ocean. 


221 


Summary 

The  use  of  ship  or  aircraft  rosters  as  measures  of  Japan's 
military  power  and  potential  is  misleading.  For  a  host  of 
reasons  the  MSDF  is  truly  a  "Paper  Tiger."  Even  should  the 
quantity  and  quality  of  its  equipment  expand  markedly,  the  lack 
of  national  inclination  to  use  such  force  would  undercut  its 
credibility,  thus  making  attempts  to  use  it  even  more  dangerous. 
Projections  of  Western  naval  forces  being  used  in  support  of 
diplomacy  are  difficult  to  extrapolate  to  present-day  Japan. 
Such  leverage  implies  a  linkage  between  military  force,  economic 
power  and  political  influence  which  is  rarely  voiced  in  TokyS. 
In  fact,  the  Japanese  Government  consistently  has  sought  to 
separate  politics  and  economics  in  international  negotiations. 
This  has  brought  her  a  number  of  spectacular  successes,  such  as 
the  establishment  of  diplomatic  relations  with  Peking  while 
increasing  her  trade  with  Taiwan.  It  is  not  clear,  however, 
that  this  happy  separation  can  be  continued.  Certainly  it  is 
hard  to  insist  that  food  and  oil  are  not  both  political  and 
economic  weapons. 

The  potential  evolution  of  the  above  mentioned  constraints 
will  be  examined  in  the  next  chapter.  For  the  present,  however, 
the  political-economic  dichotomy  is  incompatible  with  the  active 
use  of  seapower  (or  almost  any  power)  to  protect  vital  interests, 
since  nearly  all  of  the  interests  which  Japan  perceives  as  vital 
are  economic. 


Chapter  Seven 
THE  EVOLUTION  OF  THE  INTERESTS  AND  CONSTRAINTS 

Intangible  issues  will  be  central  to  Japan's  future  mari- 
time posture  (indeed  to  her  whole  security  problem).  Among  these 
are  (1)  the  possible  emotional  reaction  to  severe  and  prolonged 
economic  difficulties,  (2)  the  development  of  a  consensus  con- 
cerning Japan's  future  course,  and  (3)  Japan's  continued 
acceptance  of  a  passive  international  role.  Her  reactions  to 
the  external  environment  also  will  be  critical.  This  chapter 
will  examine  some  of  the  domestic  and  international  changes  which 
may  affect  the  acceptability  and  employment  of  the  SDP  in  general 
and  the  MSDF  in  particular  in  the  next  few  years. 

Domestic  Issues 

An  Uncertain  Future 

So  long  as  Japan's  major  political  decisions  involved  the 
domestic  division  of  an  ever-growing  economic  pie,  there  was 
little  incentive  to  change,  or  even  to  challenge  the  national 
course.  There  were  unwanted  side  effects  to  be  sure.  Worsening 
pollution,  urban  overcrowding  and  a  few  clouds  on  the  resource 
horizon  had  been  apparent  since  the  late  1960s.  Indeed,  by  1971 
or  72  there  was  widespread  recognition  that  the  economy  would 


222 


223 


have  to  be  reoriented  from  unimpeded  growth  towards  social 

1 

welfare  goals.   Though  the  two  Nixon  shocks  had  shown  the  rate 

at  which  the  world  was  changing,  it  always  was  felt  that  there 
would  be  time  enough  to  make  the  transition.  This  comfortable 
vision  was  shattered  in  October  1973* 

The  Japanese  overreacted  to  the  oil  embargo  and  later  price 
increases,  as  did  most  of  the  world.  These  sentiments  moderated 
once  it  was  clear  that  the  country  would  not  grind  to  a  halt  for 
lack  of  fuel  or  foreign  currency.  However,  a  more  sober  analysis 
has  revealed  other  serious,  long-term  weaknesses — notably  a 
combination  of  persistent  inflation,  a  high  debt- to- equity  ratio 
for  most  Japanese  firms  (which  makes  them  vulnerable  to  inflation 
countermeasures — even  as  they  profited  from  the  price  rises 

themselves),  the  disappearance  of  cheap  energy  and  transportation 

2 

and  an  ever  worsening  pollution  problem.   These  are  coupled  with 

3 
an  industrial  structure  which  limits  conservation  possibilities. 

These  difficulties  are  compounded  by  the  weakened  position  of  the 


i 
For  instance,  the  1971  report  on  "Trade  and  Industrial 

Policies  in  the  1970s,*1  op_.  cit.  (note  5-68).   It  also  is  inter- 
esting to  compare  the  changing  tone  of  Keidanren  President  Uemura 
Kogoro's  speeches  as  reprinted  in  Keidanren  Review  during  this 
period. 

2 
See  Donald  Keene,  "The  Short,  Happy  Life  of  Japan  as  a 

Superpower,"  New  York  Times  Magazine,  March  3>  1 974»  P»  19» 

^Japan  has  resisted  Secretary  Kissinger's  pressures  for  a 
commitment  to  a  Jilf/o   energy  consumption  reduction  on  the  grounds 
that  Japan's  energy  usage  is  much  more  industrial  than  America's, 
thus  there  is  less  room  for  savings  through  consumer  conservation 
measures. 


224 


ruling  Liberal  Democratic  Party  (LDP),  which  will  find  it  hard 
to  take  the  necessary  strict,  and  thus  unpopular,  economic 
measures. 

In  retrospect,  the  problems  did  not  arise  so  suddenly. 
Japanese  prosperity,  throughout  the  1960s,  had  fed,  indeed 
thrived,  on  inflation.   Thus,  so  long  as  real  growth  continued 
at  9  to  11  percent  per  year,  there  was  little  incentive  to  con- 
trol the  inflation  at  an  early  stage.  Even  by  early  1973,  when 
prices  were  rising  at  an  annual  rate  of  about  13  percent,  no 
effective  measures  were  taken. 

Japan  also  profited  from  the  U.S.  efforts  in  Korea  and 
Indochina,  although  they  don't  like  to  admit  it.   It  is  not  yet 
clear  what  impact  the  end  of  the  Vietnam  War  and  the  U.S. 
retrenchment  will  have  on  the  future  peace  and  stability  of  Asia. 
It  is  fairly  evident,  however,  that  it  already  has  resulted  in  a 


The  average  annual  increase  of  the  consumer  price  index 
in  the  late  1960s  and  early  '70s  was  about  Gfo.     The  real  cost  of 
money  thus  was  very  cheap  (a  typical  prime  rate  being  around 
7.5?°— NKIW,  October  28,  1972). 

5 
See  Bix,  "The  Security  Treaty  System  and  the  Japanese 

Military-Industrial  Complex,"  op.  cit.  (note  6-27),  pp.  49_50. 

In  1950-53*  U.S.  special  payments  to  Japan  totalled  #2, 374*000, 

which  was  50.3$  of  her  total  exports  for  the  same  period.   It 

has  been  estimated  that  direct  Vietnam  procurement  between  1965 

and  '67  was  $450  million,  and  that  indirect  effects  totalled 

nearly  a  billion  dollars,   (indirect  effects  stem  from  exports 

which  satisfy  war-generated  excess  demand  either  in  the  U.S.  or 

in  Asia.)  This  figure  Y/as  supported  by  a  Nihon  Keizai  estimate 

that:   "Realization  of  the  peace  in  Vietnam  is  going  to  become  a 

factor  in  causing  a  maximum  yearly  deficit  of  around  $1  billion 

in  Japan's  balance  of  payments."   (NKJW,  November  21,  1973)*  P»  2, 


225 


substantial  financial  loss  to  Japanese  business.   Farther 
afield,  the  so-called  North-South  problem  has  been  apparent  ever 
since  the  1964  UNCTAD,  if  not  before.  The  only  really  surprising 
development  was  the  ability  of  OAPEC  to  act  in  concert. 

Whatever  their  origins,  Japan's  domestic  weaknesses  are 
likely  to  be  compounded  by  the  international  situation.  There 
are,  for  instance,  signs  that  many  countries  may  be  adopting  a 
neo-mercantilist  outlook  in  place  of  the  free-trade  liberalism 
under  which  Japan  has  prospered.  The  most  obvious  effect  is 
resources  nationalism,  now  finding  its  way  to  the  industrialized 
world  as  well. 

Paradoxically,  Japan's  commitment  to  unrestricted  trade 
and  inflation  countermeasures  may  contribute  to  the  world-wide 
recession  to  which  she  is  so  vulnerable.  Though  her  own  1974 
export  drive  succeeded  spectacularly  in  balancing  the  increased 
costs  of  raw  materials,  it  has  accentuated  the  same  problem  in 


The  interpretation  of  this  is  left  to  the  beholder.  A 
radical  critique  may  point  to  the  ties  between  Japan  and  American 
imperialism.   Others  may  see  a  welcome  partnership  in  the  pursuit 
of  common  goals.  Still  others  may  visualize  unwarranted  Japanese 
profits  from  the  defense  burdens  of  others.   (A  Republic  of 
China  naval  officer,  who  requested  anonymity,  made  the  last 
observation  in  an  interview,  May  8,  1 974* )  In  &h>r  case,  it  is 
an  economic  fact  of  life.  Whether  or  not  such  monetary  gains 
alone  would  ensure  Japan's  support  for  future  American  military 
activities  is  doubtful,  especially  if  such  actions  might  subject 
her  to  resource  cut-offs  or  terrorism.  A  billion  dollars  a 
year,  after  all,  is  less  than  ,j/o   of  GNP  or  2fo   of  1974  exports. 


226 


7 

many  other  countries.   In  the  long  run,  this  will  be  counter- 
productive since  it  eventually  will  reduce  the  demand  for 
exports  itself,  or  even  stimulate  trade  barriers.  By  the  same 
token,  the  domestic  success  of  Japanese  inflation  countermeasures 
also  will  aggravate  the  balance  of  payments  problems  of  those 
countries  which  will  be  drawn  to  import  from  her. 

The  point  is  that  Japan  has  become  too  important  to  the 
world's  economy  to  allow  her  the  luxury  of  unilateral  measures, 
vulnerable  though  she  may  be  in  many  ways.  While  she  has  no 
organization  like  the  EEC  to  support  her  in  times  of  stress, 
neither  does  she  have  such  a  body  to  encourage  cooperative 
solutions.  It  would  indeed  be  ironic  if  Japan's  success  at,  and 
continued  commitment  to  free  trade  once  again  brought  her  out  of 
phase  with  her  times,  just  as  her  imperialism  was  anachronistic 
in  the  1930s  and  her  isolation  had  grown  untenable  by  the  mid- 
nineteenth  century. 

Signs  which  point  to  domestic  disharmony  and  a  lack  of 


7 

This  is  a  criticism  of  degree  rather  than  of  kind.  Japan 

must  export  to  survive.  She  also  had  to  cope  with  a  massive 
increase  in  oil  payments.  Thus  a  move  to  expand  exports  was 
understandable.  The  problem  has  stemmed  from  the  decision  to 
promote  exports  at  the  maximum  possible  level,  rather  than  to 
accept  a  more  moderate  income  (and  possible  payments  deficit  of 
her  own)  in  consideration  of  the  problems  of  her  trading  partners 
Japan,  of  course,  can  legitimately  complain  that  her  diligence 
and  talent  should  not  be  penalized  by  the  lack  of  others' 
competitiveness,  but  the  problem  remains  nonetheless. 

Q 

Takane  Masaaki,  "Historical  Structure  of  Japanese 
Bureaucracy — Bureaucracy  and  Modernization  in  Japan,"  Chuo  Koron, 
September  1 974*  Translation  in  Magazine  Summary,  October  1974* 


227 


g 

self-discipline  and  group  identity  among  the  young  are  on  a 

different  plane.  Should  these  predictions  be  realized,  they 
would  undermine  the  very  conditions  which  lay  at  the  heart  of 
the  post-war  prosperity.  Another  possibly  significant  develop- 
ment is  the  growth  of  citizens'  groups,  which  have  especially 
centered  on  environmental  issues.    Their  importance  lies  in 
the  complications  which  they  have  introduced  into  regional 
development  and  nuclear  power  plant  plans. 

Given  any  sort  of  direction,  the  inherent  talent,  loyalty 
and  homogeneity  of  the  Japanese  people  will  enable  them  to 
succeed  wherever  they  are  led.  It  is  this  problem  of  leadership, 
however,  which  is  critical.  There  virtually  is  no  group  in 
Tokyo  now  capable  of  innovative  political  guidance.  This  is  not 
a  problem  unique  to  Japan,  but  it  may  be  more  critical  for  her 
than  for  some  other  industrialized  states  because  of  her 
vulnerabi 1 i  ty . 

The  LDP  has  been  losing  votes  for  years.  The  July  1974 
elections  were  indicative  of  voter  dissatisfaction,  which  only 
was  compounded  by  the  personal  scandals  which  later  surrounded 


9Morita  Akira  (President  of  Sony)  in  NKT.7,  May  28,  1974. 
Also,  Prime  Minister's  Office,  1974  Y/hite  Paper  on  Youths. 
Reported  in  MM,  December  7»  1974* 

1 0 

Some  have  argued  that  these  were  spawned  by  weaknesses 

in  the  policy-making  process  and  can  be  expected  to  increase  in 

the  future.     See  B.   L.  Simcock,    "Environmental  Pollution  and  the 

Citizen's  Movements,"  Area  Development  in  Japan  _£  (T5ky3,    1972). 


228 


Prime  Minister  Tanaka.  Whether  or  not  future  Prime  Ministers 
can  regain  public  confidence  remains  to  be  seen.  But  their 
success  will  depend  on  factors  largely  beyond  their  own  control, 
such  as  the  health  of  the  U.S.  economy  and  the  cooperation  of 
other  faction  leaders  (who  are  also  potential  successors). 

One  solution  might  be  some  sort  of  party  realignment  to 
permit  the  continuation  of  conservative  government.  Coalitions 
among  the  present  parties  are  possible,  but  probably  would  be 
unstable.  Though  a  revitalization  of  the  LDP  is  doubtful  without 
sweeping  (and  improbable)  leadership  changes,  neither  is  any 
opposition  party  considered  able  to  win  a  majority  of  its  own. 
At  the  same  time,  the  latter  seem  totally  incapable  of  acting  in 
concert.  Thus  several  years  of  domestic  political  uncertainty 
may  result.  Under  these  circumstances,  the  possibility  of  a 
more  authoritarian  government  must  at  least  be  considered.  This 

requires  some  explanation. 

11 

Consensus  is  important  to  nearly  all  Japanese  evolutions. 

The  formation  of  such  an  outlook  rarely  is  very  rapid.  In 
general,  it  is  an  incremental  process,  almost  imperceptible  at 
each  step,  but  suddenly  evident  after  seemingly  endless  wrangling 
(or  drifting,  since  important  parts  of  the  sequence  often  are 
conducted  out  of  the  public  view).  In  many  cases,  preparations 
will  have  been  made  for  a  number  of  contingencies  while  awaiting 


11See  Nakane  Chie,  Japanese  Society  (Berkeley:  University 
of  California  Press,  1972). 


229 


clarification  of  the  situation.  Once  an  appropriate  policy 

becomes  apparent,  control  devolves  to  the  group  or  faction  best 

1 2 

suited  to  the  circumstances,  which  then  acts  quickly.    This  is 

one  reason  why  Japanese  policy  sometimes  seems  prone  to  radical 
shifts  of  direction.  Such  a  consensus  is  not  equivalent  to 
unanimous  support,  but  it  does  mean  that  the  views  of  all  groups 
at  least  have  been  considered. 

In  any  case,  the  success  of  Japanese  business  and  the  LDP 
(and  conversely  the  failure  of  the  opposition)  has  been  the 
ability  to  achieve  inter- group  coordination.  This  was  not  very 
difficult  when  the  parties  concerned  were  competing  for  relatively 
larger  or  smaller  shares  of  an  expanding  economy.  Today,  however, 
some  vested  interests  are  faced  with  the  spectre  of  absolute 
losses.  Under  such  circumstances,  the  very  group-orientation 
which  has  been  the  strength  of  Japan's  post-war  recovery  could 
become  a  detriment  should  intra-organizational  loyalty  preclude 
inter-organizational  cooperation.  This  is  especially  true  within 
the  bureaucracy. 


12 

This  approach  also  is  the  key  to  Japanese  business 

practices.     These  usually  are  low-risk  strategies,   often  pre- 
ferring to  pay  additional  money  for  foreign  patents  or   to  invest 
in  joint  ventures  rather  than  pioneer  in  new  areas.     The  ocean 
mining  field,    to  be  examined  later,    is  a  classic  example. 

1  5 

^For  instance,  the  i960  opposition  to  the  Security  Treaty 

was  directed  more  against  Prime  Minister  Kishi's  strong-arm  tac- 
tics in  obtaining  Diet  approval  than  against  the  alliance  itself. 

^Takane,  op.  cit.  This  condition  apparently  prevailed  in 
the  preparations  for  the  Law  of  the  Sea  Conference  negotiations. 


230 


Thus,   although  charismatic  leadership  rarely  has  been  a 
feature  of  Japanese  politics,  some  sort  of  Oyabun  (chief  or  boss) 
may  be  needed  to  resolve  conflicting  interests.  Without  it, 
extended  delay,  or  even  paralysis  on  important  issues  is  possible, 
indeed  probable.  That  such  circumstances  might  lead  to  an 
authoritarian  government  is  by  no  means  certain.  Indeed,  it  is 
less  likely  than  a  party  reshuffling,  but  it  cannot  be  ruled  out. 
The  prospects  for  renewed  Japanese  militarism,  however,  are 
virtually  nil.  These  will  be  noted  in  the  next  section. 

Given  these  conditions,  the  Japanese  are  not  optimistic 
about  the  future.  In  a  recent  survey,  a  group  of  academic 
experts  was  asked:   "What  image  do  you  have  about  the  Japanese 
society  in  the  latter  half  of  the  1970s?"  The  answers,  in  order 

of  frequency,  were:   "upheaval,  instability,  disaster,  crisis, 

15 

disruption  and  dispute." 

In  many  respects,  logic  would  so  indicate.  But  Japan  con- 
sistently has  shown  herself  more  resilient  and  adaptable  than 
would  seem  possible  on  the  basis  of  tangible  assets  alone.  In 
any  struggle  for  economic  survival,  a  nation's  fate  vri.ll  hinge 
on  the  performance  of  her  average  citizens,  plus  the  resources 
and  the  productive  capacity  available  to  them.  Japan  surely 
excels  in  the  first  and  third  areas  just  as  she  is  weak  in  the 
second.  Even  under  rampant  nationalism,  however,  there  will  be 
those  who  must  sell  their  raw  materials  to  survive.  In  such  a 
cutthroat  scramble  for  resources,  Japan's  capital  and  intellectual 


15NKJW,  July  30,  1974. 


231 


stocks  certainly  can  be  traded  for  enough  of  a  supply  to  ensure 
a  decent  (if  unspectacular)  living  for  her  people.  In  fact,  the 
pollution  generated  by  continued  production  is  likely  to  be  more 
of  a  threat  than  the  curtailment  of  that  production  by  external 
factors. 

The  days  of  dramatic  growth  may  be  over,  but  Japan  will 
remain  one  of  the  world's  major  reservoirs  of  industrial 
potential  and  technological  skills.  As  such,  she  will  continue 
to  have  a  significant  influence  on  the  global  economy. 

Japanese  Militarism 

Militarism  is  defined  as: 

Predominance  of  the  military  class  or  prevalence 
of  their  ideals;  subordination  of  the  civil  ideals 


1  fc\ 

Kenneth  R.  Stunkel  and  John  Copper  argue  persuasively  in 

a  forthcoming  book  (Economic  Superpowers  and  the  Environment) 
that  Japan's  industrialization  alreaay  has  brought  her  to  the 
brink  of  irreversible  environmental  damage.  Moreover,  although 
lip  service  is  paid  to  emission  control  laws,  conservation  and 
the  need  to  clean  up  coastal  waters,  neither  government  nor 
business  has  really  recognized  the  magnitude  of  the  problem.  For 
instance,  the  MITI  plan  noted  earlier  (note  5_70)  has  been  criti- 
cized for  predicting  6-7  percent  growth  on  the  grounds  of  resource 
unavailability.  Stunkel  suggests  that  the  target  of  such  growth 
itself  is  out  of  touch  with  reality.  No  thought,  apparently,  has 
been  given  to  the  impact  of  burning  or  refining  4,000,000,000 
kiloliters  of  oil  in  Japan's  already  marginal  atmosphere  over  the 
next  ten  years.   (This  is,  it  should  be  noted,  nearly  two  and  a 
half  times  the  amount  consumed  in  the  quarter- century  between 
1947  and  1972.)  Similarly,  even  the  maintenance  of  present 
levels  of  production  may  lead  to  major  shortages  of  fresh  water, 
the  disappearance  of  many  fish  from  adjacent  waters  and  reduced 
agriculture.  No  doubt  the  Japanese  would  endure  these  hardships 
stoically,  but  that  is  not  equivalent  to  finding  a  solution  for 
them. 


232 


or  policies  of  a  government  to  the  military;  the 
spirit  which  exalts  military  virtues  and  ideals; 
the  policy  of  aggressive  military  preparedness. 

Webster's  New  International  Dictionary — 2nd  ed. 

Warnings  of  the  revival  of  Japanese  militarism  were  heard 

17 

frequently  in  the  early  1970s.    '     Even  moderate  analysts  argued 

that  the  self-confidence  bred  of  the  post-war  recovery  and  a 

desire  to  play  a  political  role  commensurate  with  her  economic 

1  ft 

power  would  lead  Japan  to  a  larger  military  commitment.         Now, 

with  the  limits  to  growth  apparent,  new  warnings  have  arisen. 


17 

Bix,  "Report  on  Japan  1972,"  part  I,  _op_.  cit.  (note  6-1), 

saw  Japan's  conservative  leadership  pushing  for  a  revision  of  the 
Constitution  and  other  changes  which,  if  accomplished,  would  mean 
that:  "...  the  internal  position  and  status  of  both  military 
and  emperor  in  Japanese  life  are  sure  to  be  greatly  enhanced  .  .  .' 
(p«  29).  Axelbank,  o_p_.  cit.  (note  6-27),  was  concerned  that  a 
combination  of  industrialists,  former  Imperial  Army  and  Navy 
officers  and  right  wing  politicians  were  "vigorously  backing 
stepped-up  rearmament"  (p.  25)  while  "the  people  are  showing  in- 
creasing apathy  towards  politics  .  .  ."  (p.  21).  Other  revision- 
ist writings  raised  similar  critiques.  The  last  major  attack  in 
the  Chinese  press  was  in  September  1971  (Peking  Review,  September 
17  and  24).  See  also  James  Reston's  interview  with  Chou  En-lai, 
New  York  Times,  August  10,  1971.  In  late  1972,  however,  Chou 
reportedly  told  Prime  Minister  Tanaka  that  he  "welcomed  a  'reason- 
able growth'  of  Japanese  strength  as  a  potential  counterweight 
to  the  Soviet  Union's  'aggressive  designs'  in  Asia."  (New  York 
Times,  December  13,  1972).  The  Soviet  Press,  whose  view  of 
"reviving  militarism"  also  seemed  to  depend  on  the  broader  state 
of  Moscow-Tokyo"  relations,  launched  several  attacks  in  January 
1973,  but  has  been  quiet  since.  See  Angus  M.  Praser,  "Some 
Thoughts  of  the  Resurgence  of  Militarism  in  Japan,"  Pacific 
Community  (April  1 973) >  PP»  437-451 • 

1  fi 

Herman  Kahn,  for  instance,  wrote:   "I  do  not  suggest 

that  Japan  in  the  year  2000  will  aspire  to  the  role  of  world 

policeman,  at  least  not  by  itself.  But  the  Japanese  may  well 

wish — indeed  feel  obliged  because  of  their  pervasive  worldwide 

interests  and  capabilities — to  take  part  in  such  a  role  .  •  ." 

(p.  8). 


235 


It  is  said  that  the  desperation  borne  of  a  coming  economic  crisis 

may  stimulate  nationalism,  an  authoritarian  government,  nucleari- 

19 

zation,  and  a  militarist  foreign  policy.    Japan,  it  seems,  is 

forever  suspect. 

The  possibility  of  a  more  authoritarian  government  was 
admitted  earlier  in  this  chapter.  Most  emphatically,  however, 
this  would  not  be  equivalent  to  militarism  in  the  pre-war  sense. 
Whatever  similarities  the  international  system  may  come  to  have 
to  the  1930s,  Japan's  domestic  circumstances  are  sufficiently 
different  to  invalidate  the  analogy. 

For  instance,  (1)  there  is  no  divine  symbol  which  radical 
groups  could  use  for  leverage  to  control  the  government  as  the 
Imperial  Army  and  Navy  once  did.  (2)  No  longer  is  the  public 
dazzled  by  the  victories  of  1895  and  1905*  Indeed,  the  defeat 
in  1945  thoroughly  discredited  the  military  in  most  people's 
eyes.   (3)  Today's  politicians,  whatever  their  faults,  are  much 

better  educated  and  more  experienced  than  were  their  1930s 

20 
counterparts.    At  the  same  time,  the  SDF  do  not  attract  the 

cream  of  Japan's  youth  as  the  Imperial  armed  forces  did  before 

the  war.   (4)  The  principle  of   civilian  control  of  the  military 


%iaxtin  Weinstein,  "Japan's  Foreign  Policy  Options  in  the 
Coming  Decade."  Paper  prepared  in  September  1973  for  a.  forth- 
coming book  entitled  Japan's  Coming  Decade,  edited  by  Hugh 
Patrick  and  Lewis  Austin. 


20 


See  Takane,  op.  cit.  (note  7-8). 


234 


21 

is  firmly  established.    The  Prime  Minister  also  is  in  a  much 

stronger  position  with  respect  to  his  cabinet  than  in  pre-war 
days.  The  Defense  Agency,  on  the  other  hand,  is  not  even  a 
ministry.  Finally,  (5)  the  perceived  gains  of  military  action 
have  been  much  reduced.  In  the  first  place,  the  basic  justifi- 
cation for  colonial  wars  has  vanished.  In  the  second,  Japan's 
economy  has  outgrown  regional  self-sufficiency.  The  prospect  of 
a  self-contained  Co-Prosperity  Sphere  at  least  had  popular  credi- 
bility, whatever  the  realities  might  have  been.  In  any  present 
or  future  international  environment,  from  super-power  condominium 

to  anarchy,  Japan's  use  of  military  force  to  secure  even  a 

22 

fraction  of  the  resources  she  requires  is  an  impossibility. 


21 

As  one  writer  has  noted,  in  a  slightly  different  context, 

any  clandestine  planning  to  undermine  this  arrangement  almost 
certainly  would  bring  forth  an  "Ellsberg-san"  to  leak  the  story. 
See  Monte  R.  Bullard,  "Japan's  Nuclear  Choice,"  Asian  Survey, 
XIV  (September  1974) »  P«  852.  An  example  of  the  outcry  stirred 
by  a  relatively  innocuous  contingency  plan  in  the  mid-1960s  is 
given  in  Matsueda  Tsukasa  and  George  Moore,  "Japan's  Shifting 
Attitudes  Towards  the  Military:  Mitsuya  Kenkyu  and  the  S elf- 
Defense  Forces,"  Asian  Survey,  VIII  (September  1965)1  PP»  61 4-625. 

22 

This  would  be   true  even  if  other  powers  acted  successfully 

to  gain  access  to  raw  materials  elsewhere.     Japan's  only  options 
would  be  Southeast  Asia,   Korea,   and  perhaps  Taiwan,  which  could 
not  possibly  make  her  self-sufficient.     This  is  illustrated  by 
the  following  data. 

Total  Japanese 

Material  Production  (A)       Demand  (B)       A/B  (1972  data) 

Petroleum  (m/t)  67,354,000  249,193,000  .27 

Iron  Ore   (M/T)  1,969,000  111,521,000  .02 

Coal  (M/T)  12,621,000  49,280,000  .26 

Wheat  (M/T)  322,000  5,148,282  .06 

Source:    (A)  0"N  Statistical  Yearbook  1973*     Korea,   Taiwan,   South- 
east Asia 
(B)  Finance  Ministry 


2J5 


Analogies  to  the  1930s  thus  have  been  discounted  on  five 

23 

grounds.  '  The  third  and  fourth  conditions  may  change.  Indeed, 

one  potential  problem  of  Japanese  politics  is  that  it  might  be 
difficult  to  contain,  quickly,  a  regime  which  was  prepared  to 
disregard  minority  party  and  media  opposition  in  the  conduct  of 
its  programs.    However,  the  first  condition  noted  above  would 
prevent  the  cloaking  of  consistently  unsuccessful  policies  in 
Imperial  protection.  Some  may  long  for  a  return  to  pre-war 
spirituality  and  frugality.  Others  may  wish  for  increased 
defense  spending.  Except  for  a  few  extremists,  however,  there 
is  no  support  for  the  dominance  of  military  values.  At  the  same 
time,  the  physical  limits  of  the  utility  of  Japan's  use  of  force 
will  preclude  jingoist  adventurism. 

Charges  of  militarism  will  persist,  however.  They  are  too 
useful  a  political  tool  for  the  opposition.  In  fact,  this 
equation  of  legitimate  self-defense  concerns  with  militarism  has 
been  one  of  the  main  reasons  for  the  lack  of  a  meaningful  debate 
on  security  policy  in  Japan.  The  same  is  true  for  nuclear 
questions. 


^For  some  additional  reasons,  see  Richard  Ellingworth, 
Japanese  Economic  Policies  and  Security,  Adelphi  Paper  No.  90 
(London:   IISS,  1972). 

lJakane  Chie  has  voiced  concern  that  the  single-minded 
dedication  of  the  Japanese  once  their  goal  is  defined  could  be 
dangerous  if  the  wrong  ideal  were  chosen.  See  Y/akaizumi  Kei, 
"Japan's  Dilemma:  To  Act  or  Not  to  Act,"  Foreign  Policy,  16 
(Fall  1974),  PP.  30-47. 


236 


The  Quest  for  a  Satisfying  World  Role 

Since  1945>  Japan's  international  political  role  has  been 
relatively  passive.  Her  economic  strategies  have  been  reactive, 
but  also  highly  nationalist. 

Quite  apart  from  the  militarism  issue,  it  is  possible  that 
Japan  might  try  to  influence  external  events  more  actively  in 
the  future.  There  is  no  doubt  that  she  would  appreciate  more 
international  recognition.  But  how  far  she  will  go  in  seeking 
the  associated  commitments,  or  even  accepting  those  now  avail- 
able (such  as  UK  peace-keeping  assignments),  remains  to  be  seen. 

The  key  question  is  whether  or  not  Japan  can  find  a  place 
for  herself  which  is  emotionally  satisfying  without  being 
expansive.  It  is  not  clear  that  she  can.  On  the  other  hand, 
it  does  not  necessarily  follow  that  dissatisfaction  will  lead  to 
expansion,  at  least  in  the  near  term.  In  the  first  place,  so 
long  as  the  Japanese  are  undecided  about  their  own  self-image, 
they  probably  will  not  try  to  impose  it  on  others.  Should  they 
again  succeed  in  some  national  achievement  which  could  be  the 
object  of  collective  pride,  such  as  the  Meiji  modernization  or 
the  post-war  economic  miracle,  it  might  be  tempting  to  hold  it 
up  as  a  model.  The  establishment  of  a  stable,  welfare-oriented, 
low-waste  society  might  be  such  an  example,  but  its  fulfillment 
seems  years  away. 

In  the  second,  if  Japan's  economy  really  is  endangered, 
the  excess  energy  (physical  or  mental)  available  for  non-essential 


237 


foreign  policy  projects  will  be  marginal.  *  A  diminished 
emphasis  on  the  separation  of  politics  and  economics,  and  increased 
commitments  to  international  cooperative  plans  might  give  the 
appearance  of  an  expanded  political  role.  Such  moves,  however, 
could  he  understood  better  as  new  strategies  for  the  economy's 
maintenance  than  as  a  fundamental  redefinition  of  international 
responsibilities. 

Finally,  the  characterization  of  even  Japan's  current  role 
as  "passive"  is  misleading.  It  is  true  that  it  is  reactive  in 
the  sense  that  the  major  initiatives  usually  are  left  to  others. 
But  it  also  is  highly  opportunistic,  self-serving,  and  fast-paced. 
The  diversification  of  resource  suppliers,  strategies  to  cope 
with  nationalizations  and  trade  barriers,  and  steps  to  reduce 
vulnerabilities  to  third  party  actions  are  challenging,  time 


25 

It  might,  of  course,  be  tempting  to  resort  to  the  ploy 

of  foreign  distractions  to  domestic  problems.  77ere  strikes, 

riots,  or  terrorist  activities  to  proliferate,  for  instance, 

externally- sponsored  subversion  always  could  be  blamed.  But  this 

is  not  the  same  as  embarking  on  foreign  ventures  oneself. 

2£> 

There  is  a  strong  possibility,  however,  that  economic 

activities  will  be  more  formally  related  to  security.  For 
instance,  aid  to  developing  countries  may  come  to  be  considered 
as  non-military  defense  spending.   (Shinohara  Hiroshi,  interview, 
December  9»  1 974*  This  also  v/as  suggested  by  Ellingworth,  op. 
cit. ,  p.  31  •)  Additional  developments  eventually  might  include 
arms  sales  or  much  harder  positions  on  lav/  of  the  sea  issues, 
but  would  exclude  almost  any  attempts  by  Japan  to  forcibly  coerce 
other  states.  As  has  been  argued  throughout  this  paper,  the 
ability  of  naval  vessels  to  exercise  such  suasion  is  declining, 
while  the  introduction  of  ground  troops  is  out  of  the  question. 
A  nuclear  decision  might  further  Japan's  general  bargaining 
position,  but  she  would  be  limited  in  her  ability  to  use  it  out- 
side of  a  deterrent  role. 


238 


consuming,  ever-changing,  and  vitally  important.  While  they  may 
have  had  a  one- dimensional  economic  aura  in  the  past,  they 
certainly  will  become  multi- faceted  in  the  future.  Should  the 
security  ties  with  the  U.S.  loosen,  the  additional  burden  of 
balancing  her  position  among  the  nuclear  powers  would  be  added. 
In  sum,  Japan's  weaknesses  require,  and  will  continue  to 
require,  continuous  foreign  policy  adjustments.  Even  with  the 
constant  factor  of  the  U.S.  military  relationship,  a  successful 
course  amidst  these  often-conflicting  pressures  is  a  noteworthy 
achievement,  though  it  could  be  better  presented  to  the  public 
as  such.  Should  a  neutralist  option  be  chosen,  she  will  not  be 
permitted  the  luxury  of  a  Swiss  or  Swedish-style  aloofness  from 
international  entanglements,  especially  since  economics  has  been 
elevated  to  the  status  of  "high  politics."  Her  dilemma  is  not 
between  international  ties  or  their  absence,  but  rather  how  to 
balance  the  conflicting  demands  of  multiple  linkages.  Indeed, 
the  problems  of  Singapore's  survival  might  be  a  better  analogy 
than  Switzerland's  perpetual  neutrality  or  Sweden's  non-alignment. 
In  time,  perhaps,  Japan  might  acquire  a  reputation  for  imparti- 
ality which  would  insulate  her  from  some  of  these  challenges, 
but  it  certainly  will  not  be  within  the  time  frame  of  this  study. 

External  Changes 

The  People ' s  Republic  of  China 

Predictions  regarding  post-Maoist  China  seem  to  lie  more 
in  the  realm  of  astrology  than  political  science.  Some 


239 


alternatives,  however,  include  (1)  a  general  continuation  of 
present  trends,  (2)  rapprochement  with  the  USSR,  (3)  a  more 
belligerent  China  or  (4)  a  fragmentation  of  the  nation  in  the 
course  of  a  power  struggle. 

It  seems  evident  that  the  present  situation  maximizes 
Japan's  flexibility.  A  tri-lateral  structure  in  the  Northwest 
Pacific  offers  opportunities  for  approaching  both  the  PRG  and  the 
Soviet  Union  while  reducing  her  dependence  on  the  United  States. 
The  easing  of  tensions  also  encourages  trade  relationships  and 
eases  the  pressures  for  defense  spending.  Washington's  recog- 
nition of  Peking  would  further  institutionalize  these  develop- 
ments although  it  could  have  unpleasant  aftereffects  if  China 
then  chose  to  strike  against  Taiwan. 

Much  of  this  flexibility  would  be  lost  should  the  Sine— 
Soviet  dispute  be  resolved.  In  this  event,  Japan  might  feel  the 
need  to  increase  her  own  defense  effort,  but  she  also  would 
almost  certainly  be  driven  back  towards  the  United  States. 

Similarly,  if  China  became  more  belligerent,  either  towards 
the  U.S.  or  her  neighbors,  there  would  be  strong  pressures  for  a 
larger  Japanese  security  role.  An  armed  PRC  attack  on  Taiwan, 
though  less  inflamatory  than  it  once  might  have  been,  would 
reverse  the  relaxation  of  tensions  in  the  region,  at  least 
temporarily.  To  succeed,  China  also  would  have  to  demonstrate 
a  quantum  jump  in  amphibious  or  airborne  capability  which  Japan 
might  find  disquieting.  Certainly  it  would  change  the  balance 


240 


of  power  in  the  Senkakus  and  western  Ryukyus.  A  PRC  naval  build- 
up could  be  another  justification  for  enlarging  the  MSDF.    At 
the  same  time,  unless  the  U.S.  showed  complete  indifference, 
Japan  probably  would  prefer  to  restrengthen  the  bi-lateral  ties 
rather  than  face  the  People's  Republic  alone.  It  is  possible, 
of  course,  that  Peking  could  try  to  force  Tokyo  to  chose  between 
itself  and  Washington.  It  even  is  possible  that  this  might  suc- 
ceed if  coordinated  with  some  of  the  U.S. -Japan  strains  noted 
earlier.  However,  the  initiative  in  such  circumstances  would 
remain  with  Washington,  which  could  maintain  the  ties  if  it  were 
willing  to  make  the  effort.  This  gambit  also  would  threaten 
China  with  isolation  against  both  the  West  and  the  Soviets. 

The  fourth  choice,  a  fragmented  China,  would  have  world- 
wide implications.  The  key  question  for  Japan  is  whether  the 
return  to  bipolarity  in  the  Northwest  Pacific  would  push  her  back 
to  the  U.S.  alliance  or  whether  she  would  be  drawn  into  the 
vacuum  herself.  The  only  real  benefit  of  the  latter  course  for 
Japan  would  be  psychological.  It  is  by  no  means  certain,  however, 


27 

In  the  face  of  competing  demands  by  the  nuclear  program, 

a  3  million  man  army,  and  an  air  force  and  riverine  force  for  the 
northern  border,  the  "blue  water"  component  of  China's  navy  has 
done  well  just  to  survive.  Nevertheless,  reports  persist  in  the 
Western  press  and  technical  literature  suggesting  that  the  PRC 
navy  may  soon  try  to  spread  its  influence  farther  afield. 
Missile  destroyers  have  been  built,  but  there  is  little  that 
could  operate  beyond  the  range  of  fighter  cover.  In  any  case, 
even  if  such  a  decision  were  made  soon,  the  time  lags  involved 
in  the  intelligence  evaluation,  decision-making  and  ship  con- 
'stfuction  would  put  it  well  into  the  1980s  before  a  PRC  build-up 
was  reflected  in  13SDF  force  levels. 


241 


that  she  could  take  China's  place  even  if  she  wanted  to.  At  the 
heart  of  the  PRC's  credibility  as  a  major  power  is  her  ability 
both  to  absorb  a  nuclear  strike  and  to  swallow  an  invading  army. 
Japan  can  do  neither,  and  her  leaders  know  it  very  well. 

One  probable  consequence  of  a  sharp  decline  in  Chinese 
influence  would  be  a  stronger  Japanese  position  towards  Taiwan 
and  Korea.  This  would  be  especially  true  in  the  case  of  seabed 
resource  disputes.  However,  the  relative  increase  in  Soviet 
power  would  make  the  U.S.  security  ties  more  attractive.  In 
turn,  this  would  restrict  Japan's  freedom  of  action  in  Southeast 
Asia.  Even  if  she  were  tempted  to  overlook  her  own  weaknesses 
and  play  a  larger  role  in  the  Northwest  Pacific,  she  would  be 
limited  farther  south  to  those  efforts  which  did  not  threaten 
America's  growing  economic  presence  there. 

In  sum,  events  in  China  will  be  keenly  felt  in  Japan.  It 
is  possible  that  these  would  spur  an  expansion  of  the  SDF,  or  a 
less  conciliatory  posture  towards  her  immediate  neighbors.  But 
unless  Washington  were  to  cut  her  off  completely,  Japan  would 
not  become  significantly  more  activist  in  the  region  as  a  whole. 

The  Soviet  Union 

The  future  course  of  the  USSR  is  relatively  more  predictable 
than  China's.  A  continued  policy  of  detente  on  the  one  hand  and 
friendship  and  economic  cooperation  with  Japan  on  the  other  would 
facilitate  Tokyo's  equidistant  diplomacy.  But  the  replacement  of 
the  Security  Treaty  with  a  Moscow-oriented  pact  is  inconceivable 


242 


in  the  near  future.  At  the  same  time,  Japan's  development  of 
Soviet  resources  will  be  carefully  designed  to  increase  her  own 
flexibility,  not  simply  to  substitute  one  potential  source  of 
blackmail  for  another. 

The  completion  of  the  second  Trans-Siberian  rail  line  in 
the  early  1980s  will  increase  Russia's  military  potential  in  the 
Far  East.  Without  a  complete  abdication  by  the  U.S.,  however, 
any  hint  of  its  use  would  only  drive  Japan  closer  to  Washington 
again.   The  same  probably  would  be  true  for  a  general  breakdown 
in  detente. 

The  United  States 

The  U.S.  and  Japan  may  drift  apart  if  the  axis  of  confron- 
tation continues  to  shift  from  East-West  to  North-South  problems. 
In  case  of  renewed  tensions  in  the  Northwest  Pacific,  America's 
reaction  will  be  the  key  to  Japan's  response.  Neither  the  Soviet 
Union  nor  China  would  be  able  to  keep  her  from  returning  to  the 
West  unless  the  U.S.  turned  away. 

In  the  meantime,  though  both  Washington  and  Tokyo  may  want 
to  retain  some  tangible  evidence  of  the  U.S.  commitment,  budgetary 

and  balance  of  payments  constraints  could  restrict  the  basing  of 

2ft 
American  units  in  Japan  before  too  long.    In  turn,  this  might 

provide  the  occasion  for  a  reevaluation  of  the  Security  Treaty 


28 

One  estimate  of  the  U.S.  base  costs  is  ¥200  billion 

(about  $670  million)  annually.  Cited  by  Taoka  Shunji,  December 
30,  1974. 


243 


system.  A  total  abolition  of  security  ties  would  not  be  in  the 
interests  of  either  side,  but  some  sort  of  redefinition  will  be 
almost  inevitable. 

Such  a  shift,  by  itself,  probably  would  not  lead  to  more 
emphasis  on  the  SDF,  but  it  could  in  some  areas.  Particularly 
in  the  logistics  field,  the  more  distant  the  U.S.  re-supply 
forces,  the  larger  the  domestic  capacity  would  have  to  be. 
Without  an  increase  in  tensions,  however,  few  changes  would  be 
demanded.   Some  additional  funds  might  be  appropriated  as  a 
symbol  of  resolve,  but  the  unit  costs  of  new  construction  are  so 
high  as  to  preclude  a  major  expansion  of  forces  without  a  drastic 
change  in  priorities.   If  anything,  it  would  be  the  non-SDF  com- 
ponent of  security  spending  which  probably  would  be  increased. 

It  is,  of  course,  theoretically  possible  that  an  increase 
in  tension  might  be  accompanied  by  American  indifference. 
Japan's  options  in  such  a  case  would  be  three-fold:   accommoda- 
tion, an  attempt  to  establish  her  neutrality,  or  expansion  of 
the  SDF,  with  a  possible  re-definition  of  their  roles.  A  priori 
it  is  difficult  to  predict  which  course  she  would  follow.  A 
combination  of  neutrality  and  enhanced  self-defense  might  be 
ideal,  but  the  choices  would  depend  greatly  on  the  state  of  the 
Sino-Soviet  balance  at  the  time.  The  likelihood  of  such  an 
abandonment  seems  remote,  however.   In  Robert  Osgood's  words: 

.  .  .  There  is  no  American  interest  in  Asia  that 
does  not  depend  on  America's  central  interest  in 


244 


maintaining  the  vitality  of  its  alliance  with 
Japan  .  .  .29 


Other  States 

It  has  been  argued  earlier  that  the  opinions  of  Southeast 
Asian  states  would  not  really  be  a  constraint  if  Japan  saw  her 
basic  interests  threatened.  Whether  or  not  they  could  be  a 
determinant  of  MSDF  deployments  i3  another  question.   Disturbances 
in  Indonesian  waters  might  threaten  the  crucial  tanker  routes. 
This  certainly  would  produce  calls  for  protection  of  the  ships,  but 
it  will  be  shown  later  that  no  amount  of  harassment  could  cause 
enough  economic  harm  to  offset  the  costs  of  deployments.  More- 
over, it  already  has  been  argued  that  naval  vessels  alone  are 
unlikely  to  quell  such  disturbances,  and  it  is  very  doubtful  if 
anyone  would  be  willing  to  commit  any  of  the  other  Self-Defense 
Forces  to  such  work.  Finally,  given  the  lack  of  logistics  sup- 
port, it  is  not  clear  that  the  MSDF  ships  could  operate  that  far 

from  home.  Nevertheless,  the  psychology  of  the  issue  is  such 

30 
that  it  might  stimulate  a  few  token  deployments. 


^Robert  Osgood,  The  Weary  and  the  Wary  (Baltimore:  The 
Johns  Hopkins  University  Press,  1972),  p.  91* 

*  Donald  C.  Hellmann,  in  Japan  and  East  Asia  (New  York: 
Praeger,  19?2),  argues  that  the  web  of  economic  ties  linking 
Japan  to  East  Asia  (including  Southeast  Asia)  inevitably  will 
draw  her  into  regional  politics  ".  .  .in  ways  that  ultimately 
will  require  a  new  and  expanded  security  policy."  (p.  169). 
This  may  well  be  true  eventually,  but  in  part  it  is  predicated 
on  continued  rapid  economic  expansion  which  seems  at  best  to 
have  been  delayed. 


245 


Changes  and  Continuities  in  Maritime  Affairs 

Although  these  arguments  mostly  seem  to  point  to  a  mainte- 
nance of  the  status  quo,  this  is  by  no  means  the  case.  Japan 
will  continue  to  act  to  maximize  her  flexibility.  Her  nuclear 
power  programs;  shipbuilding,  electronics  and  aircraft  industries; 
and  scientific  rocket  development  have  given  her  the  basis  of  a 
nuclear  option  should  she  so  choose.  The  Security  Treaty  System 
has  enabled  her  to  concentrate  on  economic  growth  for  over 
twenty  years.    Even  the  SDF  reflect  this  propensity  for  flexi- 
bility since  their  force  structures,  for  the  MSDF  and  ASDP  at 
least,  consistently  have  stressed  future  potential  at  the  expense 
of  current  capability.    Similarly,  the  whole  thrust  of  resources 
diplomacy  is  directed  to  the  maximization  of  alternatives. 

This  stylistic  continuity,  however,  may  encompass  major 
substantive  changes.  For  instance,  new  resource  finds,  techno- 
logical breakthroughs,  local  wars,  nationalizations  or  other 
discontinuities  may  alter  the  relative  importance  of  raw 
materials  suppliers.   (U.S.  and  European  markets,  however, 
almost  certainly  will  remain  central  to  Japan's  trade.) 
Increased  contacts  with  the  socialist  countries  may  have  far- 


31 

J   Whether  or  not  this  was  the  result  of  a  deliberate 

decision  in  1947,  as  Weinstein  argues,  or  through  the  lack  of 
one,  as  advocated  by  Auer,  does  not  alter  the  result. 

52See  Auer,  op_.  cit.  (note  5-34),  P«  145,  and  Hughes,  op_. 
cit.  (note  5-34),  P»  338. 


246 


reaching  consequences  as  the  PRC  and  USSR  enter  into  economic 
competition  and  interdependence  with  the  capitalist  world.  Such 
topics  quickly  will  lead  too  far  afield  for  this  study.  One 
area  which  can  be  investigated,  however,  concerns  extended 
claims  to  ocean  jurisdiction. 

A  Twelve  Mile  Territorial  Sea 

Having  agreed  in  principle  to  a  universal  twelve  mile 

33 

limit,   Japan  will  extend  her  own  three  mile  territorial  sea 

before  very  long.  Aside  from  the  fact  that  the  area  to  be 
defended  has  been  increased  severalfold,    the  shift  will  bring 
the  Tsugaru  Strait  (between  Honshu  and  Hokkaido)  completely  with- 
in Japanese  jurisdiction.  This  poses  two  problems. 

The  first  is  whether  or  not  the  strait  should  be  governed 
by  a  regime  of  free  transit,  or  one  of  innocent  passage.  The 
latter,  it  is  argued  (usually  by  defense  personnel),  is  more 
appropriate  on  national  security  grounds  because  of  the  limita- 
tions which  it  would  pose  on  Soviet  naval  and  air  operations 
(see  Chapter  Three).    The  mobility  of  U.S.  forces  would  not  be 


^Tokyo  Shimbun,  April  23,  1974- 

^From  58,650  sq.  km.  to  over  240,000  oq.  km.   3-mile  data 
from  U.S.  Department  of  State,  Office  of  the  Geographer.   12-mile 
figure  estimated  from  linear  extensions  (4x)  in  some  areas  plus 
greater  enlargements  (up  to  16x)  around  outlying  islands. 

^The  Eastern  Tsushima  Strait  (between  Iki  Island  and 
Shimonoshima)  is  25  miles  wide  and  thus  there  still  will  be  a 
mile-wide  corridor  of  the  high  seas  in  the  center.  The  Soya 
Strait  (between  Hokkaido  and  Sakhalin)  is  less  than  24  miles, 


247 


affected  by  virtue  of  bilateral  agreements.  Opponents  of  this 
position  point  to  Japan's  call  for  free  transit   (at  least  for 
surface  ships)  in  all  other  straits,  and  the  difficulty  (and 

danger)  of  doing  anything  about  Soviet  submarines  and  aircraft 

57 

if  they  did  not  comply  with  innocent  passage  provisions.    It 

seems  likely  that  a  regime  of  free  transit  eventually  will  be 
decided  on  for  the  Tsugaru  Strait. 

The  second  problem  involves  Japan's  three  non-nuclear 
principles.  A  warship  carrying  nuclear  weapons  in  territorial 
waters  presumably  would  violate  the  restrictions  on  the  importa- 
tion of  such  devices.  However,  if  Tsugaru  Strait  traffic  is  not 
to  be  restricted,  some  compromise  must  be  made  on  the  principles 
themselves. 

By  rights,  the  broadened  territorial  sea  should  justify 
some  increased  expenditures  for  its  protection,  at  least  for 


but  lies  partly  within  Soviet  jurisdiction.  The  Western  side  of 
the  Tsushima  Strait  is  23  miles  wide  and  would  be  overlapped  by 
Japan  and  South  Korea. 

36 

J   Yomiuri,  August  3,  1974* 

^'In  the  event  of  hostilities,  Japan  would  have  an  obliga- 
tion as  a  neutral  power  to  ensure  that  belligerent  warships  did 
not  violate  her  waters.  Norway's  failure  to  enforce  such  rights 
led  in  part  to  the  Altmark  affair,  while  Uruguay's  insistence 
on  them  resulted  in  the  scuttling  of  the  pocket  battleship  Graf 
Spec.  Whether  or  not  Japan  would  choose  the  latter  course  and 
risk  Soviet  wrath  remains  to  be  seen. 

58See  Mainichi,  August  8,  1974-  The  three  principles  are 
that  Japan  will  not  possess,  produce,  or  permit  the  introduction 
of  nuclear  weapons  into  her  territory. 


248 


improved  surveillance  systems  and  patrol  craft.  It  probably  will 
not,  however.  In  any  case,  the  additional  requirements  of  the 
territorial  sea  will  pale  before  the  demands  of  the  200  mile 
economic  zone  (see  below).  The  nuclear  weapons  question  does  not 
affect  the  MSDF  directly,  but  any  devaluation  of  the  three  non- 
nuclear  principles  (some  now  are  calling  them  the  2.5  principles) 
may  simplify  future  changes  in  attitude. 

200  Mile  Economic  Zone 

Although  Japan  consistently  has  opposed  the  200  mile  con- 
cept, it  is  almost  inevitable  that  she  will  follow  world  trends 
and  declare  one  herself.  The  complications  introduced  by  a  pro- 
liferation of  strictly  200  mile  claims  in  the  Northwest  Pacific 
would  be  formidable,  as  shown  in  Figure  '/-1 .  Under  any  set  of 
baselines,  Japan  will  have  oceanic  borders  with  The  Philippines, 
Taiwan,  the  People's  Republic,  South  Korea,  North  Korea  and  the 
USSR.   If  the  Northern  Marianas  become  an  American  territory, 
she  will  add  a  boundary  with  the  U.S.  as  well.  Moreover,  80 
percent  of  Japan's  distant-water  fish  catch  (40  percent  of  her 
total  yield)  would  be  within  the  zones  of  Canada,  the  U.S.,  the 
USSR  and  the  PRC . 

To  these  issues  also  must  be  added  the  difficult  problems 
of  the  Senkaku  islands  ownership,  whether  or  not  various  rocks 
and  islets  can  be  used  for  baseline  measurements,  the  use  of 
median  lines  or  continental  shelf  geomorphology  as  the  basis  for 
delimitation  and  the  status  of  the  Soviet-occupied  northern 


249 


=^_r&.\..0-r= 


250 


islands  as  the  source  of  a  200  mile  claim.  The  four  hatched 
(disputed)  regions  on  Figure  7-1  total  over  340,000  square  kilo- 
meters, more  than  90  percent  of  Japan's  land  area.  Figure  7-2 
illustrates  the  unresolved  boundaries  on  the  East  China  and 
Yellow  Sea  shelves.  Because  of  overlaps,  these  ocean  issues 
also  are  tied  to  the  hostilities  between  Taiwan  and  the  PRC  and 

between  North  and  South  Korea.  There  is  not  space  to  examine 

39 

these  arguments  in  detail,   but  a  greatly  increased  potential 

for  disagreement  certainly  will  exist  when  the  zones  are 
designated. 

It  is  this  development  (if  any  will)  which  may  bring  the 

greatest  changes  for  the  MSDF  and,  perhaps,  for  the  ASDF  as  well. 

The  requirements  for  enforcing  one's  jurisdiction  in  a  200-mile 

economic  zone  are  much  more  complicated  than  in  a  twelve-mile 

40 

territorial  sea.  Not  only  is  the  area  covered  much  larger, 

but  existing  radars  also  inadequate  for  monitoring  even  20  or  30 
miles  off  the  coast.  Besides  providing  issues  in  which  the  MSDF 
might  get  involved,  the  zone  also  will  require  more  LISA  patrol 
craft. 

Though  officials  recognize  that  Japan  would  be  better  off 
in  a  free  trade  environment,  the  economic  zone  could  come  to  have 


^See  park  Choon  Ho,  "Oil  Under  Troubled  Waters:  The 
Northeast  Asia  Seabed  Controversy,"  Harvard  International  Law 
Journal,  XIV  (Spring  1973),  PP»  212-260. 

4°3, 862, 000  sq.  km.  vs.  about  240,000  sq.  km. 


251 


Figure   7-2 


This  dormant  11   lor  backa'ound  Ml  ond  del   noi 


Disputed  Seabed  Areas  on  the  East  China  and  Yellow 
Sea  Continental  Shelf 


252 


great  popular  appeal.  After  all,  the  area  of  a  200-mile  claim 
would  be  more  than  ten  times  the  present  area  of  a  country  which 
always  has  been  concerned  about  its  lack  of  space. 

It  is  too  early  to  tell  whether  or  not  zone-related  dis- 
agreements will  be  resolved  by  means  other  than  diplomacy.  While 
no  formal  protest  was  made,  the  1974  Chinese  action  in  the 
Paracels  caused  private  concern  within  the  Gaimusho.    Had  China 
extended  her  reach  to  the  Spratlies,  fears  of  a  similar  gesture 
in  the  East  China  Sea  disputes  (notably  the  Senkakus)  would  have 
been  intensified.  For  the  moment,  however,  the  Senkaku  issue 

A  0 

officially  has  been  shelved  between  Tokyo  and  Peking. 

All  these  disputes,  of  course,  will  be  submerged  in  the 
larger  framework  of  Japanese  diplomacy.  As  rich  as  the  East 
China  Sea  continental  shelf  may  be,   it  has  been  less  important 
so  far  than  improved  ties  with  the  People's  Republic.  By  the 
same  token,  the  emotional  Northern  Islands  issue  has  not  pre- 
vented a  v/arming  of  relations  with  Moscow.  Resentment  over  ever- 
more-severe fishing  limitations  by  the  U.S.,  Canada  and  the 
Soviet  Union  also  has  been  kept  in  perspective.   In  the  future, 


/•1 
f  See  Jay  H.  Long,  "The  Paracels  Incident:   Implications 

for  Chinese  Policy,"  Asian  Affairs,  4  (l.larch/ April  1 974) »  PP» 

229-239. 

Agence  Prance  Presse  reported  (October  1,    1972)    that 
Chou  En-lai  had  dismissed  them  as   "a  few  fly-specks  on  a  map" 
during  his  meeting  with  Prime  Minister  Tanaka. 

A  1968  ECAFE  survey  pronounced  it  as  potentially  "one  of 
the  most  prolific  oil  reserves  in  the  world."     See  Park,   p.    213. 


253 


it  is  probable  that  Japan  will  intensively  develop  the  resources 
in  her  own  area  and  avoid  issues  provocative  to  the  superpowers. 
Whether  or  not  she  will  be  so  deferential  to  Korea,  Taiwan  or 
the  Philippines  is  questionable. 

Oceanic  States  and  the  "World  Lake" 

Figure  7~3  is  a  reproduction  of  part  of  a  State  Department 
chart  showing  the  area  under  Japan's  jurisdiction  should  the 
seas  be  entirely  divided  on  the  basis  of  median  lines.    Even 
before  this  ultimate  erosion  of  the  high  seas  was  reached,  how- 
ever, extensions  of  national  ocean  claims  would  create  a  group 
of  geographically  advantaged  states  with  control  over  especially 
large  areas  of  the  seas.  Malta's  Ambassador  Pardo  has  termed 
these  Oceanic  States,  and  has  suggested  that  they  may  come  to 

have  a  considerable  community  of  interest  linking  otherwise 

45 

disparate  stages  of  economic  development  or  social  systems. 

This  may  v/ell  be  the  case  in  the  future,  but  even  if  such  a 
division  could  be  arranged  in  the  period  of  this  study,  it  will 
be  many  more  years  before  Japan  is  likely  to  forge  major  diplo- 
matic ties  based  on  ocean  interests  alone.   In  the  Northwest 
Pacific,  such  an  area  would  not  add  many  more  problems  than  the 


^^U.S.  Department  of  State,  Office  of  the  Geographer, 
"World  Lake"  Chart. 

^Some  of  the  more  prominent  are:  The  U.S.,  the  USSR, 
Canada,  Australia,  New  Zealand,  Britain  and  France  (by  virtue  of 
distant  islands),  Chile,  Mexico  and  Brazil.  Japan  ranks  approxi- 
mately 10th  in  ocean  area  under  such  a  regime. 


254 


Figure  7~3 


Office  of  the  Geographer 
U.S.  Department  of  State 


JAPAN'S  SHARE  OP  A  PARTITIONED  OCEAN 


255 


200  mile  zone,  though  Japanese  fishermen  would  suffer. 

Summary 

There  is  no  compelling  evidence  to  support  forecasts  of  a 
major  change  in  the  domestic  political  constraints  on  the  MSDF 
during  the  next  five  years  or  so.  Beyond  that  there  is  more  un- 
certainty, but  little  indication  of  what  the  SDF  might  be  used 
for  even  if  they  were  unrestricted.  Even  were  commitments  to  be 
made  to  UN  peacekeeping  forces,  the  budgetary  limits  show  no 
signs  of  relaxation.   Indeed,  the  multi-nationalization  of 
Japanese  shipping  (along  with  that  of  most  other  nations)  may 
reduce  support  for  the  MSDF's  merchant  marine  protection  even 
further.    In  a  severe  recession,  some  defense  construction 
might  be  used  for  pump-priming,  but  this  probably  would  not  be 
significant.   If  the  decision  were  taken  to  permit  foreign  arms 
sales,  the  lowered  costs  from  longer  production  runs  might  ease 
some  SDF  procurement  problems  but,  again,  its  influence  would  be 
marginal.  A  U.S.  pullback  probably  would  dictate  a  logistical 
strengthening,  and  perhaps  some  increased  appropriations.   But 
there  are  no  signs  that  the  MSDF  would  be  used  to  fill  part  of 
the  vacuum.   If  any  stimulus  does  arise  for  an  increase  in  LISDF 


Of  course,  the  reverse  argument  also  could  be  made, 
namely  that  since  Japan  could  only  count  on  her  own  dwindling 
number  of  ships  in  time  of  emergency,  she  could  not  afford  to 
suffer  heavy  losses  and  thus  should  increase  her  sealane  defense 
capabilities.  Nonetheless,  bureaucratic  and  political  consider- 
ations make  it  doubtful  that  this  view  would  prevail. 


256 


capabilities,  short  of  a  drastic  change  in  the  international 
situation,  it  may  be  from  ocean  resource  zone  extensions. 

The  hypothesis  that  emotionally-based  demand  for  a  larger 
world  role  will  spur  a  defense  build-up  also  is  tenuous.  Unless 
an  immediate  threat  arises  in  the  Northwest  Pacific,  diplomacy 
will  continue  to  be  the  focal  point  of  Japan's  security  measures, 


PART  III 


THE  SEA  AND  JAPAN'S  STRATEGIC  INTERESTS 


Chapter  Eight  . 
Chapter  Nine 
Chapter  Ten 


Introduction 

.  The  Military  Dimension  -  Part  I: 
Global  and  Regional  Interests 

.  The  Military  Dimension  -  Part  II: 

The  Local  Balance  and  Other  Considerations 

.  The  Non-Military  Dimensions  of  Japanese 
Seapower 


THE  SEA  AND  JAPAN'S  STRATEGIC  INTERESTS 
Introduction 

The  relationship  between  seapower  and  Japan's  strategic 
interests  can  be  approached  in  at  least  two  ways.  The  first  is 
the  concept  that  Japanese  security  depends  on  a  stable  balance 
of  power  on  three  levels — global,  regional  and  local.  The  second 
is  keyed  to  the  versatility  of  naval  forces  in  meeting  or  deter- 
ring a  variety  of  threats,  and  to  the  potential  for  leverage 
inherent  in  non-military  ocean  activities.  The  distinction  also 
must  be  made  between  actions  designed  to  exert  pressures  on 
other  states,  and  those  meant  to  reduce  one's  own  vulnerabilities 
to  such  pressures. 

This  section  will  consider  some  ways  in  which  Japan  can  use 
the  seas  to  promote  or  protect  the  interests  outlined  in  Chapter 
Five.  The  general  roles  which  the  MSDF  can  play  on  each  of  the 
three  levels  will  be  examined,  followed  by  more  specific  discus- 
sions of  force  mixes.  The  constraints  and  their  evolution  out- 
lined in  the  previous  chapter  will  be  considered  to  apply,  but 
sometimes  will  be  relaxed  for  the  sake  of  argument.  A  final 
chapter  will  be  devoted  to  Japan's  commercial  seapower. 


258 


Chapter  Eight 

THE  MILITARY  DIMENSION  -  PART  I 
GLOBAL  AND  REGIONAL  INTERESTS 

At  the  present  time,  any  discussion  of  the  MSDF's  roles 
(indeed  of  any  part  of  Japan's  external  security)  must  consider 
the  United  States  as  well.  These  calculations  include  at  least 
four  questions: 

1.  What  are  Japan's  interests  on  a  particular  issue, 
and  does  she  have  the  ability  to  defend  them  by 

herself? 

2.  If  not,  do  U.S.  and  Japanese  interests  coincide? 

3.  If  they  do,  does  the  U.S.  have  the  capability  and, 
just  as  importantly,  the  will  to  act? 

4.  If  the  second  and  third  conditions  are  satisfied, 
what  contributions  can  Japan  make  to  the  U.S. 
effort?   If  they  are  not,  are  there  other  powers 
to  which  she  can  turn? 

One  may  question  the  wisdom  of  basing  plans  on  such 

continued  reliance  on  the  U.S.,  but  it  is  a  current  fact  of  life. 

The  Global  Balance 

Japan's  interests  on  the  global  level  lie  in  the  prevention 
of  a  general  war  and  in  the  stability  of  the  international  climate , 
She  will  be  unable  to  secure  them  by  herself.  On  the  whole,  how- 
ever, they  coincide  with  those  of  the  United  States,  especially 


259 


260 


on  the  prevention  of  nuclear  war. 

By  almost  any  projection,  Japan's  armed  forces  will  not 
have  a  major  impact  on  the  global  military  balance  within  the 
next  10-15  years.  Even  were  a  decision  on  full-scale  nucleari- 
zation to  be  made  today,  it  is  doubtful  that  anything  more  than 
a  force  de  frappe  could  be  created  within  this  time  frame.   Had 
the  great  economic  growth  rates  of  the  1960s  been  sustained,  it 
might  have  become  possible  to  offset  this  military  weakness  with 
other  forms  of  pressure.   However,  the  world-wide  shortages, 
uncertainties  and  instabilities  which  loom  in  the  future  are 
poor  conditions  for  Japan's  prosperity.  Neither  does  she  have 
large  reserves  of  food  or  raw  materials  to  offset  international 
imbalances  and  promote  moderation.  Japan  doubtless  will  continue 
to  play  an  important  role  as  a  major  industrial  nation,  but  her 
image  as  an  emerging  superstate  with  the  key  to  global  equilibrium 
no  longer  is  credible  (if  it  ever  was). 

Without  becoming  enmeshed  in  the  debates  over  "How  much  is 
enough?",  or  whether  or  not  mutual  deterrence  is  a  sane  v/ay  of 
avoiding  the  holocaust,  it  is  certain  that  Japan's  sense  of 

insecurity  would  be  increased  if  the  effectiveness  of  the  U.S. 

2 
strategic  forces  were  in  doubt.   In  any  case,  there  is  nothing 


For  instance,  after  more  than  a  decade  of  the  French  and 
Chinese  weapons  programs,  each  reportedly  still  had  fewer  war- 
heads than  the  U.S.  has  on  one  (MIRVed)  Poseidon  submarine 
(160  to  224  according  to  published  accounts). 

T?his  is  not  simply  the  question  of  whether  or  not  the 


261 


that  Japan  can  do  about  it  except  to  hope  that  America's  efforts 
to  preserve  the  balance  on  her  own  account  will  be  adequate. 

Both  nations  also  have  a  stake  in  creating  a  stable  inter- 
national climate,  but  Japan's  need  for  such  stability  is  greater, 
while  her  ability  to  promote  it  is  less.  This  asymmetry  contains 
the  seeds  of  several  possible  differences,  summarily  noted  in 
Chapter  Five.   In  the  first  place,  actions  which  America  takes 

to  stabilize  local  and  regional  conflicts  may  be  seen  as  escala- 

3 
tory  by  Japan.   In  the  second,  Washington's  ability  to  withstand 

pressures  involving  resources  and  energy  is  much  greater  than 
Tokyo's,   (indeed,  the  U.S.  itself  may  be  seen  as  a  primary 
villain  in  a  crisis  over  foodstuffs.)  This  is  related  to  the 
third  point,  which  is  that  the  U.S.  has  opted  for  strategies  to 
maximize  its  independence  from  resource  suppliers  while  promoting 
interdependence  in  the  industrialized  world.  Japan,  on  the  other 
hand,  has  tried  to  increase  its  interdependence  with  developed 
and  developing  countries  alike.  So  long  as  U.S.  policy  continues 
to  consider  the  weaknesses  of  the  Western  alliance  as  a  whole, 
Japan  will  be  protected  by  those  even  more  vulnerable  than  her- 
self. But  she  could  pay  dearly  for  her  previously  close  ties 


U.S.  "nuclear  umbrella"  applies  to  Japan.  As  noted  earlier 
(p»  159)j  the  "nuclear  umbrella"  issue  is  associated  with  the 
continued  utility  of  the  Security  Treaty.  Without  the  treaty 
there  still  might  be  an  effective  "umbrella"  but  without  a 
credible  U.S.  deterrent  neither  formal  nor  informal  ties  would 
provide  much  protection. 

%itness  the  alarmed  Japanese  reaction  to  the  U.S.  military 
alert  during  the  Yom  Kippur  War. 


262 


should  Washington  retreat  to  a  more  nationalistic  stance. 

In  point  of  fact,  Japan's  economic  policies  now  are  able 
to  affect  the  prosperity,  or  at  least  the  balance  of  payments, 
of  most  of  her  trading  partners.  Such  strength  implies  an 
influence  on  global  stability  as  well,  though  it  is  much  less 
easily  assessed  or  controlled.  Nevertheless,  the  military  ele- 
ments of  global  peacekeeping  will  remain  the  province  of  foreign 
forces. 

For  whatever  purpose,  American  seapower  can  bring  to  bear 
the  fleet  ballistic  missile  system  (Pffl) ;  a  flexible  array  of 
general  purpose  naval  forces;  a  limited,  but  increasingly  modern 
merchant  marine;  and  a  number  of  technologies  for  extracting 
food  and  energy  from  the  seas. 

The  FBM  is,  and  will  remain,   one  of  the  most  secure  parts 
of  the  strategic  balance.  The  U.S.  merchant  marine,  progressive 
though  it  may  have  become,  will  not  play  much  of  a  role  in 
global  stability.  Advanced  maritime  technology  may  be  stabilizing 
if  it  can  provide  distributable  surplusses  of  food,  resources  or 
energy.   If  it  is  used  simply  for  the  benefit  of  the  industrial- 
ized countries,  its  effect  will  be  neutral  at  best.   In  either 
case,  its  impact  probably  will  be  felt  only  gradually  over  the 
next  few  years. 

The  key  issue,  then,  is  the  degree  to  which  American 


^See  Tsipis,  et  al. ,  The  Future  of  the  Sea  Based  Deterrent, 
op.  cit.  (note  1-45T7  PP»  3_9» 


263 


general  purpose  forces  can,  or  will,  support  Japanese  interests. 
In  the  global  context,  this  boils  down  to  how  much  such  naval 
power  actually  contributes  to  stability.  A  definitive  answer, 
of  course,  is  impossible,  but  it  has  been  argued  in  Part  I  that 
the  absence  of  major  power  naval  forces  has  led  to  disorder  at 
sea  in  the  past.  However,  the  rising  costs  of  technological 
sophistication  have  reduced  the  numbers  of  ships  available  for 
peacekeeping  roles.  Moreover,  unless  some  dramatic  event  occurs 
to  re-establish  the  political  credibility  of  Western  warships, 
their  impact  on  coastal  states  will  decline  even  when  they  can 
be  present. 

Thus,  should  present  trends  continue,  the  U.S.  Navy's 
general  purpose  forces  will  become  less  and  less  able  to  maintain 
order  on  a  global  scale.  In  turn,  this  would  reduce  the  incen- 
tive for  Japan  to  build  her  own  naval  force  to  take  up  the  thank- 
less mantle,  even  if  the  domestic  situation  allowed  it. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  the  U.S.  acted  successfully  to 
restore  the  efficacy  of  gunboat  diplomacy,  the  choices  would  be 
more  difficult.   In  the  short  run,  American  military  action 
against  either  resource-rich  states  or  oceanic  claims  could  sub- 
ject Japan  to  severe  pressures  through  embargoes  or  retaliatory 
terrorism  unless  she  publicly  broke  with  the  U.S.  Should  that 
happen,  calls  for  a  naval  buildup  could  develop  since  (a)  the 
heretofore  all-important  security  links  with  Washington  might  no 
longer  be  credible  and  (b)  the  example  of  using  force  to  control 


264 


resources  might  have  been  made  attractive  as  a  last  resort. 
Although  her  growing  dependence  on  increasingly  diverse  regions 
would  make  it  impossible  for  Japan  to  pursue  such  a  policy 
successfully,  its  advocates  might  arise  nonetheless. 

Should  an  American  campaign  fail,  an  even  more  ambiguous 
situation  could  result.  The  apparently  diminished  utility  of 
distant-water  naval  forces  would  have  to  be  weighed  against  the 
loss  of  reassurance  which  would  accompany  the  break-up  of  the 
Security  Treaty. 

In  either  case,  however,  if  the  basic  relationship  could 
survive  the  short-term  stresses  (perhaps  through  resource- 
sharing),  there  would  be  little  incentive  for  naval  expansion. 
Either  someone  else  would  be  doing  the  peacekeeping  already  or 
it  would  be  evident  that  no  one  could. 

This  discussion  has  considered  neither  the  probability  nor 
the  propriety  of  such  actions  from  the  U.S.  point  of  view.  The 
point  simply  has  been  to  note  possible  Japanese  reactions.  The 

prospects  that  others  might  execute  such  a  policy  also  have  been 

5 

discounted,   mainly  on  the  grounds  of  capability. 

Regional  Balances 

The  Japanese  usually  think  of  their  regional  concerns    only 
within  East  Asia  and  the  Western  Pacific.      In  point  of  fact,    they 


The  question  of  the  re source- related  disputes  in  the  eco- 
nomic  zones  or  along  the  East  China  Sea  continental   shelf  will 
be  examined  later. 


265 


also  depend  on  stability  in  other  regions  as  well,  notably  the 
Indian  Ocean,  and,  increasingly,  Latin  America.  (See  Tables 
5-1  to  5-30 

Japan's  interest  in  these  areas  typically  involves  (1)  the 
acquisition  of  raw  materials,  (2)  the  maintenance  and  expansion 
of  markets,  (3)  the  safe  transport  of  exports  and  imports  and 
(4)  the  containment  of  regional  disputes.  Her  commercial  sea- 
power  can  support  the  first  two  objectives.  Naval  forces  may  be 
necessary,  though  not  sufficient  to  achieve  the  last  two  goals. 

Although  the  MSDF  now  is  restricted  to  training  squadron 
visits  outside  of  home  waters,  this  may  not  be  so  in  the  future. 
Japan's  regional  security  options  include  the  development  of 
enough  naval  power  to  act  as  a  surrogate  for  the  United  States 
in  the  Western  Pacific.  Alternatively,  she  could  totally  disavow 
such  involvements  and  abolish  the  American  presence.  In  between 
are  a  variety  of  choices,  to  be  discussed  below. 

Options  Involving  the  United  States 

( 1 )  The  continued  provision  of  bases  for  U.S.  Forces 
(Western  Pacific  only) 

The  deployment  of  extra-regional  warships  for  stabilizing 
regional  disputes  usually  has  all  the  disadvantages  associated 
with  global  peacekeeping.   In  an  area  such  as  the  Northwest 
Pacific,  however,  where  the  interests  of  three  nuclear  powers 
and  Japan  converge,  America's  ability  to  introduce  general  pur- 
pose naval  forces  can  be  genuinely  balancing.  Moreover,  thi3 


266 


interest  extends  throughout  the  region  in  so  far  as  neither  Japan 
nor  the  United  States  would  welcome  a  hostile  presence  or  a  state 
of  turmoil  astride  the  gateways  to  the  Indian  Ocean. 

The  availability  of  Japanese  bases  greatly  facilitates 
U.S.  operations  in  the  Northwest  Pacific,  but  the  Japanese  them- 
selves have  reservations  about  the  extent  of  America's  activities. 

The  contentious  points  have  been  the  "Par  East"  clause  of  the 

c 

Security  Treaty  and  the  system  of  "prior  consultations."   The 

Vietnam  Y/ar  raised  questions  about  the  geographic  scope  of  per- 
missible American  operations.   Reports  of  nuclear  weapons  aboard 
U.S.  warships  have  brought  doubts  about  Washington's  compliance 
with  consultation  agreements.  So  long  as  the  bases  are  used  to 
counter  Soviet  or  Chinese  pressures  on  Japan,  or  are  seen  to 
deter  a  Sino-Soviet  conflict,  there  will  be  few  limits  on 
America's  freedom  of  action.  However,  should  Japan  be  used  to 
support  operations  related  to  a  Taiwan-PRC  or  Korean  conflict 
there  is  likely  to  be  a  serious  domestic  outcry.  This  also  is 
true  for  possible  outbreaks  elsewhere  in  Asia,  although  neither 
the  Japanese  reaction  nor  the  U.S.  need  for  the  bases  would  be 
as  strong. 

In  the  past  many  members  of  the  LDP  have  supported  U.S. 


The  Par  East  clause  stems  from  Article  IV  of  the  Security 
Treaty.  The  consultation  formula  was  contained  in  an  exchange 
of  notes  between  Washington  and  Tokyo  dated  January  19,  i960. 
Some  of  the  resulting  problems  have  been  outlined  by  Emmerson, 
op.  cit.  (note  5~33)>  PP»  82-89» 


267 


actions  in  private  more  strongly  than  they  have  been  able  to  do 
openly.  But  it  is  not  certain  that  such  support  will  continue 
as  younger  politicians  come  into  positions  of  leadership.  This 
is  even  more  true  if  some  sort  of  coalition  government  develops. 

Thus,  America  might  find  itself  basing  contingency  plans 
on  facilities  which  could  become  unavailable  when  they  were  most 
necessary.  In  fact,  the  base  right  agreements  may  come  to  have 
little  meaning.  So  long  as  the  two  countries  remain  close,  U.S. 
ships  will  have  access  to  Japanese  ports  and  repair  facilities 
in  peacetime.   In  wartime,  if  Japan's  interests  are  threatened 
she  would  ask  for  assistance  and  the  U.S.  probably  would  accept. 
Should  Japan  not  see  her  interests  in  jeopardy  she  would  probably 
refuse  landing  rights  or  ship  entry  in  the  same  way  that  much  of 
Europe  did  during  the  Yom  Kippur  War. 

From  the  U.S.  military  standpoint,  of  course,  it  would  be 
better  to  keep  the  Japanese  facilities  even  though  they  will  have 

to  be  consolidated  rapidly.  Broader  consideration,  however, 

7 
might  suggest  a  retrenchment  to  the  Llarianas  or  the  Philippines. 

A  full  discussion  of  this  point  would  extend  far  beyond  the  scope 


^See  Chapters  Five  (p.  160)  and  Seven  (p.  242).  One  impor- 
tant counter- argument  to  such  a  move  is  that  the  return  of 
Okinawa  has  made  it  very  difficult  for  the  U.S.  to  get  to  Korea 
without  crossing  Japanese  airspace.   Indeed,  were  both  the 
Philippines  and  Japan  to  declare  a  200-mile  territorial  sea,  it 
also  could  become  impossible  to  get  to  Taiwan  legally  without 
permission.  Some  of  the  benefits  of  an  American  pullback  are 
given  in  James  H.  Webb,  Jr.,  Micronesia  and  U.S.  Pacific  Strategy; 
A  Blueprint  for  the  1980s  (New  York:  Praeger,  1974). 


268 


of  this  study.  As  argued  in  Chapter  Seven,  however,  such  a  with- 
drawal probably  would  not  lead  to  a  major  expansion  of  the  Self- 
Defense  Forces,  especially  if  it  were  done  tactfully  and  with 
adequate  consultation.  This  is  particularly  true  if  America 
explicitly  re-stated  its  commitment  to  Japan's  security  in  the 
process. 

(2)  Developing  the  SDF  to  free  U.S.  forces  for  other  duties 
(primarily  Western  Pacific,  but  also  the  Indian  Ocean  in 
a  more  limited  sense). 

This  could  be  accomplished  by  having  the  MSDF:   (a)  take 
over  some  of  the  reconnaissance  and  surveillance  duties  in  the 
Northwest  Pacific,  (b)  be  able  to  extend  the  period  in  which 
Japan  could  resist  direct  military  pressure  to  permit  the  wider 
dispersal  of  American  assets,  (c)  become  more  closely  integrated 
into  the  U.S.  force  structure,  for  instance  by  exercising  more 
frequently  with  available  U.S.  units,  or  even  by  providing 
escorts  for  carriers  where  possible,  (d)  develop  into  a  regional 
force  capable  of  acting  as  a  surrogate  peace  keeper  should  the 
need  arise. 

In  the  present  domestic  climate  only  the  first  and  second 
alternatives  are  feasible,  although  the  conduct  of  more  joint 
training  might  be  beneficial  and  not  too  sensitive. 

Since  the  MSDF  would  like  to  improve  its  intelligence 
apparatus  anyway,  it  probably  will  acquire  more  capability  for 
acoustic  surveillance  and  surface  ship  tracking  in  the  next  few 


269 


years.  In  turn,  this  information  could  be  made  available  to  the 
United  States.  Although  the  remote  sensing  technology  outlined 
in  Chapter  One  may  reduce  American  reliance  on  foreign  sources 
for  strategic  intelligence,  the  need  for  identification  and 
timeliness  will  continue  to  require  as  many  tactical  inputs  as 
possible.  Given  the  amount  of  cloud  cover  in  the  Northwest 
Pacific  (see  Figure  8-1),  some  low-level  reconnaissance  plat- 
forms could  be  very  useful. 

Since  no  major  acceleration  is  seen  in  the  rate  of  Japan's 
defense  build-up,  the  improved  capabilities  of  the  SDF,  per  se, 
are  unlikely  to  enable  the  U.S.  to  redeploy  many  of  its  units. 
Some  problems  of  the  defense  of  Japan  itself  and  suggestion  for 
SDF  improvements  will  be  found  in  the  next  chapter. 

The  integration  of  Japanese  ships  or  aircraft  into  American 
operational  units  will  be  politically  impossible  without  a 
drastic  change  in  the  threat  situation.  Indeed,  it  will  take 
concerted  efforts  just  to  keep  the  military  relationship  from 
drifting  apart,  much  less  to  strengthen  it. 

In  the  final  case,  the  previous  chapter  already  has  con- 
cluded that  the  next  decade  will  see  no  compelling  domestic 
pressures  for  a  geographically  expanded  MSDF  role.  Even  were 
the  defense  perimeter  pushed  outward,  a  more  activist  form  of 
naval  supremacy  is  unlikely.  As  Michael  MccGwire  has  noted: 
"The  flexibility  of  seapower  .  .  .  can  only  be  successfully 
exploited  when  there  exists  a  surplus  of  capability  over  one's 


Figure  8-1 


270 


-+-  l   i,  i 


NORTHWEST  PACIFIC  CLOUD  COYER   (in  tenths) 

Top  figure  in  each  block  is  the  average  for  the  clearest  month. 

Middle  figure  in  each  block  is  the  average  for  all  months. 

Bottom  figure  in  each  block  is  the  average  for  the  cloudiest  month. 

Source:  Hc0o  97.  Sailing  Directions  for  Japan. 


271 


Q 

essential  defensive  requirements  ....'•   Japan  will  not  have 
such  a  surplus  in  the  near  future.  With  the  exception  of  Singa- 
pore, it  also  is  hard  to  imagine  many  Southeast  Asian  countries 
which  would  welcome  a  Japanese  naval  presence  in  the  same  period, 
defensively  oriented  or  otherwise.  Though  this  would  not  be  a 
binding  constraint  in  itself,  it  would  reduce  the  incentive  for 
such  developments  from  Tokyo's  point  of  view. 

Even  should  it  become  theoretically  attractive,  a  serious 
drawback  in  attempting  a  wider  naval  role  is  the  historical 
generality  that  maritime  or  air  forces  rarely  have  been  decisive 
by  themselves.   It  would  be  one  thing  to  extend  the  MSDF  to  play 
a  more  visible  part  in  the  Western  Pacific.  It  would  be  quite 
another  to  develop  the  intervention  capability  which  might  be 
necessary  to  make  that  presence  credible.  On  the  other  hand,  it 
was  suggested  in  Chapter  Four  that  such  pointed  calculations 
rarely  enter  into  the  evaluation  of  naval  presence,  at  least 
among  the  persons  interviewed  by  the  author  in  Southeast  Asia. 
Moreover,  the  real  significance  of  a  distant-water  I.ISDF  deploy- 
ment would  be  as  a  reflection  of  a  major  political  change  within 
Japan  itself.  Under  such  condition  of  uncertainty,  the  influence 
of  Japanese  units  might  be  greater  than  would  be  warranted  by 
their  actual  capabilities,  at  least  in  the  beginning. 

Leaving  aside  the  development  of  a  regional  navy,  it  is 
interesting  that  none  of  the  above  suggestions  would  require 


8 


MccGwire,  _op.  cit.  (note  1  -54) >  P»  8i 


272 


major  changes  in  the  current  composition  of  the  SDP  (the  second 
point,  for  instance,  could  partly  be  accomplished  by  improved 
logistics).  As  will  be  discussed  later,  Japan's  present  force 
structure  may  not  be  best  suited  to  the  unilateral  protection  of 
her  own  interests,  but  it  is  nicely  complementary  to  the  U.S. 
Navy. 

Options  Involving  Countries  other  than  the  U.S.,  or 

Multi-lateral  Ties 

(1)  Cooperate  with  the  PRC  or  USSR  (Western  Pacific) 

Both  the  USSR  and  the  PRC  could  profit  greatly  from  mari- 
time cooperation  with  Japan.   Indeed,  each  might  gain  more  from 
such  assistance  than  the  United  States.  Were  Japan's  ties  with 
the  U.S.  to  loosen,  she  may  well  seek  closer  relations  with  her 
mainland  neighbors,  particularly  with  China.  Commercial  maritime 
associations  may  grow  rapidly.  However,  for  either  socialist 
country  to  play  an  active  part  in  regional  peacekeeping  and  for 
Japan  to  align  herself  with  one  of  them  would  require  domestic 
and  international  transformations  which  would  completely  alter 
the  Pacific  balance.  So  far  there  is  little  evidence  of  such  a 
shift.  Moreover,  the  anti-communist  sentiment  noted  in  Japan's 
leaders  extends  to  most  other  levels  of  the  society  as  well. 
Recent  election  gains  by  the  JCP  have  been  seen  more  as  an  anti- 
LDP  vote  than  as  a  pro-communist  one.  While  this  would  not 
dampen  Japan's  general  desire  to  improve  relations,  it  would 
pose  serious  obstacles  to  the  conclusion  of  closer  ties, 
especially  in  the  military  sphere. 


273 


(2)  Japanese  participation  in  UN  Peacekeeping  Operations 
(any  region) 

The  political  problems  of  Japanese  manpower  contributions 
to  UN  forces  were  noted  in  Chapter  Six.  Although  such  partici- 
pation would  seem  a  simple  way  to  begin  Japan's  demonstration  of 
increased  responsibility  in  international  affairs,  the  fact  that 
it  would  involve  the  dispatch  of  ground  troops  will  continue  to 
be  a  major  stumbling  block.  If  some  form  of  maritime  observers 
(perhaps  for  fisheries  disputes)  could  be  arranged,  it  might  find 

an  easier  acceptance  (LISA  officials  could  be  sent,  for  instance). 

9 
If  it  were  outside  Asia,  so  much  the  better.   While  such 

arrangements  may  seem  unlikely  at  present,  they  may  become  less 

so  if  law  of  the  sea  disputes  proliferate. 

(3)  An  Asian  Multi-Lateral  Force  (Western  Pacific) 

In  1973,  Prime  Minister  Lee  Kwan  Yew  of  Singapore  proposed 
that  Japanese  warships  might  join  a  multi-lateral  task  force  in 
Southeast  Asian  waters.  Although  Lee  was  concerned  mainly  with 
a  balance  of  major  power  fleets,  suggestions  also  have  been  made 

that  some  sort  of  ASPAC  or  ASEAN  squadron  might  be  feasible, 

10 
along  the  lines  of  NATO's  Standing  Naval  Forces. 


°This  discussion  is  limited  to  personnel.  The  MSDF  or 
LISA  also  probably  would  be  reluctant  to  part  with  a  scarce  ship, 
although  the  icebreaker  Fuji  has  been  dedicated  to  international 
Antarctic  research  for  several  years. 

10STANAVFORLANT  consists  of  about  four  destroyers  or 
frigates  each  drawn  from  one  of  the  NATO  fleets.   It  has  been 
in  operation  since  January  1968,  but  is  more  of  a  political 


274 


Within  ASEAN  itself,  such  an  organization  might  have  some 
merit,  at  least  symbolically.  There  even  is  an  operational 
foundation.  Thai  and  Malaysian  units  have  conducted  joint  anti- 
smuggling  patrols  along  the  Kra  Isthmus.  Indonesia  and  Malayesia 
also  have  cooperated  in  the  Straits  of  Malacca.  But  an  ocean- 
going standing  force  is  improbable.  For  one  thing,  Singapore 
has  no  ships  larger  than  missile  patrol  boats.  Thailand  and 
Malaysia  each  have  one  modern  frigate,  the  fleet  flagship  in 
each  case,  which  they  would  be  reluctant  to  commit  to  detached 
control.  For  another,  there  are  a  number  of  serious  ocean- 
related  disputes  among  the  member  states — Malaysia  (Sabah)  has 
at  least  tacitly  supported  the  Moslem  insurrection  in  the  southern 
Philippines  around  the  Sulu  Sea,  shelf-locked  Singapore  differs 
with  her  neighbors  on  the  control  of  the  Straits  of  Malacca,  and 
there  are  several  unresolved  seabed  delimitation  issues. 

Even  should  an  ASEAN  force  materialize,  it  is  doubtful  that 
Japan  would  be  invited  to  participate. 

The  anti-communist  oriented  ASPAC  has  become  moribund  with 
the  advent  of  de  tente . 

Perhaps  the  most  interesting  arrangement  (and  the  most  com- 
patible from  a  philosophical  and  material  standpoint)  would  be 
MSDF  cooperation  with  Australian  or  New  Zealand  units.  One  might 
even  speculate  on  Japan's  taking  Britain's  place  in  the  Five 


showpiece  than  an  effective  combat  force.  In  May  1973  a  Standing 
Naval  Force  Channel  was  activated,  and  there  is  hope  of  a  similar 
unit  in  the  Mediterranean. 


275 


Power  Defense  Agreement  (FPDA)  for  Singapore. 

It  must  be  reiterated  that  this  is  pure  speculation.  There 
is  no  evidence  pointing  to  such  cooperation  at  present.    As 
noted  earlier,  the  first  signs  of  Japanese  participation  in 
international  peacekeeping  probably  would  come  through  the  UN 

outside  of  Asia.  But  the  possibility  of  jie  facto  maritime 

12 

arrangements  with  other  states  cannot  be  excluded. 

(4)  Arms  Sales 

Present  limitations  on  arms  sales  stem  from  two  sources: 
(a)  the  Government's  1962  position  that  weapons  cannot  be  ex- 
ported to  (1)  countries  at  war,  (2)  Communist  countries,  or  (3) 
countries  under  UN  sanctions;  and  (b)  the  genez*al  political 
sensitivity  of  military  matters  in  Japan.  A  weapon  officially 

has  been  regarded  as  "a  tool  for  killing  and  injuring  and  for 

13 
direct  combat  purposes,"   but  the  interpretation  is  subjective. 

For  instance,  a  jeep  with  a  gun  mount  is  a  weapon,  and  cannot  be 


"1  *1 

Bix,  "The  Security  Treaty  System,"  op_.  cit.  (note   6-27), 
quotes  a  report  of  " .  .  .  naval  maneuvers  with  Australian  and 
Malaysian  warships  during  the  summer  of  1969  .  .  .  ."  Just  what 
these  consisted  of  is  not  clear.  There  are,  however,  few 
references  to  them  in  revisionist  wri tings  which  would  hardly  be 
the  case  had  any  sort  of  important  ties  been  developed. 

1  p 
The  U.S.  Navy,  for  instance,  might  act  as  an  intermediary, 

i.e.  joint  U.S. -Japanese  exercises  held  simultaneously  with  ANZU3 

training. 

1^Given  in  the  Diet,  March  23,    1972.     Quoted  by  an  official 
of   the  Equipment  Bureau,   JDA,    in  an  interview,   July  25,    1974* 


276 


exported.  Without  the  mounting,  it  may  be.  Such  equipment  as 
Japan  has  sent  overseas  generally  has  been  oriented  towards 
police  work,  but  some  have  been  questioned.  One  of  the  most 
controversial  contracts  involved  the  1 971  sale  of  helicopters  to 
Sweden. 

Nearly  all  Japanese  who  were  interviewed  regarded  the  pros- 
pects for  a  future  expansion  of  arms  exports  as  doubtful. 

Certainly  the  defense  production  sector  of  Japanese  industry  is 

15 
in  no  position  to  initiate  such  a  program  on  its  own.    But  the 

profitability  of  such  a  trade  might  promote  it  nonetheless.  This 
is  particularly  true  if  a  major  arms  market  developed  in  East  or 
South  Asia.   In  1 974>  for  instance,  it  was  reported  that  several 
European  firms  were  considering  the  establishment  of  weapons- 
related  plants  in  Singapore. 

In  the  past  twenty-five  years  there  have  been  adequate 
opportunities  for  Japanese  exports  in  other  fields.  Should  the 


1  A 

Although  Sweden  had  requested  them  for  police  work,  they 

were  based  on  a  U.S.  military  design. 

1  S 
^Defense  production  in  Japan  in  1973  accounted  for  about 

•  496  of  GNP. 

1  ( 

Several  sources  indicated  that  the  Dutch  Fire  Control 

System  manufacturer  Ilollandse  Signaalapparaten  would  establish  a 
factory  in  conjunction  with  a  Phillips  Electric  venture  already 
in  operation.  The  Swedish  and  Swiss  firms  of  Bofors  and  Oerlikon 
also  were  ostensively  interested  in  a  Singapore-based  operation. 
These  have  not  yet  been  verified  however.  The  Singapore  Ship- 
building Company  builds  fast  patrol  boats  with  assistance  from 
Lurssen  of  West  Germany.   Similar  craft  also  are  constructed  by 
a  subsidiary  of  Britain's  Vosper  Thorneycraft.  All  data  derived 
from  interviews  conducted  in  Singapore  between  May  28  and  June  4, 
1974. 


277 


economic  climate  become  particularly  severe,  however,  this  here- 
tofore forbidden  source  of  foreign  exchange  might  become  more 
attractive.  The  production  of  such  equipment  in  overseas  sub- 
sidiaries also  might  become  politically  acceptable,  though  it  is 
not  at  present. 

The  naval  component  of  such  sales  could  range  from  warships 

to  electronic  equipment  such  as  radars  or  radios  which  are  common 

17 

to  all  vessels.    Japanese  and  subsidiary  yards  have,  in  fact, 

built  a  number  of  vessels  which  appear  on  foreign  naval  rosters. 
They  are  listed  in  Table  8-1 . 

Note  that  most  of  these  ships  pre-date  the  1962  export 
restrictions.  Even  for  those  that  do  not,  such  designs  as  patrol 
craft  can  be  considered  as  being  for  internal  security  (police) 
rather  than  external  security  (naval)  duties.  Moreover,  any 
armament  now  on  board  almost  certainly  was  mounted  after  leaving 
the  shipyard.  One  measure  of  the  scrupulousness  with  which  the 
principles  have  been  observed  was  the  1965  decision  to  turn  down 

an  Indonesian  request  for  landing  craft  because  of  Konfrontasi 

1  ft 
with  Malaysia. 

Marine-related  defense  production  for  export  probably  will 

continue  to  bo  concentrated  in  shipboard  equipments,  such  as 


17 

The  Republic  of  China  (ROC)  navy,  for  instance,  uses 

Japanese  navigational  x-adars  on  some  units.  ROC  naval  officer 

(who  requested  anonymity),  interview,  May  8,  1974* 

1  ft 

Cited  in  Mat  sue  da  and  Moore,    op_.    cit.    (note  7-21),    p.   619« 


278 


Table  8-1 


FOREIGN  NAVAL  CONSTRUCTION  BY  JAPANESE  SHIPYARDS 


Year 

Country 

Type  Ship 

Number 

Builder 

1954 

Brazil 

Transport 

2 

Ishikawajima 

1955 

Taiwan 

Landing  Craft  (LCU) 

5 

Ishikawajima 

1956 

Brazil 

Transport 

2 

Ishikawajima 

1957 

Taiwan 

Torpedo  Boats  (FT) 

2 

Mitsubishi 

1957 

Brazil 

Survey  Ship  (armed) 

2 

Ishikawajima 

1958 

Philippines 

Command  Ship 

1 

Ishikawajima 

1961 

Indonesia 

Landing  Ship  (LST) 

1 

n.a. 

Submarine  Tender 

1 

Ishikawajima 

Ocean  Tug 

1 

n.a. 

Harbor  Tug 

2 

n.a. 

1966 

Philippines 

Hydrofoil  Patrol 
Craft 

2 

Hitachi  Zosen 

1968 

Israel 

Coastal  Patrol  Craft 

4 

Mitsubishi 

Brazil 

Oiler 

1 

Ishibras 

(in  Brazil) 

1969 

Taiwan 

Oiler 

1 

Ujina 

1974 

Burma 

River  Patrol  Craft 

20 
(about) 

Mitsubishi 

Source:   Jane's  Fighting  Ships  1974~75»  passim.  The  year,  in 

general,  is  the  date  of  launching.   Burmese  craft  noted 
during  several  interviews.  They  are  part  of  a  group  of 
about  50  boats,  some  of  which  are  used  for  cargo,  some 
for  ferry,  and  some  for  patrol  purposes. 


279 


electronics  or  auxiliary  machinery.  It  is  unlikely  that  such 
sales  will  approach  anything  like  the  present  volumes  of  Euro- 
pean firms,  but  some  increase  would  not  be  surprising. 

(5)  Training  of  personnel 

In  the  future,  it  is  possible  that  Japan  might  be  more 
willing  to  accept  the  overtures  for  the  training  of  developing 

country  military  personnel.  Officers  of  Singapore  and  Thailand 

19 

have  attended  Japan's  National  Defense  College  in  recent  years. 

Reportedly,  many  other  requests  for  training  from  Southeast  Asian 
countries  have  been  declined.  Such  assistance  can  leave  lasting 
impressions,  witness  the  influence  of  the  Royal  Navy  in  Japan 
from  the  beginning  of  the  build-up  of  the  Imperial  Navy  to  the 
end  of  the  Anglo- Japanese  Alliance. 

(6)  Financial  and  Technical  Assistance 

The  previous  chapter  indicated  that  non-military  security 
spending,  namely  various  forms  of  aid,  almost  certainly  would  be 
used  to  complement  the  formal  defense  budget.   The  explicit 
designation  of  such  funds  for  military  purposes  by  the  recipient 
country  would  cause  political  difficulties  in  Japan,  but  this 
constraint  may  weaken  in  the  next  few  years.  Even  if  it  does 
not,  however,  security  assistance  could  be  feasible  in  a  multi- 
lateral context.  For  instance,  a  financial  pool  might  be 
established  with  contributions  from  several  countries. 


19 
yMomoi  Makoto,  interview,  January  25,  1973' 


280 


Recipient  states  could  put  such  funds  to  a  variety  of  uses, 

20 

including  security.    The  direct  linkage  between  Japan  and 

foreign  weapons  procurement  thus  would  be  broken. 

By  the  same  token,  technical  assistance  or  ventures  with 
multiple  purposes — developing  country  shipyards,  for  instance — 
also  could  be  acceptable. 

Other  Regional  Considerations 

Two  final  points  of  regional  security  must  be  considered. 
The  first  is  the  safety  of  tankers  far  from  Japanese  home  waters. 
The  second  is  the  advantage  of  seeking  stability,  particularly  in 
the  Indian  Ocean,  through  ties  with  other  middle  power  navies. 

There  are  four  situations  under  which  Japanese  merchantmen 

could  be  threatened — through  a  breakdown  of  order  at  sea,  as  an 

21 

offshoot  of  a  local  war,   as  a  result  of  a  campaign  specifically 

directed  against  Japan,  or  in  connection  with  a  general  war  at 
sea.  Unless  the  U.S.  and  USSR  actively  oppose  the  first  trend, 
Japan  can  neither  expect  much  assistance  nor  act  effectively  in 
her  own  behalf.   If  the  ocean  situation  became  highly  chaotic, 
it  might  become  possible  to  escort  shipping  as  far  as  Southeast 


20 

This  is  similar  to  the  "Pacific  Fund"  idea  advanced  by 

several  prominent  Japanese.  The  author  also  investigated  this 

concept  during  the  trip  to  Southeast  Asia  and  found  it  well 

received,  in  principle  at  least. 

21 

Foreign  merchantmen  have  been  damaged  in  most  of  the 

recent  limited  wars — in  North  Vietnamese  ports  by  U.S.  bombing, 
off  Karachi  by  Indian  Styxs,  at  Latakia  by  Israeli  patrol  craft, 
in  Tripoli  by  Libyan  minefields,  and  on  other  occasions. 


281 


Asian  waters.  But  beyond  there,  MSDF  logistics  limitations  would 
preclude  effective  protection  unless  someone  else  was  willing  to 
include  Japanese  ships  under  their  own  escort. 

Similarly,  in  the  second  event,  the  overall  power  of  the 
U.S.  or  the  Soviet  Union  might  deter  deliberate  attacks  on  their 
merchantmen,  but  the  damage  incurred  in  local  wars  usually  has 

been  accidental,  and  hence  largely  undeterrable.  It  is  possible 

22 

that  some  sort  of  Nyon-type  guarantee   of  the  security  of 

shipping  in  the  vicinity  of  a  protracted  war  could  be  set  up. 
But  probably  the  best  that  Japan  could  hope  for  would  be  that 
superpower  intervention  would  halt  the  fighting  itself,  rather 
than  protect  the  ships  per  se. 

The  impact  of  law  of  the  sea  changes  on  Japan's  attitudes 
towards  distant  shipping  should  not  be  discounted.  In  the  late 
1960s  and  early  70s,  any  interruption  of  traffic  in  the  Straits 
of  Malacca  would  have  led  to  calls  for  defense  of  the  sealanes 
by  right-wing  Japanese  and  forecasts  of  J.ISDF  dispatch  by  leftist 
critics.  The  1968  grounding  of  a  VLCC  in  the  Straits  prompted  a 
series  of  navigational  surveys  in  which  Japan' s  participation 
generated  considerable  riparian  state  resentment.  In  January 

1 97  5 »  however,  the  237>698-ton  tanker  Show  a  Maru  struck  a  reef 

23        -     - 

off  Singapore.  Tokyo's  response  was  reported  as  follows: 


22 

See  above,  note  1-46. 

23 

It  is  interesting  that  the  ship  was  in  the  Straits  at 

all,  in  light  of  the  December  1972  Malay-Indonesian  declaration 
excluding  ships  over  200,000  tons.  Many  coastal  state  claims 
have  been  disregarded  during  the  law  of  the  sea  negotiations, 
however. 


282 


Confronted  with  this  big  incident  of  a  Japanese 
ship  polluting  international  waters  with  oil,  the 
Government  has  come  around  to  the  view  that  it 
appears  inevitable  that  free  navigation  of  shipping 
is  due  to  come  under  some  form  of  international 
restriction  in  the  future. ^4 

This  is  hardly  the  militaristic  outcry  once  envisioned. 

The  increasing  acceptance  of  restrictions  on  shipping 
through  legal  regimes  will  make  it  harder  to  justify  unilateral 
responses  to  restrictions  which  stem  from  local  wars  or  other 
disturbances  not  specifically  directed  at  Japan.  As  noted 
earlier,  however,  some  sort  of  multi-national  action  might  be 
possible  if  violations  of  propriety  become  too  flagrant. 

The  cases  of  a  campaign  against  Japan  itself  and  a  general 
war  at  sea  will  be  considered  in  the  next  chapter. 

The  other  basic  question,  concerning  the  advisability  of 
seeking  regional  stability  through  local  naval  hegemonies 
probably  will  not  be  Japan's  to  decide.  Devolutions  of  power, 
should  they  take  place,  will  be  determined  by  the  superpowers. 
Moreover,  such  surrogates  will  derive  their  primary  strengths 
from  superpower  arms,  to  which  Japan  can  offer  few  alternatives. 
In  its  pursuit  of  a  maximum  diversification  of  resource 
suppliers,  Japan  cannot  afford  to  be  on  the  wrong  side  of  a 
power  struggle  involving  an  entire  region,  and  so  would  do  best 
to  sell  her  offerings  (military  or  otherwise)  to  all  sides  or 
none.   It  was  suggested  in  Chapter  Four  that  stability  as  an 


"%KIW,  January  14,  1975,  P-  2. 


283 


offshoot  of  regional  hegemony  was  preferable  to  anarchy,  recog- 
nizing that  the  price  for  such  equilibrium  might  be  restrictions 
on  the  very  navigation  it  professes  to  protect.  It  is  in  such 
situations  that  Japan  can  best  contribute  to  both  her  own 
interests  and  the  evolution  of  the  international  system.  By 
using  her  own  formidable  marine  commercial  potential  to  build 
ships,  train  seamen,  etc.,  she  can  enhance  the  stake  of  the  con- 
testing powers  in  eliminating  restrictions  on  seaborne  trade,  at 
least  between  regions.  In  time,  these  might  lead  to  the  reduc- 
tion of  discrimination  to  some  lowest  common  denominator  while 
broadening  the  focus  of  ocean  management  beyond  the  national 
level. 


Chapter  Nine 

THE  MILITARY  DIMENSION  -  PART  II 
THE  LOCAL  BALANCE  AND  OTHER  CONSIDERATIONS 

Japan's  physical  security  and  political  autonomy  both  rest 

1 

on  a  balance  among  the  nuclear  powers  in  the  Northwest  Pacific. 

A  deterioration  in  this  local  equilibrium  could  lead  to  threats 
of  invasion,  air  attack  or  blockade,  attempts  at  intimidation  by 
demonstrations  of  force,  or  moves  against  third  parties  which  could 
create  undesirable  precedents.  Whether  or  not  there  were  any 
overt  pressures,  Japan  would  be  at  least  deferential  towards  any 
power  which  held  naval  superiority  in  the  Northwest  Pacific. 
Even  within  a  generally  stable  balance  there  may  be  conflicts 
over  ocean  resource  zones,  terrorist  activities  or  infiltration. 

It  is  at  this  local  level  that  the  MS DP  is  designed  to 
operate.   It  also  is  within  the  adjacent  sea  areas  that  its 
greatest  potential  lies,  for  that  is  where  Japan  can  act  as  a 
coastal  state  in  the  defense  of  her  interests. 

Patterns  of  Threats 

No  one  so  far  has  been  able  to  put  forth  a  txuly  believable 


This  would  be  true  even  if  she  pursued  armed  or  unarmed 


neutrality. 


284 


285 


scenario  for  an  attack  on  Japan.  There  simply  are  too  many 
hypotheses  which  must  be  strung  together  to  arrive  at  such  a 
threat  from  the  present  situation.  Another  approach,  however, 
may  be  more  fruitful.  Namely,  by  beginning  with  the  objectives— 
the  internal  changes  in  Japan  which  an  opponent  might  wish  to 
encourage — one  can  work  backwards  to  the  methods  which  might  be 
used  to  achieve  them. 

Basically,  Japan  could  find  herself  threatened  with  force 

2 

on  the  strategic  level  by  those  who  sought  to  (a)  overwhelm  a 

united  country,  (b)  weaken  the  nation  by  accentuating  internal 
divisions,  (c)  intimidate  the  government  if  the  State  were 

divided  or  (d)  promote  revolution  or  social  upheaval.  Tacti- 

3 
cally,   force  may  be  employed  to  impose  one's  point  of  view  in 

a  particular  dispute,  or  to  improve  a  negotiating  stance. 

The  key  point  is  that  neither  the  international  situation 
nor  the  domestic  one  can  be  considered  independently.  The  inter- 
action between  the  two  will  be  at  least  as  important  as  either 
by  itself. 


2 

I.e.,  in  such  a  way  as  to  endanger  the  territorial 

integrity,  political  autonomy  or  economic  well-being  of  the  home 
islands  themselves.  Some  rationales  for  such  pressures  might  be 
to  gain  better  access  to  the  Pacific,  split  the  Western  Alliance, 
eliminate  economic  competition  or  encourage  one's  own  brand  of 
revolution. 


cally. 


I.e.,  less  important  issues,  usually  localized  geographi- 


286 


Direct  Threats  to  the  National  Territory 

It  is  unlikely  that  a  united  Japan  would  be  left  to  face  a 
major  assault  alone.  Such  an  attack  could  not  be  quick  and 

easy.   Moreover,  there  is  no  question  of  the  legitimacy  of 

5 
Japan's  borders.   Thus  the  international  community  would  not  be 

presented  with  a  fait  accompli.  It  would  witness  several  weeks 
(at  least)  of  attacks  on  territory  whose  sovereignty  is  unques- 
tionable. However  far  America  might  have  renounced  its  inter- 
national commitments,  the  success  of  such  aggression  would 
establish  a  very  dangerous  precedent.  Similarly,  although 
sporadic  attacks  on  individual  merchant  ships  might  not  invoke 
U.S.  assistance,  America  is  too  dependent  on  her  own  sealanes  to 
allow  a  coordinated  campaign  against  Japan  to  go  unanswered. 

A  weakened  and  divided  Japan,  on  the  other  hand,  probably 
could  be  coerced  towards  the  desired  position  without  the  actual 
use  of  force. 


H'/hile  I  accept  Mr.  Kaihara's  critiques  of  the  Self-Defense 
Forces,  I  do  not  agree  that  the  country  could  be  quickly  over- 
whelmed— assuming  that  it  chose  to  resist.   See  Taoka,  op_.  cit. , 
(note  5-11),  passim. 

Excepting  the  Northern  Islands  question  and  some  seabed 
disputes.   But  these  will  be  discussed  later. 

Whether  or  not  the  process  of  such  intimidation  would 
unify  the  country  will  have  to  await  the  actual  course  of  events. 
Perhaps  the  most  dangerous  situation  (in  the  sense  of  leading  to 
a  longer  struggle)  would  be  a  case  where  outside  pressures 
created  a  will  to  resist  which  was  not  recognized  by  attacker 
and  allies  alike  until  the  fighting  already  had  begun.  This,  of 
course,  is  precisely  the  error  that  Japan  herself  made  at  Pearl 
Harbor. 


287 


The  potential  threats  which  a  united  Japan  might  face 
range  from  nuclear  or  conventional  air  strikes  to  invasion. 
Among  the  roles  which  naval  forces  could  play  in  such  situations 
are:   deterrence,  early  warning,  air  defense,  and  invasion 
defense. 
(1 )   Deterrence 

The  question  of  Japanese  nuclearization  has  been  explicitly 
excluded  from  this  study.  Were  such  weapons  to  be  decided  on, 
however,  there  would  be  valid  arguments  for  putting  them  in  sub- 
marines to  enhance  their  survivability.  Such  a  force  probably 
would  not  affect  the  MSDF  very  much.   The  fact  that  sea-based 
deterrence  resides  in  naval  ships  does  not  increase  a  nation's 
naval  power  per  se.  The  missile  submarines  would  not  be  avail- 
able for  ASW  or  anti-shipping  roles  until  they  had  launched  their 
weapons,  by  which  time  such  additional  capability  probably 
wouldn't  matter  very  much. 

The  conventionally- armed  SDF,  however,  can  deter  simply  by 
reducing  the  prospects  for  the  quick  (not  necessarily  the  ulti- 
mate) success  of  an  assault.  Such  a  philosophy  implies  that  at 
least  some  capability  should  be  maintained  against  as  broad  a 
range  of  threats  as  possible  to  minimize  the  chances  of  blackmail 
by  means  for  which  there  are  no  defenses.  This  is  reinforced  by 
the  fact  that  Japan  is  limited  in  her  ability  to  exert  counter- 
pressure  on  other  issues. 


288 


(2)     Eaxl.y  Warning 

One  of  the  weaknesses  of  Japan's  air-defense   system  is  the 
vulnerability  and  limited  number  of  air-search  radar  sites. 
(See  Figure   9-1«)      One  writer  has  noted  that  the  destruction  of 

any  two  adjacent  radars  could  leave  a  detection- free  approach 

7 
corridor  for  low  altitude  aircraft.        Furthermore,    even  when 

operational,    such  sites  are  horizon- limited  in  the  detection  of 

low  flyers. 

Airborne  Early  Warning  (AEW)  aircraft  can  give  the  most 

effective  notice  of  impending  air  attack.   Surprisingly,  none 

are  included  in  the  ASDF  inventory,  although  halting  steps  are 


7 

Hughes,  _op_.  cit.  (note  5_34),  P«  334*   It  should  be 
remembered,  however,  that  few  other  countries  are  better  off. 
In  NATO,  for  instance,  the  NADGE  system  (NATO  Air  Defense  Ground 
Environment)  contains  ".  .  .no  provisions  for  the  detection  and 
countering  of  missiles  and  low-level,  sub-radar  threats." 
Furthermore,  although  additional  coverage  is  provided  by  inter- 
faces with  national  air  defense  systems  in  some  countries,  NADGE 
also  is  vulnerable  to  the  creation  of  detection- free  corridors 
by  the  destruction  of  only  a  few  radars — particularly  in  the 
south.  This  probably  will  not  be  remedied  until  the  U.S.  A7/ACS 
(Airborne  Warning  and  Control  System)  becomes  operational  late 
in  the  1970s.   (See  Jane's  Weapon  Systems,  1973-74,  pp.  195-196.) 
The  U.S.  southern  coast  is  vulnerable  from  Cuba — a  fact  often 
stressed  in  the  early  1960s.   In  part,  each  of  these  cases  is  a 
corollary  of  the  7Je  stern  defense  philosophy  which  (until 
recently,  anyway)  emphasized  sophisticated  equipment  in  neces- 
sarily smaller  numbers.  The  contrasting  approach  is  provided  by 
the  Soviet  air  defense  network,  which  is  built  around  thousands 
of  relatively  simple  (and  overlapping)  radar,  missile  ajid  gun 
sites. 

Q 

See  the  description  of  the  American  AWACS  in  Richard  D. 
English  and  Dan  I.  Bolef,  "Defense  Against  Bomber  Attack," 
Scientific  American,  CCXXIX  (August  1973),  pp.  11-19. 


289 


Figure  9-1 


Hughes,  p.  355 


JAPANESE  AIR  DEFENSE  RADAR  COVERAGE 


290 


9 
being  taken  to  procure  them.   On  an  interim  basis,  therefore, 

and  also  in  areas  away  from  the  primary  threat  axis,  MSDF  units 
sometimes  could  provide  mobile  radar  coverage  and  additional 
intelligence. 

It  is  recognized  that  picket  duty  is  an  inefficient  use  of 
Japan's  ASW-oriented  destroyers  and  frigates.  Furthermore,  the 
ships  assigned  to  such  stations  traditionally  have  suffered 
heavy  casualties — witness  the  tremendous  losses  of  U.S.  destroyers 
off  Okinawa  in  1 945*  Nevertheless,  if  no  alternatives  were  avail- 
able, and  air  attacks  were  expected,  the  diversion  of  some  MSDF 
ships  to  early  warning  tasks  might  be  attractive.  As  a  change  in 
policy,  it  also  would  signal  an  awareness  of  a  coming  crisis  and 
a  willingness  to  respond  to  it. 

(3)  Air  Defense 

Most  MSDF  ships  are  poorly  suited  to  break  up  massed  air 
attacks,  or  even  to  defend  themselves.  Only  Amatsukaze  has  a 
surface-to-air  missile  capability,  although  two  more  guided 
missile  destroyers  (DDG)  will  be  added  by  the  end  of  the  Fourth 
Defense  Plan. 

In  any  case,  the  important  targets  to  be  defended  are  on 
land,  except  possibly  for  offshore  oil  fields.  Moreover,  even 
a  missile  ship  probably  would  require  more  fighters  to  defend  it 


9 

The  AEW  acquisition,  along  with  the  PXL,  was  delayed  by 

the  debate  over  domestic  production. 


291 


than  its  armament  could  free  for  other  tasks.  Should  forward 
air  defense,  fighter  cover  for  ocean  resource  disputes,  or  pro- 
tection of  outlying  islands  be  required,  however,  the  limitations 

10 
of  the  F4EJ   (the  Japanese  version  of  the  U.S.  F-4  Phantom  air- 

11 

craft)  might  necessitate  shipboard  air  control.    This  in  turn 

would  require  greater  coordination  between  MSDF  and  ASDF  units — 

the  more  so  because  the  MSDF,  unlike  the  USN,  does  not  have  air 

12 

defense  aircraft  of  its  own  to  draw  on  for  experience. 

In  inshore  waters,  air  defense  weapons  on  patroling  ships 
could  force  frequent  changes  in  the  approach  and  exit  corridors 


10 

In  order  to  restrict  the  offensive  potential  of  the  air- 
craft, its  self-contained  air- intercept  capability  was  reduced. 
Instead,  target  information  is  fed  to  the  aircraft  from  ground 
radars.   It  is  questionable  how  well  this  would  work  in  an 
intensive  electronic  warfare  (EW)  environment  or  if  some  of  the 
ground  stations  were  destroyed,  but  even  in  peacetime  some  sort 
of  forward  base  probably  would  be  needed  for  offshore  operations, 

11 

Air  control,  in  this  sense,  means  the  shipboard  capa- 
bility to  direct  fighters  to  intercept  other  aircraft.   One 
essential  device  for  such  work  is  a  height- finding  radar,  which 
now  only  is  found  on  Amatsukaze .   The  MSDF  potential  for  air 
control  missions  could  be  improved  fairly  quickly  by  the  instal- 
lation of  height-finding  or  three-dimensional  radars  on  newly 
built  or  refitted  ships. 

12 

Hegrettably,  there  is  little  evidence  that  such  coopera- 
tion is  developing.  No  ASDF  aircraft  were  involved  in  the  Yuyo 
Maru  sinking  (see  below,  p.  $17)*   Though  this  had  some  basis  in 
budgetary  and  operational  concerns,  it  also  appears  that  neither 
the  MSDF  nor  ASDF  was  very  enthusiastic  about  a  joint  training 
exercise.   (JDA  official,  interview,  December  13,  1 974* )  Auer, 
op.  cit.  (note  5-34) >  PP«  291  ff.  16,  notes  a  1971  case  where 
ASDF  aircraft,  assigned  to  make  simulated  attacks  on  MSDF  units, 
mistakenly  made  their  passes  against  a  Soviet  destroyer,  thus 
precipitating  a  minor  international  incident. 


292 


for  attacking  aircraft,  thus  complicating  an  opponent's  planning. 
In  this  regard,  mobile  anti-aircraft  units  on  barges,  or  con- 
tainerized SAM  mountings  could  be  very  useful  items  of  coastal 
air  defense. 
(4)   Defense  Against  Invasion 

Whatever  their  other  missions,  the  SDF  must  have  some 

ability  to  defend  Japan  against  invasion,  however  remote  that 

•1  2 

possibility  may  be.    It  has  been  suggested  (Chapter  One)  that 

air  superiority  is  the  key  to  control  of  coastal  waters.  Despite 
the  limited  range  of  Soviet  fighters,  it  is  doubtful  that  the 
ASDF  could  maintain  control  over  the  skies  of  Hokkaido  and 
northern  Honshu,  especially  since  its  airfields  would  become 
early  casualties.  However,  during  the  first  stages  of  an 
invasion  they  could  provide  cover  for  a  naval  strike  against 
the  landing  force  in  addition  to  delivering  their  own  ordnance. 
Moreover,  by  distracting  the  escorts  they  could  provide  better 
opportunities  for  submarine  attack. 


13 

See  above,  p.  15/.   One  uncertain  factor  in  invasion 

defense  is  the  willingness  of  the  Japanese  people  to  resist. 
A  recent  survey  indicated  that  "if  Japan  is  invaded  by  armed 
force  by  a  foreign  country,"  44/«  of  those  interviewed  would  flee 
or  not  resist.   (Tokyo  Shimbun,  November  24,  1973)*  On  the  other 
hand,  the  same  poll  showed  over  yQf/o   willing  to  fight  with  the  SDF 
or  to  offer  guerrilla- type  resistance — a  manpower  pool  of  over 
thirty  million  if  extrapolated  to  a  national  response.   It  is 
very  hard  to  judge  wartime  reactions  from  peacetime  polls.  How- 
ever, several  observers  have  suggested  that  the  surrender  and 
peaceful  occupation  of  1945  were  possible  so  long  as  foreign 
troops  were  not  on  Japanese  soil.  Had  the  invasion  actually 
taken  place,  it  is  said,  the  resistance  would  have  been  bitter 
and  lengthy. 


293 


As  Taoka  has  pointed  out,  the  amphibious  forces  of  the 
Soviet  Pacific  Fleet  are  limited.    In  particular,  they  have: 


Table  9-1 

SOVIET  PACIFIC  AMPHIBIOUS  ASSETS 
(as  of  July  1,   1974) 


Type 

Class 

Number 

1ST 

Alligator 

4 

lsv/m 

Polnocny 

MP8 

MP4 

15 
2 

8 

LCT 

Vydra 
MP  10 

35 
10 

Capacity  (each) 

1,700  tons,  30  light  tanks,  about 
15  medium  tanks 

350  tons,  6  tanks  (est.) 
400  tons,  6  tanks 
?  tons,  6-8  tanks 

250  tons,  6  tanks  (est.) 
150  tons,  4  tanks 


59      24-25,000  tons,  about  480  tanks 

and  armored  vehicles 


Source:  M.  MccGwire,  et  al.,  Soviet  Naval  Policy,  Chapter  22 

(LSV  and  LCT  class  figures  estimated.  Type  totals  only 
were  specified  in  most  cases.)  These  numbers  are  con- 
siderably higher  than  those  given  in  Jane's  Fighting 
Ships,  1974-75. 


Thus  the  250  medium  tanks  (T54/55)  and  19  light  tanks 

1  R 

(PT76)  of  a  single  Soviet  mechanized  division  would  require 
more  than  half  the  capacity  of  the  Pacific  amphibious  forces. 
The  problem  is   compounded  when  armored  personnel  carriers,    tank 


^Taoka,  _op_.   cit.    (note   5_11)>   P»   28. 
1^The  Military  Balance   1974~75,   p.   83. 


294 


destroyers  and  artillery  are  included.  When  coupled  with  the 
tenuous  supply  lines  at  the  end  of  the  Trans-Siberian  Railway 
and  the  Chinese  position  on  the  Russian  flank,  the  direct 
invasion  threat  to  the  home  islands  does  not  seem  particularly 
impressive.  This  is  true  even  should  the  Soviet  Union  use 
merchant  shipping  support  and  airborne  troops  for  the  initial 
strike.  This  point  is  magnified  by  the  frequently  rough  waters 
in  the  Sea  of  Japan,  the  vulnerability  of  such  a  landing  force 
to  submarine  attack  throughout  its  transit,  the  Japanese  exper- 
tise at  mine  warfare,  and  the  fact  that  the  GSDF  keeps  four 
divisions  and  300  tanks  deployed  in  Hokkaido  against  such  an 
eventuality. 

The  People's  Republic  of  China  is  even  less  of  a  direct 
menace,  with  some  4-00  miles  of  sea  to  cross,  and  a  much  less 
capable  long-range  amphibious  force.  Indeed,  the  PRC  has  had 
great  difficulties  mounting  assaults  against  the  Nationalist- 
held  offshore  islands  ever  since  1 949 • 

The  use  of  Korea  as  a  stepping  stone  would  add  several 
possible  threat  axes  to  complicate  Japan's  planning,  but  would 
not  offset  the  socialist  countries'  logistics  or  transport  weak- 
nesses. 

Thus,  neither  China  nor  the  Soviet  Union  could  afford  to 
suffer  many  losses  in  an  amphibious  operation  without  seriously 
degrading  its  ability  to  sustain  the  campaign. 

This  situation  is  not  so  secure  with  regard  either  to  the 


295 


southwestern  Ryukyus,  or  some  islands  on  the  East  China  Sea 
continental  shelf.  Both  probably  could  be  taken  by  a  quick 
attack,  and  an  incentive  might  be  provided  if  there  were  dis- 
coveries of  nearby  seabed  resources.  The  defense  of  these  areas 
will  be  discussed  below  in  connection  with  oceanic  boundary  pro- 
tection. 

The  question  now  arises  of  the  armament  for  ships  in  an 
anti- invasion  role.  The  advantages  of  ship-to-ship  missiles 
have  been  proven  on  numerous  occasions.  Speed  and  sea-keeping 
ability  will  be  important,  especially  in  the  Sea  of  Japan. 
Although  some  air  defense  will  be  necessary,  it  would  be  expected 
that  fighters  would  provide  cover  insofar  as  possible.  Thus 
point  defense  rather  than  area  defense  systems  would  be  more 
cost-effective.  A  major  anti-submarine  suit  would  be  superfluous 
since  most  of  the  sensors  would  be  incompatible  with  a  sudden, 
high-speed  strike.  Should  some  sort  of  screen  be  needed,  it 
might  be  provided  by  shipboard  helicopters.  The  most  suitable 
platform  for  such  a  mission  from  speed  and  maneuverability  stand- 
points probably  would  be  a  surface  skimmer. 

In  sum,  then,  the  optimum  surface  ship  for  the  protection 
of  Japanese  coastal  waters  would  seem  to  be  a  surface  effect 
ship  or  hydrofoil  with  SSMs,  a  reasonable  air  control  capability, 
point  defense  weapons,  and  a  minimal  ASW  suit.  Air  cover,  par- 
ticularly in  the  Sea  of  Japan,  should  be  available.  These  also 
should  be  complemented  by  submarines,  both  for  attacks  on  the 


296 


landing  force  and  on  escorts  or  pickets. 

Such  submarines,  incidently,  need  not  be  nuclear.  The 
increased  cost  of  an  SSN  makes  sense  only  if  Japan  were  to  adapt 
a  defense-in-depth  strategy  of  carrying  attacks  to  the  enemy 

while  his  submarines  were  in  transit,  or  sinking  his  own  coastal 

1 6 

shipping.    If  attacks  on  invasion  forces  or  blockades  of 

straits  are  to  remain  their  primary  mission,  it  is  not  certain 

that  a  noisy,  first-generation  SSN  would  be  much  more  effective 

17 

than  a  quiet,  advanced  conventional  boat.    On  the  other  hand, 

building  at  least  a  few  nuclear  submarines  would  give  Japan 

additional  options,  as  well  as  experience  in  the  construction  of 

1  8 
such  ships.  '   With  the  increased  cost  of  fuel,  the  life  cycle 

19 

costs  of  an  SSN  also  might  not  be  disproportionate.    In  any 


1  C\ 

Janes  E.   Auer,    in  "Japanese  Militarism,"  US NIP t   XCIX 

(September  1973)>   P»   51 1   notes  that  "If  attacked,    [Japan's] 

forces  would  be  authorized,    the  government  has  stated  since  1 959? 

to  attack  enemy  bases."     Presumably  this  also  would  include 

forays   into   the  Sea  of  Okhotsk     or  the  western  Sea  of  Japan. 

17 

The  Soviet  Union  has  continued  to  build  non-nuclear  sub- 
marines, some  of  which  may  use  exotic  propulsion  systems  such  as 
the  Walther-cycle  pioneered  by  Germany  during  Y/orld  War  II. 
Alternatives  might  be  hydrogen  peroxide  systems  like  Britain's 
Explorer  and  Excaliber,  improved  fuel  cells  or  high-capacity 
batteries. 

1  ft 

Commander  Sekino  has  noted  that  a  warship  power  reactor 

would  not  be  subjected  to  international  inspection  under  the 

non-proliferation  treaty.  Japan  thus  could  carry  out  advanced 

research  without  fear  of  losing  industrial  secrets  if  NPT  were 

ratified. 

19 

A  1972  study  found  that  the  average  construction  costs 

of  a  nuclear  submarine  ranged  from  2.4  to  11. 4  times  those  of  a 
conventional  boat,  with  5*1  a-s  "the  most  likely  figure.  Life 


297 


case,  the  decision  probably  will  be  based  more  on  political  con- 
siderations than  on  military  ones.  It  would  be  facilitated  if 
world-wide  trends  pointed  to  the  wide-spread  use  of  such  plants 
in  merchant  ships. 

It  may  be  useful  at  this  point  to  compare  this  approach  to 
that  adopted  by  Sweden  and  in  Germany  whose  naval  concerns  are 
mostly  coastal  defense.  Table  9~2  summarizes  Swedish,  German 
and  Japanese  defense  forces. 

Note  that  Japan  is  able  to  maintain  a  force  roughly  three 
times  as  large  as  Sweden's  with  only  a  quarter  of  the  burden. 
The  SDF  have  become  slightly  less  than  half  the  size  of  Germany's 

with  only  about  a  third  of  the  relative  expenditures.  Of  course, 
numbers  alone  are  a  poor  measure  of  a  nation's  military  effec- 
tiveness. The  point,  however,  is  to  show  that  the  general  result 
of  the  Japanese  defense  effort  does  not  compare  unfavorably  with 
that  of  some  European  States.  Neither  is  it  unreasonable  in 
light  of  the  current  threat  to  environment  and  her  more  secure 
geographic  situation. 


cycle  multiples  lay  between  1 .65  and  4»25  with  2.90  as  most 
probable.   See  the  abstract  of  LCDR  James  R.  Shreckengaust,  USN, 
"Conventional  vs  Nuclear  Attack  Submarines"  (U),  unpublished 
thesis,  U.S.  Naval  War  College,  Newport,  K.I.,  1972.  SECRET/ 
NOFORN  in  Naval  War  College  Journal  of  Abstracts  1971-72,  p.  95* 

20 

This   is   true  even  despite   the  Ivlutsu  fiasco.      See   below, 

note  10-13. 

21 

For  instance,  much  of  German  land  effort  is  devoted  to 

tanks  and  armored  personnel  carriers  for  use  on  her  northern 


298 


9 

S 

•~3 


ft    PP 


o  o  o 

o 

ocno 

LP, 

^1- 

• 

LP,-*—    ON 

ON  O   CO 

LP, 

LP, 

in 

LP.  CO  VO 

^ta  c— 

VO 

CNJ 

o 

• 

*•,      •*      «> 

*-       m 

«, 

n 

rH 

CO 

m  on  p— 

VO   CM 

CO 

VO 

CO 

CD 

CO     T~ 

T— 

VO 

O 

VO 

8 

^^ 

VO   rH 

■h 

• 

VO 

' — \/ — N^-""S 

p< 

<■ — xx — xx — X 

- — X 

| 

o 

+ 

o  cm  o 

NN 

r-  VO  O 

CM 

T-      P« 

0] 

KN 

s 

•rl 

3 

CM 

LP,  "«*  O 

O 

LP  CO  CM 

VO 

ON 

NN 

"4"  T-    CM 

"xt 

r— 

o 

o 

Ob 

CM 

T— 

<*■ 

CO 

NN 

23 


S 


CD 
O 


CM 
I 

o> 

0) 

cd 

En 


CO 
M 
P 


c3 

en 

H 

1 

O 


CO 
CD 

o 

U 
o 


o 
o 

CO 


r. 

i 


a;  tj 

a  pq 


s-~\ 

k( 

CO 

c 

M 

•H 

CD 

-y 

r^ 

i— i 

p 

•H 

;j 

3 

tq 

PQ 

O  O  CM  O 

r-0\O  Vf 

C — vO  CO         NN 


^t  'SJ-  NN 


o  o  o 


r-Ovo 
t-  NN 


CM 


o 

CM 


O  CM   O         O 
LP.T-    O  O 

CM    CM    £—  '=* 


vo 


O  VO   CM 


CO  CM    CM 


"nJ- 


CM    lT\f- 


o  o  o 


O  CM   CM  CM 

r-  VO  CM 


o 

ON 


ON 

o 


CM 


O 
CM 


ON 


O    LP,  O 

o 

O    O    LP, 

o 

O 

O   ON 

** 

O    CO    LP, 

VO 

NN 

O   ON 

T— 

nn  nn  NN 

LP, 

C— 

•.       *h 

■*•*•* 

M 

•n 

■^ON 

LP.VO  ON 

V— 

vO 

CM 

CO 

CM 
NN 


CO 

CD 

fH 

O 

pq  co 

O 

&4    u 

o 

CO 

•t 

o  -P 

r~ 

VO     P* 

CM 

o 

-  o 

+ 

Pj   -H 

O 

S    0) 

o 

o 

LP,  CM 

ON 

T-  CM 

NN 

co 

CD 

H 

co 

O 

u 

O 

CD 

ON 

-P 

■ft 

Ph 

CNJ 

O 

o 

+ 

•H 

rH 

o 

CD 

o 

W 

ON 

CM 


CO     CO 
U     CD 

CD    -P 

C?£ 


-p 

CO 
CD 

R 


CO 
CD 

Pi 

H 
H    3 

n  a 

P 

CO 


O 

u 

-p 
nj 

ra  CL, 
CD 

-p 
-p 

CD 

o 
o 


OJ 


co  pq 

•H 


o 
CD    C 

o 

EH 


CO 

U 

CD 

Pi 

CD 
CD 
•£ 

CO 

CD 
Cj 


Ckfz* 


h 

rH 

•rH 

CD 

«l 

l-l 

O 

Gj 

CO 

> 

fH 

a 

CD 

a 

PU 

299 


CO 


*3 

3 

o 

^  Pn 

^  CO 

$ 

Q) 
CO          T* 

PI  d   5        S) 

1 

s 

o 

CO 

5  p 

Ph 

o  o  ha  o  -h 

^"9 

o 

Pn 

£ 

•H   -H   -H   Tj     Pi 

o 

o 

o 

o 

divis 
divis 

me  br 
briga 

leiy  b 

0) 

•t 

o 

toi  >^-  CO 

.2 

ON 

CM 

T— 

LOi 

•H 

N^ 

O  Q 

r— 

II 

T" 

S3 

+ 

f<-\  O 

n 

D 

Jbd     CO 

*•     •* 

o4 

•      <     O   Tl   H 

te  p< 

o 

o  o 

| 

€ 

O 

CO 

^<H^I    CD  -H 

o  rf  fh  h  -p 

CO     3 

W  o 

o 
o 

r— o 

KN  o 

& 

CO 

CJ1 

On 

CD   -H   -H   -H     Pj 

a      dad 

O    S) 

■t 

CO 

CO 

•t 

^H- 

VO 

o 

O 

CM 

v^- 

LP> 

o 

<3- 

1— 

*— 

«* 

*■"   *—    t-   r~   r— 

t-   l_T\ 

r— 

CO 


TH 

CD 

S 

•H 
-P 
PJ 
O 

o 


CM 

I 

ON 

<x> 
1-1 
& 

CO 
EH 


CO 
CD 

o 

u 

o 

fin 


O     T- 

t-    ON 
1*1    CJ3 

O  CO 
CO  MD 


II     II 


O1  cr1 
CO    CO 

O   CO 


S3 


-P 

•H 


^   d  -d 

■D    ij      Cf 

CO     CO 

Ph 

«=4  r—  O 
oo  ir\\o 

N^    I       I 

I     ^W 
<$  <3  CO 


Ph 

o 


>3    T3  TD 


CO 


-3  o4 

cr*  co 

CO 

n 


I     KN 
*-)     I 
•-5 


CD 
Pi 

% 

o 

£ 

o 

o 

•t 

o 

LT\ 

VO 

CO 

II 

+ 

s 

o 
o 

CF* 

o 

CO 

•> 

o 
-p 


CT1    CJ1 
CO     CO 


o  w 

CM    LOi 

ro,  n~\ 

I      I 

CO  CO 

CM   N^ 


CO 
CD 

-3     CD 

Cf    CO 
CO     CD 

""-v  U 

-P 

<H    O 

CO  o 
pi  o 

O  CM 

u 

•H     + 

cd 
o 

CO  O 
■p-  r— 

on 


o 

CO 

CD 

cd 

Pi 

O 

-p 

o 

a 

-p 

Pi  -p 

cd 

CD    ft 

CO     CO 

XI     CD 

to   Pi 

CO    Ti 

-P    O 

•H     CD 

u  2 

cd   Pi 

cd  -P 

o   d 

CD     CD 

d  ■£ 

-P    o 

fs  -P 

2   fcio 

tiD  Go 

d 

O  -H 
O  Ph 

•H 

rH 

CD 

(*< 

<«J 

« 

0 

N 

■H 

co   Pi  co  co  co 

CD    O  CD  CD  CD 

tl  -p  xi  "d  "ti 

cd   o  cd  cd  cd 

toa  to  to  ta 

•H  -H  -H  -H 

Pi    Pi  Pi  Pi  Pi 

X>     O  X>  rO  ,0 


co 
o 

H 

o. 


CM    K~\ 


O       '  O 
M3   OJ    ^T  LP\ 


CO 

s 

o 
o 
o 


CO 
CD 

Pi 
O 

o 

o 


o 

o 

CO 


o  o 

^o 

MD   O 

CO  o 

^CO 
<M   f— 


M3 


o  o 

L—    O 

o  o 

CO  O 

1° 

co 


OS 
CM 


ir\ 


■«h- 

ON 


cd 


CO  ^— x 

y1 

cd  r<A 

cd 

^>  3  cr\ 

-p 

•H 

T-     -P     T- 

rH 

^r~-H--/ 

•H 

CM       CJN  tH 

^- 

J^S£ 

CD 

CD 
CO 

-d  ^° 

Xi 
EH 

P! 

rH 

cd    O    CD  Ch 

CD 

CD 

CD   -H            O 

tH 

rl 

Pi  -ij   cd 
co   cd   co  V5 

•  • 

CD 

9 

CD 

« 

O 

rH     CJ 

O 

CO 

T)     d     CD     CO 

B 

Pi 

Pi 

p;  ftCn  cd 

•H 

CD 

CO    O    CD 

o 

-^ 

r4 

h4  ft  « 

CO 

500 


Still,  the  emphasis  placed  by  Germany  and  Sweden  on  small 
patrol  craft  for  coastal  defense  is  important.  Particularly 
valuable,  although  not  shown  in  the  table,  are  the  shelters  which 
Sweden  has  built  for  her  ships.  Carved  out  of  rock  along  the 
coast,  they  are  said  to  be  capable  of  withstanding  nuclear 
attacks.  Earthquakes  would  be  a  drawback  against  such  a  plan  for 
Japan,  but  since  civilian  submarine  tunnels  have  been  designed, 
this  should  not  be  insoluble.  In  any  case,  the  fate  of  the  North 
Vietnamese  torpedo  boat  fleet  after  the  Gulf  of  Tonkin  incident 
indicates  the  fragility  of  exposed  fast  patrol  boats.  Unlike 
logistics  improvements,  such  shelters  would  be  fairly  long  lead- 
time  items,  whose  construction  would  have  to  be  begun  well  in 
advance  of  hostilities. 

Direct  Threats  to  the  Sea  Lines  of  Communication 

(1)   The  Nature  of  the  Problem 

In  contrast  to  the  coastal  orientations  of  Germany  and 
Sweden,  problems  of  sealane  protection  weigh  heavily  on  Japanese 
defense  planners.  The  experiences  of  World  War  II  are  an  impor- 
tant part  of  these  concerns.   In  that  conflict: 


plains.  Aside  from  the  obvious  lack  of  land  frontiers,  Japan's 
topography  limits  the  usefulness  of  such  mobility  even  if  it 
were  available.  Similarly,  Japanese  ground  attack  aircraft  are 
restricted  by  their  potential  as  "offense  weapons."  Note  also 
that,  despite  its  large  size,  the  Bundesmarine  is  primarily  a 
coastal  defense  force.  Over  half  its  tonnage  is  devoted  to 
support  ships. 


301 


The  war  against  shipping  was  perhaps  the  most 
decisive  single  factor  in  the  collapse  of  the 
Japanese  economy  and  the  logistic  support  of 
Japanese  military  and  naval  power. 22 

Today  the  nation  is  even  more  dependent  on  imports  than  in  the 
1940s,  and  its  stockpiles  are  lower.  The  size  and  value  of 
modern  tankers  and  container ships  drastically  increases  the 
importance  of  each  sinking,  while  the  modern  submarine  is  much 
more  capable  than  its  predecessors.  By  no  stretch  of  the  imagi- 
nation could  the  present  Self-Defense  Forces  protect  the  ocean 
lifelines  in  a  sustained  campaign. 

The  improbability  of  such  an  offensive   may  suggest  that 
it  should  be  dismissed  out-of-hand  but  the  fact  remains  that 
Japan's  weakness  to  this  form  of  attack  is  conceded  by  nearly 
all  analysts,  whether  they  support  or  oppose  an  escort  role  for 
the  MSDF.  What  are  frequently  overlooked,  however,  are  her 
strengths  and  the  vulnerabilities  of  her  potential  opponents. 
Therefore,  to  highlight  these  points,  as  well  as  to  introduce 
the  concept  of  containerized  weapon  systems,  it  is  worth  dis- 
cussing sealane  defense  at  some  length. 

For  the  sake  of  argument  this  analysis  accepts  the  "worst 
case'*  assumption  of  a  Soviet  campaign  against  Western  Pacific 


uSSBS,  The  War  Against  Japanese  Transportation  (hereafter 
Transportation) ,  op.  cit.  (note  1-55) »  P«  6. 

^fccGwire,  op_.  cit.  (note  1  —  54) »  has  pointed  to  the 
unlikelihood  of  a  submarine  attack  against  NATO  on  the  grounds 
of  Soviet  capabilities,  requirements,  national  interests  and 
intentions.  Many  of  the  same  arguments  operate  in  Japan's  behalf 
as  well. 


J02 


shipping  around  1980.  It  already  has  been  suggested  that  the 
U.S.  would  almost  be  forced  to  offer  at  least  some  assistance 
under  these  circumstances.  The  less  intense,  but  perhaps  even 
more  dangerous  case  of  sporadic  attacks  on  widely  dispersed 
merchantmen  will  be  examined  later. 

The  crucial  factor  for  Japan  in  a  modern  guerre  de  course 
would  be  time.   Initial  losses  would  be  heavy,  since  the  sub- 
marine fleets  probably  would  be  deployed  prior  to  hostilities, 

O  A 

and  convoy  systems  could  not  be  organized  immediately.    These 
sinkings,  particularly  if  they  included  a  few  supertankers,  would 
have  a  great  psychological  impact.  Insurance  and  freight  rates 
would  be  driven  to  extraordinary  levels.  Seamen  might  balk  at 
serving.  But  the  rapidity  with  which  the  overall  economy  would 
be  affected  will  depend  on  a  number  of  conditions.  Among  them 
are:   (1)  stockpiles,  (2)  austerity  measures,  (3)  the  availability 
of  substitute  materials,  either  domestically  or  from  regions  which 
are  not  cut  off  by  the  fighting,  (4)  the  ability  of  the  ship- 
building industry  to  replace  losses,  and  (5)  the  effectiveness  of 
defensive  measures,  taken  either  unilaterally  or  in  concert  with 
allies. 


O  A 

The  critical  shipping  situation  faced  by  the  Allies 
immediately  after  the  resumption  of  unrestricted  submarine  war- 
fare in  1917  probably  is  a  better  analogy  for  a  modern  undersea 
campaign  than  the  World  War  II  experiences.  In  the  latter  case, 
nearly  three  years  passed  between  the  commencement  of  hostilities 
and  the  greatest  submarine  successes.  The  U-boats  recorded  their 
best  hunting  in  1941  and  '42,  while  U.S.  submarine  sinkings 
peaked  in  1944* 


303 


Moreover,  it  must  be  kept  in  mind  that  the  defense  of  the 
sealanes  is  not  an  end  in  itself.  The  United  States  must  keep 
the  North  Atlantic  and  Pacific  open  in  order  to  fulfill  its 
treaty  commitments,  as  well  as  for  its  own  security  and  com- 
mercial motives.  Japan,  on  the  other  hand,  needs  only  to  be 
able  to  survive  for  the  duration  of  a  conflict.  A  combination 
of  increased  stockpiles,  domestic  conservation  and  a  credible 
capability  to  protect  at  least  part  of  her  commerce  may  enable 
her  to  remain  neutral  in  a  war  which  is  not  specifically  directed 
at  her,  and  to  hold  out  long  enough  for  foreign  help  to  arrive  in 
one  that  is. 

Unclassified  reports  of  U.S.  war  planning  are  difficult  to 

come  by.  In  the  North  Atlantic,  however,  a  termination  within 

25 

90  days  is  assumed.    Under  such  conditions,  in  a  NATO  war  in 

1980,  it  is  expected  that  some  185  American  merchantmen  would  be 

26 

sunk — from  a  total  of  about  450  U.S.  flag  vessels.    The  assump- 
tions and  data  underlying  this  study  are  not  available r   and  it 
therefore  is  hazardous  to  extrapolate  the  results  to  the  Pacific. 
However,  a  figure  of  about  200  ships  lost  in  the  first  three 
months  of  a  Pacific  War  also  might  be  reasonable  as  a  first 


25 

Blackwell  Testimony,  op_.  cit.  (note  1-52),  pp.  58-69. 

26 

Ibid.   Included  are  43  containerships,  83  other  dry 

cargo  vessels,  39  tankers,  and  20  older  vessels  from  the  reserve 
fleet.  U.S.  fleet  total  is  a  1978  estimate  from  Kasputys,  op. 
cit. ,  p.  162. 


304 

27 

approximation.  One  reason  for  this  is  indicated  in  Table  9~3» 

Note  that  the  U.S.  Pacific  fleet  and  the  MSDF  comprise  a  rela- 
tively larger  share  of  non-communist  ASW  units  than  the  Soviet 

28 
Pacific  Fleet  does  of  socialist  submarines.    Moreover,  in  both 

oceans  geography  has  been  unkind  to  the  USSR,  with  choke  points 

at  the  entrance  to  the  Baltic  and  the  GIUK  (Greenland-Iceland- 

UK)  gap  in  the  Atlantic,  and  at  the  Tsushima,  Tsugaru  and  Soya 

Straits  in  the  Pacific.  Only  Petropavlosk  in  Kamchatka  faces 

the  open  ocean,  and  it  is  restricted  by  weather  and  logistics. 

Bases  in  the  Kuriles  could  be  developed  or  serviced  by  tenders, 

but  there  still  would  be  logistics  problems. 

Thus,  though  it  would  seem  that  fewer  than  185  ships  would 

be  lost  in  the  Pacific,  a  figure  of  200  will  be  used  to  allow 

for  LIS  DP  weaknesses  and  the  possible  diversion  of  U.S.  assets  to 

a  simultaneous  NATO  crisis.  This  is  a  tremendous  loss  rate. 

Drawing  from  one  projection  of  average  ship  size  and  numbers  in 

29 

1980,  7  it  would  equate  to  over  3,900,000  GRT.  By  contrast,  the 


27 

The  Soviet  decline  is  derived  from  the  assumed  phase-out 

of  more  than  120  diesel  submarines  (Q,  W  and  Z  classes)  built 

during  the  mid-1950s.  A  replacement  rate  of  9  attack  submarines 

a  year  was  assumed,  with  the  rest  of  Soviet  attention  being 

devoted  to  missile  boats. 

28 

This  assumes  that  USSR  and  PRC  assets  would  not  be  addi- 
tive in  an  oceanic  conflict  in  the  near  future.  Were  they  to  be, 
the  geographic  constraints  on  the  USSR  would  be  broken  since, 
presumably,  she  also  could  use  Chinese  bases. 

29 

Bates  and  Yost,  "Where  Trends  the  Flow  of  Llerchant 

Ships,"  op.  cit.  (note  2-3),  pp.  258-259.  Data  as  follows: 


305 


Table   9-3 
A  COMPARISON  OF  SUBMARINE  AND  ASW  ASSETS  IN  THE  NORTH 
ATLANTIC  AND  NORTH  PACIFIC   IN  1974  AND  1980 


Submarines  (excluding  FBMs) 


Atlantic 


USSR  (Northern  &  Baltic  Fleets) 
Warsaw  Pact 


Pacific 

USSR  (Pacific  Fleet) 
PRC 


1214 

204 

6 

210 


75 

49 


(a) 


1980 


155 
6 

161 


55 
50 


ASW  Units 

Carriers 

00 

Ocean v  ' 

Sub» 

Carriers 

&  Helo 

&  Helo 

Ocean 

Sub- 

Carriers 

Escorts 

marines 

Carriers 

Escorts 

marines 

Atlantic 

U.S. 

7 

96 

39 

6 

94 

38 

Potential 

-z 

148 

100 

_^ 

152 

_28 

Allies(d) 

10 

244 

139 

11 

246 

135 

Pacific 

U.S. 

8 

96 

39 

6 

94 

38 

Japan 

__— 

45 

14 

, 

JA 

12 

8 

141 

53 

6 

148 

51 

Source:      Jane's  Fighting  Ships,    1 974_ 75 •      1980  figures   estimated 
from  probable   fleet  buildup  programs  and  retirements  of  aging 
ships.     U.S.   assets  distributed  equally  between  Atlantic  and 
Pacific — a  reasonable  assumption  based  on  1971    data. 

Notes: 

(a)  Soviet  Naval  Developments,  Chapters  22  and  23,  give  155  and 
60  respectively  for  mid-1974  Soviet  submarine  strengths. 
1980  figures,  however,  are  not  markedly  different. 

(b)  CG(ex  DLG),  DDG,  DD,  FF  or  foreign  equivalents 

(c)  SSN,  SSGN,  SSG,  SS.  Coastal  submarines  included  for  those 
nations  bordering  choke  points. 

(d)  Britain,  France  (two- thirds  only,  assuming  some  Mediterranean 
commitment),  Canada  (two- thirds,  assuming  a  Pacific  squadron), 
Netherlands,  Belgium,  West  Germany,  Norway,  Denmark. 


506 


heaviest  losses  which  Japan  suffered  to  submarines  during  an 

equivalent  period  in  World  War  II  were  1 64  ships  of  756,000 

30 
tons . 

Even  in  the  unlikely  case  that  the  full  weight  of  the 

attack  fell  on  Japanese  shipping  it  is  not  the  magnitude  of  the 

loss  alone  which  must  be  considered.  It  is  submitted  that  the 

important  issues  are  (a)  the  amount  of  the  loss  as  a  percent  of 

Japan's  total  transportation  capacity  and  (b)  the  ability  of  her 

shipyards  to  replace  it.  The  tonnage  noted  above  comprises  about 

10  percent  of  the  1973  Japanese  merchant  marine  (presumably,  it 

51 

would  be  a  somewhat  smaller  part  of  the  1980  fleet  )  and  is 


Type  Ship 

Tanker 
Bulk  Carrier 
Container  Ship 
General  Cargo 


Avg.Size 

(cwt) 

75,000 

45,000 

13,500 

8,000 


io  of 

Total  No. 

19.5 

14.4 

7.8 

58.5 


Number 
Lost 

39 

23 

16 

117 


Tonnage 
Lost 

2,925,000 

1,260,000 

360,000 

936,000 


5,861,000  DWT 
equals  about  3,926,800  GRT 

If  the  mix  of  lost  ships  was  the  same  as  the  1974  Japanese  fleet 
proportion,  the  losses  would  total  4,825,000  GRT.  Using  the 
breakdown  of  U.S.  projections  given  by  Secretary  Blackwell 
(extended  to  200  ships)  adds  up  to  3,447,000  GRT. 

*HJSSBS,  Transportation,  op.  cit.  (note  1-55),  p.  47.  The 
maximum  sinkings  occurred  between  August  and  October  1944'   It  is 
not  clear  whether  this  is  GRT  or  DWT. 

31 

Although  Japan's  merchant  tonnage  is  expected  to  increase 

in  the  next  few  years  with  the  completion  of  large  tankers  and 

bulk  carriers  now  on  order,  this  trend  eventually  may  be  reversed 

as  less  profitable  ships  are  sold  off  to  foreign  owners.  It  is 

probable,  however,  that  the  capacity  of  the  1980  fleet  will  be 

larger  than  today's,  though  its  numbers  may  be  smaller. 


307 


proportionately  about  half  as  much  as  the  quarterly  losses 
during  1944*    However,  at  its  wartime  peak  Japan's  shipbuild- 
ing produced  only  about  a  half  million  tons  annually,  whereas 
the  country's  average  quarterly  output  during  1973  was  about 
3,900>000  GRT — nearly  enough  to  replace  the  losses.  Admittedly 
resource  shortages  eventually  would  curtail  the  building,  but 
the  backlog  of  nearly- completed  ships  probably  would  be  enough 
to  last  through  the  first  critical  period.  It  also  may  be  that 
the  post-1977  volume  of  Japanese  ship  construction  will  be  con- 
siderably less  than  during  the  recent  heyday  of  the  large 
tankers.  Nevertheless,  it  almost  certainly  will  continue  to  be 
a  sizeable  percentage  of  the  expected  sinkings. 

Other  factors  also  work  to  Japan's  advantage.  There  is  no 

need  today  to  support  a  war  economy  such  as  that  which  consumed 

33 
over  50  percent  of  GNP  in  1 944-    The  number  of  hostile  sub- 
marines will  decline  over  time  as  they  fall  victim  to  mines  and 

other  hazards  while  returning  to  base,  as  well  as  by  attrition 

34 
in  mid-ocean  engagements.    Facilities  for  providing  contact 


32 

Ibid. ,   p.    114*     An  average  of  3*710,000  tons  of  Japanese 

merchant   shipping  was  afloat  at  the   time. 

33 

USSBS,  War  Economy,  op.  cit.  (note  1-55)*  P»  16. 

34 

The  decline  in  her  potential  opponents'  ability  to  build 

submarines  rapidly  is  almost  a  mirror  of  her  own  increased  ability 
to  build  merchant  ships.  Nuclear  submarine  production  probably 
will  not  exceed  two  dozen  boats  per  year  and,  although  the  con- 
struction of  conventional  units  could  be  accelerated,  no  country 
or  coalition  is  likely  to  match  Hitler's  1943  figure  of  281  new 
U-boats.  MccGwire,  "The  Submarine  Threat  to  Western  Shipping, " 


308 


localization  information  from  seabed  hydrophones,  satellites  or 
radio-direction  finding  nets  give  on-scene  ASW  commanders  better 
intelligence  than  they  ever  have  had. 

None  of  this  is  to  deny  Japan's  vulnerability  at  sea. 

Neither  is  it  wise  to  base  all  calculations  on  a  single 

35 
scenario.    It  can  be  argued  that  the  probable  weapons  expendi- 
ture rates  would  exhaust  both  sides  early  in  such  a  war,  that 

the  conflict  would  escalate,  or  even  that  the  attacker  would  run 

36 

out  of  torpedoes  before  Japan  ran  out  of  ships.    On  the  other 

hand,  the  engagement  could  drag  out  over  an  extended  period  of 


op.  cit.  (note  1-54) >  P»  3,  estimates  that  50  or  so  diesel  sub- 
marines might  be  turned  out  per  year  by  the  Soviets  if  priorities 
were  so  re-ordered.  A  separate  Congressional  reference  to  a 
study  of  a  NATO  war  at  sea  (perhaps  the  same  one  cited  by  Secre- 
tary Blackwell)  projects  Soviet  submarine  losses  at  70  to  JQfo 
during  the  first  90  days.  See  U.S.,  Congress,  Joint  Committee 
on  Atomic  Energy,  Military  Applications  of  Nuclear  Technology, 
Part  2,  93rd  Cong.,  1st  Session  (Washington:  U.S.  Government 
Printing  Office,  1973),  p.  78. 

35 

This  also  has  been  one  of  the  most  important  lessons  of 

World  War  II  for  the  Japanese.   In  that  conflict  her  strategic 

planning  was  keyed  too  much  to  the  concept  of  a  single  great 

fleet  engagement  a  la  Tsushima.  See  SenC  Sadao,  "A  Chess  Game 

with  no  Checkmate:   Admiral  Inoue  and  the  Pacific  War,"  Naval 

War  College  Review,  XXVI  (January-February  1974),  PP»  26-39* 

36 

J  As  of  July   1973  Japan  had  4,171    ships   larger  than  1000 

deadweight   tons.      During  1944,    the  best  year  of  the  Second  World 

War  for  U.S.    submarines,    6,092   torpedoes  were  used  to   sink  548 

ships — over  11    fish  per  sinking.     Even  assuming  that  a  modern 

submarine  could  average   only  5   shots  per  successful  attack,    it 

still  could  take  as  many  as  10,000  torpedoes  to  destroy  half  of 

Japan's  merchant  marine.     Were   each  of  the  Soviet's   55   submarines 

to  carry  24  torpedoes  and  replenish  them  once  a  month,    at   least 

seven  months  would  be  required  even  if  the  Soviets  suffered  no 

losses.     If  a  net  of  five   submarines  a  month  could  be  removed 

from  the  order  of  battle,    the  campaign  would   terminate  in  about 


309 


time,  in  which  case  Japan  would  suffer  severely.   Indeed,  the 
post-war  effects  of  even  the  abbreviated  campaign  noted  above 
would  be  traumatic.  But  the  problem  is  not  of  the  hopeless  pro- 
portions in  which  it  often  is  couched. 

(2)  Some  Possible  Solutions 

In  fiscal  1972,  Japan  imported  over  512  million  tons  of 
cargo,  mostly  raw  materials,  including  118,785*000  tons  of  iron 

ore,  50,783,000  tons  of  coal,  256,832,000  kiloliters  of  petroleum 

37 

and  over  12,000,000  tons  of  foodstuffs.         At  the   same   time,   her 

merchant  fleet  contained  159  bulk  cargo  vessels  of  over  50,000 
GRT,    totaling  12,600,000  deadweight  tons  (carrying  capacity). 
The   tanker  portion  included  149  similarly  sized  ships  which  com- 
bined to  more  than  18,500,000  DWT. 

If  these  vessels  could  be  arranged  into  six  convoys  of 

about  50  ships  each,    capable  of  making  eight  round  trips  a 

39 
year,        they  could  cariy  148,000,000  tons  of  petroleum 


11   months  with  the   loss  of  about  40/'o  of  Japan's  merchant  fleet. 
In  point   of  fact,    even  these   losses  probably  are   exaggerated, 
since  it  would  be  very  difficult  to  maintain  much  more  than  40 
to  50fo  01   the  available  submarines  on  station. 

37 

MITI,  Statistics  on  Japanese  Industries,  1973,  PP«  76-79* 

Although  these  quantities  probably  will  grow  in  the  next  few 
years — at  least  until  conservation  measures  and  the  industrial 
re- structuring  can  take  effect,  their  growth  will  be  matched  by 
the  size  of  new  cargo  ships,  thus  reducing  the  need  for 
additional  bottoms. 

Japanese  Shipowners  Association,  Review  of  Japanese 
Shipping,  1973  (Tokyo,  1974),  p.  28. 

39 

Obviously,  the  convoys  would  be  routed  to  different 


310 


(57-8  percent  of  peacetime  imports)  and  100,800,000  tons  of  bulk 
cargoes  (about  55*6  percent  of  the  raw  materials  listed). 
Although  the  MSDF  only  has  45  ocean  escorts,  it  is  submitted 

that  meaningful  protection  could  be  provided  for  such  convoys 

40 
through  the  use  of  unconventional  concepts. 

One  such  idea  is  the  U.S.  Navy's  ARAPAH0  project,  which 
entails  the  placement  of  helicopters  and  containerized  support 
facilities  directly  on  the  merchantmen  themselves.    At  a  cost 
of  $3»5  to  4  million  per  package,  exclusive  of  aircraft,  nearly 
any  large  tanker  or  containership  could  be  equipped  to  operate 
up  to  six  helicopters  or  eventually  V/STOLs.  A  particular  ad- 
vantage of  the  system  for  Japan  is  that  no  special  structural 


destinations,  i.e.  to  the  Persian  Gulf  for  some  oil,  to  Indonesia 
for  some  other,  North  America  for  grain,  etc.  Sight  round  trips 
per  year  corresponds  to  a  20-day  voyage  each  way  (including 
loading)  with  45  days  leeway  for  repairs,  delay,  etc.  At  14 
knots  (which  85;"'j  of  Japan's  merchant  fleet  can  exceed),  the  oil 
depot  at  Kiire  is  about  19  days  from  Kuwait  and  8  days  from 
Indonesia.  Other  major  Pacific  ports,  from  Long  Beach  to  Sydney, 
are  within  15  days  of  Yokohama. 

In  a  nuclear  environment,  concentrations  of  ships  would 
be  vulnerable  to  attack  by  IltE.Is  or  IviPJSI.is,  especially  if  targeting 
could  be  done  by  satellite.  The  use  of  such  weapons,  however, 
would  open  the  possibility  of  like  reprisals  against  isolated 
bases  such  as  Petropavlosk.   (See  LIccGwire,  op_»  cit.f  paragraph 
J1  •)   In  any  case,  there  is  little  that  Japan  could  do  except 
disperse  the  convoys  under  such  circumstances. 

41 

See,  for  instance,  J.  J.  I.lulquin,  "ARAPAH0 — Emergency 

Helo  Cover  for  Merchantmen,"  USNIP,  XCIX  (November  1973) »  PP» 
113-117*  with  comments  by  H.  E.  Obedin  in  the  I.Iarch  1974  issue, 
pp.  103-104.  Also,  I.lulquin,  "The  ARAPAH0  System  and  Its  Impli- 
cations for  Future  Ship- Aviation  Concept  Development,"  Naval 
Engineers  Journal,  DQDCV  (October  1973),  pp.  25-34. 


311 


provisions  axe  needed  for  the  host  ships.  Thus  the  political 
questions  of  getting  approval  from  other  Ministries  or  the  com- 
panies concerned  would  not  be  necessary  until  a  crisis  actually 
arose.  Moreover,  much  of  the  training  could  be  accomplished 
ashore,  perhaps  even  by  reserve  units,  thus  saving  both  fuel  and 
family  separation  in  peacetime. 

If  ocean  escorts  with  helicopter  decks  are  in  company,  the 
effectiveness  of  the  system  would  be  increased  severalfold.  The 
difficult  command  and  control  problems  of  vectoring  the  heli- 
copters would  be  reduced.  Long-range,  hull-mounted  sonars  and 
the  associated  classification  and  signal  processing  equipment 
would  be  available.  Moreover,  by  using  the  ARAPAHO  platform 
primarily  for  maintenance  (vice  both  maintenance  and  operations), 
the  number  of  helicopters  supported  could  be  as  high  as  ten  or 
twelve.  In  short,  a  convoy  with  two  or  three  suitably  equipped 
merchantmen  and  about  four  escorts  could  operate  perhaps  twenty 
to  twenty- five  helicopters.  Moreover,  this  capability  could  be 
acquired  for  less  than  the  cost  of  one  additional  escort. 

This  is  not  an  argument  for  the  immediate  suspension  of 


4T?he  new  5,200  ton  DDH  ordered  by  the  LISDF  in  FY  1975  will 
cost  ¥44,372,000,000  (about  $148  million).  6  HSS-2  anti-sub- 
marine helicopters  also  are  budgeted  at  around  $4»5  million  each 
(¥8,173  million  for  6).  At  $4   million  per  ARAPAHO  package,  3 
would  cost  $512  million.   25  helicopters  would  add  $112.5  million, 
for  a  total  of  124.5  million.   100  to  1 50  men  would  be  required 
per  package  as  compared  with  about  350  in  a  DDH  crew.  Alterna- 
tively, 2  ARAPAHO  units  and  15  helicopters  would  be  about  $75»5 
million  vs.  $86.2  million  (¥25,830  million)  for  a  2,500  ton 
escort. 


312 


destroyer  or  frigate  construction.  In  the  first  place,  ARAPAHO 
works  much  more  efficiently  in  conjunction  with  ocean  escorts. 
Moreover,  it  will  not  become  available  much  before  1978,  even 
in  U.S.  hands.  In  the  second,  the  warships  are  long-lead-time 
items  whose  numbers  cannot  be  quickly  augmented  in  an  emergency. 
Finally,  the  45  ships  planned  for  the  end  of  the  Fourth  Defense 

Plan  will  barely  cover  Japan's  coastal  defense  needs,  much  less 

43 
those  of  convoy  escort.    However,  under  the  assumption  that 

the  budgetary  constraints  on  the  MSDF  will  remain  tight,  such 

modular  systems  seem  to  offer  promise  for  the  qualitative 

improvements  envisioned  in  the  Post-Fourth  Defense  Plan  period. 

It  should  be  noted  that  air  defense  weapons  also  lend 

themselves  to  containerization.    There  are  at  least  two 


Sekino  Hideo  has  estimated  that  32  destroyers  and 
frigates  (among  other  units)  would  be  needed  for  coastal  defense 
purposes  ("Japan  and  Her  Maritime  Defense,"  op_.  cit.  [note  6-1], 
p.  121).  This  tallies  closely  with  a  study  by  a  group  of  former 
Imperial  Navy  officers  who  concluded  that  the  protection  of  small 
cargo  ships  in  home  waters  would  require  36  destroyers  and  16 
aircraft.   (Reported  by  Doba  Hajime  in  the  series  "Maboroshi  no 
Jishu  B5ei"  [Visionary  Autonomous  Defense],  Yomiuri,  June  15, 
1970.)  Estimates  of  convoy  defense  needs  have  ranged  from  78 
(Sekino,  interview,  December  6,  1974)  to  54  (Doba  article). 
Even  accounting  for  new  techniques  which  might  reduce  the  number 
of  escorts  per  convoy,  and  the  possibility  of  refueling  from  the 
convoyed  tankers  themselves,  45  total  escorts  is  a  marginal 
figure. 

'Tor  instance,  the  U.S.  is  considering  a  system  tenta- 
tively known  as  Sentry.  This  would  be  a  completely  self-con- 
tained unit  including  radars,  command  and  control  facilities, 
and  16  vertically- launched  missiles  in  a  single  container  costing 
about  $1  million.  Alternatively,  the  Close  In  Weapon  System 
(CIWS)  might  be  adaptable.   (Mr.  Roland  Baker,  China  Lake,  tele- 
phone interview,  October  18,  1974») 


313 


merchantmen  sunk  by  SSMs  (one  of  them  Japanese)  since  1970  which 
might  have  been  saved  by  such  devices. 

Discussions  of  a  full-scale  anti-shipping  campaign  _in  vacuo 
have  an  aura  of  unreality  somewhat  akin  to  those  concerning 
optimal  strategies  for  a  nuclear  war.  But  the  fact  that  some 
defenses  can  be  provided  is  important  insofar  as  it  will  reduce 
Japan's  sense  of  insecurity  which  stems  from  her  import  depen- 
dence. Moreover,  an  ARAPAHO-like  system  would  violate  none  of 
the  restrictions  against  offensive  weapons  (since,  almost  by 
definition,  it  is  a  defensive  arrangement)  and  could  quickly  be 
tailored  to  threats  ranging  from  a  blockade  around  the  home 
islands  to  the  distant  harassment  of  passing  ships.  It  also  is 
compatible  with  neutral  rights  of  self-defense  and  is  ideally 
suited  to  Japan's  primary  maritime  assets — her  merchant  fleet 
and  commercial  shipbuilding  industry. 

There  is,  however,  another  potential  hazard  to  Japan's 
shipping — a  mine  blockade. 

Mine  Y/arfare 

On  March  27,  1 945 »  B-29  mine laying  operations  were  begun 
in  Japanese  ports  and  inland  waterways,  particularly  around  the 
strategic  Shimonoseki  Strait  between  Honshu  and  Kyushu.  A  post- 
war analysis  concluded  that: 

.  .  .  this  campaign,  begun  earlier  and  laid  on  with 
greater  weight,  would  have  reduced  effective  ship- 
ping nearly  to  the  vanishing  point. 45 


45 


USSBS,  Transportation,  op.  eft.  (note  1~55)»  P«  8. 


314 


Waterborne  transport  in  pre-war  Japan  carried  about  two- 
thirds  of  domestic  trade,  with  nearly  all  the  remainder  going  by 
railroad.    The  post-war  years  have  seen  a  dramatic  increase  in 
road  traffic: 


Railroad  (<fo) 
Motor  Car  ($) 
Ship  (<?o) 

Total  (10  ton-km) 


Table 

9-4 

DOMESTIC  TRANSPORTATION 

SHARES 

1?55 

1965 

1972 

52.9 
11.6 

35.5 

30.7 
26.0 

43.3 

17.4 

44.7 
37.9 

81,786 


186,343 


343,390 


Source:  Review  of  Japanese  Shipping  1973,  P»  34,  a^d  Un-yu 
Keizai  Kenkyu.  Center,  Un-yu  Keizai  Zusetsu  Showa  49, 
p.  11. 


Nevertheless,  a  mining  campaign,  conducted  either  from  aircraft 
or  submarines,  could  disrupt  Japanese  shipping  as  quickly,  and 
much  more  cheaply,  than  a  submarine  offensive.    The  MSDF  is 

well  trained  and  equipped  for  minesweeping  work,  but  it  took  the 

U.S.  Navy  several  weeks  to  clear  its  own  mines  from  North  Vietna- 
mese ports,  and  a  number  of  months  to  locate  and  identify  all  the 
debris  in  the  Northern  Suez  Canal.  Thus  major  dislocations  could 


46 
47, 


Ibid.,  pp.  17,  28. 


Harassment  might  even  be  done  by  using  ocean  currents  to 
carry  floating  mines. 


315 


be  expected  from  even  a  sporadic  application  of  sophisticated 
mines.    Sweeping  helicopters  or  special  mine-hunting  craft 
might  be  partial  answers,  but  the  job  inevitably  will  be  tedious. 
On  the  other  hand,  mines  or  devices  like  the  U.S.  Navy's  Captor 
(encapsulated  torpedo)  also  can  make  the  straits  around  Japan 
very  hazardous  for  foreign  submarines. 

Divisive/intimidating  Actions 

Perhaps  more  likely  than  direct  threats  to  the  nation  or 
the  sealanes  would  be  pressures  designed  to  create  uncertainty, 
undermine  morale  and  increase  domestic  divisions.  Such  acts 
might  include  sporadic  attacks  on  Japanese  ships  or  ships  bound 
for  Japan,  naval  demonstrations  or  harassment  of  economic 
activities  overseas  or  offshore. 

These  would  be  very  difficult  to  guard  against.  For  one 

thing,  if  kept  to  a  low  enough  intensity,  they  might  not  invoke 

49 
foreign  assistance.    For  another,  being  more-or-less  random, 

guerrilla-like  activities  away  from  Japan  itself,  they  would  be 

beyond  the  capabilities  of  the  SDF. 

However,  the  creation  of  such  disharmony  in  Japanese 


The  complexity  of  modern  mines  should  not  be  underesti- 
mated.  In  addition  to  fuzes  which  are  triggered  by  magnetism, 
noise,  pressure,  or  combinations  thereof,  there  also  are  timers 
to  turn  the  weapons  on  and  off,  ship  counters  to  allow  the 
sweepers  to  pass  before  activation,  and  other  exotic  features. 

49 

The  U.S.  is  not  legally  bound  by  the  Security  Treaty  to 

come  to  the  defense  of  Japanese  merchantmen,  for  instance. 


316 


society  would  be  more  difficult  than  in  most  other  states. 
Vertical  dissensions  (i.e.  between  industries  or  factions)  would 
come  more  easily  than  horizontal  splits  between  classes. 

Tactics  for  such  a  strategy  might  include  sanctions 
directed  against  a  whole  range  of  Japanese  interests  in  specific 

reprisal  for  the  policies  of  one  industrial  group  or  political 

50 

leader.    Presumably  only  revolutionary  governments  or  terrorist 

groups  would  acknowledge  such  acts,  but  more  established  govern- 
ments also  could  proceed  clandestinely.  Alternatively,  specific 
companies  or  activities  could  be  singled  out  to  pay  for  the 
"sins"  of  Japanese  exploitation  in  general.  By  themselves,  such 
activities  probably  would  not  have  much  immediate  impact,  but 
they  could  aggravate  existing  internal  tensions  and  heighten 
Japan's  sense  of  isolation  if  no  one  comes  to  her  aid. 

Physical  damage  need  not  be  inflicted  to  make  an  iinpression- 

at  least  not  at  first.  The  sighting  of  submarines  near  potential 

51 
targets  could  be  very  unsettling.    Similarly,  the  difficulties 


50 

It  has  been  suggested,  for  instance,  that  during  the  1972 

textile  problems  with  the  U.S.,  the  Japanese  textile  manufac- 
turers found  themselves  domestically  isolated  by  prospects  of 
American  import  restrictions  which  would  have  affected  other  pro- 
ducts as  well.  Although  it  is  not  clear  that  Washington  had 
sought  this  result  consciously,  it  was  advantageous  to  the  U.S. 
position. 

51 

The  prevailing  hypothesis  that  submarines  have  little 

use  in  presence  roles  deserves  to  be  challenged.   In  peacetime 
the  either/or  nature  of  a  submarine's  weaponry  lowers  its  credi- 
bility in  the  eyes  of  informed  observers.  The  submarine  can, 
however,  have  great  impact  on  popular  thinking,  if  only  for  short 
periods.  Soviet  submarines  in  Cuba  made  the  front  pages  of  U.S. 


317 


of  sinking  modern  tankers  or  bulk  carriers  offers  the  possibility 
of  graduated  applications  of  force,  i.e.  using  only  one  or  two 
torpedoes  to  damage,  rather  than  destroy. 

The  best  that  Japan  might  be  able  to  do  under  these  circum- 
stances would  be  to  organize  potential  targets  into  convoys  to 
at  least  improve  the  chances  for  survival  of  the  crews  of  ships 
which  might  be  hit.  Point-defense  systems  or  AELAPAHO- type  suits 
could  be  helpful  if  the  danger  were  geographically  localized, 
but  could  hardly  be  bought  in  sufficient  quantities  to  counter 
sporadic  threats  in  widespread  areas. 

V/hether  or  not  any  of  these  acts  would  be  unifying, 
divisive  or  intimidating  cannot  be  known  in  advance.  The  equip- 
ment needed  to  counter  them,  however,  generally  would  be  included 


newspapers  on  several  occasions  in  the  late  1960s  and  70s.  Dis- 
coveries of  suspicious  craft  in  Scandinavian  fjords  also  have 
been  widely  reported.   In  times  of  terrorism,  the  emotional 
response  to  sightings  of  unidentified  submarines  in  local  waters 
or  near  shipping  routes  could  significantly  influence  decision- 
making.  This  would  be  particularly  true  in  a  nation  as  sensitive 
about  her  sealanes  as  Japan. 

J   In  October  1974,  the  40,000  DWT  Liquified  Petroleum  Gas 
(LPG)  tanker  Yuyo  Maru  #10  was  set  afire  in  a  collision  near 
Tokyo.  Since  the  ship  would  have  burned  for  months,  it  was 
decided  that  the  MSDF  would  sink  it.  LPG  being  much  lighter 
than  water,  shellfire  was  used  on  the  afternoon  of  November  27 
to  open  up  escape  holes  and  accelerate  burning.  The  following 
morning  two  torpedoes  were  fired  to  encourage  flooding  (two  more 
failed  to  hit) .   The  coup  de  grace  then  was  administered  by 
additional  shellfire.  Even  admitting  the  special  problems  of 
LPG,  it  is  easy  to  visualize  the  difficulties  of  dispatching  a 
VLCC  by  torpedoes  alone.   Indeed,  perhaps  the  optimal  wartime 
tactic  against  such  ships  would  be  to  use  one  or  two  fish  to 
enflame  or  disable  them  rather  than  try  for  actual  sinkings. 


318 


in  that  designed  for  more  intense  threats. 

Threats  Which  Promote  Revolution  or  Social  Unrest 

Except  for  infiltration  by  sea,  such  threats  fall  mostly 
outside  of  the  province  of  the  MSDF.  As  noted  earlier,  Japan1 s 
27,000  km  coastline  would  be  difficult  to  defend  in  wartime.  In 
peacetime,  with  the  myriads  of  fishing  craft  and  coastal  ships, 
the  assured  interception  of  smugglers  or  infiltrators  is 
impossible. 

Nevertheless,  there  are  some  possible  countermeasures. 
(1)  Coastal  surveillance  radars  should  be  improved.  This  ought 
to  be  done  anyway  in  conjunction  with  the  12-mile  territorial 
sea  and  the  establishment  of  traffic  separation  lanes.   (2)  More 
fast  patrol  boats  would  be  useful.  Although  hydrofoils  might  be 
better  suited  to  open-water  operations,  their  rather  deep  draft 

while  transitioning  between  foilbome  and  hullborne  modes  could 

53 
limit  their  effectiveness  close  to  the  beach.    All-in-all, 

some  sort  of  fast  launches  or  hovercraft  might  be  more  suitable. 

Finally,  (3)  the  general  scope  of  Japan's  intelligence  activities 

should  be  expanded.  This,  of  course,  would  suit  a  variety  of 

other  purposes  as  well. 


S3 

-^The  NATO  Patrol  Hydrofoil,  for  instance,  draws  only  2 

meters  with  its  foils  retracted,  but  must  extend  them  to  nearly 

7  meters  prior  to  flight. 


519 


Defense  of  the  Economic  Zone 

The  extent  of  a  Japanese  200-mile  claim  has  been  outlined 
in  Chapter  Seven.  Whatever  the  timing  of  the  legal  declaration* 
Japan's  exploitation  of  the  continental  shelf  and  coastal  zone 
will  make  her  adjacent  seas  even  more  important  than  they  have 
been  to  date.  The  extent  to  which  these  activities  can  supply 
the  economy's  demands  will  be  explored  in  the  next  chapter.  It 
does  seem,  however,  that  the  national  resource  base  will  be 
significantly  enhanced.  Moreover,  the  additional  space  probably 
will  come  to  be  cherished  for  its  own  sake. 

In  sum,  there  are  ample  economic  and  psychological  reasons 
why  the  Japanese  will  resent  infringements  on  their  economic 
zone  once  it  is  declared.  Moreover,  nearly  all  of  the  states  to 
the  west  have  defined  their  own  ocean  areas  in  ways  which  are  at 
variance  with  Japan's.  At  present,  South  Korea  is  almost  the 
only  country  with  which  Tokyo  could  safely  let  a  conflict  arise, 
but  whether  or  not  this  balance  of  more  important  interests  will 
continue  to  restrain  oceanic  disputes  is  questionable.   In  any 
case,  defense  of  a  200-mile  claim  and  ocean  development  struc- 
tures will  pose  special  problems  for  the  SDF. 

It  is  about  400  kilometers  from  Naha  airport  to  the  Yaeyama 
Retto  where  Japanese  oil  exploration  now  is  underway.   Some  of 
these  same  islands  are  only  110  kilometers  from  Taiwan  and  about 
320  from  the  coast  of  mainland  China.  Indeed,  they  lie  within 


320 


54 
the  Taiwan  ADIZ.    Japan's  F4EJs  are  better  aircraft  than  the 

F5s  and  F104s  of  Nationalist  China,  and  the  locally- built 

fighters  of  the  People's  Republic.  There  also  are  differences 

in  pilot  training  and  logistics,  but  the  Japanese  aircraft  do 

depend  on  ground- control  facilities.  As  noted  above,  warships 

could  be  valuable  as  air  control  units  away  from  the  Home  Islands 

55 

particularly  if  they  are  fitted  with  computer-aided  equipment. 

Such  a  capability  might  be  a  necessary  backdrop  to  any  negoti- 
ations in  the  area.  As  has  been  noted  with  regard  to  the 
Senkaku  island  ownership: 

.  .  .  [the]  controversy  is  essentially  a  political 
one  that  is  being  argued  in  the  more  polite  language 
of  international  law  and  diplomacy.  No  territorial 
issue  between  East  Asian  states  has  ever  been 
settled  in  this  way  .  .  .  .56 


54 

Air  Defense  Identification  Zone,  a  unilaterally  imposed 

area  in  which  aircraft  must  identify  themselves.  The  Japanese 

and  Taiwanese  ADIZ  overlap  in  this  region. 

55 
Examples  were  noted  in  Chapter  One.  One  illustration  of 

the  capabilities  of  such  a  system  was  provided  by  NTDS  in  the 
Gulf  of  Tonkin.  Computer-equipped  frigates  and  cruisers  were 
assigned  to  a  station  known  as  PIRAZ  (Positive  Identification 
Radar  Advisory  Zone)  well  north  of  the  carriers  on  Yankee  Station. 
The  ships  were  able  to  keep  track  of  U.S.  aircraft  over  the  Gulf 
(which  sometimes  numbered  more  than  100),  weed  out  enemy  air- 
craft, if  any,  from  returning  U.S.  strikes  and  vector  fighters 
to  several  dozen  intercepts.   In  addition  they  accounted  for  a 
number  of  MIGs  with  their  own  missiles  and  operated  search  and 
rescue  (SAR)  helicopters.  See  G.  Lockee,  "PIRAZ,"  USNIP,  XCV 
(April  1969),  pp.  100-102.  While  the  LISDF  is  not  likely  to  have 
the  resources  to  conduct  PIRAZ- type  operations,  automated  infor- 
mation systems  are  planned  for  future  units. 

*  Park,  "Oil  Under  Troubled  Waters,"  op_.  cit.  (note  7-39), 
p.  257. 


321 


Aside  from  disputes  at  the  borders  of  the  economic  zone, 
offshore  drilling  platforms,  pipelines,  seabed  mining  equipment 
and,  of  course,  fishing  boats  also  are  vulnerable  to  attack  or 

harassment.  NATO  is  worried  about  this  in  regard  to  the  North 

57 
Sea  fields.    Among  the  defenses  which  have  been  considered  are 

fast  patrol  craft,  ready-alert  heliborne  units  or  VTOL  aircraft 

based  on  offshore  platforms,  and  increased  reconnaissance.  Once 

again,  an  air-tight  shield  is  impossible,  but  some  security 

improvements  can  be  made. 

Naval  Power  as  a  Bargaining  Chip 

Instead  of  starting  the  development  of  advanced  strategic 
weapon  systems,  Japan  can  use  the  threat  of  a  qualitative  change 
in  defense  policy  itself  for  international  leverage.  This  is 
perhaps  more  true  in  the  nuclear  sphere  than  in  the  naval  one 
(indeed,  the  advantages  derived  from  the  threat  of  nuclearization 
has  been  advanced  as  one  argument  for  not  closing  the  option  by 
ratifying  NPT),  but  some  influence  might  be  possible  nonetheless. 
Abrogation  of  the  Security  Treaty,  or  the  removal  of  the  U.S. 
bases  would  bring  Japan's  actions  under  closer  scrutiny  through- 
out the  Far  East.  Announcement  of  plans  for  nuclear  submarines 
or  helicopter  carriers  might  then  somehow  be  linked  to  negoti- 
ations with  Washington,  Peking,  Moscow,  or  even  Southeast  Asia. 


57 

J   New  York  Times,  December  25,  1974- 


322 


Summary 

While  it  is  difficult  to  postulate  a  single  most  likely 
threat  for  the  MSDP  to  prepare  for,  the  range  of  possibilities 
is  broad  enough  to  suggest  that  future  force  levels  should  be 
keyed  to  balance  and  flexibility.  The  limits  of  conventional 
warship  design  can  go  only  so  far  in  providing  such  options  at 
reasonable  cost. 

Containerized  defensive  systems  for  merchantmen  have  uses 
ranging  from  local  instabilities  to  full-scale  wars  against  ship- 
ping. Ocean  escorts  are  complementary  to  such  systems  in  many 
cases.  Indeed,  they  are  the  most  flexible  units  which  the  MSDF 
could  acquire  under  its  present  constraints,  although  they  are 
becoming  prohibitively  expensive.  Their  effectiveness  could  be 
greatly  improved  by  the  addition  of  tactical  data  systems  and 
three-dimensional  radars,  and  the  upgrading  of  aircraft  facili- 
ties to  handle  manned  helicopters  and  RPVs.  Nuclear  submarines 
might  become  politically  possible  in  the  1980s.  Wixhout  an 
increase  in  budget,  however,  the  increased  effectiveness  of  the 
SSN  might  be  outweighted  by  its  additional  costs.  The  present 
emphasis  on  minesweeping  must  be  continued,  and  new  equipment 
procured  to  deal  with  modern  devices. 

Surface  skimming  patrol  craft  would  have  great  advantages 
in  invasion  defense,  policing  of  the  economic  zone  and  rapid 
reaction  missions.  If  surface  effect  ships  or  hovercraft  develop 
rapidly  enough,  they  might  fill  both  offshore  and  inshore  roles. 


323 


Hydrofoils,  however,  probably  would  have  to  be  supplemented  by 
displacement-hull  patrol  boats  in  restricted  waters.  Surveil- 
lance radars  will  be  needed  for  defense  and  safe  navigation  in 
the  economic  zone.  Hydrophone  and  sensor  technology  should  be 
developed  to  improve  intelligence-gathering  capabilities  and 
initial  contact  localization.  In  turn,  this  will  necessitate 
a  more  sophisticated  command  and  control  system,  both  to  handle 
the  increased  volume  of  data  and  to  cover  the  expanded  area  of 
operations.  Provisions  also  must  be  made  to  upgrade  the  elec- 
tronic warfare  capabilities  of  individual  units  and  to  ensure 
the  ability  of  communications  systems  to  operate  in  an  intense 
EW  environment. 

In  a  longer  term,  v/STOL  aircraft  eventually  will  be  neces- 
sary for  ships  or  offshore  platforms.  Although  new  weapon 
systems  should  be  planned  to  include  better  domestic  logistics 
support  than  has  been  provided  to  date,  the  basic  philosophy  of 
emphasizing  long  lead-time  hardware  still  seems  to  be  valid. 
Should  the  international  climate  deteriorate,  however,  the  focus 
should  be  shifted  to  develop  the  full  potential  of  existing 
equipment  before  continuing  with  expansion. 


Chapter  10 
THE  NON-MILITARY  DIMENSIONS  OF  JAPANESE  SEAPOWER 

Japan  probably  makes  more  intensive  use  of  the  seas  than 
any  other  state.  Her  shipbuilding  has  led  the  world  for  nearly 
two  decades  and  completely  dominated  all  competition  in  recent 
years.  The  Japanese  merchant  marine  ranks  second  only  to  the 
Liberian  flag  of  convenience  in  tonnage.  Her  fishing  industry 

has  been  characterized  as  "the  most  important,  diversified, 

1 

extensive  and  far  ranging  in  the  world." 

To  date,  these  ocean  economic  interests  have  been  largely 
apolitical — particularly  because  of  Tokyo's  continuing  efforts 
to  separate  them  from  diplomatic  problems.  With  the  advent  of 
resource  shortages,  economic  warfare,  and  the  changing  marine 
political  climate,  however,  the  commercial  elements  of  Japan's 

seapower  can  have  important  political  uses.  The  first  of  these 
is  protective — those  ocean  resources  and  marine  services  under 
Japan's  control  can  help  to  insulate  her  from  pressures  applied 
by  other  states  or  non-national  groups.  The  second  is  acquisi- 
tive— maritime  capital  and  expertise  can  be  traded  for  resources. 


United  Nations,  Food  and  Agriculture  Organization, 
Country  Fishery  Profiles,  1972. 


524 


325 


Finally  there  is  the  potential  for  suasive  applications  of  com- 
mercial seapower.  This  is  an  aspect  little  explored  to  date, 
but  it  holds  some  promise  should  Japan  choose  to  exercise  it. 

The  Scope  of  Japan's  Commercial  Ocean  Interests 

Shipping 

The  Japanese  merchant  marine  consisted  of  9,459  vessels  of 

2 

36,790,000  GRT  in  March  1 974-   Over  three-quarters  of  this  ton- 
nage was  accounted  for  by  tankers  and  bulk  carriers — rather  above 
the  world  average  of  about  67  percent  (see  Table  2-1 ).  An 
additional  711  ships  of  15,070,000  GET  were  on  charter.  During 
Fiscal  1973?  Japanese  ships  and  charters  carried  319,200,000  tons 

of  cargo.   26.6  percent  of  her  exports,  and  43*7  percent  of 

3 

imports  were  loaded  in  domestic  bottoms.   This  share  has  been 

declining  for  several  years  and  it  is  doubtful  that  the  Govern- 
ment target  of  50  percent  ever  will  be  met.  Nonetheless,  the 
1973  figures  do  represent  a  21  percent  increase  in  absolute 
volume . 

Although  Japanese  shipping  earned  over  3  billion  dollars 

4 
in  1973,   her  maritime  transportation  international  payments 


Ministry  of  Transport,  Transportation  77hite  Paper,  1974* 

nJnyusho,  Kaiun  Koku  (Shipping  Bureau,  Ministry  of  Trans- 
port) ,  Ninon  Kaiun  no  Genkyo  (Present  Condition  of  Japanese 
Shipping),  TokyS,  July  20,  1974,  p.  21.  By  contrast  the  1973 
U.S.  flag  share  of  American  trade  was  6.4/^,  totaling  40  million 
tons.  (Blackwell  Testimony,  op_.  cit.  (note  1-52),  p.  7.) 

TCaiun  no  Genkyo ,  p.  23. 


326 


balance  was  in  deficit  by  1,707  million  dollars  in  the  same 

5 
period.   This  situation  probably  will  worsen  in  the  years  ahead, 

for  Japan1 s  merchant  marine  is  faced  with  a  number  of  serious 

problems.  In  the  short  run,  there  are  the  current  inflationary 

pressures,  and  weaknesses  in  the  international  shipping  market. 

In  the  longer  term,  however,  Japanese  shipowners  are  particularly 

vulnerable  to  the  worldwide  changes  in  the  marine  political 

climate  described  in  Chapter  Three.  Those  pertaining  to  merchant 

shipping  include: 

(1)  Flag  discrimination  by  developing  countries. 

(2)  Possible  navigation  restrictions  from  broader 
coastal  state  law  of  the  sea  claims. 

(3)  Marine  anti-pollution  regulations. 
Counter-measures  for  each  of  these  are  being  considered. 

Despite  some  reservations,  notably  on  the  dispute  settlement  pro- 
visions, Japan  voted  for  the  Declaration  of  Principles  at  the 
Geneva  Liner  Conference.  This  was  partly  designed  to  improve 
relations  with  the  Third  World.  More  important,  however,  was  the 
fact  that  a  guaranteed  50  percent  share  in  bilateral  trade  (40 

percent  where  third  country  ships  are  involved),  would  be  advan- 

7 
tageous  if  present  trends  continue.   Nonetheless,  the  convention 


^Nihon  Kai.ji,  June  10,  1974. 

Maritime  wage  hikes  averaged  41»5/J  in  the  1974  Spring 
Offensive.  The  increase  in  operating  costs  due  to  these  raises 
is  expected  to  vary  from  5%  i*1  the  case  of  VLCCs,  to  nearly  30/£ 
for  conventional  cargo  ships.  In  the  case  of  the  more  labor  in- 
tensive coastal  vessels,  it  is  even  higher.  Ninon  Keizai,  April 
19,  1974. 

'Asahi,  March  13,  1974. 


327 


will  not  be  effective  for  several  years,  and  in  the  interim  the 
Ministry  of  Transport  is  preparing  options  for  legal  retaliation 
in  the  event  of  excessive  damage  to  Japanese  interests. 

The  principal  victims  of  the  law  of  the  sea  claims  will  he 
the  large  tankers  upon  which  Japan's  economy  is  so  dependent. 
The  restrictions  on  the  Straits  of  Malacca  already  have  been 
described  (Chapter  Three).  Nevertheless,  unless  the  entire 

Indonesian  archipelago  were  totally  closed  to  tankers,  the 

9 
economic  impact  will  not  be  excessive.   It  also  is  probable 

that  drastic  limitations  would  be  necessary  to  justify  the  long- 

10 
delayed  Kra  canal.    The  Showa  Maru  incident,  however,  may  have 


Some  of  the  measures  under  consideration  were  listed  in 
Mihon  Keizai,  April  16,  1974. 

9 
In  late  1974  a  250,000  ton  Japanese  tanker  cost  about 

¥10  million  per  day — about  $33)000.   (Data  provided  by  U.S. 

Maritime  Administration,  Tokyo.)  The  voyage  from  the  Persian 

Gulf  to  Japan  is  about  6,800  miles  via  the  Malacca  Strait  (the 

shortest  course),  8,000  via  the  Lombok  Strait,  and  14*000  south 

of  Australia.  This  translates  to  about  7  extra  days  (at  15  knots) 

on  a  round  trip  via  Lombok  or  40  days  via  the  southern  route.  At 

$10  per  barrel  (and  roughly  7  barrels  per  ton),  the  value  of  a 

250,000-ton  load  would  be  about  $17,  500,000.^  Thus  the  added 

transportation  costs  would  come  to  only  1.3$  of  the  value  of  the 

cargo  for  the  first  alternative,  or  7«5?°  for  the  second.  Clearly, 

these  figures  will  vary.  Smaller  tankers,  for  instance,  would 

cost  more.  The  increased  value  of  oil  inventories  tied  up  during 

the  longer  voyages  also  must  be  considered.  Although  even  the 

sum  of  these  costs  might  not  make  too  much  difference  for  the 

Lombok  route  (note  Japan' s  willingness  to  re-route  her  ships 

after  the  Showa  Maru  grounding),  they  could  become  significant 

on  the  Australian  transit,  especially  given  the  narrow  profit 

margins  of  Japanese  firms. 

10 

Several  construction  plans  for  a  canal  across  Thailand's 

Kra  isthmus  have  been  drawn  up  since   the  project  first  was  pro- 
posed in  the  19th  century.     Some   schemes  involve  nuclear 


328 


11 
given  impetus  to  a  pipeline  across  the  isthmus. 

Japan  has  begun  to  revise  her  pollution  laws  to  reduce  the 
vulnerability  of  her  ovm  ships  to  foreign  pressures.  They  also 
may  facilitate  counter-measures  on  others'  vessels  in  her  waters. 

In  addition  to  these  political  problems,  there  also  are 
structural  difficulties.  These  include  the  reduced  efficiency 
of  existing  general  cargo  liners  in  the  face  of  containerization, 
and  the  planned  restructuring  of  the  Japanese  economy  towards 
service  industries  and  reduced  dependence  on  raw  materials 
imports. 

It  is  not  clear  how  the  shipping  industry  will  cope  with 
these  changes,  particularly  the  latter.  However,  the  merchant 
marine  is  too  important  to  a  maritime  nation  like  Japan  to  let 
it  die.  Suggested  directions  have  included  less  emphasis  on 
tankers  and  more  on  oil  product  carriers,  refrigerated  vessels 

to  import  fish,  containerships  and  self-propelled  petroleum 

12 

drilling  ships.    Nuclear  ship  development  received  a  serious 


explosives,  which  has  made  Japanese  participation  sensitive.  For 
some  of  the  analyses,  see  Kra  Canal  Project,  "Preliminary  Survey 
Report:   A  Summary,"  Revision  5  (Bangkok:  K.  Y.  Chow,  April  30, 
1974)  and  Patrick  Low  and  Yeung  Yue-man,  The  Proposed  Kra,  Canal: 
A  Critical  Evaluation  and  Its  Impact  on  Singapore  (Singapore: 
Institute  of  Southeast  Asian  Studies,  February  1 973) • 

11 

NKIW,  January  14,  1 975?  P«  4»  suggests  that  Saudi  Arabian 

interests  may  provide  the  capital  for  a  CTS  and  pipeline. 

12 

See  the  excellent  25th  anniversary  supplement  to  the 

Shipping  and  Tra.de  News  (Tokyo,  October  25,  1974)  for  a  review 
of  the  development  of  Japan's  shipping  and  shipbuilding  indus- 
tries and  discussions  of  their  future.  Particularly,  in  this 
context,  see  the  panel  discussion  on  pp.  67-70. 


329 


13 
setback  from  the  Mutsu  debacle,   but  could  be  revived  if  world 

trends  pointed  in  that  direction.  Perhaps  even  more  certain, 

and  revolutionary,  will  be  the  multi-nationalization  of  the 

industry.  Profitability  could  be  increased  by  the  use  of 

14 
foreign  subsidiaries,  "tie-in"  ships   and  a  mixture  of  Japanese 

and  foreign  crews.  In  turn,  this  may  give  the  companies  con- 
cerned broader  interests  than  those  of  Japan  alone.  As  one  ship- 
ping executive  noted: 

...  I  think  the  Japanese  Merchant  Marine  from  now 
on  should  become  more  international.  I  think  it  is 
nonsensical  for  unarmed  Japan  to  adhere  to  such      . _ 
narrow  concepts  as  Japanese  territory  or  nationalism. 

Such  developments  would  make  it  progressively  more  difficult 

to  justify  the  commitment  of  the  USE   or  SDP  in  defense  of 

merchantmen  with  suspect  loyalties. 


1  3 

The  sea  trials  of  Japan's  first  nuclear  powered  ship, 

Mutsu,  were  delayed  for  nearly  too  years  by  fishermen  in  her 
homeport,  who  feared  that  their  market  would  be  damaged  by  con- 
tamination, or  even  rumors  of  it.  In  August  1974  the  ship 
finally  put  to  sea,  only  to  develop  a  reactor  leak  due  to  gross 
engineering  defects.  In  the  ensuing  uproar,  she  was  refused 
re-entry  to  Japanese  ports  and  drifted  for  over  seven  weeks 
before  arrangements  were  made  to  bring  her  in.  As  of  January 
1975  her  fate  is  undecided,  with  suggestions  ranging   from 
reactor  shielding  improvements  to  scuttling. 

"Tie-in"  (Shikumisen)  and  "Charter- back"  arrangements 
are  ways  of  maintaining  control  of  bottoms  under  less-expensive 
foreign  flags.  See  Bruce  Littman,  "How  the  'Shikumisen'  Deal 
Works,"  Seatrade,  December  1973,  pp.  137-138. 

15 

Kikuchi  Shojiro,  President  of  Nippon  Yusen  Kaisha,  Ltd. 

(NYK  Line),  in  Shipping  and  Trade  Hews  Supplement,  op_.  cit. , 
p.  70. 


330 


Shipbuilding 

No  less  than  49*8  percent  of  worldwide  ship  construction 

16 
was  launched  from  Japanese  yards  during  1973*    Ship  sales  alone 

accounted  for  more  than  10  percent  of  export  earnings,  second 

17 
only  to  steel.    The  industry  continued  the  spectacular  rebound 

begun  in  1972,  and  by  the  end  of  fiscal  1973  (March  1974),  a 

backlog  of  630  vessels  of  over  50  million  gross  tons  was  on  order, 

mostly  for  export.  This  should  keep  the  yards  busy  well  into 

1978. 18 

Forecasts,  however,  were  not  so  bright  as  recent  performance 

As  noted  earlier,  the  world  shipping  market  is  weak,  and  there  is 

a  widespread  feeling  that  shipowners  everywhere  may  have  over- 

19 
booked  during  1973*    The  oil  crisis  and  potential  reopening  of 

Suez  also  have  undercut  the  market  for  VLCCs  and  ULCCs  which  had 

20 
been  counted  on  for  much  of  future  business.    Japanese  yard3 


1  £ 

Japan  Times,   February  28,    1974* 

1 7 
'Tsusansho  (MITl),    1974  Tsilsho  Hakusho  (1974  International 

Trade  White  Paper),   Yoyakulian  Shiryoshu  (an)      (Lata  Summary 

Volume — draft),   Tokyo,   June  1974,   Figure   12.     This  was  up  from 

about  Tfo  in  1972. 

18 

Japan  Times,  April  20,  1974* 

19 

Lloyd's  Register  of  Shipping,   Annual  Report  1 974* 

Reported  in  MLN,   April  4,    1974. 

20 

Japan  Times,    Japan's  Shipbuilding  and  Shipping,    1974 

Survey,  May  1974,   P«   8.     Also  Shipping  and  Trade  I  Jews ,   Supple- 
ment,   op_.   cit.     According  to  figures  published  in  Zosen,  new 
monthly  orders  for  export  ships  had  fallen  from  over  2,^00,000 
tons  in  January  1974  "to  about  250,000  tons  in  September. 


331 


have  been  hard  hit  by  inflationary  pressures,  and  these  have  cur- 
tailed expansion  plans  (especially  for  very  large  dry  docks)  as 
well  as  upsetting  previous  contracts.  However  such  problems  were 
common  to  most  other  major  shipbuilding  countries,  so  Japan's 
relative  competitive  position  will  not  suffer  too  badly.  Foreign 
leads  in  sophisticated  product  carriers,  such  as  LKG  Tankers  were 
worrisome,  however,  as  was  the  possibility  of  EEC  or  U.S.  counter- 
measures. 

Another  potential  threat  is  from  the  growing  shipbuilding 
and  ship  repair  industries  in  the  developing  countries.  South 
Korea,  Taiwan  and  Singapore  all  have  made  sizeable  commitments 
in  this  field.  Spain  and  Portugal  also  have  been  attracting 
business  which  once  went  to  Japanese  yards. 

It  is  likely  that  the  construction  of  relatively  simple 
craft  and  those  below  100,000  tons  will  cease  to  be  profitable 
in  Japan.  Nevertheless,  the  industry  has  shown  remarkable 
resilience  in  the  past,  and  tliis  is  likely  to  continue.  More- 
over, despite  their  lower  labor  costs,  developing  country  ship- 
yards cannot  match  the  skill  of  Japan's  labor  pool,  her  advanced 
technology,  and  the  integrated  industrial  structure  which 
enables  her  to  produce  both  hulls  and  machinery  for  a  variety 
of  ships. 

Japan  is  fortunate  in  that  the  current  backlog  of  orders 


21 

Ninon  Keizai,  June  8,  1974* 


332 


will  give  her  managers  tine  to  evaluate  future  prospects  before 

22 

committing  themselves.    The  future  of  her  shipbuilding,  how- 
ever, would  seem  to  be  in  a  combination  of  advanced  designs  and 

overseas  movement.  Among  the  former  may  well  be  oil  product 

23 
carriers,  super-automated  ships  and  ocean  engineering  structures. 

These  are  consistent  with  the  needs  of  the  merchant  marine,  noted 
earlier.  Joint  ventures  and  technological  assistance  programs 
already  are  well  under  way,  originally  in  Brazil  and  East  Asia, 
and  now  increasingly  in  the  Middle  East.  Such  offshore  invest- 
ments have  been  dictated  not  only  by  the  lack  of  land  in  Japan 
itself,  but  also  by  the  planned  foreign  diversification  of  the 
steel  industry. 

It  is  possible  that  this  construction  will  come  to  include 
export  warships,  but  such  ships  probably  would  not  amount  to  more 
than  a  small  fraction  of  total  work. 

Fisheries 

Well  over  50  percent  of  the  animal  protein  in  the  Japanese 


see  the  round-table  discussion  in  the  Stripping  and  Trade 
News  Supplement,  op_.  cit . ,  pp.  98-102.  Note  also,  however,  that 
many  of  these  orders  have  become  unprofitable  because  of  higher 
building  costs. 

^NKIYT,  July  2,  1974,  p.  4.  Mitsui  Shipbuilding  has 
received  orders  for  a  total  of  four  dynamically  positioned 
drilling  rigs  in  six  months.  The  boom  comes  when  "the  business 
of  its  shipbuilding  division  is  dulling."   (NKIW,  July  16,  1 974> 
p.  9)»  This  development  has  been  serious  enough  to  prompt  U.S. 
shipbuilders,  who  now  lead  the  world  in  such  structures,  to  con- 
sider legislative  countermeasures.  (Official  of  the  Shipbuilders 
Association  of  America,  interview,  October  9>  1 97 4 • )  The  Mitsu- 
bishi shipyard  in  Nagasaki  also  is  assembling  the  first  full-scale 
floating  city  (Aquapolis)  for  Expo  75  in  Okinawa. 


333 


diet  comes  from  the  sea.  The  annual  catch  is  the  world's  most 
valuable,  and  overtook  Peru's  in  tonnage  when  the  latter 's 
anchovy  industry  was  devastated  by  over-fishing  and  a  shift  in 
the  Humboldt  Current. 

Pelagic  (distant  water  and  offshore)  fisheries  account  for 
some  70  percent  by  weight  and  50  percent  by  value  of  the  Japanese 
catch.  These  are  mostly  large-scale,  technologically  intensive 
operations  under  the  control  of  a  few  influential  companies. 
Government  regulation  is  maintained  by  licenses  issued  through 
the  Fisheries  Agency  of  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture  and  Forestry 
which  are  designed  to  discourage  over- investment  and  prevent 
species  over-fishing. 

Neritic  (coastal)  fisheries  include  family,  cooperative  or 
corporate  operations  and  bring  in  about  30  percent  of  the  total 
harvest  value.  Small  unit  fishing  is  tightly  controlled  at  the 
prefectural  level  where  it  has  considerable  political  power. 

Large  coastal  vessels,  notably  purse  seiners,  usually  belong  to 

24 
corporate  interests  and  are  regulated  at  the  national  level. 

The  remainder  of  the  fishing  industry  is  comprised  of 
aquaculture  and  fresh  water  operations.  Whaling  is  a  separate 
issue  and  will  be  considered  later. 

The  1972  catch  was  a  record,  exceeding  10  million  metric 


%.  C.  Harrington,  "Operation  of  the  Japanese  Fishery 
Management  System,"  in  A.  R.  Tussing,  T.  A.  Liorehouse  and  J.  D. 
Babb,  Jr.,  eds.,  Alaska  Fisheries  Policy  (university  of  Alaska, 
1970),  pp.  419-442. 


334 


tons  for  the  first  time.  Japanese  fleets  range  worldwide,  driven 

by  a  population  which  eats  more  than  four  times  as  much  fish  as 

25 

the  world  average.    Their  technology  is  superb,  and  is  sup- 
ported by  extensive  research  efforts.  Yet  nearly  all  sectors 

of  Japanese  fishing-  face  troubled  futures. 

26 

The  problems  are  fourfold. 

(1)  Domestic  demand  for  marine  products  has  become 
larger  and  more  diversified  than  domestic  sup- 
plies, thus  increasing  reliance  on  imports. 

(2)  Pollution  has  seriously  affected  coastal 
fisheries  and  aquaculture. 

(3)  The  international  acceptance  of  the  200-mile 
economic  zone  could  affect  up  to  80  percent  of 
the  pelagic  catch. 

(4)  Inflation  and  the  sharp  increase  in  fuel  prices, 
as  well  as  a  shortage  of  fisheries  product 
material,  have  reduced  fishermen's  profit 
margins 


•   •   •   • 


In  the  first  case,  the  demand/supply  imbalance  is  not 
readily  correctable  by  market  forces.  Demand  has  centered  on 
medium  and  high  grade  fish  (such  as  tuna),  delicacies  like  shell- 
fish or  shrimp,  and  fishmeal  for  livestock.  Largely  because  of 
its  efforts  to  meet  this  demand,  coastal  fisheries  diversifica- 
tion has  stagnated,  with  some  species  coming  close  to  being  over- 
fished. It  may  be  that  government  efforts  to  promote  aquaculture 


25 

Food  and  People,  XVI. 

26 

Asahi  (eve),  April  12,  1 974»  report  on  FY  1973>  Fisheries 

White  Paper.  Original  in  Suisancho,  hen  (Fisheries  Agency,  ed.), 

GyoKyo  Hakusho  Showa  48  ("Fishing  Industry  White  Paper  FY  1973") > 

T5kyo,  1974,  PP.  4-5. 


335 


27 
and  the  world-wide  need  to  develop  new  ocean  resources,   will 

send  Japanese  fishermen  in  search  of  other  species  which  eventu- 
ally will  satisfy  Japanese  consumers.  Virtually  all  forecasts, 

however,  show  a  continued  increase  in  imports  for  the  next  few 
28 


years. 


In  the  "battle  against  pollution  in  Japan,  some  isolated 


29 
progress  has  been  made.    But  the  overall  problem  is  far  from 

30 
being  solved,  and  actually  may  be  getting  worse.    During  fiscal 

1972,  345  claims  (1.1  times  those  in  fiscal  1971)  were  filed  for 
damages,  but  the  amount  of  the  damages  was  115*9  billion  yen,  up 
3.1  times  from  those  of  the  previous  year.  The  disastrous  1974 
oil  spill  in  the  inland  sea  will  seriously  affect  mariculture  in 
the  area.  From  the  standpoint  of  coastal  fisheries,  the  intensi- 
fied search  for  oil  and  minerals  on   the  continental  shelf  can 
only  compound  the  problem.  If  previous  negotiations  are  any 
guide,  a  compromise  eventually  will  be  reached  which  will  permit 


27 

Particularly  the  Antarctic  krill  which  may  lead  to  a 

doubling  of  the  world's  catch.  See  also  Suisancho  Kenkyu  bu 

(Fisheries  Agency,  Research  and  Development  Section),  Shinkai 

Gyo  .jo  Kai  hat  sura  Suishin  Hosaku  Kenkyukai  Hokoku  ("Research 

Society  Report  on  Promotion  Plan  for  Deep  Sea  Fishery  Grounds 

Development")  (Tokyo,  July  1974). 

Fisheries  White  Paper,  crp_»   cit. ,  p.  67 • 

29 

Some  fish  reportedly  have  returned  to  the  once- barren 

waters  around  Enoshiiaa,   and  the  production  of  mackerel-pike  and 
sardines  has  revived. 

30 
Note  the  massive  oil  spill  which  devastated  inland  sea 

fisheries  in  December  1974* 


336 


seabed  exploitation  in  exchange  for  the  generous  compensation  of 
local  fishermen.  But  a  quick  resolution  is  unlikely. 

To  date,  Japanese  ocean  fishing  has  been  regulated  through 
a  host  of  regional  fisheries  and  bilateral  treaties.    The 
latter  mostly  have  been  spawned  by  extensions  of  coastal  state 
jurisdiction.  Typically,  Japan  either  has  established  joint 
ventures  with  developing  country  partners,  or  has  arranged  to 
pay  some  sort  of  license  fee  for  the  privilege  of  fishing.  Two 
factors,  however,  are  likely  to  complicate  these  arrangements. 
The  first  is  a  proliferation  of  200-mile  claims,  largely  legiti- 
mated at  Caracas  whether  or  not  a  formal  treaty  ever  becomes 
effective.  The  second  is  a  general  trend  towards  resources 
nationalism,  which  is  likely  to  intensify  if  a  food  crisis 
approaches. 

Most  attention  with  regard  to  200-mile  economic  zones  has 
focused  on  the  developing  countries.  Despite  their  high  visi- 
bility, however,  only  about  370,000  tons  of  fish  a  year  are 

caught  off  the  coasts  of  Africa,  South  America  and  Southeast 

32 
Asia.    By  far  the  largest  part  of  the  endangered  catch  comes 

from  the  North  Atlantic  and  North  Pacific,  the  Sea  of  Japan  and 

33 

the  East  China  Sea.    The  principal  adversaries  thus  are  not 


31 

These  are  listed  in  Suisancho,   Suissn  Tokei  Shihyo  #4 

(Fisheries  Statistics  Index  £4)    (Tokyo,    June   1974)  >   p.    102. 

flihon  Keizai   (ed.),   June  3>    1 974* 

33 

On  a  species  basis,  a  200-mile  limit  would  affect  some 


337 


the  developing  countries  (except  for  China  and  Korea).  Rather, 
they  are  the  USSR,  Canada  and  the  United  States,  with  whom 
fisheries  negotiations  have  been  conducted  almost  continuously 
since  the  1950s*  It  is  here,  rather  than  in  the  Third  World, 
that  resources  nationalism  poses  the  greatest  hardship  for 
Japanese  fishermen. 

Fourth,  the  rapid  rate  of  inflation  has  had  a  serious 

34 
impact  on  fishing  operations  at  all  levels.    In  general,  fish 

culture  has  become  increasingly  profitable,  while  boat  operators 

have  been  rather  hard  hit.  In  mid-1973  the  number  of  fishermen 

35 

was  508, 200,  a  figure  which  has  been  declining  since  1 9^4* 

Fishing  in  Japan  is  supported  by  an  extensive  scientific 
research  organization;  public,  corporate  and  academic,  at  the 
national  and  perfectural  levels.  In  fiscal  1974?  excluding  the 
funding  for  the  Okinawa  Ocean  Expo,  the  Fishery  Agency  received 

the  largest  share  of  the  Government's  marine  development  budget — 

36 
as  it  has  in  previous  years.    In  addition  to  improving  ship 

and  equipment  design  there  are  intensive  efforts  underway  to 


40/S  of  the  tuna  catch,  and  JCF/o   of  that  of  prawns,  cuttlefish  and 
pollack.  A  total  of  about  4*5  million  tons.  Fisheries  Agency 
Data. 

Suisan  Keizai,  January  9>  1974* 

35 

Fisheries  White  Paper,  op.  eft.  (introduction),  p.  12. 

36 

JAuiSTEC,    Governmental  Marine  Development  Program  (by 

general  account)   of  Japan  for  1974  Fiscal  Year,    by_  Ministerial 
Agency  (hereafter  IJDP  74 j,    Yokosuka,   April  1974  (mimeo) . 


338 


37 

promote  the  optimum  usage  of  living  ocean  resources. 

Aquaculture,  however,  attracts  the  major  share  of  the 
Fishery  Agency  marine  development  budget,  and  it  is  expected 
to  increase.  Japan  already  boasts  a  cultivated  yield  of  over 
700,000  tons,  more  than  any  other  country.  Among  the  species 
currently  grown  are  salmon,  greenling,  octopus,  crab  and  a  host 
of  shellfish.  In  addition,  the  traditional  harvests  of  pearl  and 
seaweed  are  taken.  Several  studies  have  called  for  the  promotion 
of  fish  farming,  not  only  to  provide  more  efficient  use  of  the 
resource,  but  also  to  increase  national  self-sufficiency  in  food. 
Perhaps  some  lessons  can  be  learned  from  the  prototype  "sea 
ranch"  at  the  1975  Okinawa  Ocean  Exposition.  A  joint  Japan- 
Soviet  symposium  also  recently  suggested  cooperative  large  scale 

38 

farming  of  aquatic  products. 

Whaling 

Although  whaling  ha3  fallen  precipitously,  both  in  volume 
and  in  value,  it  remains  a  highly  emotional  issue  in  Japan.  The 
primary  reason  has  been  the  attempts  of  conservation  groups,  and 
lately  the  U.S.  Government,  to  impose  a  global  ban  on  the  indus- 
try. Such  pressures  have  intensified  since  the  adoption  of  a 


37 
Kagaku  Gijitsu  Cho  (Science  and  Technology  Agency), 

Kaiyo  Kaihatsu  no  Gen jo  to  Tembo  ("Present  Situation  of  and 

Prospects  for  Ocean  Development"),  Tokyo,  November  1973>  Sect. 

4.3,  PP.  171-177. 

58MM,  November  23,    1974. 


339 


U.S.  proposal  for  a  10  year  moratorium  on  whaling  at  the  Stock- 
holm Environment  Conference  in  1972. 

The  opposition  arguments  are  three-fold.  (1)  Whales  are 
on  the  verge  of  extinction,  (2)  they  are  being  taken  for  greed, 
rather  than  necessity  and  (3)  the  slaughter  of  such  mammals  is 

cruel,  and  the  methods  currently  used  are  especially  so.  The 

39 
Japanese  counter  with  data  to  dispute  the  first  point   and  note 


that  seven  percent  of  the  nation's  1973  meat  intake  came  from 

po: 
41 


whales.    They  also  point  to  the  killing  of  animals  for  sport 


and  furs  in  the  West. 

Whatever  the  merits  of  each  case,  the  ban  has  become  a 
most  sensitive  issue.  For  one  thing  even  if  the  total  prohi- 
bition has  not  yet  been  accepted  by  the  International  Whaling 
Commission  (IWC),  it  has  led  to  Japan's  near-isolation  in  that 

forum.  For  another,  many  Japanese  feel  that  they  simply  are 

42 

being  criticized  for  different  eating  habits. 


39 
For  instance,  some  endangered  species  currently  are 

increasing  at  a  rate  in  excess  of  the  IWC  quotas.   (Mainichi 

(ed.),  June  17,  1974) - 

It  would  take,  it  is  said,  nearly  220,000  tons  of  beef 
to  replace  this  whale  meat,  with  a  consequent  increase  in  grain 
demand.  (Ninon  Keizai,  June  2,  1974)* 

The  timing  of  the  U.S.  anti-whaling  campaign  was  unfortu- 
nate in  Japanese  eyes.  Beginning  as  it  did  in  the  late  1960s, 
at  the  height  of  the  Vietnam  War,  it  led  to  comments  that  Ameri- 
cans were  more  concerned  about  killing  whales  than  killing 
people.  See,  among  o thers,  Japan  Times,  April  22,  1974* 

^  Tokyo  Shimbun,  June  20,  1974. 


340 


Most  of  the  major  newspapers  have  recognized  the  limited 
future  of  whaling,  and  have  recommended  an  intensified  search 
for  new  sources  of  food.    Even  the  companies  themselves  have 
accepted  the  inevitability  of  stricter  quotas  on  the  valuable 
antarctic  fin  whales  and  are  searching  for  alternatives.   In  the 
process,  however,  the  United  States  has  come  in  for  a  good  deal 
of  criticism. 

Ocean  Development 

Aside  from  aquaculture,  Japanese  ocean  development  projects 
may  be  divided  into  three  categories:   those  in  adjacent  waters 
or  on  the  continental  shelf,  those  on  the  deep  seabed,  and  those 
off  the  coasts  of  other  states.  Volumes  have  been  written  about 
these  efforts,   but  a  brief  recapitulation  is  in  order  since 
they  will  become  an  increasingly  important  part  of  Japanese  sea- 
power  in  the  future. 

(1)  Adjacent  Projects 

The  Japanese  Continental  Shelf  is  relatively  narrow,  rarely 
exceeding  25  miles  except  in  the  area  of  the  Tsushima  Strait  and 


^For  instance,  Asahi  (ed.),  June  30,  1974* 

Among  these  are:   Science  and  Technology  Agency,  Marine 
Development  in  Japan  1972  (hereafter  MDIJ  72);  Japan  ECCR,  "Status 
Report  of  Sea-Bed  Exploration  and  Exploitation  Technology  in 
Japan  1972"  (Revised  edition)  (hereafter  Seabed  Status  Report); 
Science  and  Technology  Agency,  Kai.yo  Kaihatsu  No  Gen  jo  to  Tembo' , 
op.  cit. ;  and  the  June  1974  edition  (Vol.  5>  ilA)   of  Kaiyo"  SangyP 
Kenkyu,  Shiryo  (Ocean  Industry  Research  Materials)  entitled  "V/aga 
Kuni  Kaiyo  Sangyo  No  Gonen"  (Five  Year3  of  Our  Country's  Ocean 
Industry) . 


341 


north  of  HokkaidcS.  Nevertheless,  the  shelf  area  is  nearly  7 6 

45 
percent  of  the  total  land,  area,   so  it  has  been  the  subject  of 

intensive  investigation.  The  adjacent  waters,  which  once  pro- 
vided most  of  the  fish,  now  offer  minerals  as  well.   They  also 
are  used  for  desalinization,  man  in  the  sea  projects,  fish  farm- 
ing and  a  host  of  scientific  explorations  including,  unfortunately, 
pollution  studies. 

(a)  Marine  Mineral  resources  include  oil  and  natural  gas, 
coal,  and  iron  sands.  Manganese  nodules  will  be  considered 
separately.  Gold  and  other  minerals  have  been  found,  but  not 
commercially  exploited. 

Japan's  offshore  oil  fields  are  new,  with  prospects  for  expan- 
sion. However,  it  is  doubtful  that  domestic  production,  onshore 
or  off,  ever  will  become  a  significant  factor  in  her  energy  pic- 
ture. Such  sources  accounted  for  .3  percent  of  1973  demand,  and 
even  a  50-fold  expansion  would  provide  less  than  10  percent  of 
the  expected  1980  requirements.  Nonetheless,  every  little  bit 
helps,  so  it  is  being  pursued  vigorously. 

The  political  problems  often  have  been  more  formidable  than 

the  geological  ones.  Notable  among  these  have  been  the  seabed 

46 
boundary  disputes  in  the  East  China  and  Yellow  Seas.    Local 

fishermen  also  have  opposed  even  seismic  surveys  on  the  grounds 


45MDLJ  22,  p.  13. 

AG 

See  Park,  "Oil  Under  Troubled  Waters,"  _op_.  cit.  (note 

7-39).  Also  pp.  251-252,  above. 


342 


that  they  may  lead  to  exploitation  which  would  bring  pollution 
and  interfere  with  fishing  operations. 

Major  physical  hurdles  also  must  be  overcome.   In  the  Sea 
of  Japan,  for  instance,  the  working  season  rarely  is  longer  than 
from  March  to  July.  By  August  the  threat  of  typhoons  has  arisen, 
and  they  are  followed  by  Fall  and  Winter  storms. 

Despite  these  impediments,  progress  is  being  made.  There 

are  plans  to  develop  the  Sakhalin  continental  shelf  in  cooperation 

48 
with  the  USSR,  possibly  with  American  assistance.    Recent  surveys 

indicate  promising  geological  structures  off  the  northeast  coast 

-  49 
of  Honshu.    An  ambitious  three-year  plan  has  been  devised  for 

oil  and  gas  surveys  on  the  continental  slopes,  which  nearly  will 

50 
triple  the  size  of  the  offshore  areas  under  study.    In  addition, 

new  legislations  had  been  proposed  to  promote  the  development  of 

51 

continental  shelf  minerals. 

The  energy  crisis  has  renewed  interest  in  coal,  whose  pro- 
duction had  been  allowed  to  decline  in  recent  years.  In  1970 
about  12,500,000  tons  (one-quarter  of  the  national  output)  came 
from  seabed  areas.  Working  shafts  have  been  sunk  from  artificial 
islands  off  Western  Kyushu,  but  research  also  has  been  done  on 


47lihon  Keizai,  April  21,  1974. 
48Nihon  Keizai  (eve.),  April  27,  1974. 
4%ihon  Keizai,  April  24,  1974. 
*  Nikkan  Kowo,   July  4,  1974. 
51Nikkan  Kogvo,  May  21,  1974. 


343 


exploitation  from  ships  or  offshore  platforms. 

Gravel  and  magnetite  placer  sand   have  been  recovered  from 
Japanese  coastal  waters  for  years.  In  the  past  the  latter  have 
been  less  important  than  onshore  iron  sands,  but  may  become  more 
attractive  in  the  future.  Moreover,  the  technology  developed  for 
this  recovery  can  be  used  for  other  placer  deposits  worldwide. 

(b)  Desalinization.   By  1985  Japan  is  expected  to  face  a 

53 
serious  fresh  water  shortage  particularly  in  urban  areas.    In 

fact,  it  is  estimated  that  nearly  22  billion  tons  of  fresh  water 

may  have  to  be  recovered  from  the  ocean.  The  annual  capacity  of 

the  three  plants  operating  in  1972  was  about  2,500,000  tons  per 

5/ 
year,   which  obviously  will  need  vast  improvements,  both  in 

technology  and  capacity. 

(c)  Unconventional  Ocean  Energy  Sources.  The  theoretical 
attractiveness  of  harnessing  waves,  tides  and  marine  currents  in 
Japan  is  limited  by  several  physical  factors.  Among  these  are 
the  relatively  low  tidal  ranges  throughout  the  country  and  the 
fact  that  the  position  of  the  Gulf  Stream-like  Kuroshio  varies 
too  much  to  permit  the  use  of  fixed  equipment.   In  the  future, 
solar  plants  or  other  advanced  systems  may  become  attractive, 
but  this  will  take  many  years. 

(d)  Effective  use  of  Coastal  Areas.  The  rapid  rise  of 


52 

See  above,  note  2-30. 

53 

Japan  Times,    June   4>    1 97 3 • 

5%DLJ,    0£.    cit.,   p.    19. 


344 


land  prices,  additional  food  requirements,  the  lack  of  space  for 
new  industrial  sites,  the  need  for  new  port  facilities,  and  a 
host  of  other  factors  have  made  utilization  of  the  Japanese 
coastal  zone  more  and  more  attractive.  Coastal  and  brackish 
water  aquaculture  has  been  mentioned.  Large  portions  of  Japan's 
industrial  areas  already  sit  on  reclaimed  land.  An  airport  in 
Osaka  Bay  is  planned  to  reduce  complaints  of  noise  pollution 
which  have  limited  operations  at  the  present  field.  Superports 
have  been  built,  and  more  are  planned.  Even  arable  lands  have 
been  recovered  from  the  shallow  seas. 

The  uses  of  the  zone  bordering  Japan's  27,000  kilometers  of 
coastline  will  intensify  rapidlj'-.  Floating  nuclear  power  plant 

site  studies  have  been  made,  but  the  density  of  sea  (and  air) 

55 
traffic  along  the  east  coast  poses  safety  hazards.    The  location 

56 
of  industrial  complexes  at  sea  has  been  considered.    Eventually, 

seabed  oil  tanks  (such  as  Ekofisk  City  in  the  North  Sea)  or  other 

storage  facilities  will  be  built.  Man  in  the  Sea  projects  one 

day  may  progress  beyond  the  range  of  mere  scientific  research. 

Marine  recreation  facilities  in  the  form  of  undersea  parks  and 

viewing  towers  already  are  being  built. 

In  sum,  the  use  of  Japan's  adjacent  waters  will  grow 

rapidly,  from  inshore  areas  out  into  the  economic  zone,  however 


55 

Okamura  Kenji,  Japan  ECOR,  interview,  December  8,  1 974* 

56 

J   Odani  Kosuke,  JAMSTEC,  interview,  July  25,  1974. 


545 


far  it  may  extend. 

(2)  Deep  Seabed  Projects 

Japanese  firms  became  interested  in  manganese  nodules  late 

57 
in  the  1960s.    Initially  it  was  decided  to  develop  their  own 

system,  the  so-called  continuous  line  bucket  (CLB).  After  several 

years  of  testing,  however,  the  approach  was  changed  to  investment 

in  joint  ventures  with  American,  French  and  German  companies. 

At  the  same  time  33  corporations  and  10  organizations  have  formed 

a  Deep  Seabed  Mineral  Resources  Development  Association  to 

59 
coordinate  domestic  efforts.    Geophysical  surveys  of  the  waters 

around  Japan  also  will  include  prospective  nodule  sites. 

Another  area  of  interest  on  the  deep  seabed  has  been  remote- 
controlled  drilling  equipment.  Recent  technology  has  been 
directed  towards  the  recovery  of  petroleum  and  gas  reserves  from 
the  continental  slopes  and  possibly  the  abyssal  plain  itself. 
Japanese  efforts  may  not  be  in  the  forefront  of  these  develop- 
ments, but  her  firms  will  be  quick  to  make  use  of  any  break- 
throughs which  occur.  There  also  is  the  possibility  that  local 
geo thermal  activity  might  produce  mineral-rich  springs  such  as 


57 

Seabed  S tatus  Report,  op.  cit. ,  p.  65. 

58 

3  Japanese  firms  have  signed  with  Tenneco,  four  with 

International  Nickel  (INCO),  and  Mitsubishi  Shoji  is  cooperating 
with  Kennecott  Copper.  See  Ninon  Keizai,  May  8,  1974?  <"md 
Nikkan  Kogyo,  July  2  and  12,  1974*   Once  again,  this  is  con- 
sistent with  the  philosophy  of  minimizing  risks  and  maximizing 
options. 

^Nihon  Keizai,  April  10,  1974. 


346 


those  found  in  the  Red  Sea  and  along  the  Mid-Atlantic  Ridge. 
(3)  Foreign  Projects 

Japan  has  used  its  organization,  technology  and  experience 
very  effectively  to  gain  entry  to  foreign  ocean  development 
markets.  Foremost  among  these  have  been  oil  and  gas,  part  of 
the  key  to  her  "resources  diplomacy." 

In  the  future,  such  efforts  will  he  coordinated  with  a 
whole  range  of  diversified  assistance  programs,  many  of  them  in 
marine-related  fields.  These  will  be  explored  more  fully  in  the 
section  below  on  acquisitive  seapower. 

Japan's  Organization  for  Maritime  Development 

The  business- government  relationship  in  Japan  has  been  the 
subject  of  extensive  inquiry.  Many  credit  it  for  the  nation's 
post-war  economic  success.  In  the  specific  field  of  ocean  tech- 
nology, it  has  been  argued  that  Japan  is  better  organized  than 
any  other  country  in  the  world  to  exploit  the  future  riches  of 
the  sea. 

The  ties  between  government  and  business  in  Japan  are 
undeniably  closer  than  they  are  in  most  capitalist  countries. 
Nevertheless,  the  associations  are  more  complicated  than  is  sug- 
gested by  the  term  "Japan,  Inc."    Perhaps  this  is  best 


John  P.  Craven,  "Indus try /Government  Relations  in  Off- 
shore Resource  Development."  Paper  presented  at  the  5th  annual 
Offshore  Technology  Conference,  Houston,  April  29-LIay  3>  1 975 - 
Pt.  II,  pp.  947-949. 

61 

U.S.,  Department  of  Commerce,  Japan:  The  Government- 


347 


illustrated  by  an  example  from  the  deep  ocean  mining  area. 

Businessmen  coordinate  policies  within  the  zaikai  (business 
leaders'  clique)  which  includes  such  influential  elements  as 
Keidanren  (Federation  of  Economic  Organizations)  and  Keizai 
Doyukai  (Committee  for  Economic  Development).  Mutual  interests 
among  bureaucrats  lead  to  the  so-called  kambatsu  (bureaucratic 
clique) .  Barriers  between  occupations  are  broken  by  the  closely- 
knit  gakubatsu  (university  cliques)  and  innumerable  informal 
associations  such  as  those  for  common  birthyears  or  zodiac  signs. 
Most  important  of  all  are  the  keibatsu  (familial  ties)  which  per- 
vade the  upper  echelons  of  Japanese  business  and  government. 

Decision-making  is  a  continuous  and  often  informal  process 
designed  to  establish  the  consensus  so  important  to  most  Japanese 
evolutions.  Coordination  is  emphasized  at  all  levels.  There  is 
an  ongoing  dialogue,  usually  by  telephone,  between  company  repre- 
sentatives and  their  contacts  in  the  twelve  ministries  and  five 
agencies  of  the  Government's  executive  branch.  Petroleum  and 
seabed  mining  concerns  work  through  the  Ocean  Division  of  the 
Resources  and  Energy  Agency.  The  Ministry  of  Transport  is  the 
liaison  for  shipping  companies,  while  fishermen  approach  the 
Fisheries  Agency.  Formal  lobbying  may  be  resorted  to  if  legis- 
lation is  pending  before  the  Diet,  but  it  must  be  paralleled  by 
continued  consultation  with  the  bureaucracy.  Recently,  however, 


Business  Relationship  (Washington;  U.S.  Government  Printing 
Office,  1971),  passim. 


348 


the  growing  importance  of  ocean- related  projects  has  been  empha- 
sized by  the  development  of  more  complex  channels. 

Aside  from  fisheries,  probably  the  most  important  com- 
mercial forces  in  Japanese  ocean  policy  are  the  enterprise  groups 
associated  with  the  major  trading  companies  such  as  Mitsubishi, 
Sumitomo  and  Mitsui.  Functional  successors  to  the  pre-war 

zaibatsu  (financial  cliques),  the  six  major  groups  controlled 

62 
nearly  68  percent  of  Japan's  corporate  capital  in  1971 •    No 

longer  under  family  control,  they  still  represent  associations 

of  diverse  companies  linked  by  a  parent  bank  and  inter-locking 

management.  Much  of  the  Japanese  policy  planning  process  can  be 

illustrated  by  a  brief  description  of  the  interwoven  competition 

and  cooperation  of  these  units  in  search  of  seabed  minerals. 

(See  Figure  10-1.) 

63 

Between  1970  and  1973  the  Sumitomo  group   developed  a 

pilot  system  for  seabed  mining  operations,  The  bulk  of  the  work 
was  accomplished  jointly  by  the  parent  trading  company  (Sumitomo 
Shoji),  Sumitomo  Shipbuilding  and  Machinery,  and  Sumitomo  Metal 
Mining.  Such  cooperative  efforts  are  common,  although  the  indi- 
vidual companies  are  distinct  corporate  entities  which  vie  for 
funds  and  projects  within  the  group. 

Among  the  44  Sumitomo  Companies  there  are  some  60  organiza- 
tions which  are  involved  in  ocean- related  activities.  To  increase 


62F£ER,  August  6,  1973,  p.   37. 

63 

I  am  indebted  to  the  personnel  of  Sumitomo  Shoji  America, 

Inc.  for  assistance  in  the  preparation  of  this  example. 


349 


Figure  10-1 

ORGANIZATIONAL  RELATIONSHIPS  INVOLVED  IN  SUMITOMO  MANGANESE 
NODULE  MINING  (SUPERIMPOSED  ON  DIVERSE  INTERPERSONAL  TIES) 


Seabed  Mining 
Negotiation  Position 


Foreign  Ministry 


Government 
Ministries  and  Agencies 


MITI 


DOMA 


JOIA 


Trading  Company 
Groups 


Sumitomo    Mitsui 


Other  Interested 
Industries 


SODECO 


Sumitomo 
Shoji 


Sumitomo 
Shipbuilding 
&  Machinery 


f 

Sumitomo 
Metal  Mining 


Other  Sumitomo  Companies 


350 


the  competitiveness  of  such  ventures,  their  management  recently 
has  been  coordinated  within  a  newly-formed  Ocean  Development  and 
Engineering  Company  (SODECO) .  The  directorate  of  SCDECO  is 
drawn  from  the  officers  of  the  concerned  Sumitomo  companies,  who 
usually  will  hold  multiple  appointments. 

Thus,  future  projects  in  seabed  mining  will  be  balanced  by 
SODECO  against  other  ocean  programs.  Budget  requests  will  be 
forwarded  to  the  Sumitomo  Bank  for  consideration  along  with  pro- 
posals from  other  companies  in  the  group.  Finally,  if  approved, 
the  funds  would  be  disbursed  (effectively  subcontracted)  through 
SODECO  to  the  appropriate  firm.  Although,  in  most  cases,  the 
companies  which  had  done  the  work  prior  to  the  formation  of 
SODECO  will  continue  to  get  the  contracts,  this  system  offers 
better  coordination.  Equivalent  mechanisms  operate  within  the 
other  trading  company  groups. 

However,  according  to  SODECO  President  Nishimura 
Tsunesaburo: 

There  is  no  sector  in  ocean  development  fields  which 
is  small  enough  for  a  single  company  to  tackle  on 
its  own.  All  ocean  development  firms  have  to 
cooperate  with  one  another  if  they  really  want  to 
produce  results.  The  Government,  on  its  part,  should 
select  several  high  priority  projects  for  the  com- 
panies to  pour  everything  in  [sic].  Dispersing 
emphasis  on  an  unwieldily  [sic]  large  number  of  pro- 
jects will  come  to  nothing. 64 

In  order  to  facilitate  this  policy  coordination  process, 

the  Deep  Ocean  Minerals  Association  (DOHA)  was  formed  early  in 


HlKIW,  October  2J,  1973. 


351 


1973*  Managed  by  representatives  from  five  trading  companies 
and  including  27  firms  from  the  mining/ smelting  shipbuilding  and 
steel  industries,  it  was  designed  to  channel  communications  to 
and  from  MITI.  A  year  later  DOMA  was  transformed  into  a  legal 
entity  (hs.jin)  as  the  Deep  Seabed  Minerals  Resources  Development 
Association.  Additional  consultations  are  conducted  through  the 
more  broadly-based  Japan  Ocean  Industries  Association  (JOIA). 

While  proposals  are  discussed  between  commercial  interests 
and  their  ministries,  a  similar  process  is  underway  within  the 
government  it3elf.  An  "International  Conference  on  the  Law  of 
the  Sea  Preparations  Promotion  Headquarters"  was  set  up  prior  to 
the  Geneva  Seabed  Committee  meeting  to  draw  inputs  from  interested 
parts  of  the  bureaucracy.    In  theory  positions  thus  derived  are 
presented  by  the  Foreign  Ministry  for  international  negotiation. 
The  inability  to  agree  on  a  forward-looking  position  for  Caracas, 
however,  is  indicative  of  some  of  the  rigidities  in  the  system. 

Although  this  summary  has  focused  on  ocean  mining,  it  is 
representative  of  arrangements  in  other  industries.   For  instance, 
there  is  the  Japan  Fisheries  Association  to  link  fishermen  and 
the  Ministry  of  Agriculture  and  Forestry  (though  it  often  is  by- 
passed). Several  zaibatsu  recently  have  withdrawn  from  a 
Japanese  multi-group  venture,  strengthened  their  individual  oil 
development  companies  and  immediately  begun  to  coordinate 
negotiations  for  joint  explorations  with  American  firms  in 


Sankei,  June  25,  1973. 


352 


Southeast  Asia  waters. 

These  organizations  are,  of  course,  superimposed  on  the 
myriad  of  previously  noted  inter-personal  ties.  It  is  thus 
difficult  to  separate  a  private  stance  from  an  official  one. 
Rarely  in  these  circumstances  will  an  interest  group  resort  to 
public  pronouncements  to  try  to  bring  pressure  on  the  government. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  can  be  certain  that  its  point  of  view  at 
least  has  been  considered  in  some  phase  of  the  policy-making 
process. 

Dr.  Craven,  pointing  to  this  cooperative  approach,  and  the 

level  of  government  investment  in  private  industry,  concluded 

that  Japan  "most  closely  approximates  the  ideal  national  manager 

for  ocean  resources."    Moreover: 

There  is  a  long  range  plan  and  goal  which  considers 
the  total  system  including  environmental  protection 
and  there  are  national  resources  of  significant 
amounts  to  implement  the  resource  development  plan. 
The  departure  from  the  system  manager  idealization 
is  primarily  in  the  fact  that  the  industry  response 
to  national  planning  is  tacit  rather  than  explicit.  ° 

Although  it  certainly  is  true  that  Japan  is  closer  to  an 
idealized  ocean  system  managex*  than  the  U.S.  or  Great  Britain, 
there  are  more  serious  weaknesses  than  may  be  apparent. 

In  the  first  place,  the  government  itself  is  by  no  means 


Nikkan  Kogvo,  June  16,  1973* 
fi'j 

Craven,  cip_.  cit. ,  p.  11-997 • 

68Ibid.,  p.  11-949. 


353 


monolithic.  Each  of  the  ministries  is,  in  many  ways,  a  fief- 

69 
dom.    Within  the  ministries  disputes  can  be  resolved  by  con- 
sensus before  external  positions  are  presented.  But  between  the 
ministries,  neither  the  resolution  of  differences  nor  adequate 
cooperation  is  by  any  means  assured.  The  Caracas  negotiations, 
as  already  noted,  highlighted  this,  and  such  examples  of  disarray 
are  likely  to  continue  as  Japan  reorients  its  national  goals  from 
economic  growth  to  social  welfare. 

Another  example  of  a  lack  of  bureaucratic  coordination  is 
provided  by  the  case  of  ocean  surveys.  Currently,  these  are 
conducted  by  the  MSDF,  the  Agriculture  and  Forestry  Ministry, 
and  the  Transportation  Ministry.  Additional  surveys  involving 
petroleum  development  are  conducted  under  MITI.  JAMS TEC  is  keyed 

to  man  in  the  sea  projects,  but  MSDF  cooperation  is  excluded  by 

70 
pressures  for  the  separation  of  civil  and  military  activities. 

A  second  problem  is  a  surprising  disinclination  to  engage 
in  really  innovative  planning.   The  mistrust  of  long-range  plan- 
ning in  Japan  stems  in  part  from  a  view  that  major  world  move- 
ments will  be  largely  independent  of  her  own  efforts.  There  is 
thus  little  point  in  setting  forth  extended  programs  in  pursuit 
of  fixed  goals  when  one  has  so  little  control  over  the  events 


69 

See,  for  instance,  Kusayanagi  Daizo,  "A  Kingdom  of 

Bureaucrats:   The  Finance  Ministry,"  Bungei  Shunji,  July  1 974» 

translation  in  Magazine  Summary,  July  1974>  PP«  6-20. 

70 

'  VADM  Kitamura  Kenichi,  MSDF  (Ret.),  interview,  August  14, 

1974  and  Odani  Kosuke,  interview,  December  9>  1 974- 


354 


which  might  prove  critical.  Once  again,  as  in  her  diplomacy, 
this  leads  to  strategies  which  maximize  options  at  each  step. 

A  final  point  is  a  relatively  low  level  of  financing. 
Japan's  Governmental  Marine  Development  Program  totaled  approxi- 
mately $100  million  in  Fiscal  1974  (April  1974-March  1975). 71 
Over  66  million  of  this  was  devoted  to   the  Okinawa  Exposition, 
however.     By  contrast,    the  non-"national  security"   portion  of 

the  U.S.  Federal  Ocean  Program  for  Fiscal   1975  (July  1974- June 

72 

1975)  equals  $641  million  — nearly  19  times  that  which  Japan  is 

devoting  to  similar  purposes.  Such  comparisons  admittedly  are 
inexact  because  of  undetermined  levels  of  private  spending,  but 
the  imbalance  certainly  is  significant. 

In  point  of  fact,  a  modest  level  of  Research  and  Develop- 
ment spending  long  has  been  characteristic  of  Japanese  business 
(with  the  possible  exception  of  fisheries).  This  is  consistent 
with  the  joint  venture  approach  to  new  technology,  evidenced  in 
ocean  mining.  By  waiting  for  foreign  firms  to  do  the  pioneering 
research  and  then  providing  capital  at  a  later  stage  in  the 
development  process,  the  risk  in  both  funds  and  wasted  effort  is 
greatly  reduced,  although  the  final  cost  in  license  fees  and 
patents  may  be  more  expensive.  Such  an  approach  offers  great 
flexibility,  but  it  also  may  mean  significant  time  lags  before 


71MDP  24,  op_.  cit. 

72 

Larry  L.  Booda,  "Federal  Ocean  Program  Budget  Request 

Up  S64  Million,"  Sea  Technology,  XV  (March  1974),  P-  25. 


355 


Japan  can  take  advantage  of  new  opportunities  in  the  rapidly 

73 
changing  ocean  development  field. 

Non-Military  Seapower  and  Japan's  Interests 

Protective  Maritime  Ventures 

One  of  the  ways  in  which  Japan  can  use  her  seapower  is  to 
insulate  herself  from  the  effects  of  others'  actions.  This  will 
be  termed  protective  seapower.  The  MS DP,  of  course,  is  specifi- 
cally designed  for  this  purpose,  but  commercial  activities  also 
may  contribute. 

National  security  has  been  one  of  the  classic  rationales 
for  a  strong  merchant  marine — guaranteed  capacity  in  time  of 
emergency.  Such  arguments  still  can  be  heard,  but  trends  to 
multi-national  crews,  long-term  charters,  international  insurance 
markets  and  other  economies  of  modern  shipping  will  make  it 
harder  to  ensure  Japan's  control  over  large  fleets  even  should 
they  still  fly  her  flag.   In  general,  however,  this  will  be  less 
troublesome  than  it  once  might  have  been  because  the  inter- 
nationalization of  maritime  commercial  linkages  has  affected 
almost  everyone. 

Still,  there  may  be  problems.  The  transfer  of  control  of 
the  tanker  fleets  to  Arab  states  will  undeniably  make  the  indus- 
trialized world  more  vulnerable  in  future  confrontations. 


73 

Admiral  Nakayama  Sadayoshi,  MSDF  (Ret.),   interview, 

August  14,    1974. 


556 


Moreover,  non-Japanese  crews  might  refuse  to  sail  in  the  face  of 
some  of  the  threats  outlined  in  the  previous  chapter.  Japan's 
encouragement  of  both  of  these  trends  has  been  dictated  by  her 
resources  diplomacy  on  the  one  hand,  and  profitability  on  the 
other.  Although  the  results  are  antithetical  to  her  security  in 
the  sense  of  protective  seapower,  there  is  little  that  can  be 
done  to  change  them.  The  national  merchant  marine,  insofar  as 
it  exists,  will  continue  to  provide  her  with  a  buffer,  but  this 
will  play  a  subordinate  part  in  future  policy  decisions. 

The  protective  role  of  the  shipbuilding  industry  lies  in 
its  ability  to  replace  war/ terrorist  losses. 

Since  resources  are  Japan's  principal  vulnerability,  how- 
ever, the  real  protective  value  of  her  seapower  will  be  the 
extent  to  which  it  can  contribute  to  self-sufficiency.  At 
present,  there  is  no  indication  that  ocean  resources  ever  will 
be  able  to  make  Japan  independent  of  foreign  suppliers,  but  data 
are  hard  to  come  by.  In  the  first  place,  long  range  forecasts 
are  regarded  suspiciously,  as  noted  earlier.  In  the  second,  the 
events  of  late  1973  destroyed  the  basis  of  nearly  all  the  plan- 
ning that  did  exist.  They  also  introduced  such  uncertainties  as 
to  cast  doubt  on  any  studies  which  have  tried  to  take  them  into 
account.  Finally,  in  the  case  of  new  ocean  resources,  there 
simply  is  too  little  information  as  yet. 

Even  before  the  extensions  of  national  ocean  claims, 
fisheries  imports  were  expected  to  increase.  It  is  possible 


357 


that  new  species,  aquaculture  and  mid-ocean  fishing  grounds  may 
offset  the  losses  expected  from  the  North  Pacific  economic  zones, 
The  harvesting  of  krill  might  even  increase  the  total  catch. 
But  without  changes  in  the  Japanese  diet,  there  still  will  he  a 
demand  for  imports  of  seafood. 

The  limited  near-term  potential  of  Japanese  off-shore 
petroleum  already  has  been  noted.  Detailed  surveys  of  minerals 
on  her  continental  margins  are  just  beginning.  Except  for 
manganese  nodules,  which  will  be  mined  by  foreign  (U.S.)  ships 
for  the  next  few  years,  abyssal  resources  hardly  have  been 
studied  at  all.  Regarding  the  nodules,  incidently,  a  hypotheti- 
cal 33  percent  Japanese  interest  in  a  3 , 000 , 000  ton  per  year 
operation  might  yield  results  as  noted  in  Table  10-1. 

Table  10-1 


POSSIBLE  NODULE  METALS  PRODUCTION  AS  A 
PERCENT  OF  1972  JAPANESE  DEMAND 

Approximate       1972  Japanese  (Metric  Tons) 

Metal       Production  (A)      Demand  (b)       A/B 

Manganese       230,000           n.a.  n.a. 
(if  recovered) 

Nickel          15,000          26,315  .57 

Copper          13,000         927,679  .02 


15,000 

26,315 

13,000 

927,679 

2,000 

2,558 

Cobalt  2,000  2,558  .78 


Source:   (A)  United  Nations,  Economic  Implications  of  Sea-Bed 

Mineral  Development  in  the  International  Area,  p.  28. 

(B)  Ninon  Tckei  Nenkan  1973-74,  Table  170. 


358 


It  is  evident  that  these  outputs,  while  useful  in  reducing  some 
imports,  will  not  be  a  panacea.  Indeed,  this  would  seem  to  apply 
as  a  general  statement  about  the  protective  value  of  all  of 
Japan's  seapower.  Even  as  an  oceanic  state,  relying  on  hereto- 
fore untapped  wealth  from  the  sea,  it  will  be  many  decades,  if 
ever,  before  Japan  could  begin  to  consider  herself  detached  from 
foreign  economic  pressures. 

Acquisitive  Maritime  Ventures 

Acquisition,  of  course,  is  the  usual  goal  of  all  marine 
economic  activities — to  win  either  profits,  resources,  or  foreign 
exchange.  Nonetheless,  Japan's  ocean-related  industrial  capacity 
and  technological  expertise  (which  thus  are  elements  of  her  sea- 
power)  have  opened  new  ways  for  her  to  gain  access  to  markets  and 
raw  materials.  In  turn, many  of  these  efforts  also  may  reduce  the 
incentive  to  take  action  against  Japanese  operations. 

First  among  these  are  joint  ventures,  which  have  become 
especially  important  to  fishermen.  As  of  March  1 975>  Japanese 
firms  were  involved  in  96  such  projects  in  43  countries,   and 
several  have  been  established  since,  particularly  in  Africa  and 
the  Middle  East.  Foreign  subsidiary  and  joint  venture  shipyards 
have  been  operating  for  years,  for  instance  in  Brazil  and  Singa- 
pore. However,  overtures  to  Persian  Gulf  States  since  1973  have 


*7  A 

Suisancho,  Suisanpyo  No  Taisuru  Taigai  Shihon  Kyoryoku 
Jiigyo  no  Genjo  (Present  Situation  of  Overseas  Joint  Ventures 
Facing  Fishing  Industries),  Tokyo,  July  1974* 


359 


been  designed  as  much  to  improve  Japan's  standing  in  the  struggle 

for  oil  as  for  profit.  In  the  same  vein,  joint  tanker  companies 

75 
have  been  established  with  Iraq,  Abu  Dhabi  and  Saudi  Arabia. 

Marine-related  technological  assistance  is  another  way  of 

approaching  the  problem.  The  Foreign  Ministry  and  an  industry 

source  known  as  the  Overseas  Fishery  Cooperation  Fund  have  set  up 

a  fund  for  loans  to  developing  country  fisheries  which  could  grow 

76 
as  large  as  15  billion  yen  ($50  million).    The  above-mentioned 

shipping  agreements  also  include  provisions  for  the  progressive 

phase-out  of  direct  Japanese  participation  as  local  competence 

develops.  Thus  they  eventually  also  may  become  oriented  towards 

technological  assistance.  This  encouragement  of  the  merchant 

marines  of  strategic  coastal  states,  whatever  competition  it  may 

generate  for  Japanese  vessels  in  the  short  run,  could  well  work 

to  her  long-run  interests  by  increasing  their  stakes  in  minimum 

restrictions  on  maritime  commerce. 

Finally,  there  are  barter  arrangements.  Ships,  for 
example,  or  fishing  equipment,  could  be  built  in  Japan  with 
domestic  funds  and  then  exchanged  for  resources  to  save  foreign 
currency . 

The  majority  of  maritime  commercial  affairs  probably  will 


'^Nihon  Keizai,  March  19  and  July  16,  1974- 

Suisan  Keizai,  January  9>  1974*  This  compares  to 
Japanese  investment  of  $30.5  million  in  the  96  joint  ventures 
noted  above. 


360 


continue  to  be  profit-motivated.  Moreover,  such  cooperative 
arrangements  outlined  above  are  possible  in  fields  that  have 
nothing  to  do  with  the  oceans.  Nonetheless,  Japan  is  well-suited 
to  take  advantage  of  the  growing  global  interest  in  marine 
industries  to  secure  a  variety  of  goods  and  services. 

77 

Suasive  Measures 

Japan  would  seem  to  have  few  means  by  which  to  exercise 

suasion.  She  has  renounced  the  "threat  of  force  as  a  means  of 

7fi 
settling  international  disputes."    She  also  has  sought  to  sepa- 
rate politics  and  economics  in  her  international  dealings.  There 
are  few  signs  that  she  will  alter  the  deployments  of  the  Self- 
Defense  Forces  (outside  of  an  extended  economic  zone).  However, 
domestic  and  foreign  circumstances  may  enable  her  to  exert  more 
international  pressure  through  non-military  ocean  activities. 

For  one  thing,  Japan  may  be  changing  her  policy  to  include 
broad  connections  between  political,  economic  and  social  con- 
ditions, especially  in  relation  to  the  Third  World.  Distinct 

economic  issues  with  diverse  political  overtones  also  may  be 

79 

increasingly  linked  in  the  future. 


77 

Edward  Luttwak,  ep_.  cit.  (note  I~5)»  has  discussed  the 

uses  of  naval  forces  as  an  exercise  of  "armed  suasion."  These 

may  be  latent  (i.e.  undirected)  or  active.  The  latter  in  turn 

can  be  broken  down  into  deterrence  and  compellance.  Herein,  this 

typology  will  be  extended  to  non-military  seapower  as  well. 

78 

Article  IX  of  the  Constitution. 

79 

It  was  reported,  for  instance,  during  President  Ford's  1974 

visit  to  Tokyo,  that  Japanese  concessions  on  fisheries  were  offered 
in  exchange  for  guarantees  of  food  supplies. 


361 


For  another,  the  manipulation  of  currency  markets,  large- 
scale  investments  and  commodity  flows  have  become  weapons  of 
great  consequence.  Perhaps  even  more  importantly,  they  have 
become  generally  recognized  as  legitimate  alternatives  to  mili- 
tary power  under  many  circumstances. 

Japan's  seapower,  indeed  most  of  her  economic  programs,  can 
operate  most  effectively  in  latent  or  deterrent  modes.  For 
instance,  efforts  to  promote  interdependence  through  bi-lateral 
shipping  or  fisheries  agreements  could  give  Tokyo1  some  positive 
counter-leverage.  Attractive  technology  transfer  provisions  with 
joint  ventures  could  reduce  the  incentives  for  nationalization, 
although  local  political  and  emotional  concerns  might  easily 
override  such  rationality.  In  the  same  way,  long-term  shipyard 
or  ocean  development  projects  would  be  difficult  to  complete  by 
developing  country  assets  alone. 

The  advantages  of  promoting  coastal  state  interests  in 
shipping  or  distant-water  fishing  already  have  been  noted. 

Under  some  conditions,  merchantmen  can  act  as  "trip  wires" 
almost  as  well  as  warships.  Soviet  freighters  limited  U.S. 
freedom  of  action  in  Haiphong,  for  instance.  An  American  tanker 
tested  the  blockade  of  the  Straits  of  Tiran  in  1967*  It  may  be 
argued  that  this  influence  was  derived  only  from  the  military 
power  of  the  two  superpowers  and  the  perception  of  a  merchant 
ship  as  the  symbol  of  state  interests  on  those  particular 
occasions.  This  may  well  be  correct.  But  though  Japan  does  not 


362 


have  the  military  power  to  act  on  her  own  behalf,  one  of  her 
ships  could  be  persuasive  if  it  was  seen  as  the  representative 
of  most  maritime  powers  on  a  given  issue,  i.e.  the  levying  of 
straits  tolls.  Alternatively,  if  the  domestic  situation  in 
Japan  were  unsettled,  interference  with  her  merchantmen  or  ocean 
development  projects  might  be  deterred  on  the  grounds  that  it 
could  stimulate  an  MSDF  dispatch,  with  all  the  associated  uncer- 
tainties. Finally,  merchantmen  capable  of  self-defense  could  be 
used  to  prevent  the  establishment  of  undesired  precedents  by 
ignoring  unilateral  declarations  of  restrictions  to  navigation. 

It  is  difficult  to  imagine  Japan  exercising  much  more 
active  suasion,  either  through  her  military  or  commercial 
activities  in  the  next  several  years.  Were  she  to  begin  to, 
however,  the  signs  would  be  visible  first  at  the  fringes  of  her 
ocean  resources  zone. 


CONCLUSIONS 

This  paper  has  recommended  several  specific  programs  for 
the  Maritime  Self-Defense  Force  and  Japan's  commercial  ocean 
interests.  These  results  are  based  on  two  fundamental  conclusions, 

The  first  is  that  world-wide  technical,  political  and  legal 
developments  will  force  major  adjustments  in  national  maritime 
policies.  In  particular,  these  developments  include:   (1)  A 
shifting  image  of  the  sea  itself  from  a  neutral  medium  of  communi- 
cations and  commerce  to  a  territorial  area  with  intrinsic  value, 
(2)  asymmetries  in  the  acceptability  of  force  between  developed 
and  developing  states,  (3)  the  current  state  of  naval  technology, 
which  favors  the  defenders  of  inshore  areas,  (4)  the  increasing 
economic  and  political  importance  of  near-shore  ocean  interests 
and  (5)  the  erosion  of  the  foundations  of  freedom  of  the  seas. 
Whether  or  not  such  changes  will  offer  new  opportunities  or  fore- 
close long-standing  advantages,  Japan  must  consider  them  more 
carefully  in  her  policy-planning. 

The  second  conclusion  is  that  projections  of  a  militaristic 
future  for  Japan,  or  even  an  expanded  security  role,  are  over- 
drawn. In  the  face  of  pollution,  resources  nationalism,  impending 
earthquakes  and  other  hazards,  arguments  can  be  made  for  the 
impossibility  of  maintaining  Japan's  present  course,  but  there  is 


363 


364 


almost  no  evidence  that  she  will  choose  an  expansionist  path  in 
the  near  future.  Domestically  the  opposition  to  such  a  role  is 
widespread  and  vocal.  Internationally  there  are  few  states  which 
would  either  encourage  or  welcome  it.  Moreover,  though  the 
economic  and  idealistic  orientation  of  Japanese  nationalism  might 
lead  to  strains  between  Washington  and  TQkyS,  it  shows  little  sign 
of  turning  militaristic.  An  authoritarian  government,  and  perhaps 
a  nuclear  weapons  program  are  possible,  but  Japan's  physical  limi- 
tations and  vulnerabilities  would  make  foreign  adventurism  very 
risky.  By  the  same  token  an  increase  in  tensions  in  Northeast 
Asia  would  be  more  likely  to  drive  Japan  back  towards  the  United 
States,  rather  than  off  on  her  own.  The  most  likely  course  is  a 
continuation  of  an  opportunistic,  low- risk  foreign  policy  with 
expenditures  on  conventional  weaponry  remaining  at  about  one  per- 
cent of  GNP  while  non-military  security  spending  is  increased. 
Within  this  framework,  more  specific  issues  of  Japanese 
seapower  were  analyzed.  For  all  the  constraints  which  her 
physical  situation  puts  on  expansive  or  aggressive  activities, 
Japan  also  has  strengths  which  are  less  frequently  recognized. 
Her  island  status,  topography  and  the  limits  of  her  neighbors' 
amphibious  capabilities  would  make  direct  invasion  difficult. 
Surface-skimming  patrol  craft,  anti-ship  missiles  and  improved 
coordination  between  the  MSDP  and  ASDF  could  further  increase  an 
attacker's  problem.  At  the  same  time,  the  size  of  her  merchant 
marine,  shipbuilding  capacity  and  other  factors  will  reduce  the 


365 


impact  of  a  submarine  campaign  against  the  sealanes.  Japan  could 
strengthen  her  defenses  in  this  area  by  the  use  of  unconventional 
concepts,  such  as  containerized  weapon  systems  for  merchantmen. 
Although  mines  may  pose  a  serious  threat  to  the  harbors  and  choke 
points  of  the  archipelago,  they  also  can  be  extremely  effective 
in  the  narrow  straits  which  control  Soviet  passage  to  and  from 
the  Sea  of  Japan. 

In  time,  the  demands  of  near-shore  ocean  activities  probably 
will  compel  Japan  to  extend  her  own  territorial  sea  and  economic 
zone.  This  will  be  a  major  change  whose  impact  will  extend 
beyond  the  realm  of  ocean  politics.  In  the  first  place,  the 
expanded  ocean  area  will  be  nearly  ten  times  as  large  as  the  home 
islands  themselves.  In  fact,  under  a  200-mile  limit,  Japan  would 
acquire  the  seventh  largest  maritime  zone  on  earth.  As  ocean 
development  activities  intensify,  the  psychological  attractive- 
ness of  the  additional  productive  territory  could  become  very 
important  for  a  nation  which  has  long  been  sensitive  about  its 
population  and  lack  of  space. 

In  the  second  place,  the  extension  of  jurisdiction  will 
bring  her  oceanic  borders  with  seven  states,  along  with  several 
boundary  disputes.  Many  of  these  quarrels  probably  will  be 
settled  diplomatically  or  officially  ignored  in  the  interests  of 
larger  issues.  Some,  however,  may  contain  the  seeds  of  future 
violence,  particularly  with  Taiwan  and  Korea. 

Finally,  the  task  of  defending,  or  even  monitoring  such  an 


366 


area  will  require  improvements  in  MSDF  and  Maritime  Safety  Agency 
ships,  surveillance  equipment  and  command  and  control  facilities. 

The  concepts  of  protective,  acquisitive  and  suasive  sea- 
power  were  introduced  with  particular  emphasis  on  Japan's  com- 
mercial ocean  activities.  So  long  as  she  is  vulnerable  to 
countermeasures  at  so  many  points,  Tokyo's  options  for  maritime 
suasion,  through  military  or  commercial  means,  are  limited.  The 
major  values  of  protective  seapower  will  be  to  increase  fisheries 
yield  within  the  extended  economic  zone  and  to  improve  marine 
pollution  control  techniques.  Ocean  resources  will  play  an 
increasingly  important  part  in  Japan's  economy,  but  they  will 
only  marginally  reduce  her  dependence  on  raw  materials  imports. 
Acquisitive  ocean  ventures,  however,  can  contribute  greatly  to 
the  uncertain  future.  As  ocean  economic  activities  become 
increasingly  important  world-wide,  Japan  should  be  well-placed 
to  trade  on  her  stores  of  marine-related  capital  and  expertise. 

Japan's  ocean  activities  could  be  managed  more  effectively. 
The  model  of  a  smoothly-coordinated,  rational  animal,  guided  by 
long-range  planning  has  many  weaknesses,  at  least  in  the  area  of 
ocean  affairs.  The  nation  would  profit  by  better  planning  and 
intra- bureaucratic  coordination  at  the  least,  and  possibly  by 
higher  levels  of  research  and  development  spending  as  well.  One 
can  understand  the  attractiveness  of  strategies  which  maintain 
flexibility,  but  the  lead  times  involved  in  modem  industrial 
projects,  as  well  as  their  multiple  side-effects  dc  seem  to 


367 


warrant  greater  emphasis  on  forecasting. 

In  sum,  the  next  decade  is  likely  to  see  Japan's  seapower 
used  to  support  opportunistic  strategies  in  pursuit  of  interests 
similar  to  those  which  exist  today.  Near-shore  activities  and 
extensions  of  jurisdiction  probably  will  be  emphasized  while 
distant-water  programs  fall  more  and  more  under  multinational 
control. 


Appendix  One 


UNITS  CONVERSION  TABLE 


Units  of  Length 


Units 


Inch 


Foot 


Meter 


Mile 


N.M. 


1   inch 

1 

.083 

.025 

- 

- 

1   foot 

12 

1 

.305 

- 

- 

1   meter 

39-37 

3.28 

1 

- 

- 

1  mile 

63,360 

5,280 

1,609 

1 

.869 

1   naut.  mile 

72,913 

6,076.1 
Units  of  Area 

1,852 

1.151 

1 

Units 

Acre 

Hectare 

Sq .km. 

Sq .mi. 

'    Sq.n.m. 

1   acre 

1 

.405 

.004 

.002 

.001 

1   hectare 

2.471 

1 

.01 

.004 

.003 

1    sq.   km. 

247.11 

100 

1 

.386 

.292 

1    sq.   mile 

640 

258.9 

2.589 

1 

.755 

1    sq.  n.m. 

847.4 

195.5 

1.955 

1.324 

1 

Units  of  Mass 


Units 

Pound 

Kilogram 

Sh.Ton 

Long 
Ton 

Metric 
Ton 

1   pound 

1 

•  454 

- 

- 

- 

1   kilogram 

2205 

1 

.001 

.001 

.001 

1    short  ton 

2000 

907.2 

1 

.893 

.907 

1   long  ton 

2240 

1,016.0 

1.12 

1 

1.016 

1   metric   ton 

2204.6 

1,000.0 

1.102 

.984 

1 

368 


369 


Units  of  Volume 


Units 

Liter 

Gallon 

Cubic  Foot 

Cut 

dc  Meter 

1 

liter 

1 

.264 

.035 

.001 

1 

gallon 

3-785 

1 

.133 

.004 

1 

cubic  foot 

28.317 

7.840 

1 

.028 

1 

cubic  me 

ter 

1,000 

276.9 

35.315 

1 

F  =  9/5  C  +  32 
C  =  5/9  (F  -  32) 


Temperature 


0°C  =  32°F 
100°C  =  212°F 


Other  Measures 


Water 

1  cubic  ft. 
25.96  cubic  ft. 


Crude  Oil 


=  62.4  lbs.      1  barrel  (bbl)  =  42  gallons 

=  2240  lbs.      1  metric  ton  =  7.35  bbls. 

1  bbl/day  =  49*8  tons/year 

1  kiloliter  =6.29  bbls. 


Ener,sy  Conversions 


1  bbl.  crude  oil 
1  kwh  electricity 


=     5.60  x  10     Btu 
=     5,413  Btu 


1    cu.   ft.   day  natural  gas     =     1,051   Btu 

1    short  ton  of  avg.  coal       =     27.7  x  10     Btu 


SELECTED  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Much  of  the  information  in  this  paper  was  gathered  from 
personal  interviews,  particularly  in  Parts  Two  and  Three.  Many 
of  the  subjects  spoke  excellent  English.  Interpreters  were 
available  in  most  cases  when  there  was  any  doubt.  Information 
from  interviews  conducted  in  Japanese  by  the  author  was  checked 
against  other  sources  to  prevent  misunderstandings.  Of  the  131 
interviews  conducted  during  the  Southeast  Asia  trip,  many  did  not 
pertain  directly  to  Japan,  although  collectively  they  were  designed 
to  give  a  picture  of  regional  seapower.  Accordingly,  only  those 
most  closely  related  to  this  thesis  have  been  cited  here.  Those 
names  marked  with  an  asterisk  were  consulted  on  a  continuing 
basis  during  the  author's  stay  in  Japan. 

Some  of  the  information  presented  in  Part  One  may  be  con- 
sidered classified  by  some  persons.  No  reference  was  made  to 
classified  materials  during  this  research,  in  fact  potentially 
useful  background  sources  frequently  were  avoided  to  preclude  the 
danger  of  inadvertent  citation.  When  there  was  any  doubt,  data 
were  not  used  unless  they  could  be  documented  from  the  open 
literature. 


370 


371 


Interviews 

Abe  Yuzo,  Captain,  JMSLF.  April  9,  1974;  December  11,  1974* 

Aoki  Sotaro.  Tokio  Marine  and  Fire  Insurance  Company. 
November  25,  1974* 

Armacost,  Michael.  American  Embassy,  Tokyo.  March  29,  1974» 

Auer,  James  E.,  Lieutenant  Commander,  USN.  USS  Parsons  (DDG-33)*  * 


Baker,  Roland.  Naval  Ordnance  Test  Station,  China  Lake. 
October  18,  1974  (telephone). 

Blake,  James.  Geological  Services,  Ltd.,  Singapore.  May  30,  1 974« 

Bonner,  Robin,  Commander,  RAN.  Central  Studies  Establishment, 
Canberra.  June  19,  1974* 

Bull,  Hedley.  Australian  National  University,  Canberra. 
June  19,  1974. 

Burke,  Arleigh  A.,  Admiral,  USN  (Ret.).  January  16,  1974* 

Chee,  Dr.  Stephen.  Universiti  Malaya.  May  24,  1974* 

Cheng  Quee  Wah.  Singapore  Shipbuilding  and  Engineering  Company. 
June  5,  1974. 

Chihaya  Masataka.  Shipping  and  Trade  News  (Tokyo) .  November  28, 
1974. 

Clark,  Marc,  Commander,  RAN.  Central  Studies  Establishment, 
Canberra.   June  19,  1 974» 

Craven,  John  P.  Director  of  Marine  Programs,  University  of 
Hawaii.  July  5,  1974. 

Dicks te in,  Howard.  Universiti  Malaya.  May  23,  1974,  May  24, 
1974;  May  27,  1974- 

Dixon,  Prank  W.,  Colonel,  USA.  Defense  Attache,  Philippines. 
May  13,  1974. 

Doba  Hajime.  Defense  Correspondent,  Yomiuri  Shimbun. 
December  11,  1 974. 

Duke,  Marvin  L.,  Captain,  USN.  U.S.  Naval  Attache,  TokyS. 
August  8,  1974. 


372 


Eguchi  Yujiro.  Nomura  Research  Institute.  April  2,  1 974» 

Fatasi,  Mito.  Southeast  Asia  Fisheries  Research  Center,  Singa- 
pore. May  30>  1974* 

Fukui  Shizuo,  Constructor  Lieutenant  Commander,  IJN  (Ret.).  * 


Fukushima  Yasuto.  Professor,  National  Defense  College. 
March  20,  1974. 

Fusano  Natsuaki.  Assistant  Director,  Office  of  Defence 
Production  Committee,  Keidanren.  August  6,  1974* 

Fuse  Tsutomu.  Graduate  Student,  International  Law.  * 


Gannon,  James  M.,  Captain,  DSN.  Naval  Attache,  Singapore. 
May  28,  1974* 

Genda  Minoru.  Member,  House  of  Councillors.  December  12,  1 974* 

Gorter,  Wirtze.  University  of  Hawaii.  July  3>  1 974 • 

Graham,  H.  Edward,  Captain,  USN.  Naval  Attache,  Thailand. 
May  22,  1974- 

Habanananda  Kajit.  Executive  Officer,  Kra  Canal  Survey 
Office,  Bangkok.  May  21,  1974;  May  22,  1974- 

Harper,  Donald.  Ministry  of  Defence,  Wellington.  June  26,  1974* 

Hashim,  Zain,  Brigadier  General.  Commandant,  Armed  Forces  Staff 
College,  Malaysia.   May  25,  1 974» 

Hayashi  Y.,  Captain,  ASDF.  Defense  Academy.  April  25,  1 974» 

Heredia,  Armando,  Lieutenant,  Philippine  Navy.  May  13>  1 974» 
May  14,  1974. 

Inoki  Masamichi.  President,  Defense  Academy.  April  4»  1974* 

Ishida  Minoru.    Ishikav/ajima-Harima  Heavy  Industries  Co., 
Ltd.  (Ocean  Engineering  Structures) .  August  14,  1974* 

Ito  Keiichi.  Assistant  Director  of  Defense  Bureau,  Japan 
Defense  Agency.  November  25,  1974* 

Johnson,  Robert  Lee.  Vice  President,  Mobil  Sekiyu  Kabushiki 
Kaisha,  Tokyo.  July  16,  1974. 


373 


Jukes,  Geoffrey.  Australian  National  University,  Canberra. 
June  18,  1974. 

Kaihara  Osamu.  Former  Secretary  General,  National  Defense 
Council.  March  24,  1974* 

Kamura  Hiroshi.  Japan  Center  for  International  Exchange. 
April  10,  1974;  April  12,  1974. 

Kanagaki  Shigeru,  Rear  Admiral,  JMSDF  (Ret.).  Defense  Production 
Councilors'  Room  Keidanren.  August  6,  1974* 

Kato  Fumihisa.  Ministry  of  Transport.  April  22,  1974* 

Kawasaki  Kanji.  JSP  Member,  House  of  Delegates.  April  17,  1 974* 

Kitamura  Kenichi,  Vice  Admiral,  JMSDF  (Ret.).  Former  Commander, 
Self-Defense  Fleet.  * 

Klass,  Philip  J.  Aviation  Week  and  Space  Technology  Magazine. 
October  8,  1974  (telephone). 

Kogan,  Rudolf,  Colonel,  USA.  Defense  Attache,  Singapore. 
May  29,  1974;  June  3,  1974- 

Kubo  Takuya.  Chief,  Defense  Bureau,  Japan  Defense  Agency. 
March  11,  1974;  November  25,  1974. 

Kully,  Sheldon  D.,  Captain,  USN.  Naval  Attache,  Republic  of 
China.  May  6,  1974. 

Kunishima  Kiyonori,  Vice  Admiral,  JMSDF.  President,  Maritime  Staff 
College.  April  5,  1974« 

Kusumi  Tadao.  Defense  Analyst.  March  1,  1974;  April  18,  1974; 
August  17,  1974. 

Lansangan,  Jose  G.,  Jr.,  Captain.  Philippine  Navy.  May  14> 
1974;  May  16,  1974- 

Lewis,  Theodore,  Commander,  USN.  Defense  Liaison  Group, 
Indonesia.  June  7>  1974* 

MacDonald,  Gerald  E.,  Major,  USMC.  Assistant  Naval  Attache, 
Bangkok.  May  17,  1974. 

Mataxis,  Theodore  C,  Brigadier  General,  USA  (Ret.).  Ministry 
of  Defence  Consultant,  Singapore.  May  29,  1974;  May  30> 
1974;  June  4,  1974. 


374 


MccGwire,  Michael.  Dalhousie  University,  Halifax.  October  21, 
1974;  December  21,  1 974  (letter). 

Millar,  T.  B.  Australian  National  University,  Canberra. 
June  20,  1 974. 

Mitchell,  J.  T.,  Colonel,  USMC.  Naval  Attache,  Indonesia. 
June  9-11,  1974. 

Momoi  Makoto.  Professor,  National  Defense  College. 
January  15,  1973;  February  28,  1974. 

Nakai  Yoko.  United  States  Information  Service,  Toky<3.  * 


Nakamura  Teijif  Vice  Admiral,  JMSDF.  Commander,  Self-Defense 
Fleet.  December  3,  1974. 

Nakao  Eichi.  LDP  Member,  House  of  Delegates  (Seirankai). 
April  19,  1974. 

Nakayama  Sadayoshi,  Admiral,  JMSDF  (Ret.).  August  14,  1974* 

Nelson,  Roger  L.  Triton  Oil  and  Gas  Co.,  Manila.  May  15»  1974* 

Oberdorfer,  Don.  The  Washington  Post,  Bureau  Chief,  Tcky5. 
April  4,  1974;  August  6,  1974. 

Oblena,  Grace  Carla.  Chief,  Shipping  and  Freight  Study  Unit, 

Department  of  Transportation,  Republic  of  the  Philippines. 
May  15,  1974. 

Odani  Kosuke.  Head,  Technical  Information  Service,  Japan  Marine 
Science  and  Technology  Center  ( JAMS  TEC  ).* 


O'Farrell,  J.  A.,  Captain,  RAN.  Maritime  Air  Study  Group. 
June  19,  1974. 

Okamura  Kenji.  Chairman,  Japan  National  Committee  for 
Engineering  Committee  on  Ocean  Resources  (ECOR). 
December  8,  1974- 

Okuhara  Toshio.  Assistant  Professor  of  International  Law, 
Kokusikan  University.  * 


O'Neill,  Robert  J.  Australian  National  University,  Canberra. 
June  20,  1974. 


375 


Dshima  Kenzo.  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Law  of  the  Sea 

Headquarters.  April  5,  1974;  April  12,  1974- 
Page,  George  L.,  Captain,  USN.  Naval  Attache,  Australia. 
June  17,  1974. 

Pee,  Peter.  Professor,  University  of  Singapore.  May  29,  1 974» 

Peek,  Sir  Peter,  Vice  Admiral,  RAN  (Ret.).  Former  Chief  of 
Australian  Naval  Staff.  June  19,  1974. 

Primrose,  B.  N.  Australian  National  University,  Canberra. 
June  17,  1974. 

Rogers,  W.  Haley,  Rear  Admiral,  USN.  Commander,  U.S.  Naval 
Forces,  Japan.  February  19,  1 974- 

Royama  Michio.  Professor,  Sophia  University.  January  9>  1973; 
August  5,  1974. 

Rubey,  E.  B.,  Jr.,  Captain,  USN.  Naval  Attache,  New  Zealand. 
June  25,  1974;  June  26,  1974. 

Saeki  Kiichi.  Director,  Nomura  Research  Institute.  December  11, 
1974. 

Sakanaka  Tomohisa.  Political  Correspondent,  Asalii  Shimbun. 
March  13,  1974;  November  26,  1974- 

Sakurai  Kiyohiko.  Managing  Director,  Jurong  Shipyard  Ltd., 
Singapore.  May  JO,  1974. 

Samejima  Iliroichi,  Admiral,  JMSDF.  Chief  of  the  Maritime  Staff. 
March  28,  1974. 

Santos,  GonzaloM.,  Captain.  Philippine  Navy.  Executive  Vice 
President,  National  Defense  College,  The  Philippines. 
May  14,  1974. 

Sekino  Hideo,  Commander,  IJN  (Ret.).  Military  Analyst.  * 


Seno   Sadao,  Commander,  JMSDF.  March  6,  1974;  November  29,  1974; 
December  12,  1974. 

Shaw,  K.  E.  Nanyang  University,  Singapore.  June  5»  1974* 

Shinohara  Hiroshi.  Special  Reporter  on  Defense,  Political  News 
Division,  Asahi  Shim'tron.  March  6,  1974;  November  25,  1974* 


376 


Sitwell,  D.  W.   Vosper  Thornycroft  Private,  Ltd.,  Singapore. 
June  3,  1974. 

Spivakovsky,  David.  Central  Studies  Establishment,  Canberra. 
June  19,  1974. 

Stunkel,  Kenneth  R.  Professor,  Monmouth  College.  December  28, 
1974. 

Taoka  Shunji.  Defense  Correspondent,  Asahi  Shjmbun.  * 


Thorne,  E.  C,  Rear  Admiral,  RNZN.  Chief  of  Naval  Staff, 
June  28,  1974- 

Tsunoda  Jun.  National  Diet  Library.  * 


Uchida  Kazutomi,  Admiral,  JMSDF  (Ret.).  November  29,  1974* 

Varrell,  Derek.  Australian  National  University,  Canberra. 
June  20,  1974* 

Viccelio,  John  S.,  Commander,  USN.  Assistant  Naval  Attache, 
Tokyo.  February  20,  1974. 

Walsh,  Don,  Captain,  USN.  October  22,  1974;  January  3,  1975* 

Yamaguchi  Kaiji,  Captain,  JMSDF.  March  6,  1974;  December  12, 
1974. 

Yamamoto  Takashi.  Ministry  of  Transport.  December  2,  1974« 

Yamashita  Tokuo.  LDP  Member,  House  of  Delegates;  Member, 
Dietmens  League  on  the  Ocean.  April  17,  1 97 4 • 

Yamato  Kunitami.  Maritime  Administration,  American  Embassy, 
Tokyo.* 

Yamazumi  Akira,  Captain,  MSDF.  Head,  Foreign  Liaison  Section, 
Maritime  Staff  Office.  * 


Unpublished  Material  and  Public  Statements 


Burleson,  Hugh  L.  "The  Nixon  Doctrine  in  Northeast  Asia: 

Strategic  Implications  of  Japanese  Relations."  Carlisle 
Barracks,  Pa.:  U.S.  Army  War  College,  April  18,  1973. 


377 


Blackwell,  Robert  J.  Assistant  Secretary  of  Commerce  for  Mari- 
time Affairs.  Statement  before  the  Sea  Power  Subcommittee 
of  the  House  Armed  Services  Committee.  September  19»  1974 
(Mimeo) • 

Hughes,  Michael  Bryant.  "Japan's  Air  Power  Options:  The 

Employment  of  Military  Aviation  in  the  Post-War  Era." 
Unpublished  Ph.D.  dissertation,  Fletcher  School  of  Law 
and  Diplomacy,  1972. 

Ino  Takashi.  "Marine  Parks  in  Japan."   (Typewritten). 

Japan  Engineering  Committee  on  Ocean  Resources.  "Status  Report 
of  Sea-Bed  Exploration  and  Exploitation  Technology  in 
Japan  1972."   (Xerox). 

Japan  Marine  Science  Technology  Center.  "Brief  List  of  the 

Government  R&D  Projects  Relevant  to  Marine  Development." 
Yokosuka:  February  1974» 

"Governmental  Marine  Development  Program  (by 


general  account)  of  Japan  for  1974  Fiscal  Year,  by 
Ministerial  Agency."  Yokosuka:  April  1974  (Mimeo). 

Japan  Ocean  Industries  Association.  "JOIA."  Tokyo,  March  JO, 
1974- 

Keidanren.  Defense  Production  Committee  Secretariat. 

"Chotatsukaku  no  Jittai  ni  Kansuru  Chosa  Kenkyu  Hokokusho." 
("Investigative  Research  Report  Concerning  the  Realities 
of  Procurement  Costs.")  Tokyo,  1975  (Xerox). 

Kra  Canal  Project.  "Preliminary  Survey  Report:  A  Summary." 
Revision  5.  Bangkok:  K.  Y.  Chow,  April  30,  1974. 

Martin,  Laurence  W.  "The  Role  of  Force  in  the  Ocean."  Paper 

presented  to  the  School  of  Advanced  International  Studies 
Conference  on  "Conflict  and  Order  in  Ocean  Relations," 
October  22,  1974. 

Sekino  Hideo.  "Implications  for  Japan  and  Far  East:  Some 
Strategic  Problems."  April  1969  (Mimeo). 

"Significance  of  Sea  Power  for  Maritime  Nations." 


(Typewritten). 

Sissons,  D.  C.  S.  "Japan  in  the  1980s."  Canberra,  February 
1971  (Mimeo). 

Taoka  Shunji.  "Japan's  Strategic  Situation  and  the  U.S.  Military 
Presence."   (Typewritten). 


378 


Weinstein,  Martin  E.     "Japan's  Foreign  Policy  Options  in  the 
Coming  Decade."     September  1973  (Xerox). 


Basic  Reference  Works  and  Government  Documents 

Jane's  All  The  World's  Aircraft.     London:     Sampson  Low,   Annual. 

Jane's  Fighting  Ships.     London:     Sampson  Low,  Annual. 

Jane's  Surface  Skimmers.     London:     Sampson  Low,  Annual. 

Jane's  Weapon  Systems.     London:     Sampson  Low,  Annual. 

Japan.     Defense  Agency.     The  Defense  of  Japan.     Defense  White 
Paper.     Tokyo:     Defense  Agency,    1970. 

.     Defense  of  Japan  1 973 »     Tokyo:     Defense  Agency, 


1973. 


.  Japan's  Fourth  Five  Year  Defense  Plan.  T<5ky5: 

Defense  Agency,  1972. 

.  Kuni  no  Mamori  ("National  Defense").  Tokyo: 

Defense  Agency,  1973* 

Japan.  Environment  Agency.  The  Quality  of  the  Environment  in 
Japan.  Tokyo:  Environment  Agency,  December  1972. 

.  Water  Pollution  Control  in  Japan.  Tokyo: 


Environment  Agency,  May  1972. 

Japan.  Fisheries  Agency.  Gyogyo  Hakusho  Shov/a  43  ("Fishing 

Industry  White  Paper  FY  1973")'  Tokyo:  Fisheries  Agency, 
1974. 

Shirikai  Gyojo  Kaihatsura  Suishin  Hosaku  Kenkyukai 


Hokoldi  ("Research  Society  Report  on  Promotion  Plans  for 
Deep  Sea  Fishery  Grounds  Development").  Tokyo:  Fisheries 
Agency,  July  1974* 

Suisan  Tokei  Shihyo  ilA   ("Fisheries  Statistics 


Index  #4") •  Tokyo:  Fisheries  Agency,  June  1974* 

Suisangyo1  no  Taisuru  Taigai  Shihon  Kyoryoku  Jigyo 


no  Gen.jo  ("Present  Situation  of  Overseas  Joint  Ventures 
Facing  Fishing  Industries").  Tokyo:  Fisheries  Agency, 
July  1974. 


379 


Japan.  Ministry  of  Agriculture  and  Forestry.  Abstract  of 

Statistics  on  Agriculture,  Forestry  and  Fisheries  1 973 « 
Tokyo:  Ministry  of  Agriculture  and  Forestry,  1 973» 

.  White  Paper  on  Agriculture,  1 973 »  Tokyo: 


Ministry  of  Agriculture  and  Forestry,  1 974» 

Japan.  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs.   The  Northern  Territorial 
Issue.  Tokyo:  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  1970. 

Statistical  Survey  of  Japan's  Economy,  1972. 


Tokyo:  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  1972. 

Japan.  Ministry  of  International  Trade  and  Industry. 

Statistics  on  Japanese  Industries,  1973*   Tokyo:  Ministry 
of  International  Trade  and  Industry,  1 973 • 

__.   1974  Tsusho  Hakusho  (1974  International  Trade 

White  Paper) .  Tokyo:  Ministry  of  International  Trade  and 
Industry,  June  1974- 

Japan.  Ministry  of  Transport.  Nihon  Kaiun  no  Genkyo  (Present 
Condition  of  Japanese  Shipping).  Tokyo:  Ministry  of 
Transport,  July  20,  1974. 

.   Transportation  White  Paper,  1974*  Toky5: 


Ministry  of  Transport,  1974* 

Japan.  National  Police  Agency.  National  Police  Agency  White 
Paper,  197?*   Tokyo:  National  Police  Agency,  1973* 

Japan.  Prime  Minister's  Office.  Kokusai  Tokei  Yoran. ( "Inter- 
national  Statistics  Handbook"). Tokyo:  Prime  Minister's 
Office,  March  1974. 

.   Statistical  Handbook  of  Japan,  1971 «  Tokyo: 


Prime  Minister's  Office,  June  1971. 
.   1974  White  Paper  on  Youths .  Tokyo:  Prime 


Minister's  Office,  1974. 

Japan.  Science  and  Technology  Agency.  Kaiyo  Kaihatsu  no  GenjO 
to  Tembo  ("Present  Situation  of  and  Prospects  for  Ocean 
Development").   Tokyo:  Science  and  Technology  Agency, 
November  1 973- 

.  Marine  Development  in  Japan  1972.  Tokyo:  Science 


and  Technology  Agency,  1972. 

Japan  Times.  Japan' s  Shipbuilding  and  Shipping,  1974  Survey. 
Tokyo:   Japan  Times,  1974. 


380 


Japanese  Shipowners  Association.  Review  of  Japanese  Shipping 
1975.  Tokyo:  1974. 

Jieitai  Sobi  Nenkan  '73  ("Self-Defense  Force  Equipment  Yearbook"). 
Tokyo:   Asagumo  Shimbunsha,  1973* 

Mainichi  Daily  News.  Industries  of  Japan,  1974*  Vol.  17 • 
Tokyo:  Mainichi,  1974* 

Malaysia.  Ministry  of  External  Affairs.  Indonesian  Aggression 
Agains t  Malaysia.  Vol.  II.  Kuala  Lumpur:  Ministry  of 
External  Affairs,  1965. 

Nihon  Keizai  Shimbun.  Industrial  Review  of  Japan  1974*  Tokyo: 
Nihon  Keizai,  1974. 

Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development.  Policy 
Perspectives  for  International  Trade  and  Economic 
Relations.  Paris:  Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation 
and  Development,  1972. 

United  Nations.  Conference  on  Trade  and  Development.  Review  of 
International  Trade  and  Development  1969.   (TDB.257, 
Rev.  1). 

United  Nations.  "Convention  on  a  Code  of  Conduct  for  Liner 
Conferences."   (undated)  (mimeo) . 

United  Nations.  Food  and  Agriculture  Organization.  Country 
Fishery  Profiles.   1972. 

.  The  State  of  Food  and  Agriculture  1973.  (C73/2) . 


August  1973. 

.  V/orld  Situation  and  Outlook:   Fisheries  Problems. 

(C73/13).  September  1973. 

United  Nations.  Third  Conference  on  the  Law  of  the  Sea. 

Economic  Implications  of  Seabed  Mineral  Development  in  the 
International  Area:  Report  of  the  Secretary  General. 
(A/Conf.  62/25)7  May  22,  1974. 

.  Tentative  Comparative  Table  of  Proposals, 


Declarations,  Working  Papers,  etc. ,  Relating  to  Subjects 
and  Issues  Allocated  to  Sub-Committee  II.   (SCII/WG/Paper 
#4  with  Revision  1  through  July  19,  1973). 

United  Nations.  United  Nations  Statistical  Yearbook  1973* 
New  York:   1973. 


381 


U.S.  Congress.  House.  Committee  on  Armed  Services.  Hearings 
on  Military  Posture  and  H.R.  1 2564,  Department  of  Defense 
Authorization  for  Appropriations  for  Fiscal  Year  1975* 
Part  2  of  4  (Seapower). 93rd  Cong.,  2nd  Sess.  Washington: 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1974- 

.  Report  93-1035  Authorizing  Appropriations  for 


Military  procurement  and  Research,  Development,  Test  and 
Evaluation.   93rd  Cong.,  2nd  Sess.  Washington:   U.S. 
Government  Printing  Office,  1 974» 

U.S.  Congress.  House.  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs.  The 

Indian  Ocean:   Political  and  Strategic  Future.   92nd  Cong. , 
1st  Sess.  Washington:  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
1971. 

U.S.  Congress.  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy.  Military 

Applications  of  Nuclear  Technology.  Part  2.   93rd  Cong., 
1st  Sess.  Washington:  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
1973. 

U.S.  Congress.  Senate  and  House  Armed  Services  Committees. 
C VAN- 70  Aircraft  Carrier.   91st  Cong.,  2nd  Sess. 
Washington:  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1970. 

U.S.  Department  of  Commerce.  Japan:  The  Business-Government 

Relationship.  Washington:  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
1971. 

U.S.  Department  of  the  Interior.  Minerals  Yearbook.  3  volumes. 
Washington:  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  Annual. 

U.S.  Department  of  the  Navy.  Office  of  the  Chief  of  Naval 

Operations.  U.S.  Lifelines,  09D-P1  (Revised).  Washington: 
June  1971. 

U.S.  Department  of  State.   "Japanese  Defense  Policy."  Unclassi- 
fied Document  A1 1  58  of  December  11,  1970,  updated  to 
April  18,  1972. 

.  National  Claims  to  Maritime  Jurisdictions.   2nd 


Revision.  Limits  in  the  Seas,  No.  36.  April  1,  1974* 
Sovereignty  of  the  Sea.  Geographic  Bulletin 


No.  3*  Revised  October  19&9* 

.  Theoretical  Areal  Allocations  of  Seabed  to  Coastal 


States  ....   International  Boundary  Study  Series  A, 
Limits  in  the  Seas,  No.  46.  August  12,  1972. 


382 


U.S.  Department  of  State.  Chart  entitled  "World  Straits 
Affected  by  a  Twelve  Mile  Territorial  Sea." 

Un-Yu  Keizai  Kenkyu  Center.  Un-Yu  Keizai  Zusetsu  Showa  49  Nenhan 
("Illustrated  Book  of  Transportation  Economics,  1974 
edition").  Tokyo:  Un-Yu  Keizai  Kenyu  Center,  March  1974- 

Weyers  Flottentaschenbuch.  Munich:  J.  P.  Lehmanns  Verlag, 
Annual. 


Books 


Albers,  John  P.,  et  al.  Summary  Petroleum  and  Selected  Mineral 
Statistics  for  120  Countries,  Including  Offshore  Areas. 
Geological  Survey  Professional  Paper  81 7 •  Washington: 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1973* 

Albion,  Robert  G.  and  Pope,  Jennie  B.  Sea  Lanes  in  Wartime. 
New  York:  W.  W.  Norton  and  Company,  1942. 

Alpers,  E.  A.  The  East  African  Slave  Trade. 
East  African  Publishing  House,  19&9* 

Auer,  James  E.  The  Postwar  Rearmament  of  Japan's  Maritime 
Forces.  New  York:   Praeger,  1 973 • 

Axelbank,  Albert.  Black  Star  over  Japan.  Tokyo:  Charles  E. 
Tuttle,  1973- 

Ballard,  George  A.   The  Influence  of  the  Sea  on  the  Political 

History  of  Japan.  London:   Houghton  Miff lin  Company,  1921. 

.  Rulers  of  the  Indian  Ocean.  London:   Houghton 


Mifflin  Company,  1928. 

Behrens,  C.  B.  A.  Merchant  Shipping  and  the  Demands  of  War. 
U.K.  Civil  Series.  London:   Her  Majesty's  Stationery 
Office,  1955. 

Brodie,  Bernard.   A  Guide  to  Naval  Strategy.  4th  ed.  Princeton: 
Princeton  University  Press,  1958. 

.  Seapower  in  the  Machine  Age.  Princeton: 


Princeton  University  Press,  1941- 

.  War  and  Politics.  New  York:  The  MacMillan 


Company,  1973* 


383 


Brzezinski,  Zbigniew.  The  Fragile  Blossom,  New  York:  Harper 
and  Row,  1972. 

Burke,  William  T.  Ocean  Sciences,  Technology,  and  the  Future 
International  Law  of  the  Sea.  Athens,  Ohio:  Ohio 
University  Press,  1966. 

Cable,  James.  Gunboat  Diplomacy.  London:   International 
Institute  for  Strategic  Studies,  1971* 

Clark,  Joseph  J.  and  Barnes,  Dwight  H.  Seapower  and  its  Meaning. 
New  York:  Franklin  Watts,  Inc.,  1966. 

Collins,  John  M.  Grand  Strategy.  Annapolis:  United  States 
Naval  Institute,  1973* 

Colombos,  C.  John.  The  International  Law  of  the  Sea.  5th  ed. 
New  York:   David  McKay  Company,  1962. 

Compass  Publications.  Sea  Technology  Handbook  Directory  1974» 
Arlington:  Compass  Publications,  1974* 

Council  on  National  Security  Problems.  Peace  in  Asia.  Tokyo: 
Council  on  National  Security  Problems,  1973* 

Deakin,  Brian  M.  and  Steward,  T.  Shipping  Conferences. 
Cambridge:  University  Press,  1973* 

Doumani,  George  A.  Ocean  Wealth:  Policy  and  Potential. 

Rochelle  Park,  N.J.:  Hayden  Book  Company,  Inc.,  1973* 

Ellingworth,  Richard.  Japanese  Economic  Policies  and  Security. 

Adelphi  Papers  Number  90«  London:   International  Institute 
for  Strategic  Studies,  1972. 

Emmerson,  John  K.  Arms,  Yen  and  Power.  Tokyo:  Charles  E. 
Tuttle,  1972. 

and  Humphreys,  Leonard  A.  Will  Japan  Rearm? 


Stanford:   Hoover  Institute  on  War,  Revolution  and  Peace, 
1973. 

European  Conference  of  Ministers  of  Transport.  A  Study  of  the 

Economic  Influence  of  Containerization.  Paris:   Organiza- 
tion for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development,  1 974- 

Farago,  Ladislas.  The  Tenth  Fleet.  New  York:  Ivan  Obelensky, 
1962. 


584 


Fayle,  C.  Ernest.  The  Submarine  Campaign  to  the  End  of  1916. 
Seaborne  Trade  Series,  Vol.  II.  London:  John  Manning, 
1923. 

Force  in  Modern  Societies:   Its  Place  in  International  Politics. 
Adelphi  Paper  102.  London:   International  Institute  for 
Strategic  Studies,  1973. 

Fox,  Grace.  British  Admirals  and  Chinese  Pirates  1832-1869* 

London:  Kegan  Paul,  Trench,  Trubner  and  Company,  Limited, 
1940. 

Gamble,  JohnK.,  Jr.  and  Pontecorvo,  Giulio  (eds.).  Law  of  the 
Sea:   The  Emerging  Regime  of  the  Oceans.   Cambridge: 
Ballinger  Publishing  Co.,  1974* 

Gasteyger,  Curt  (ed.).  Japan  and  the  Atlantic  World.  Atlantic 
Papers  3»  Westmead:  Saxon  Hill,  1972. 

Goldston,  Robert.  The  Civil  War  in  Spain.  Greenwich:  Fawcett, 
1966. 

Graham,  Gerald  S.  The  Politics  of  Naval  Supremacy.  Cambridge: 
University  Press,  1965- 

.  Tides  of  Empire.  London:   Queen's  University 


Press,  1972. 

Greenwood,  Ted.  Reconnaissance  Surveillance  and  Arras  Control. 
Adelphi  Papers  No.  88.  London:  International  Institute 
for  Strategic  Studies,  1972. 

Gretton,  Peter.  Liar i time  Strategy.  New  York:  Praeger,  1 9^5 • 

Gross,  R.  0.  Studies  in  Maritime  Economics.   Cambridge: 
University  Press,  1963. 

Halliday,  Jon  and  McCormack,  Gavin.  Japanese  Imperialism  Today. 
New  York:  Monthly  Review  Press,  1 975 - 

Hezlet,  Arthur.  Aircraft  and  Sea  Power.  New  York:  Stein  and 
Lay,  1970.  " 

Hill,  Charles  E.  The  Danish  Sound  Dues  and  the  Coma and  of  the 
Baltic.   Durham:  Duke  University  Press,  1 926. 

Howe,  John  T.  Multicrises.  Cambridge:  Massachusetts  Institute 
of  Technology,  1971. 


385 


Howeth,  Linwood  S.  History  of  Communications — Electronics  in 
the  United  States  Navy.  Washington:  U.S.  Government 
Printing  Office,  1963. 

Hyatt,  A.  M.  J.   Dreadnought  to  Polaris;  Maritime  Strategy 
Since  I.Iahan.  Toronto:   Copp  Clark  Publishing  Company, 
1973. 

International  Institute  for  Strategic  Studies.  Strategic  Survey. 
London:  International  Institute  for  Strategic  Studies, 
Annual* 

.  The  Military  Balance.  London:   International 


Institute  for  Strategic  Studies,  Annual. 

Johnson,  K.  M.  and  Garnett,  H.  C.  The  Economics  of  Containeri- 
zation.  Glascow:  Social  and  Economic  Survey,  November 
20,  1971. 

Kahn,  Herman.  The  Emerging  Japanese  Superstate.  Englewood 
Cliffs:  Prentice  Hall,  1970. 

Keith,  Barbara  A.  Fisheries  of  Peru,  1 972-73 *  Washington: 
National  Marine  Fisheries  Service,  July  1974* 

Knudsen,  Olav.  The  Politics  of  International  Shipping. 
London:  Lexington  Books,  1 973 * 

Lane-Poole,  Stanley.  The  Story  of  the  Barbary  Corsairs.  New 
York:  G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons,  1890. 

Langdon,  F.  C.  Japan's  Foreign  Policy.  Vancouver:  University 
of  British  Columbia  Press,  1 973 - 

Lewis,  Michael.  The  History  of  the  British  Navy.  London: 
George  Allen  and  Unwin,  1 959 • 

Littauer,  Raphael  and  Uphoff,  Norman  (eds.).  The  Air  War  in 
Vietnam.  Boston:  Beacon  Press,  1972. 

Low,  Patrick  and  Yeung  Yue-man.  The  Proposed  Kra  Canal:   A 

Critical  Evaluation  and  its  Impact  on  Singapore.  Singa- 
pore:  Institute  of  Southeast  Asian  Studies,  February  1973* 

Luttwak,  Edward.  The  Political  Uses  of  Sea  Power.  Baltimore: 
Johns  Hopkins  Press,  1974* 

Maclntyre,  Donald  and  Bathe,  Basil  W.  Man- of -War.  New  York: 
McGraw-Hill,  1969. 


386 


Mahan,  Alfred  T.  The  Influence  of  Seapower  Upon  History  1660- 
1785»  Boston:  Little,  Brown  and  Company,  1941 • 

.  The  Problem  of  Asia*  London:  Kennikat  Press, 


1970. 

Marder,  Arthur  J.  The  Anatomy  of  British  Seapower.  New  York: 
A.  A.  Knopf,  1940. 

Martin,  Laurence  W.  Arms  and  Strategy.  New  York:  David  McKay 
Company,  Inc.,  1 973 • 

The  Sea  in  Modern  Strategy.  New  York:  Praeger, 


1967. 

Mero,  John  L.  The  Mineral  Resources  of  the  Sea.  New  York: 
Elsevier  Publishing,  1 965 • 

Miller,  Harry.  Pirates  of  the  Far  East.  London:  Robert  Hall 
and  Co.,  1970. 

Morley,  James  William  (ed.).  Forecast  For  Japan:  Security  in 
the  Seventies.  Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press, 
1972. 

Mostert,  Noe*l.  Suoership .  New  York:  Alfred  A.  Knopf,  1974- 

Nakane,  Chie.  Japanese  Society.  Berkeley:  University  of 
California  Press,  1972. 

Osgood,  Robert  E.  The  Weary  and  the  Wary.  Baltimore:  The  Johns 
Hopkins  University  Press,  1972. 

Park,  Choon-Ho.  Fisheries  Issues  in  Jbhe  Yellow  Sea  and  _the  East 
China  Sea.  Kingston:  Law  of  the  Sea  Institute,  University 
of  Rhode  Island,  1973. 

Parry,  J.  H.  The  Spanish  Seaborne  Empire .  Middlesex:  Pelican 
Books,  1973. 

Polmar,  Norman.  Aircraft  Carriers.  New  York:  Doubleday,  19°9« 

Pope,  Dudley.  The  Battle  of  the  River  Plate.  London:  William 
Kimber,  1 956. 

Rodgers,  William  L.  Naval  Warfare  Under  Oars.  Annapolis: 
United  States  Naval  Institute,  1 939- 

Roskill,  S.  W.  The  Strategy  of  Seapower.  London:   Collins, 
1962. 


387 


Shipping  and  Trade  News  (T3kyo) .  25th  Anniversary  Supplement. 
Tokyo:  Tokyo  News  Service,  Ltd.,  October  25,  1974* 

Sokol,  Anthony  E.  Seapower  in  the  Nuclear  Age.  Washington: 
Public  Affairs  Press,  1961. 

Southworth,  John  Van  Duyn.  The  Ancient  Fleets.  New  York: 
Twayne  Publishers,  1968. 

Swartztrauber,  S.  A.  The  Three  Mile  Limit  of  the  Territorial 
Sea.  Annapolis:  United  States  Naval  Institute,  1972. 

Tarling,  Nicholas.  Piracy  and  Politics  in  the  Malay  World. 
Singapore:  D.  Moore,  1973* 

Tsipis,  Kosta;  Cahn,  Anne  H.;  and  Peld,  Bernard  T.  (eds.).  The 
Future  of  the  Sea-Based  Deterrent.  Cambridge:  The  MIT 
Press,  1973. 

U.S.  Naval  Institute.  To  Use  the  Sea.  Annapolis:  U.  S.  Naval 
Institute,  1974*  " 

United  States  Strategic  Bombing  Survey.  The  Effects  of  Strategic 
Bombing  on  Japan's  War  Economy.  USSBS,  Volume  53» 
Washington:  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1 947 • 

Ward,  W.  E.  F.  The  Royal  Navy  and  the  Slavers.  London:  George 
Allen  and  Unwin,  1969* 

Weinstein,  Martin  E.  Japan's  Postwar  Defense  Policy  1947-1968. 
New  York:  Columbia  University  Press,  1971* 

Wiener,  Friedrich.  Moderne  Seemacht  ("Modern  Seapower"). 
Munich:  J.  F.  Lehmanns  Verlag,  1972. 

Willoughby,  Malcolm  F.  Rum  War  at  Sea.  Washington:  U.S. 
Government  Printing  Office,  19^4* 


Articles 


"Annual  Drilling  and  Production  Report."  Offshore,  June  20,  1974' 

Asahi  Evening  News.  "Food  and  People."  Asahi  Evening  News 
Series,  July  7,  1973  "to  August  21,  1973  (30  parts). 

Athay,  Robert  E.  "The  Sea  and  Soviet  Domestic  Transportation." 
U.S.  Naval  Institute  Proceedings,  XCVIII  (May  1972),  158- 
177.  " 


389 


Cagle,  Malcolm  W.  "Task  Force  77  in  Action  Off  Vietnam."  U.S. 
Naval  Institute  Proceedings,  XCVIII  (May  1972),  66-109. 

Cohen,  Paul.  "The  Erosion  of  Surface  Naval  Power."  Foreign 
Affairs.  XLIX  (January  1971),  330-341. 

Cortada,  James  W.  "Ships,  Diplomacy  and  the  Spanish  Civil  War: 
Nyon  Conference,  September  1937."  II  Politico,  XXXVII 
(December  1972),  673-689. 

Craven,  John  P.  "Indus try /Government  Relations  in  Offshore 

Resource  Development."  Paper  presented  at  the  Fifth  Annual 
Offshore  Technology  Conference,  Houston,  April  29-May  3, 
1973,  Pt.  II,  pp.  947-49. 

DSba  Hajime.  "The  Japan  Sea."  American  Embassy,  Tokyo.  Summary 
of  Selected  Japanese  Magazines,  date  unknown.  Translation 

from  Chuo  Koron,  April  1968. 

Emery,  S.  W.  "The  United  States  Effective  Control  Fleet." 

U.S.  Naval  Institute  Proceedings,  XCVI  (May  1970),  158-177- 

English,  Richard  D.  and  Bolef,  Dan  I.   "Defense  Against  Bomber 

Attack."  Scientific  American,  LCXXIX  (August  1973),  11-19- 

Erell,  Shlomo.  "Israeli  Saar  FPBs  Pass  Combat  Test  in  Yom 
Kippur  War."  U.S.  Naval  Institute  Proceeding,  c 
(September  1974),  115-118. 

Eto  Shinkichi  and  Miyoshi  Osamu.  "What  is  the  Axis  of  Japanese 

Diplomacy?"    American  Embassy,  TDkyS,  Summary  of  Selected 
Japanese  Magazines,  April  1974-  Translation  from  Keizai 
Orai,  December  1973- 

Fraser,  Angus  M.   "Some  Thoughts  on  the  Resurgence  of  Militarism 
in  Japan."  Pacific  Community  (April  1973),  437-451- 

Frye,  Richard.  "The  Economics  of  Unconventional  Energy  Resources." 
Marine  Technology  Society  10th  Annual  Conference 
Proceedings,  September  22-25,  1974,  PP-  455-4&4- 

Greenwood,  Ted.   "Reconnaissance  and  Arms  Control."  Scientific 
American,  228  (February  1973),  14-25. 

Hart,  B.  H.  Liddell.   "The  Objective  in  War."  A  lecture  delivered 
at  the  U.S.  Naval  War  College,  September  24,  1952. 
Reprinted  in  T_o  Use  the  Sea.  Annapolis:  Naval  Institute 
Press,  1973,  PP-  3-9. 


589 


Cagle,  Malcolm  W.  "Task  Force  77  in  Action  Off  Vietnam."  U.S. 
Naval  Institute  Proceedings,  XCVIII  (May  1972),  66-109. 

Cohen,  Paul.  "The  Erosion  of  Surface  Naval  Power."  Foreign. 
Affairs,  XLIX  (January  1971),  330-341. 

Cortada,  James  W.  "Ships,  Diplomacy  and  the  Spanish  Civil  War: 
Nyon  Conference,  September  1937."  II  Politico,  XXXVII 
(December  1972),  673-689. 

Craven,  John  P.  "Indus try /Government  Relations  in  Offshore 

Resource  Development."  Paper  presented  at  the  Fifth  Annual 
Offshore  Technology  Conference,  Houston,  April  29-May  3, 
1973,  Pt.  II,  pp.  947-49. 

D5ba  Hajime.  "The  Japan  Sea."  American  Embassy,  Tokyo.  Summary 
of  Selected  Japanese  Magazines,  date  unknown.  Translation 
from  Chuo  Koron,  April  1968. 

Emery,  S.  W.  "The  United  States  Effective  Control  Fleet." 

U.S.  Naval  Institute  Proceedings,  XCVI  (May  1970),  1 58-177. 

English,  Richard  D.  and  Bolef,  Dan  I.   "Defense  Against  Bomber 

Attack."  Scientific  American,  LCXXIX  (August  1973),  11-19. 

Ere 11,  Shlomo.  "Israeli  Saar  FPBs  Pass  Combat  Test  in  Yom 
Kippur  War."  U.S.  Naval  Institute  Proceedings,  C 
(September  1974),  115-118. 

Eto  Shinkichi  and  Miyoshi  Osamu.  "What  is  the  Axis  of  Japanese 

Diplomacy?"    American  Embassy,  TokyS,  Summary  of  Selected 
Japanese  Magazines,  April  1974*  Translation  from  Keizai 
Orai,  December  1973* 

Fraser,  Angus  M.  "Some  Thoughts  on  the  Resurgence  of  Militarism 
in  Japan."  Pacific  Community  (April  1973),  437-451. 

Frye,  Richard.  "The  Economics  of  Unconventional  Energy  Resources." 
Marine  Technology  Society  10th  Annual  Conference 
Proceedings,  September  22-25,  1974,  pp.  455-464* 

Greenwood,  Ted.  "Reconnaissance  and  Arms  Control."  Scientific 
American,  228  (February  1973),  14-25- 

Hart,  B.  H.  Liddell.  "The  Objective  in  War."  A  lecture  delivered 
at  the  U.S.  Naval  War  College,  September  24,  1952. 
Reprinted  in  To  Use  the  Sea.  Annapolis:   Naval  Institute 
Press,  1973,  PP.  3-9. 


390 


Hauser,  Hubert  K.  J.   "Desalinization:  The  Sea  as  a  Source  of 
Fresh  Water."  Underwater  Journal*  February  1973,  9— 1 7 • 

Hayes,  John  D.  "The  Sea  1967-72."  U.S.  Naval  Institute  Pro- 
ceedings, XCIX  (May  1973),  299-J10. 

Herrington,  W.  C.  "Operation  of  the  Japanese  Fishery  Management 
System"  in  Tussing,  A.  R. ,  Morehouse,  T.  A.  and  Babb, 
J.  D.  Jr.  (eds.),  Alaska  Fisheries  Policy.  University  of 
Alaska,  1970. 

Hill,  J.  R.  "Maritime  Forces  in  Confrontation."  Brassey ' s 
Annual  1971.  New  York:  MacMillan,  1971,  pp.  13-36. 

.  "The  Role  of  Navies."  Brassey' s  Annual  1970. 


London:  William  Clowes  and  Sons,  Ltd.,  1970. 

Hosoya  Chihiro.  "How  to  Conduct  Diplomacy  Toward  Three  Poles." 
American  Embassy,  Tokyo,  Summary  of  Selected  Japanese 
Magazines,  June  1973,  1-28.  Translation  from  ChUo  Koron, 
June  1973. 

Huntington,  Samuel  P.   "After  Containment:  The  Function  of  the 
Military  Establishment."  The  Annals,  Vol.  406  (March 
1973),  1-16. 

I to  Yasuto.  "Effects  of  Soviet  Ocean  Strategy  on  Our  Country* s 
Defense."  Cited  in  American  Embassy,  Tokyo,  Daily  Simmary 
of  the  Japanese  Press,  August  15,  1973,  PP«  11-14* 
Translation  from  Mainichi,  August  10,  1973* 

"Jieitai  no  Sobi  to  Boei  Sangyo  no  Jittai"  ("Actual  Condition  of 
Self-Defense  Force  Equipment  and  Defense  Production"). 
Ninon  no  Boei  ( Defense  of  Japan) .  Tokyo:  Sangyo  Seisaku 
Kenkyukai ,  September  15,  1974,  PP»  S5~93. 

Joseph,  James  and  Klav/e,  V/itoId  L.  "The  Living  Pelagic  Resources 
of  the  Americas."  Ocean  Development  and  International  Law, 
II  (Spring  1974),  37-64.  " 

Kaihara  Osamu.  "Study  on  Realistic  National  Defense."  Mainichi 
Daily  News,  January  50  to  February  5,  1973* 

Kasputys,  Joseph.  "The  Evolving  Role  of  the  Merchant  Marine  as 
a  Determinant  of  Seapower."  Third  International  Seapqwcr 
Symposium.  Newport:  U.S.  Naval  War  College,  1973* 

Kaul,  Ravi.  "The  Indo-Pakistani  War  and  the  Changing  Balance  of 
Power  in  the  Indian  Ocean."  U.S.  Naval  Institute  Pro- 
ceedings. XCIX  (May  1973),  172-195. 


391 


Keene,  Donald.   "The  Short,  Happy  Life  of  Japan  as  a  Superpower." 
New  York  Times  Magazine.  March  5,  1974,  p.  19. 

Kitaniura  Kenichi.  "Kokubo  Kaigi  Muyoron"  ("Comment  on  the 

Ineffectiveness  of  the  National  Defense  Council").  Parts 
I  and  II.  Gun.ji  Kenkyu,  #5  and  6,  1 974» 

Kotani  Hidejiro.  "Squarely  Look  at  the  Basis  of  National 

Defense."  .American  Embassy,  Tokyo,  Summary  of  Selected 
Japanese  Magazines,  May  1972.  Translation  from  Jiyu, 
April  1972. 

Krutein,  Manfred  G.  "Ocean  Mining."  U.S.  Naval  Institute  Pro- 
ceedings, XCV  (May  1969),  135-140. 

Kusayanagi  Daizo.  "A  Kingdom  of  Bureaucrats:  The  Finance 

Ministry."  American  Embassy,  Tokyo,  Summaries  of  Selected 
Japanese  Magazines,  July  1974,  PP»  6-20.  Translation  from 
Bungei  Shuntji,  July  1974* 

Lelyveld,  John.  "The  United  States  and  South  Asia."  New  York 
Times.  June  24-26,  1974. 

Littman,  Bruce.  "How  the  'Shikumisen'  Deal  Works."  Seatrade. 
December  1973,  pp.  1 37-1 38. 

Long,  Jay  H.   "The  Paracels  Incident:  Implications  for  Chinese 
Policy."  Asian  Affairs,  4  (March/April  1974),  229-239. 

Low,  Patrick.  "New  Dimension  to  the  Oil  Crisis."  Petroleum 
News  Southeast  Asia.   February  1974,  PP»  19+* 

Luard,  Evan.   "V,rho  Gets  What  on  the  Seabed."  Foreign  Policy,  9 
(Winter  1972-73),  132-147. 

Matsueda  Tsukasa  and  Moore,  George.  "Japan's  Shifting  Attitudes 
Towards  the  Military:  Mitsuya  Kenkyu  and  the  Self-Defense 
Forces."  Asian  Survey,  VIII  (September  1965),  61 4-625. 

McAleer,  John.  "Multi-Use  Potential  of  Offshore  Facilities, 

Artificial  Islands  and  Platforms  in  Bays  and  Estuaries." 
Marine  Technology  Society  10th  Annual  Conference  Preceed- 
ings,  September  23-25,  1974,  pp.  697-71 4. 

MccGwire,  Michael.  "The  Submarine  Threat  to  Western  Shipping."  In 
Moulton,  J.  L.,  British  Maritime  Strategy  in  the  Seventies. 
London:   Royal  United  Services  Institute,  1969* 


392 


McWethy,  Patricia  J.  "Process  for  Determining  the  Federal  Role 
in  Stimulating  Development  of  Ocean  Energy  Technologies." 
Marine  Technology  Society  10th  Annual  Conference 
Proceedings,  September  23-25,  1974,  pp.  465-48I . 

"The  Militarization  of  the  Deep  Ocean."  SIPRI  Yearbook  1969-70. 
Stockholm:  Stockholm  International  Peace  Research 
Institute,  1970,  92-1 53. 

Miller,  George  H.  "Necessary  for  the  National  Defense." 
Shipmate  (May  1974). 

Miwa  Kimitada.  "Sino-U.S. -Japan  Relations  Will  Cause  Illusion." 
American  Embassy,  Tokyo,  Summary  of  Selected  Japanese 
Magazines,  September  1 973 •  Translation  from  Jiyu,  August 
1973. 

Miyoshi  Shuichi.  "Japan's  Resource  Policy  at  a  Turning  Point." 
Japan  Quarterly,  XVIII  ( July-September  1971),  281-287. 

Mulquin,  J.  J.   "ARAPAQO — Emergency  Helo  Cover  for  Merchantmen." 
U.S.  Naval  Institute  Proceedings,  XCIX  (November  1973) t 
113-117. 

.  "The  ARAPAHO  System  and  Its  Implications  for 

Future  Ship-Aviation  Concept  Development."  Naval  Engineers 
Journal,  LXXXV  (October  1973),  25-34. 

Nagasu  Kazuji.  "The  Super-Illusions  of  an  Economic  Superpower." 
Japan  Interpreter,  IX  (Summer- Autumn  1974),  149-1 64. 

Namiki  Nobuyoshi.  "Japanese  Industry's  Competitive  Power 
Examined."  Economist  (Tokyo),  July  2,  1974* 

"The  National  Territory."  New  Philippines  (Manila),  February 
1974. 

Nihon  Keizai  Shimbun.  "Defense  Industry  in  Japan."  Japan 

Economic  Journal  International  Weekly,  July  4-December  19, 
1972  (25  parts).  " 

Niu  Sien-chong.  "The  Resurgence  of  Japanese  Sea  Power."  NATO's 
Fifteen  Nations,  October-November  1971,  pp.  71-78. 

O'Connell,  D.  P.   "Can  the  Navy  Plan  for  Peace?"  New  Scientist 
(U.K.),  October  25,  1973,  p.  257. 

.   "International  Law  and  Contemporary  Naval 

Operations."  British  Yearbook  of  International  Law  1970. 
London:   Oxford  University  Press,  1971,  19-8?' 


393 


Ohmura  Tamotsu.  "The  Status  of  Marine  Development  in  Japan." 
Marine  Technology  Society  Journal,  VIII  (January  1 97 4 ) > 
29-33- 

Okita  Saburo.   "Natural  Resource  Dependency  and  Japan's  Foreign 
Policy."  Foreign  Affairs,  LII  (July  1974),  714-724- 

Okumiya  Masatake.   "Proposal  for  a  Weil-Balanced  National 

Security."  In  American  Embassy,  TCkyS,  Summary  of  Selected 
Japanese  Magazines,  June  1974*  Translation  from  Shin  Boei 
Ronshu,  March  1974. 

Osgood,  Robert  E.  "U.S.  Security  Interests  in  Ocean  Law."  Ocean 
Development  and  International  Law,  II  (Spring  1 974) »  1-36. 

Pardo,  Arvid.  "Who  Will  Control  the  Seabed?"  Foreign  Affairs, 
XLVII  (October  1968),  1 23-1 37 . 

Park  Choon-Ho.  "Oil  Under  Troubled  Waters:  The  Northeast  Asia 
Seabed  Controversy."  Harvard  International  Law  Journal, 
XIV  (Spring  1973),  212-260. 

Pella,  Vespasien.  "la  Repression  de  la  Piraterie."  Recueil  des 
Cours,  XV  (1926-V). 

Ponte, Lowell.  "Nippon  Goes  Nuclear."  The  Progressive,  September 
1973,  PP.  32-34. 

Reitzer,  William.  "Mahan  on  the  Use  of  the  Sea."  Naval  War 
College  Review,  XXV  (May-June  1973),  73-82. 

Research  Institute  for  Ocean  Economics  (T3kyo) .  "Waga  Kuni 

Kaiyo  Sangyo  no  Gonen'I  ("Five  Years  of  Our  Country's  Ocean 
Industry") .   Issue  title  for  Kaiyo  Sangyo  Keiikyu  Shiryo 
(Ocean  Industry  Research  Materials ) ,   V  (Spring  1974J • 

Roesnadi,  0.  Sutomo.   "ASEAN  and  the  Great  Powers."  The  Indo- 
nesian Quarterly,  I  (July  1973),  15-25. 

Salmon,  Jack  D.  "Japan  as  a  Great  Power:  The  Military  Context 
and  Policy  Options."  Japan  Interpreter,  VII  (1 972) , 
396- 408. 

Sansone,  Wallace  T.  "Domestic  Shipping  and  American  Maritime 

Policy."  U.S.  Naval  Institute  Proceedings,  C  (May  1974), 
162-177. 

Saunders,  George  D.  "Land  Bridge  Comes  of  Age."  U.S.  Naval 
Institute  Proceedings,  XCIX  (December  1973)  ,~38-43. 


394 


Schratz,  Paul.  "The  Nuclear  Carrier  and  Modern  War."  U.S.  Naval 
Institute  Proceedings,  XCVIII  (August  1972),  18-25. 

Scrivener,  Desmond.  "Escort  Ships — An  Alternative  Solution?" 
International  Defense  Review,  #4/l973>  460-463. 

"Weapons  for  the  General  Purpose  Escort."  Inter- 


national Defense  Review,  #3/1973,  331-336. 

Sekino  Hideo.  "Japan  and  Her  Maritime  Defense."  U.S.  Naval 
Institute  Proceedings,  XCVII  (May  1971),  98-121.  " 

Seno  Sadao.  "A  Chess  Game  with  No  Checkmate:  Admiral  Inoue  and 
the  Pacific  War."  Naval  War  College  Review,  XXVI  (January- 
February  1974),  26-39. 

"Shinkaitei  Kobutsu  Shigen  Kaihatsu  Kyokai  ga  Hassoku"  ("Deep 
Seabed  Mineral  Resources  Association  is  Started"). 
INS PACE,  August  1974,  pp.  2-6. 

Shinohara  Hiroshi.  "U.S. -China  Rapprochement  and  Defense  of 
Japan."   American  Embassy,  Tokyo,  Summary  of  Selected 
Japanese  Magazines,  May  1972.  Translation  from  Chuo  Koron, 
October  1971. 

Shiratori  Rei.  "U.S. -Japan  Relations  Headed  Toward  Dangerous  and 
Unstable  Period."  American  Embassy,  Tokyo,  Summary  of 
Selected  Japanese  Magazines,  June  1974*  Translation  from 
Economist,  June  4>  1974* 

Shore,  J.  C.  and  Reeds,  C.  B.  "Subsea  Oil  and  Completion." 
Marine  Technology  Society  10th  Annual  Conference 
Proceedings,  September  23-25,  1974,  pp.  547-555. 

Simcock,  B.  L.  "Environmental  Pollution  and  the  Citizen's  Move- 
ments." Area  Development  in  Japan,  5»  Tokyo,  1972. 

Soesastro,  M.  Hadi.  "Japan  and  Southeast  Asia:  A  Regional  or 

Global  Question?"  The  Indonesian  Quarterly,  I  (July  1973) > 
pp.  26-35- 

Stockwin,  J.  A.  A.   "Continuity  and  Change  in  Japanese  Foreign 
Policy."  Pacific  Affairs,  XLVI  (Spring  1973),  77-93* 

Suenaga  Y.  "Japan  Wants  a  Voice  in  Pacific  Naval  Balance." 
Part  8  of  a  Series  on  U.S. -Japan  Relations  in  Yomiuri 
(English  Edition),  January  31 ,  1972. 

Surrey,  John.  "Japan's  Uncertain  Energy  Prospects:  The  Problem 
of  Import  Dependence."  Energy  Policy,  II  (September  1 974) • 
204-230. 


395 


Takane  Masaaki.  "Historical  Structure  of  Japanese  Bureaucracy — 
Bureaucracy  and  Modernization  in  Japan."  American  Embassy, 
Tokyo,  Summaries  of  Selected  Japanese  Magazines,  October 
1 974«  Translation  from  Chu5  Koron,  September  1974* 

Thompson,  Robert  P.  "Establishing  Global  Traffic  Flows." 
Journal  of  Navigation,  XXV  (October  1972),  483-495* 

Tsukudo  Tatsuo,  Vice  Admiral,  JMSDF  (Ret.).  "Defense  of  Terri- 
tory." Translation  in  Articles  from  Staff  College  Review 
1971-1972.  Tokyo:  Maritime  Self-Defense  Force  Staff 
College,  undated,  pp.  51-54* 

.  "Ninon  no  Kokubo  nd  Okeru  Shokei  Keikantei  no  Igi" 


("Role  of  Light  Naval  Craft  in  Defending  Japan").  Sekai 
no  Kansen,  208  (December  1974),  86-89. 

"Sea  Power  and  Our  Defense  in  the  New  Era." 


Translation  in  Articles  from  Staff  College  Review  1971-1972, 
Tokyo:  Maritime  Self-Defense  Force  Staff  College,  undated, 
PP.  65-71. 

Uchida  Kazutomi.  "Japan's  National  Defense  and  the  Role  of  the 
Maritime  Self-Defense  Force."  Pacific  Community  (October 
1974),  PP.  38-54. 

"The  Rearmament  of  the  Japanese  Maritime  Forces." 


Naval  War  College  Review,  XXYl  (November-December  1973) » 
41-48. 

"Verification  Using  Reconnaissance  Satellites."  SIPRI  Yearbook 
1973«  Stockholm:  Stockholm  International  Peace  Research 
Institute,  1973,  pp.  60-101. 

Wakaizumi  Kei.  "Japan's  Dilemma:  To  Act  or  Not  to  Act." 
Foreign  Policy,  16  (Fall  1974),  30-47. 

"War  Logistics  and  the  Freight  Container."  Jane ' s  Freight 

Containers  1973~74»  London:  Sampson  Low,  Mars ton,  1 973 - 

Wechsler,  L.;  Brown,  C.  E.;  and  Sundaram,  T.  R.  "Engineering 

Analysis  of  Systems  for  Extracting  Useful  Energy  from  the 
Sea."  Marine  Technology  Society,  10th  Annual  Conference 
Proceedings.  September  23-25,  1974,  pp.  483-499. 

Weinstein,  Martin  E.  "The  Strategic  Balance  in  East  Asia," 
Current  Hist pit,  LXV  (November  1973),  193+. 


396 


Wells,  Linton  II.  "Japan  and  the  United  Nations  Conference  on 
the  Law  of  the  Sea."  Ocean  Development  and  International 
Law,  II  (Spring  1974),  65-91- 

Wenk,  Edward,  Jr.  "The  Physical  Resources  of  the  Oceans." 
Scientific  American  (September  1969),  PP«  82-91. 

White,  R.  M.   "Our  Changing  Ocean  Priorities."  Marine  Technology 
Society  Journal,  VI  (September-October  1972),  3_5» 

Wilson,  Desmond  P.   "Evolution  of  the  Attack  Carrier:  A  Case 

Study  in  Technology  and  Strategy."  U.S.  Congress,  Senate 
and  House  Armed  Services  Committees,  CVAN-70  Aircraft 
Carrier.  91st  Cong.,  2nd  Sess.,  1970. 

Wohlstetter,  Albert.  "Japan's  Security:   Balancing  after  the 
Shocks."  Foreign  Policy,  9  (Winter  1972-73),  171-190. 

Yasuda  M.  [pseudonym].   "No  Drastic  About-Face  in  Security 
Policy."  Yomiuri  (English  Edition),  January  6,  1 971 . 

Young,  Elizabeth.  "Arms  Control  and  Disarmament  in  the  Ocean." 
In  Borgese,  Elizabeth  Mann  (ed.),  Pacem  in  I/laribus . 
New  York:  Dodd,  Mead  &  Co.,  1972),  266-284. 


Periodicals 


Those  magazines  consulted  on  a  regular  basis  included: 

Asian  Survey 

Aviation  Week  and  Space  Technology 

Foreign  Affairs 

Foreign  Policy 

International  Defense  Review 

Japan  Interpreter 

Japan  Quarterly 

Marine  Technology  Society  Journal 

N aval  Engineers  Journal 

Naval  War  College  Review 

Offshore 

Pacific  Affairs 

Pacific  Community 

Petroleum  News  Southeast  Asia 

Sea  Power 

Sea  Technology;  (formerly  Undersea  Technology) 

Sekai  no  Kansen  (Ships  of  the  World) 

U.S.  Naval  Institute  Proceedings 

Zosen 


397 


Newspapers 


The  most  frequently  read  newspapers  were: 

Asahi  Evening  News 

Japan  Times 

Mainichi  Daily  News 

The  New  York  Times 

Nihon  Keizai  Shimbun  International  Weekly 

Stars  and  Stripes  (Pacific) 

The  Washington  Post 

Yomiuri  (English) 


Japanese  newspapers  and  magazines  mostly  were  reviewed 
through  the  publications  of  the  Translation  Section  of  the 
American  Embassy,  Tokyo,  and  Hiss  Nakai  Yoko. 


VITA 


Linton  Wells  II  was  born  in  Luanda,  Angola,  Portuguese  West 
Africa,  on  April  7>  1946.  After  attending  school  in  New  York, 
Connecticut  and  Florida  he  was  graduated  from  the  Browning  School 
in  New  York  City  in  1963. 

In  1967  he  received  a  Bachelor  of  Science  degree  from  the 
U.S.  Naval  Academy  with  majors  in  Physics  and  Oceanography.  He 
was  elected  to  Sigma  Pi  Sigma  and  received  the  Captain  Charles 
N.  G.  Hendrix  award  for  oceanography. 

After  two  years  as  weapons/ supply  officer  on  a  Pacific 
Fleet  patrol  gunboat,  Lieutenant  Wells  served  as  navigator  of 
the  guided  missile  frigate  U.S.S.  Josephus  Daniels  (DLG-27)  in 
the  Caribbean  and  Gulf  of  Tonkin. 

Since  January  1971?  he  has  done  graduate  work  at  The  Johns 
Hopkins  University  and  completed  the  requirements  for  an  M.S.E. 
degree  in  Mathematical  Sciences  in  1975*  He  is  a  member  of  Tan 
Beta  Pi. 


<*L  HVWO  < 


2  U  0  U  o 


Thesis 

133528 

W4427 

Wells 

The   sea 

and   Japan's 

strategic 
1975-1985 

i  nterests , 

->n  MAY7  5 

9i  HYHO1 

DISPLAY 
2U008 

Thesis  1  L  9528 

W4427         Wells 

The   sea  and   Japan's 

strategic   interests, 

1975-1985. 


thesW4427 

The  sea  and  Japans  strateg 


ic  interests, 


3  2768  001  95232  8 

DUDLEY  KNOX  LIBRARY